September 2002 Newsletter

SOME THOUGHTS ON SPECIAL PROVIDENCE

by James Fetzer, SUNY Maritime College

There is a good deal to admire in Walter Russell Mead's new treatment of the history of American foreign policy entitled Special Providence. Mead provides a provocative analytical alternative to the tired realism versus idealism dichotomy that has often been employed to explain U.S. foreign policy. He also makes it clear that isolationism is a largely sterile concept in terms of understanding the American response to international affairs. The book provides the useful reminder that globalization is not just a post-world war development. Mead impressively demonstrates that the relationship of the United States to the international economy has been important to the U.S. for over two centuries.

The core of Mead's analysis is his contention that over the course of American history the interaction of four schools of thought has been responsible for a large successful foreign policy. Each of the schools features a distinctive set of ideas and values which dictates how the United States should behave in international affairs. The content of policy, Mead contends, is a function of the waxing and waning of influence excercised by each school as well as by the abiility or inability of each school to find common cause with the others. The four schools are labeled Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, Jeffersonian, and Jacksonian.

The Hamiltonian way is described as emphasizing the U.S. "need to be integrated into the global economy on favorable terms." This need produced a Hamiltonian emphasis on freedom of the seas, maintaining an open door for trade and investment, and, in the nineteenth century, forging amicable relations with Britain and its empire. A protectionist tariff policy was also embraced until World War II. Hamiltonians, Mead asserts, also promoted a strong national government that would provide sufficient military power and exercise regulatory power, particularly in the area of finance. The Hamiltonian way has not sought to advance transcendent values and achieve, thereby, the moral reform of a quarrelsome and greedy world. The Hamiltonian school, instead, has pursued the economic and strategic interest of the U.S. with great vigor.

Mead's depiction of the Hamiltonian school needs to be strengthened by more emphasis on the tensions and contradictions present within the Hamiltonian point of view. For example, Mead fails to stress that, in the early history of the country, pursuing freedom of the seas and amicable relations with Great Britain were not compatible goals. In the context of European wars, from 1793 to 1812, the United States sought to implement its broad view of neutral rights on the high seas. This effort ran head long into Britain's effort to use its naval power to restrict neutrals' contact with Britain's enemies. The collision of these two endeavors created major problems in Anglo-American relations. Advancing America's freedom on the seas while achieving friendly relations with Great Britain was a difficult, if not impossible, task. Hamilton recognized this and knew that, at times, a choice had to be made between these competing goals. In the Jay Treaty, he opted for better relations with Britain at the cost of backing down on freedom of the seas. The Hamiltonian school often confronted this type of choice. Mead's treatment of this school would be enriched by more emphasis on these types of dilemmas.

Mead's analysis of the Hamiltonian perspective also contains some curious contentions and bothersome omissions. Mead contends that the period 1860-1929 was "the zenith of Hamiltonian power in the United States." He also contends that strong, centralized authority provided by central banks and regulatory power exercised by a powerful national government were developments embraced by Hamiltonians. For a good deal of the period 1860-1929, the United States did not have anything resembling a central bank and "laissez-faire" reigned supreme in relation to the regulatory power of government. How, then, can this period be "the zenith of Hamiltonian power in the United States?" Mead also depicts Hamiltonians as advocates of protective tariffs until around World War 11. During or after World War 11, it is not entirely clear, the Hamiltonians converted to free trade and the abolition of protectionism. By the 1990s, Mead argues, the Hamiltonians were in the vanguard of those advocating a world without trade restrictions. How this important conversion came to pass is never really explained. It should be.

Mead's analysis of the Wilsonian point of view stresses the school's emphasis on the advancement of the principles of democratic government and the protection of human rights. While advancing these principles, Wilsonians insist "that the United States has the right and the duty to change the rest of the world's behavior, and that the United States can and should concern itself not only with way other countries conduct their international affairs, but with their domestic policies as well." Mead traces this Wilsonian urge to the American missionary movement of the nineteenth century. The missionary impulse sought to go forth in the world and make it a better place. Wilsonians, in government carried on this work in foreign policy.

Mead astutely stresses the point that Wilsonian projects represent more than the work of dreamy-eyed and impractical idealists. Wilsonian endeavors have a practical side. Advancing American principles, in effect, pays handsome dividends. Simply put, if people around the world embrace American values, then the United States will be able to advance its foreign policy goals in a congenial environment.

Unfortunately, Mead fails to emphasize sufficiently how this practical side of Wilsonianism has meshed nicely with the Hamiltonian perspective. He does note that there are complementary points between the schools.(See pp. 167-168.) Mead stresses, however, the points of antagonism between the two perspectives. He argues, for example, that the foreign policy debates of the 1990s were basically a struggle between the Hamiltonian and Wilsonian points of view. This emphasis on antagonism neglects very important instances of the two schools working together effectively. For example, the United States rationale for cold war policies was often an effective amalgam of Hamiltonian and Wilsonian considerations. Also, more than antagonism between the two schools exists in the contemporary world. The achievement of Wilsonian ends, such as democratic government that promotes the rule of law can provide the software in societies that is essential to the creation of the kind of integrated global economy desired by the Hamiltonians.

Mead also cannot make up his mind where Wilsonians stand on the use of violence. On one hand, he cites the prevention of war as part of the "grand strategy" of the Wilsonian school. It is only in the 1990s in the Balkans, Mead contends, that Wilsonians have "discovered a hitherto unsuspected taste for blood." However, he also cites examples in the book of Wilsonians, tramping off to war or inviting the use of violence in international affairs. If Mead is unwilling to tell us which is the real Wilsonianism, then he needs to expend more ink in explaining the Wilsonian bifurcation regarding war.

