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Contributors
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David L. Anderson is Professor of History at California State University, Monterey Bay, and Senior Lecturer of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. His most recent book is The Columbia History of the Vietnam War (2011). He is a past president of SHAFR.

M. Todd Bennett is Assistant Professor of History at East Carolina University. He is the author of One World, Big Screen: Hollywood, the Allies, and World War II (2012), and articles in the Journal of American History, Diplomatic History, and the International History Review. In addition, he edited three volumes of the Foreign Relations of the United States series and directed the Europe and Global Issues Division at the Office of the Historian at the U.S. Department of State. He is currently working on The Spirits of ’76, a history of America’s bicentennial commemoration in 1976.

Robert K. Brigham is the Shirley Ecker Boskey Professor of History and International Relations at Vassar College. He is the author or co-author of ten books, including most recently The United States and Iraq (2013). His current research project is a history of humanitarian intervention in the Clinton years.

W. Fitzhugh Brundage is the William B. Umstead Professor of History at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He has written on lynching, socialism, and historical memory in the American South, as well as African American popular culture. He is currently working on a history of torture in the United States.

Jessica M. Chapman is Assistant Professor of History at Williams College. She is the author of Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam (2013), and articles in the Journal of Vietnamese Studies and Diplomatic History. She received her doctorate from the University of California, Santa Barbara in 2006, and is currently working on a research project that explores the commodification of Kenyan runners in Europe, the United States, and the Middle East.

James Curran is Associate Professor of History and a research associate at the U.S. Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, where he teaches the history of American foreign relations. He is a former Fulbright scholar at Georgetown University and was the 2013 Keith Cameron Chair of Australian History at University College Dublin. He is finishing a history of the U.S.-Australian alliance during the presidencies of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, and journal articles on this subject are forthcoming in Diplomatic History and the Journal of Cold War Studies.

Ronald Frankum is Professor of History and chair of the Department of History at Millersville University of Pennsylvania. He has written several books on the Vietnam War, including Vietnam’s Year of the Rat: Elbridge Durbrow, Ngo Dinh Diem and the Turn in U.S. Relations, 1959-1961, which will be published in 2015.

James Goode is Professor of History at Grand Valley State University, where he teaches courses on the history of U.S. foreign relations and the history of the Middle East. He has authored several books and articles on U.S.-Iranian relations; the most recent concerns the Iranian intervention in Dhufar in the 1970s. He is currently completing a study of the Turkish arms embargo from 1974 to 1978.


Sheyda Jahanbani is Assistant Professor of History at the University of Kansas. She teaches a variety of graduate and undergraduate courses in the history of U.S. foreign relations and international history. Her book, The Poverty of the World: Rediscovering the Poor at Home and Abroad, 1935-1973, will be published by Oxford University Press in 2014.

Klaus Larres is the Richard M. Krasno Distinguished Professor in History and International Affairs at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The author and editor of thirteen books and numerous articles, book chapters, and commentaries, he is also a Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations of the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at the Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C.
Fredrik Logevall is John S. Knight Professor of International Studies at Cornell University, where he serves as vice provost for international affairs as well as director of the Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies. He is the author or editor of nine books, most recently Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam (2012), which won the 2013 Pulitzer Prize for History and the Society for American Historians’ Francis Parkman Prize, and was named a best book of the year by the Washington Post and the Christian Science Monitor. He is currently the president of SHAFR.

Matthew Masur is Associate Professor of History at St. Anselm’s College, where he teaches courses on American foreign relations, the Vietnam War, and Asian history. His research focuses on U.S.-South Vietnamese relations in the 1950s and 1960s. He recently co-edited (with John Day Tully and Brad Austin) Understanding and Teaching the Vietnam War (2013).

Eric J. Morgan is Assistant Professor in Democracy and Justice Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Green Bay. He has published articles on the United States and South Africa in Diplomatic History, Enterprise & Society: The International Journal of Business History, and Diplomacy & Statecraft, and is a contributor to the Dictionary of African Biography. He is currently working on two book projects: a study of transnational anti-apartheid activism in the United States and South Africa; and a volume on globalization and sub-Saharan Africa, co-authored with Andrew DeRoche.


Bevan Sewall is Lecturer in American History at the University of Nottingham in the United Kingdom, and an Associate Editor of the Journal of American Studies. He is presently finishing a book on U.S. policy toward Latin American in the long 1950s, and is in the early stages of a new project that is slated to be an intellectual biography of John Foster Dulles. In addition, he has published articles and essays in the English Historical Review, Diplomatic History, and Intelligence and National Security.


Kathryn C. Statler is Professor of History at the University of San Diego. She is the author of Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam (2007), and the co-editor, with Andrew L. Johns, of The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War (2006). Her current book project, Lafayette’s Ghost: A History of Franco-American Cooperation and Conflict, is a history of Franco-American cultural diplomacy from the American Revolution to the present. She is also a general editor of the University Press of Kentucky’s Studies in Conflict, Diplomacy, and Peace book series.

Shane Strate is Assistant Professor of History at Kent State University, where he teaches courses on Southeast Asia and India. He recently published an article investigating the origins of the Thai-Cambodian dispute over the Preah Vihear temple. His book, Lost Territory: Thailand’s History of National Humiliation, is forthcoming from the University of Hawaii Press.

Sarah J. Thelen is Assistant Lecturer in U.S. History at University College Cork, and also lectures at Trinity College Dublin. She is currently finishing a book manuscript on Nixon’s efforts to mobilize domestic support for the Vietnam War.


Salim Yaqub is Professor of History at the University of California, Santa Barbara, where he specializes in the history of U.S. foreign relations with a particular focus on U.S. involvement in the Middle East. He is also the director of UCSB’s Center for Cold War Studies and International History. His first book, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East (2004), was published by the University of North Carolina Press. He is currently writing a book on U.S.-Arab relations in the 1970s.
Presidental Message

Fredrik Logevall

I realized to my astonishment the other day that I have been a member of SHAFR for almost twenty-five years. A quarter century! It was late a fall day in 1989 when my first issue of Diplomatic History (then always with a white cover) arrived in my New Haven mailbox, early in my first year as a doctoral student. Ever since then, SHAFR has been the most important scholarly society to which I’ve belonged, and I have little doubt it will continue to be. Each year I look forward with great anticipation to the annual meeting, and I always feel a little jolt of excitement when a new issue of DH or Passport arrives in the mail. The organization constitutes an intellectual and social community that has been profoundly important to me in my academic career, a point brought home with special force whenever colleagues in certain other subfields point out to me—with no small amount of envy—that they have no equivalent of SHAFR. Can any of us who have even a few years in the organization imagine a world without it?

It is with immense gratitude, therefore, that I begin my term as president of the society—gratitude toward all those who make SHAFR what it is at the present time, and gratitude toward the first generation of leaders who, in 1966-67, dreamed up the idea of an organization devoted to the study of American diplomatic history and then did the hard work necessary to make it happen. The early presidents were an exceptionally distinguished group—Thomas Bailey, Alexander DeConde, Richard Leopold, Robert Ferrell, Norman Graebner, and Wayne Cole, to name but the first half dozen—who gave their time and energy to the fledgling entity and provided it with crucial credibility.

Today, almost half a century later, SHAFR is in robust health. As the program for the upcoming annual conference in Lexington, Kentucky will show, we are broadly diverse in participants, topics, and interests, and becoming more so with each passing year. Over the past decade, SHAFR has made important strides to internationalize, and one of my chief aims as president is to continue this work through, for example, identifying ways to boost the international membership and the number of non-U.S. participants in the annual meeting.

At the same time, and reflecting our Janus-faced nature, we have work to do in the United States, in terms of bridge-building within the U.S. historical profession and within the History departments in which most of us—whether as graduate students or faculty—operate. It is here, arguably, that the biggest task awaits, and the biggest potential payoff in terms of the prospects for SHAFR as it prepares to enter its second half-century.

Indeed, the very success of SHAFR figures here. There now exists such a wide array of professional opportunities and rewards within the organization—from committee assignments to prizes to presenting papers at the annual meeting and publishing articles and reviews in Diplomatic History and Passport—that SHAFR alone can, in Robert McMahon’s words, “provide ample professional sustenance for many a career.” As a result, we don’t have much need to interact widely with the larger professional world we inhabit. Not a bad situation to be in, arguably, but the costs of the resultant dissocation are considerable for all concerned: for ourselves, for our Americanist colleagues, and for the discipline as a whole.

I’m reminded, in this context, of something Marty Sherwin said to me a few years ago when we were discussing this isolation of foreign relations historians vis-à-vis the broader discipline. Sherwin told me that as a young, beginning scholar he sent his first article to the American Historical Review. The editors accepted it. “I was stunned,” he said. “But if Diplomatic History had existed at the time, of course I would have sent it there first. The same thing has happened to many articles that are of broader interest. They ended up in DH rather than another historical journal.”

One could conclude from this anecdote that it would have been better for foreign-relations historians if SHAFR had never been founded in the first place. I believe that would be the wrong conclusion—for a host of reasons, not least those I articulated at the outset. Nor do I wish in this presidential column to be seen as urging members to stop submitting their articles and essays to our flagship journal! Still, I would suggest that we strive in the coming years to make more connections to the rest of the profession, to get other historians involved in our issues and our debates, and to make them more aware of what we’re doing. (One could also argue for doing more to strengthen our interdisciplinary ties, especially with colleagues in political science, but that’s a subject for another column.)

What does this bridge-building entail? For a start, it means continuing and expanding the efforts to get SHAFR members on the program committees of the annual meetings of the American Historical Association and the Organization of American Historians, and to submit imaginative, conceptually innovative panel proposals to these organizations’ annual meetings as well as to those of other groups such as the Southern History Association and the Society for Historians of the Early Republic. It means involving scholars in other subfields in our own meetings and in the pages of Diplomatic History and Passport. It means strengthening the organization’s web presence. And it means following what we might call the “Sherwin Rule,” according to which we submit pieces not only to our own journal, or to close cousins such as the Journal of Cold War Studies and Cold War History, but also to others such the AHR, the Journal of American History, and the Journal of Policy History. We need not fear that DH will suffer as a result; it is a sturdy and vibrant publication, and in the long run it will be further strengthened as more people outside the field become acquainted with what we do. They will learn what all of us in SHAFR already know: that the current scholarship on U.S. foreign relations history intersects in key ways with the scholarship in any number of subfields in the profession.

All of which is to say this is an extraordinarily exciting time to be a part of the SHAFR community. Like never before it’s a global community, welcoming and inclusive, made up of members in disparate locales doing highly important research and utilizing a range of languages, methodologies, and interpretive approaches. We’ll get a vivid snapshot of this work in the Bluegrass state in June; I hope to see you there.
A Roundtable on Jessica M. Chapman’s Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam

Robert K. Brigham, Seth Jacobs, Ronald Frankum, Shane Strate, Matthew Masur, and Jessica M. Chapman

Robert K. Brigham

Introduction, Roundtable on Jessica Chapman, Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam

Jessica Chapman’s Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam joins a growing list of books that explore the political culture of the Republic of Vietnam. She is primarily concerned with Ngo Dinh Diem’s defeat of the politico-religious groups in South Vietnam and his effort to consolidate power in Saigon. She argues that Diem’s efforts to delegitimize the sects are crucial to understanding how the First Republic operated. Chapman shows that Diem’s lumping of the non-communist sects with the communists served to justify violent action against any of them as a noble defense of South Vietnam’s sovereignty.

According to all four reviewers, few scholars have appreciated the importance of what is known as the “sect crisis” as much as Chapman. Ron Frankum suggests that Chapman’s portrayal of this period is “much more sophisticated and complicated” than most previous studies. For Seth Jacobs, “Chapman challenges orthodox analyses of the sect crisis in virtually every particular.” Matthew Masur believes Chapman rightly emphasizes Diem’s battles with the sects as an important aspect of state building in South Vietnam. After defeating the “sects” Americans began to see Diem as “a credible leader.” He also agrees with Chapman that there is great “continuity between the sect crisis and Diem’s subsequent policies in South Vietnam.” For Shane Strate, Chapman’s book is “refreshing in part because it addresses the divergent sources of South Vietnam’s heritage and the realities of its post-colonial phase.” Although each reviewer has nits to pick with Chapman, all agree with Jacobs when he writes, “Chapman compels us to view the familiar tragedy with new eyes.”

A number of important themes emerge in all four reviews. Two strike me as meriting consideration here. The first is that the sects were not bit players in a larger drama. All four reviewers appreciate Chapman’s attention to the politico-religious groups. Because Diem saw the sects as legitimate non-communist threats to the Republic’s survival and his own rule, he had to crush them.

What is truly remarkable is how easy it was for Diem to do this. The sects had won hard-earned political support throughout the South for their victories against Ho Chi Minh’s communists. After the French departure in 1954, the sects were poised to take their share of political power in the South. Ignoring American advice, Diem attacked the sects quickly and repeatedly and they melted away. Few observers at the time would have predicted such an outcome because Diem had been on the sidelines for much of the First Indochina War. With the sects out of the way, Diem gained credibility in American eyes and began his tenuous consolidation of power.

A second theme that makes its way into the reviews is just how brutal Diem’s consolidation of power was. All four reviewers agree with Chapman that lessons learned against the sects did not always serve Diem well. He created a national security apparatus for dealing harshly with perceived threats against the Republic, and these very institutions led to his demise. Diem severely miscalculated how much violence southerners would tolerate in the name of nation building. Americans severely miscalculated the impact of Diem’s moves on the local population. Later, Diem would add the Buddhists to the list of those who threatened the First Republic. The Americans then left Diem to his own fate.

The small quibbles each reviewer has with Chapman’s book do not detract from their universal conclusion that this is a book every student of the Vietnam War must read.

Seth Jacobs

Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Take Center Stage: A Review of Jessica M. Chapman, Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam

You know you’ve read an important book when it addresses a topic on which you’ve published extensively and it makes you feel as though you’re encountering that topic for the first time. Such was my reaction to Cauldron of Resistance, Jessica Chapman’s account of the struggle for power in mid-1950s southern Vietnam.