Reservations aside, Mead has crafted a credible description of the Hamiltonian and Wilsonian schools of thought. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for his description of the Jacksonian tradition. This part of his analysis remains very much a work in progress.

Mead's depiction of a Jacksonian school begins by asking what accounts for the frequent use of heavy handed violence in American foreign policy. A Jacksonian tradition, he argues, armed with a virulent nationalism and an exaggerated sense of honor, has made a major contribution to this propensity for violence. This point of view, while slow to anger and slow to mobilize, is capable of ferocity once aroused. The Jacksonian way operates on instinct and emotion more often than intellect and reason. According to Mead, "those who like to cast American foreign policy as an unhealthy mix of ignorance, isolationism, and irresponsible trigger-happy cowboy diplomacy are often thinking of the Jacksonian tradition." Mead's analysis of the Jacksonian persuasion, despite his occasional protests to the contrary, is essentially a trip through the land of the Yahoos.

Mead's treatment of this school of thought suffers, first of all, from a lack of clarity. It is never very clear whether Jacksonianism is only a popular sentiment forced upon a reluctant foreign policy elite or is also a point of view warmly embraced by a foreign policy elite. Mead's failure to demonstrate the sustained presence of the Jacksonian perspective in the policy of any foreign policy leader contributes significantly to this lack of clarity.

Mead also posits the existence of a Jacksonian folk community from which the Jacksonian tradition has grown. Originating during the colonial era in the backcountry Scotch-Irish population, the Jacksonian folk community, Mead contends, has spread throughout the country. Mead's analysis here is superficial and in need of much greater explanation. He proceeds frequently to cite values that he deems Jacksonian values stemming from a Jacksonian folk community. It is something of a mystery why Mead thinks the reader should accept such alleged connections when it is often easy to assign the origin of the cited values to other, equally credible sources.

In assigning certain characteristics to the Jacksonian persuasion, Mead also undermines his own analysis. Mead cites concerns about reputation as an important issue to Jacksonians. Jacksonians give great weight to preserving American prestige in the world. It is surprising, to say the least, that this concern should be noted as a Jacksonian characteristic. (Mead does not emphasize it in connection with the other three schools.) It is difficult to think of an American foreign policy leader since 1945 who has not embraced considerations of prestige as a crucial foreign policy matter. Should we conclude, then, that all of these leaders were, in some significant way, Jacksonians? If so, I anxiously await the demonstration that people such as Henry Kissinger and McGeorge and William Bundy, all self-proclaimed defenders of American prestige, possessed major Jacksonian credentials. In addition, Mead contends that Jacksonian military doctrine asserts that the enemy's will is a legitimate target in war. Just about every belligerent in every twentieth century war has adopted this idea. How, then, can this position be cited as a distinguishing characteristic of a Jacksonian school of thought? Finally, Mead argues that Jacksonians "have always supported loose monetary policy." If he means by this the expansion of the money supply by such means as the issuance of bank notes, then Mead is clearly mistaken. Jackson, himself, disliked banks in general and found particularly repugnant their practice of issuing notes which, he felt, corrupted the money supply. Jackson and other Jacksonians like him personified the hard money position in the first half of the nineteenth century.

In contrast to his chapter on the Jacksonians, Mead's analysis of the Jeffersonian tradition is a major contribution. Jeffersonians, Mead argues, "have historically been skeptical about Hamiltonian and Wilsonian policies." Hamiltonians and Wilsonians, the Jeffersonian tradition holds, are inclined to involve the United States in dangerous adventures in behalf of questionable interests. These adventures often carry the unnecessary risk of war the cost of which jeopardizes liberty at home. Jeffersonians define American interest narrowly and cautiously. The Jeffersonian tradition has been the brake on American foreign policy.

Caution, Mead stresses, is the watchword of Jeffersonians, not noninvolvement. The Jeffersonian school accepts the notion that the United States must be an alert participant in international affairs. This tradition also eschews doctrinaire attachments which resist yielding to altered circumstances. For example, the Jeffersonian view was able to leave behind the intense suspicion of Great Britain, which characterized it before 1812, and to move, after 1820, to the support of accommodation with Britain which avoided war with that power and which, in fact, enlisted the British navy as America's Atlantic protector.

The central dilemma for the Jeffersonian school, Mead argues, has been separating healthy caution from irresponsible neglect. Healthy caution can avoid misguided adventures and dangerous situations. But ill-conceived caution can cause problems to fester to the point of disaster. Put another way, the Jeffersonian tradition might save us from future Vietnams. However, as Mead points out, Jeffersonians, in the 1930s, were slow to see Germany as a threat.

The beauty of Mead's treatment of the Jeffersonian school is that it allows us to throw the idea of American isolationism into the garbage can, a place it richly deserves. The Jeffersonian tradition, as Mead describes it, makes more sense of American policy and politics than does a supposed inclination to withdraw from foreign affairs. Mead has given us a framework of analysis that can yield riches far beyond those provided by the internationalist v. isolationism or idealist v. realist dichotomies. The Jeffersonian school as the monitor of the Hamiltonian and Wilsonian schools holds the promise of being a key way of understanding American foreign policy. If, in future editions, Mead manages to bring greater analytical clarity to the idea of a Jacksonian school, then we will really have something special.