My first two books dealt in large part with this matter, and both featured chapters examining the 1955 sect crisis—
otherwise known as the Battle for Saigon—in which Premier Ngo Dinh Diem bested his rivals in a showdown that laid waste to the South Vietnamese capital. I considered myself something of an authority on Diem’s triumph, but my limited linguistic skills prevented me from mining archives in Vietnam, with the result that my perspective was, of necessity, America-centric; drawing upon exclusively English-language sources, I saw events in South Vietnam through an American lens. Indeed, the theme of my first book, America’s Miracle Man in Vietnam, was how U.S. officials’ core beliefs about religion and race shaped their policy toward Southeast Asia and impaired their capacity to process information about what was occurring there.

I think this interpretation remains valid. Nonetheless, as an Americanist, I labored under many of the same limitations as my subjects—particularly, an ignorance of local realities. When I discussed the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen politico-religious organizations, I portrayed them, in Chapman’s words, “as little more than fleeting obstacles on Ngo Dinh Diem’s path to establishing absolute power over South Vietnam” (4). Although I gave them credit for nearly forcing Washington to abandon its “Diem experiment,” I did so in order to demonstrate the tenuousness of Diem’s rule, not because I possessed any informed understanding of their unique histories, administrative structures, belief systems, or political agendas. There was nothing in Miracle Man that contradicted or even complicated the lurid caricature set forth by the New York Times in its 29 April 1955 feature, “Struggle Weird in South Vietnam.” I noted Binh Xuyen leader Bay Vien’s brutality, pointing out that he liked to feed debtors to his pet tiger, and I described the Cao Dai temple at Tay Ninh in all of its Disneyesque bedizenment, but I offered readers few insights about how such groups developed or why they controlled so much of South Vietnam’s territory and population.

Chapman challenges orthodox analyses of the sect crisis in virtually every particular, starting with terminology. “French and American officials’ use of the term sect,” she writes, “like their application of the term feudal to the same entities, reflected their judgment that these groups and their leaders were parochial, antimodern, and incapable as well as morally unworthy of participating in a nationalist government” (5). That judgment is open to question, though, as is the concomitant view, embraced almost to a man by Washington’s policymaking elite, that Diem was more broadminded, progressive, competent, or deserving of high office in the State of Vietnam than, say, Pham Cong Tac, the Cao Dai pope.

Tac is a walk-on character in David Anderson’s award-winning examination of U.S.-South Vietnamese relations in the 1950s. Anderson mentions the pope twice, as does Denis Warner, whose The Last Confucian is one of the most often-cited works on the “Diem experiment.”2 James R. Arnold, Anthony Short, and Ronald H. Spector, careful students of midcentury American policy toward Southeast Asia, do not mention Tac at all.3 One finds little in the massive literature of Anthony Short, and Ronald H. Spector, careful students of Warner, whose The Last Confucian is one of the most oft-the 1950s. Anderson mentions the pope twice, as does Denis winning examination of U.S.-South Vietnamese relations in Tac, the Cao Dai pope. more broadminded, progressive, competent, or deserving man by Washington’s policymaking elite, that Diem was though, as is the concomitant view, embraced almost to a well as morally unworthy of participating in a nationalist entities, reflected their judgment that these groups and their leaders were parochial, antimodern, and incapable as political agendas. There was nothing in Chapman’s fact that he displayed a political suppleness that Diem conspicuously lacked.

Other prominent midcentury South Vietnamese, among them the Hoa Hao generals Tran Van Soai and Le Quang Vinh, receive much more respectful treatment at Chapman’s hands than they do in most standard works on the early phases of American involvement in Southeast Asia. Even Bay Vien, customarily cast as a dime-store villain, comes across as multidimensional. While conceding that the Binh Xuyen leader was “motivated largely by the less-than-lofty ambition of protecting and enhancing [his] own wealth and power,” Chapman insists that he was “motivated as well by larger, national political concerns.” A long stretch in Poulo Condore prison left him “politiciized and embittered toward French colonialism,” but not, significantly, “converted to communist ideology,” which set him apart from most of his fellow inmates. “He remained adamantly that the Binh Xuyen did not represent a particular religion nor did it endorse a particular political philosophy,” Chapman writes. “Instead, he claimed on several occasions that the organization placed patriotism above any creed” (22). As here portrayed, Bay Vien seems the sort of figure whom a wise ruler ought to have conciliated: venal and unsavory, perhaps, but also influential and willing to make common cause—a good man to have on one’s side, especially when faced with the formidable task of knitting together a cohesive government south of Vietnam’s seventeenth parallel.

Alas, as Chapman shows in grim detail, Diem could not share power. He “exhibited a remarkably insular approach to governance that would provoke opposition almost immediately” (75). At the behest of his most loyal American patron, CIA officer Edward Lansdale, the premier met with Bay Vien at the Norodom Palace to come to terms, but the “brief and caustic” encounter only succeeded in enraging the Binh Xuyen chieftain, whom Diem insulted and had thrown off the premises (81). To a greater or lesser extent, Diem followed this pattern with all of South Vietnam’s noncommunist nationalists, making it perfectly clear that, as the Eisenhower administration’s handpicked choice to hold the line against red expansionism, he would tolerate no conceivably independent sources of authority.

Washington supported this misguided effort in the teeth not only of sect resistance but also of vigorous French criticism. One of Chapman’s most compelling points is her contention that the French, while undeniably weighed down by the paternalist and Orientalist mental baggage credulity seems to be limitless in religion.” To judge from such observations, any notion that Tac could have worked with—or perhaps replaced—Diem as South Vietnam’s leader seems ludicrous.

Yet Tac emerges from these pages as a reformist patriot whose church “filled a political void in the south” at a time when “no secular political ideology had yet emerged in Vietnam to express the people’s widespread discontent with colonial oppression.” The pope was far from nostalgic for Vietnam’s feudal past. Quite the contrary: he wanted his country to emulate the example set by Egypt after the 1952 revolution. Aware that the Cold War was dividing many decolonizing areas into rigidly antithetic blocs, and desperate to avoid the fate that befell Korea, he reached out to national leaders as dissimilar as Ngo Dinh Nhu and Ho Chi Minh during the anxious days of spring 1954, when a multinational conference of communist and noncommunist powers in Geneva sought to resolve the eight-year Franco-Viet Minh conflict. That Tac failed in his coalition-building endeavors should not obscure the fact that he displayed a political
that had accumulated over nearly a century of colonial domination, nonetheless had some “intimate contact” with Vietnam’s “‘wild’ south” and therefore possessed a greater appreciation of the region’s historic diversity than did U.S. policymakers like Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who continually “chafed at the French tendency to put the politico-religious organizations on an equal plane with the prime minister owing to their actual military and political power” (57, 96). According to Chapman, the French were right and the Americans wrong—both about the sects’ nationalist legitimacy and about the self-defeating nature of Diem’s authoritarianism. By tyrannizing rather than cooperating with the Binh Xuyen, Cao Dai, and Hoa Hao, Diem earned millions of enemies who fought alongside the communists against his government because he left them no choice. In 1960, many of them would be among the founding members of the National Liberation Front (NLF), soon to become better known by the pejorative nickname Viet Cong.

This is the key part of Chapman’s evisceration of the “Miracle Man” myth surrounding Diem: contrary to contemporary American news coverage of the Battle for Saigon and the narrative presented in too many popular histories (mine included), Diem did not eliminate noncommunist opposition to his rule in 1955; he just forced it into different channels. While the Binh Xuyen were indeed routed by government troops during the sect crisis, the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, who had for the most part stood on the sidelines, responded to Bay Vien’s defeat by abandoning their united front with the Binh Xuyen and putting “their political energies into the Revolutionary Council,” a broad-based party thrown together to serve—temporarily, as it turned out—as a loyal opposition (113). Until Diem dissolved the Revolutionary Council in early 1956, its representatives offered increasingly sharp attacks against his regime; council president Nguyen Bao Toan at one point denounced Diem for “terroristic repression,” which prompted Diem to banish him from the country (177). Meanwhile, Pope Tac intrigued with former emperor Bao Dai and former premier Tran Van Huu in Cambodia “to create a neutralist movement for Vietnam along the lines advocated by [Indian leader Jawaharlal] Nehru” (186). Other noncommunist patriots, including remnants of the shattered Binh Xuyen, went underground, engaging in antigovernment propaganda, sabotage, and hit-and-run guerrilla tactics.

Chapman demonstrates exhaustively—and for the most part persuasively—that these actors, bit players in nearly every scholarly mounting of the Diem drama, were in fact the president’s chief antagonists during at least the first act, and that “many of Diem’s harsh policies against dissidents . . . [were] designed to subdue and control the Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, and Binh Xuyen, although they were pitched in terms of anticommunism” (114). Also, “the structure and professed ideology of the South Vietnamese state that [Diem] established during his first two years in office came about in direct response to challenges posed by his noncommunist political rivals,” not because of Viet Minh stay-behind agents (174–5). Finally, and most consequentially in terms of our understanding of the “Diem experiment,” South Vietnam’s noncommunist politico-religious organizations played an essential role in the creation of the NLF. Yes, it was the North Vietnamese Politburo that made the decision to found this rebel group in December 1960, but it did so, Chapman argues, out of “fear that, in the absence of bold action, southern communists would cede the revolutionary initiative to other anti-Diem forces,” the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao foremost among them. Ho Chi Minh and his command coterie concluded that “organizations such as these could hijack the revolutionary movement in the south” if Hanoi did not take more drastic measures. Thus, the establishment of the NLF—a watershed moment in the Vietnam War by anyone’s lights—“was largely an effort to exert more effective control over the revolutionary movement in the south and to prevent ceding the revolutionary vanguard to Hoa Hao or Cao Dai resistance movements” (190–1).

This is a transformative interpretation of a subject that has received more than its share of excellent analyses from two generations of historians. Along with the scholars mentioned above, Joseph G. Morgan, Frances FitzGerald, Fredrik Logevall, John Ernst, and many others have produced high-quality work detailing Diem’s rise to power and exploring how the Eisenhower administration’s sponsorship of this complex, doomed, but not altogether meritless individual drew the United States into its most disastrous foreign-policy venture.6 While these historians differ on many points—it is hard to believe, for instance, that the Diem exorciated by James Carter is the same man lionized by Mark Moyar—they generally assign the same relational significance to their dramatis personae: Diem and Ho are the leads; Lansdale, Dulles, Nhu, presidential envoy J. Lawton “Lightning Joe” Collins, North Vietnamese military commander Vo Nguyen Giap, and French general Paul Ely the chief supporting players; Tac, Bay Vien, Soai, Vinh, and other sect representatives the supernumeraries.7 Occasionally, one of these spear-carriers is allowed to steal a scene through sheer flamboyance, but the audience never questions which characters onstage really matter. By making the sectors, rather than the communists, Diem’s foil, Chapman compels us to view a familiar tragedy with new eyes. If Cauldron of Resistance does not quite substitute Rosencrantz and Guildenstern for the prince of Denmark, it does let them fill Claudius’s shoes, and that makes it a heretical Hamlet indeed.

There are a few missteps. Chapman strains on occasion to impart depth to events that were, I suspect, less profound than she believes. To take an example that comes readily to mind, since I also addressed it in Miracle Man, at the height of the sect crisis, J. Lawton Collins, Eisenhower’s special representative in South Vietnam, met with dissident generals Trinh Minh The and Nguyen Thanh Phuong to attempt to talk them out of taking up arms against the government. His report to the State Department fairly seethed with annoyance. “This conversation left me with a sense of unreality which marks so many situations here,” Collins declared. “Discussing this problem with these generals was like trying to reason with two stubborn four-year-old children. They were either lying very ineptly or they are alarmingly stupid considering the influence and power they wield. In most instances their accusations were without foundation and their arguments without logic. Trying to determine from them exactly what they wanted was absolutely futile.”8 I noted in Miracle Man that Collins “drew upon long-standing American notions about Asian immaturity to explain his failure as pacificator”—not an especially insightful conclusion, I concede, but one that stayed within the evidence; it allowed Collins’s own words to convict him and did not speculate as to the agenda of The or Phuong—which, of course, I had no way of divining from the special representative’s cable.9 Chapman, however, is not content to dismiss Collins’s missive as midcentury American Orientalism; she must...
also construe The and Phuong’s opacity as deliberate and ascribe to them a shrewdness that, as far as I can tell from her text and endnotes, has little basis other than conjecture: “Collins failed to see that his frustrations stemmed neither from ineptitude nor stupidity on the part of the generals, but rather from their cunning, intentionally noncommittal political strategy. By making vague overtures to all sides while refusing to commit wholeheartedly to any, politico-religious leaders were able to lull American, French, and South Vietnamese officials alike into positions of defensiveness and indecision” (95).

We have here a clear case of protesting too much. It arises from a noble impulse, one widespread in diplomatic history at present: the desire to give voice and agency to subjects long marginalized, ignored, or seen solely through an American lens. While praiseworthy, such motives can sometimes lead historians to hear music when there is none, to correct an admittedly one-sided narrative by attributing undue gravity or complexity to the heretofore neglected side. This over-compensatory tendency marks several recent works on Diem, in which younger scholars feel obliged, for example, to rebut dozens of texts that pooh-pooh the South Vietnamese leader’s official philosophy, personalism, as, in one historian’s words “a confused mélange of papal encyclicals and kindergarten economics.”10 That ridicule definitely cries out for revision; still, it does not require us to accept the counterargument that personalism provided a realistic program around which to organize a modern society or that it could ever have competed with Hanoi’s Marxist nationalism in terms of unifying and mobilizing the Vietnamese.11 Analogously, we can criticize Collins for ethnocentrism without making The and Phuong into Mekong Machiavellis.

Chapman falls into the same trap when she addresses those sect commanders who decided to throw in their lot with Diem during the Battle for Saigon. “The activities of rallied politico-religious leaders,” she writes, “might, at first glance, seem to indicate sycophantic support for Ngo Dinh Diem’s government, but were in fact quite empowering. By making themselves essential to his defense and necessary for the survival and health of the regime, these leaders continued their efforts to manipulate the prime minister into meeting their demands for powerful roles in his government” (112–13). Um, yes, but isn’t that just another way of saying that they were opportunists, playing the odds? That they thought Diem would defeat the Binh Xuyen and wanted to be on the winning side? Can’t we absolve them of the charge of sycophancy and still avoid the loaded expression empowering, with its connotations of righteousness? And doesn’t the fact that Diem refused to give any of the rallied politico-religious leaders powerful roles in his government make the claim of empowerment a bit silly?

Such complaints may strike some readers as mean-spirited, especially those who embrace the apothegm that any argument worth making is worth overstating. But Chapman’s thesis is so original, and the quality of her research in Vietnamese, French, and American archives so exemplary, that one hates to see lapses into hyperbole mar an otherwise superb book.

Notes:
4. McClintock to Dulles, 6 May 1954, Record Group 59, National Archives II, College Park, MD, 751G.00/5-654.
11. Chapman, to her credit, steers between both extremes, reproving Saigon charged d'affaires Robert McClintock for his notorious characterization of Diem as “a messiah without a message” while at the same time acknowledging that “Diem’s inability to explain personalist philosophy to his constituents in a clear, inspiring, or even penetrable way rendered it meaningless to most” (6, 124).

Review of Jessica M. Chapman, Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam

Ronald Frankum

In 1957, Ngo Dinh Nhu traveled to the United States a few weeks before his brother, Ngo Dinh Diem, was to make his first and only trip to that country as president of the Republic of Vietnam. In his meetings with Americans to lay out the agenda before his brother’s arrival, Ngo Dinh Nhu raised two significant points that were emblematic of the difficulties that the Vietnamese had and would continue to have with the United States. The first issue was the proper way to address Ngo Dinh Diem. Ngo Dinh Nhu tried to explain the impropriety of calling the president of the Republic of Vietnam by his first name rather than his full name. To do so, he said, would be akin to calling the president of the United States “Dwight.” The Vietnamese, always sensitive to matters of protocol, hoped to resolve this issue, but it wasn’t fully resolved at the time and it remained unresolved until very recently, when scholars of the war finally began using “Ngo Dinh Diem.”

The second issue was Ngo Dinh Diem’s holistic approach to problem solving. Ngo Dinh Diem and Ngo Dinh Nhu maintained that the issues concerning the Republic of Vietnam were interconnected. In order to solve one, all needed to be addressed with equal attention and resources. The Americans, at the time, tended to focus on individual issues and did not make the same connections the Vietnamese did. Ngo Dinh Nhu was not able to reconcile the Vietnamese approach with the American way of doing things. The failure to integrate the two approaches foreshadowed what would be a constant source of frustration and distrust for both the Vietnamese and the Americans. These seemingly trivial problems ultimately undermined the relationship between the two allies.

Until recently, Vietnam War historiography has fared little better than the Washington decision-makers of the 1950s. Yet in Cauldron of Resistance, Jessica Chapman offers a significant contribution to scholarship on the war by addressing Ngo Dinh Nhu’s concerns, albeit not in a way he would have approved. Chapman seeks to recover the agency of the politico-religious organizations—Cao Dai,
Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen—whose importance has been misrepresented in American scholarship and sources. Her choice of the term “politico-religious” rather than the more familiar “sects” is an example of her concern that the scholars and students of the Vietnam War better understand the complexities of the groups in order to appreciate their unique positions and interests. She maintains this labeling throughout the book, though the term “sect” does appear as a descriptor for the groups on a few occasions. In taking a more holistic approach to examining the period 1953–6, Chapman correctly argues that the role these three organizations played in shaping Vietnamese politics and diplomacy is much more sophisticated and complicated than the extant Vietnam War literature has recognized. Her closer examination of these groups and Ngo Dinh Diem’s ideas about the use he might make of them and his response to the threat they represented as he consolidated his power in the State of Vietnam and then the Republic of Vietnam provides a clearer picture of how truly difficult it was for the Americans involved in that region of the world to understand Vietnam and the Vietnamese.

Chapman offers four arguments in Cauldron of Resistance. First, she contends that the politico-religious groups were important organizations that reflected Vietnamese history and were significant in ways that went far beyond their military capabilities. Second, she argues that these organizations helped to shape the authoritarian nature of Ngo Dinh Diem’s presidency, as he devoted a good deal of time to the effort to neutralize them. The Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen in fact represented a greater threat to him between 1954 and 1956 than the communist insurgency. Third, the United States readily accepted Ngo Dinh Diem’s style of rule as a result of his defeat of the politico-religious organizations in 1955, but his authoritarianism would eventually serve as the catalyst for his failure. Finally, Chapman asserts that the nature of Ngo Dinh Diem’s handling of the politico-religious organizations caused further internal dissent that would lead to the formation of the National Liberation Front in 1960.

Ultimately, Chapman seeks to move the discussion about the origins of the Vietnam War away from the focus Vietnam War historiography has so firmly fixed on the Cold War in the past forty years and towards a direction that provides for a Vietnamese voice and for Vietnamese agents who played a much greater role in their destiny than Vietnam War scholars have conceded. For Chapman, the long Vietnamese struggle involved a significant degree of internal dissent and violent action that transcends the Cold War.

Chapman offers a solid historical narrative for the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen that is based primarily on secondary literature from the United States and to a limited extent France and Vietnam. Her ability to weave existing Vietnam War historiography into the argument while providing a solid analysis of documents from the United States, France, and Vietnam makes her work a valuable contribution to the never-ending debate that is Vietnam. However, Chapman does fail to use some existing United States materials that would have provided a more nuanced and perhaps stronger argument. Specifically, the underutilized Record Group 469: Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1942–1963, at the National Archives in College Park, MD, offers information that would have complemented and perhaps challenged some of Chapman’s assertions. The collection consists of materials from the several agencies responsible for foreign assistance that existed before the establishment of the U.S. Agency for International Development. While it is true that this collection might not lend itself to Vietnamese agency, it provides an important perspective for the period under review.

The National Archive also has a complete record of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service materials for Vietnam in Record Group 263: Records of the Central Intelligence Agency. While Chapman did use the available Vietnamese newspapers from the General Science Library in Ho Chi Minh City, the FBIS would have filled in the holes in that collection. The Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech University also houses Vietnamese-language periodicals and newspapers in textual and microform that might have supplemented her already fine research. Nonetheless, Chapman should be recognized for delving into both French and Vietnamese sources to provide agency for the three politico-religious organizations. Her work is significant and representative of a new scholarship of the war that recognizes the value of Vietnamese documents, even if they are limited in quantity.

While Chapman succeeds in using this new approach to provide agency for the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen, the same cannot be said of her analysis of Ngo Dinh Diem and his reaction to the politico-religious threat. That analysis follows the standard historiography of the past forty years. While she offers new insight into the three organizations, her interpretations of Ngo Dinh Diem rely heavily on secondary sources that depend upon United States archival material from State Department records in Record Group 59 and the now forty-plus-year-old Pentagon Papers. Chapman is careful to assess who is telling the story when reconstructing the significance of the three politico-religious groups to provide them the agency they deserve, but she does not exercise the same care when assessing Ngo Dinh Diem. Her analysis will cause very few to question her work, as it conforms to the standard arguments in Vietnam War historiography, but after fifty years it seems reasonable to expect that Ngo Dinh Diem would be accorded the same agency his opponents are.

Chapman correctly contends that the domestic strife that resulted from the politico-religious organizations and Ngo Dinh Diem’s response to them is significant, and she provides a sound narrative to back up this assertion. However, there were other events going on during the period under examination that played a significant role in the domestic and political decisions of Ngo Dinh Diem and are not discussed in the book. Of these events, the movement of 810,000 Vietnamese and Chinese minorities from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to the State of Vietnam was the most trying for the new prime minister. The 300-day period after the conclusion of the 1954 Geneva Agreements was one of confusion, anxiety, and mismanagement, but it was also a time of possibilities for the State of Vietnam. Chapman does note that the influx of Catholic refugees from the North did challenge Ngo Dinh Diem, but she fails to address the extent of the burden the refugees placed on the young government or how their growing presence directly affected Ngo Dinh Diem’s relations with the politico-religious groups. Furthermore, to assert or imply that all of the refugees were Catholic is not only incorrect but gives credence to the myth that these refugees from the North supported Ngo Dinh Diem. Approximately one-third of the refugees were Catholic, though perhaps the number could be as high as half. Many of these people backed the French efforts in Indochina, but
they were not universally supportive of Ngo Dinh Diem, despite his Catholic background, and they created many more problems than opportunities in the critical months of the sect crisis.

Finally, Chapman’s assertions, while refreshing in that they do push the bounds of extant Vietnam War historiography, raise as many questions as they do answers. In charting the evolution of the three politico-religious groups, she maintains that like Ho Chi Minh and his Viet Minh, they seemed willing to work with any group that helped to advance their own political agenda. That they, at various times, worked with the French, the Japanese, the Viet Minh, Ngo Dinh Diem, and the Americans and eventually helped to establish the National Liberation Front in 1960 suggests that they might not have had Vietnam’s best interests in mind. Chapman argues that Ngo Dinh Diem’s targeting of these groups helped to spur the internal dissent in the 1950s that led to the conditions of the early 1960s and, in the end, to his assassination. While she points out that there were other alternatives for Ngo Dinh Diem, mainly providing concessions to the three groups, or perhaps just the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai, a more nuanced view of Ngo Dinh Diem’s politics and vision for the Republic of Vietnam suggests that he was correct to target these groups, as they had already proven themselves more interested in power and had ambitions beyond the well-being of the Republic. Regardless, Chapman should address more clearly the potential value of the three organizations when compared to the possible repercussions of their role in shared governance.

Ultimately, and despite the concerns and observations mentioned, Cauldron of Resistance is an important addition to the ever-growing historiography of the Vietnam War. That Chapman recognizes and addresses the notion of agency for the Vietnamese is invaluable for a better understanding of Vietnam in the 1950s. Her use of archives outside the United States is commendable, while her focus on understanding Vietnam and the Vietnamese by examining people and events from within rather than looking at them from the outside is the proper direction for new scholarship on the war. While her position toward and perspective on Ngo Dinh Diem still needs some refining—which although only a small minority of current scholars would make that claim—the overall work is solid, as is the contribution it makes.

Review of Jessica M. Chapman, Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam

Shane Strate

It is difficult, perhaps even impossible, to write an explanation of the Vietnam War that does not partially rest on an interpretation of Ngo Dinh Diem’s personality and policies. The most common approach has been to analyze the troubled relationship between the South Vietnamese and U.S. governments, as Edward Miller has recently done. Jessica Chapman offers an innovative approach in Cauldron of Resistance. The subject of her book is not the Americans, or the North, but the confrontation and cooperation between the Diem regime and his non-Communist domestic opposition. This study is built on excellent scholarship and based on Vietnamese language sources, and it offers a nuanced understanding of the myriad of characters and issues facing South Vietnam in the decade prior to the American phase of the war.

Cauldron’s take on southern politics is refreshing in part because it addresses the divergent sources of South Vietnam’s heritage and the realities of its post-colonial phase. While many historical accounts begrudgingly acknowledge that parties other than Diem and the Viet Minh competed for political leadership in the South, Chapman takes this issue seriously. Chapter 1 delves into the South’s formative conditions, describing it as a region marked by “geographic, economic, social, ethnic, and cultural heterodoxies,” all of which defied territorial boundaries (14). Such background is critical to our understanding of a region that for centuries has resisted the imposition of central governance. France’s attempt to civilize the “wild frontier” of the South resulted in the region’s balkanization and the rise of secret organizations that reflected the territory’s eclectic nature.

Chapman’s primary argument is that the Cao Dai, Binh Xuyen, and Hoa Hao were powerful organizations with national aspirations and that they played an important and heretofore overlooked role in determining the fate of South Vietnam. Her decision to use the term “politico-religious organizations” rather than the more conventional “sects” reflects an attempt to recover their agency as important actors in this political theater (5). The author challenges long-standing assumptions that these groups were limited to the margins of society by demonstrating how they filled the vacuum of nationalist leadership created by French suppression of the Vietnamese Nationalist Party and the Indochinese Communist Party during the 1930s. From that time until 1956, these groups often commanded stronger allegiances within southern rural sectors than either the Saigon regime or the Viet Minh.

By focusing on these politico-religious organizations, Cauldron of Resistance complicates our understanding of several aspects of Vietnam’s history, starting with the effect of the Japanese occupation. Southeast Asian scholarship tends to shrug off the impact of the Japanese presence on the development of a nation-state in Vietnam. Historians claim that since the Viet Minh were already entrenched as leaders of the nationalist movement, Japan’s arrival meant only a brief interlude in the ongoing conflict with the French. Chapman complicates this picture by providing evidence that the Japanese supported both the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai as alternatives to the Viet Minh, providing each party with organizational and military resources. This infusion of aid caused both groups to become more militantly anti-colonial and contributed to the outbreak of a multi-polar armed conflict in the South once the war ended.

To facilitate her re-assessment of the role of political-religious groups, the author adopts a highly critical approach to the sources. As she notes, historical scholarship in Vietnam has relied too much on the perspectives of American diplomats, most of whom demonstrated a rather limited understanding of Vietnamese politics. They characterized the “sects” as naïve, corrupt, reckless, and incompetent and constantly harped on the inconsistent or “hypocritical” attitudes of nationalist groups who relied on French financial support and then denounced France’s continued intervention in Vietnam (71).

Chapman points out that the positions of politico-religious groups only appeared contradictory to American analysts because they misunderstood the complexities of the anti-colonial struggle. Any organization that hoped to compete in the post-colonial struggle for leadership needed to accomplish two goals: raise funds from any and all possible sources and, more important, establish its credentials as a rabid opponent of foreign imperialism. American diplomats should have been more familiar with this tactic, which Filipino nationalists used against them during their own colonial tenure in the Philippines in the 1930s. Manuel Quezon and the leadership of the Parti-Nationalista would publicly call for immediate U.S. withdrawal, then meet privately with the governor-general to ensure that the Americans maintained their gradual timetable for decolonization. Vietnamese politico-religious groups demonstrated similar dexterity in their own nationalist agenda, accusing the Viet Minh of being tools of foreign masters in the People’s Republic of China or the
Soviet Union even as they courted the assistance of French and American benefactors. Adaptation and flexibility, not ideological consistency, was the key to survival in this political environment.

While Diem was at odds with every other faction, Chapman depicts an unusually harmonious relationship between the president and his American patrons. Unlike Miller’s Misalliance, which portrays an interventionist State Department that was regularly at cross-purposes with its Vietnamese counterparts, Cauldron portrays the United States as passive and accommodating—much too accommodating, in fact, for the author’s liking. One of her primary claims is that the United States was far too willing to accept Diem’s reasoning for the necessity of an authoritarian state. In part, the discrepancy between Miller and Chapman is due to differences in chronology. Chapman concentrates on Vietnamese politics prior to 1960, when the birth of the NLF caused the United States to take a more active role in defense and pacification initiatives. There is an excellent discussion of the legacy of the sect crisis and its effect on the U.S.-Vietnamese partnership. Without question, the crisis increased American confidence in Diem’s leadership ability and ended debate over potential replacements. Far more impactful, however, was Diem’s growing realization that U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia had grown dependent on his survival. From this point forward the so-called junior partner turned the patron-client dynamic on its head. Diem felt empowered to grab American aid with both hands while rejecting U.S. pleas to make his government more inclusive (114).

Readers looking for innovative material will appreciate that Cauldron ventures outside the Cold War framework that dominates scholarship on the Vietnam War and instead evaluates Diem’s leadership in the context of domestic political opponents. This is a difficult balance to strike. While Hồ Chí Minh does not occupy the privileged position we have come to expect, at times the reality of a hostile Communist North disappears from the narrative entirely. For example, Chapman argues that the formation of the NLF was the result, not the cause, of Diem’s increasingly authoritarian policies. This is partly true. However, it avoids mentioning that Hanoi never abandoned its policy of re-unification, nor was it concerned with the ideological bent of the ‘puppet regime’. In Saigon, Chapman is correct, of course, to say that Diem’s increasingly violent repression helped motivate the Politburo to transition from political to more militant forms of agitation. So long as American pressure ruled out any prospect of a neutralist coalition, confrontation between North and South was inevitable.

By the late 1950s, the Republic of Vietnam’s ironfist approach to governance proved a mixed blessing for Communist cadres. Diem was helping to create the very revolution he claimed to be preventing, but who would lead that revolution? As members of these politico-religious groups flocked to the anti-Diem banner in droves, their numbers threatened to challenge Communist control of the ‘nationalist movement’ and establish an alternate leadership of the cause. Hanoi created the National Liberation Front to perpetuate the illusion of collaboration with these groups. As the war progressed, it became clear to everyone, even the NLF, that their northern overlords had no intention of sharing power.

For Chapman, it is Diem’s inability to create space for divergent nationalist voices like the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, not his anti-Communist fervor or status as an American puppet, that best explains his failure to achieve political legitimacy. Rather than compromise with anti-Communist political leaders in the South, the Ngo brothers chose to create elaborate narratives intended to discredit potential rivals. Chapter 5 contains fascinating archival materials employed by Chapman to re-construct artfully Diem’s vision of himself as the lead protagonist in his own morality play. In the late 1950s, Interior Ministry propaganda presented the world in Manichean terms. The politico-religious leaders represented the dark forces of corruption, backwardness, and social decay, which would destroy the country unless eliminated by the state (132). In this regard, it is ironic that scholars use Diem’s despotism to explain his ultimate failure, considering that his more successful counterparts in Hanoi were even less tolerant of dissent and more ruthless in dealing with opposition. Unlike Diem, the Politburo understood that coalitions could be used to absorb, neutralize, isolate, and eventually destroy potential obstacles.

The book occasionally overreaches in its attempts at re-interpretation. Chapter 6 argues that the October 1955 campaign rhetoric “demonstrates that the prime minister himself believed in the virtues of his particular brand of democracy” (171). This is an odd statement. Whatever Diem may have believed, his actions indicated a desire to concentrate state power while reducing limitations on the exercise of that power. If he described this governing philosophy as “democracy,” aren’t modern scholars (and his political opponents) right to be cynical?

That issue aside, this is an excellent book that reorients the study of South Vietnamese politics away from the clash between Diem and the NLF and points it towards domestic political competition as the driving force behind the Saigon government’s authoritarian tendencies. Cauldron of Resistance is thoughtful, original, readable, and a welcome addition to scholarship on the topic.

Note:

Review of Jessica M. Chapman, Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam

Matthew Masur

Las November marked the fiftieth anniversary of the coup that brought down Ngo Dinh Diem and his powerful brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu. Nearly five decades later, Diem has been fleshed out in the historical scholarship and is emerging as a complicated figure. In recent years historians have explored his rise to power, the roots of his ideology, and his policies as president of the Republic of Vietnam. With Cauldron of Resistance, Jessica Chapman has continued this trend, depicting Diem as a bold and aggressive politician capable of outmaneuvering his most dangerous rivals. Using Vietnamese archival sources and contemporary Vietnamese newspapers and magazines, she has also provided a more detailed and comprehensive picture of the chaotic political landscape of 1950s South Vietnam, in which Diem was but one of many important players. The result is a fair-minded assessment of Diem and new insights into the critical period that preceded the escalation of the Vietnam War.

Although Diem’s name appears in the book’s subtitle, Cauldron of Resistance is not solely or even primarily a book about Ngo Dinh Diem. While Chapman is mostly interested in southern Vietnam in the 1950s, she contends
that its salient social and political characteristics can be traced back much further. Southern Vietnam had been home, at least since the 1500s, to “a range of diverse peoples, including Khmer, Chinese, Vietnamese and a number of ethnic minorities.” These groups “contributed to the fluid and overlapping nature of identities that came to define southern Vietnam” (14). They also created a frontier atmosphere that was frustratingly resistant to state control, whether imposed by Vietnamese imperial officials, French colonialists, or Japanese occupiers. By the end of World War II, southern Vietnam “responded to the dislocations caused by French colonial rule and Japanese occupation by balkanizing into competing armed administrative units” (14). Although Ngo Dinh Diem would have to contend with these factions, he was not the first—or last—to do so.

Chapman also resists the urge to dismiss the various political and religious groups in southern Vietnam as oddities or historical footnotes, colorful organizations noteworthy mostly for their charismatic leaders, strange (to outsiders) religious practices, or extensive criminal activity. They were those things, as Chapman’s narrative makes clear. But in the 1940s and early 1950s, the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen were also serious actors on the Cold War stage. Chapman also points out, it overlooks the local conditions that were just as important—or maybe more important—to Diem’s ascent, rule, and decline in the 1950s and early 1960s. As Chapman explains, southern Vietnam in the 1950s was a chaotic and contested place. It was home to different ethnic groups, religious organizations, and secret societies. Chief among these groups were the adherents of Cao Dai, a syncretic local religion; the devotees of Hoa Hao, a sect of Buddhism; and the Binh Xuyen, a mafia-like criminal organization.

From the outset, Chapman rescues these groups from the somewhat misleading title of “sects,” the designation that is often used to describe them. She points out that the term is imprecise on its face: the Binh Xuyen was not a religious organization at all, and while Hoa Hao is a sect of Buddhism, Cao Dai is probably best considered a separate religion entirely.

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In Cauldron of Resistance, Chapman sees much greater continuity between the sect crisis and Diem’s subsequent policies in South Vietnam. Even when the groups were ostensibly defeated or coopted in April 1955, Diem continued to view them as a threat to his political authority. Military operations against the sects continued long after American officials urged Diem to turn his attention to social, political, and economic reforms. Moreover, Diem’s attempts at nation-building were guided by his experience with the sects. One of Diem’s key goals after 1955 was to eliminate “demoralization” in South Vietnam. The roots of demoralization could be traced to both French colonialism and the “feudalist” practices of the sects. The solution, though, was clear: loyalty to the new government under Ngo Dinh Diem. While Diem’s repressive policies would eventually be used against the communists and other domestic opponents, they were originally intended to eliminate lingering support for the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen.

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In Chapman’s analysis, it was the Americans’ tendency to dismiss and overlook these groups that contributed to the fateful decision to back Ngo Dinh Diem in 1954. As French rule in Vietnam was coming to an end, the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Binh Xuyen, and other groups in the South renewed their calls for national independence. Cognizant of America’s objectives in Vietnam and hoping to win support from American officials, they emphasized their opposition to French colonialism and their deep hostility to communism. Rather than consider the possibility that these groups could comprise part of a local, nationalist “third way” between colonialism and communism, American officials dismissed the groups as “backward, irrational, and incapable of providing effective national leadership” (60). Based on this flawed assessment, American officials threw their support behind Ngo Dinh Diem and refused to countenance some sort of coalition government in the South that would represent the region’s diverse political-religious landscape. In making this argument Chapman adds another example to the depressingly long history of “missed opportunities” for the United States in Vietnam.

American officials only became aware of conditions in southern Vietnam when it fell to Ngo Dinh Diem, during the sector crisis of 1955, to impose some sort of central authority on an otherwise chaotic region. Historians typically portray Diem’s victory over the sects as a turning point for the new regime. Ignoring American counsel, Diem took on the sects and won. American advisors who had doubted his viability concluded that he was a credible leader who could establish a sustainable, non-communist government in South Vietnam. In most accounts, the sect crisis is a precursor, a brief (but important) conflagration that exists separately from the rest of Diem’s presidency. The events after the sect crisis—Diem’s repressive domestic policies, various failed nation-building activities, the growing communist-led insurgency—represent a distinct story, largely disconnected from Diem’s early struggles.

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While Chapman focuses on the early years of Diem’s rule, her book also has implications for his eventual downfall. By the early 1960s, Diem’s position was crumbling. The communist-led insurgency in the south had grown and was receiving encouragement and assistance from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. High-ranking military officers in the South Vietnamese army had lost faith in the president. Diem’s relationship with the United States was increasingly strained. When the Buddhist crisis erupted in 1963, American officials finally signaled that their patience with Diem was exhausted, opening the door to the coup of November 1. As Chapman’s book shows, this sequence of events must be understood as the outcome of the complex political forces in southern Vietnam and Diem’s reaction to them in the first years of his rule.

Cauldron of Resistance pays more attention to the Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, and Binh Xuyen than just about any other book on U.S.-Vietnamese relations in the 1950s (indeed, the book is as much a study of southern Vietnam as it is a study of U.S. foreign relations).
of some of the key leaders of these groups, such as Trinh Minh The, Ba Cut, and Bay Vien. But readers learn much less about the rank-and-file supporters of these groups. What motivated them? How did Cao Dai and Hoa Hao adherents understand the complex interplay between their organizations’ religious and political identities? How did their religious beliefs inform their visions for Vietnamese society? Did Binh Xuyen members have any lofty goals for South Vietnam, or were they simply interested in power and profit?

These questions may be unanswerable, and they may be immaterial to Chapman’s larger arguments. But rescuing these groups from obscurity or historical caricature should include greater attention to the people who, through their loyalty, bravery, or religious devotion, contributed to the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen’s very real political strength. In recent years, David Elliott and David Hunt have used extensive interviews with NLF supporters to write a more textured and human account of the communist-led insurgency. This effort has paralleled the efforts by Jessica Chapman and others to portray Diem as a complex figure: a leader who was ambitious, at times clever enough to be successful, and in the end fatally flawed. Chapman might, perhaps, have done the same for the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen. As Cauldron of Resistance demonstrates, these groups played an important role in the political events that contributed to Diem’s downfall and, by extension, the Americanization of the conflict in Vietnam.

This omission should not obscure the important contributions of Cauldron of Resistance. Chapman’s research shows that the political fortunes of South Vietnam were part of a larger story of social unrest and religious diversity. Chapman is not the first author to see these connections. Indeed, historians have long argued that Diem’s downfall was tied to the popular unrest that grew out of his repressive and narrow regime. Historians have also noted the role religion played in this process, tracing Diem’s fall to the Buddhist demonstrations that erupted in South Vietnam in 1963. But Chapman shows that the political-religious history of southern Vietnam in the 1950s cannot be described simply as a binary conflict pitting Diem’s Catholicism against the region’s predominant Buddhism. Catholics, Buddhists (including the Hoa Hao), and the Cao Dai were all a part of the very complicated story about the future of southern Vietnam. And while the Americans eventually played a key role in these disputes, they were in some ways latecomers to the conflict.

Note:

Response
Jessica M. Chapman

Ronald Frankum, Seth Jacobs, Matthew Masur and Shane Strate have all provided fair and incisive commentaries on Cauldron of Resistance. I am deeply grateful to these scholars for their thoughtful engagement with my work, to Bob Brigham for his introduction, and to Andy Johns for organizing this roundtable.

My colleagues’ embrace of the shift in focus away from Washington and towards Saigon and their appreciation for Cauldron’s serious treatment of southern Vietnamese sources and perspectives is heartening. Their enthusiasm for delving deeper into Vietnam’s complex history, evinced by the excellent questions they raise in these reviews, confirms the need for additional research into the varied experiences of the Vietnamese during their country’s long, bloody struggle for independence. The past couple of years have been exciting in this regard. The field has seen the publication of important new books on Vietnamese sides of the conflict by Lien-Hang T. Nguyen and Edward Miller, with promising works on the horizon by Masur, Geoffrey Stewart, Nu-Anh Tran, and a growing number of others.1 This emerging scholarship should open up new lines of inquiry and debate that deviate from the U.S.-centric concerns that have for too long dominated scholarship on the Vietnam War. Just as critically, it promises to facilitate a reevaluation of America’s Vietnam War in light of previously overlooked Vietnamese realities.

As all four reviewers indicate, Cauldron of Resistance takes southern Vietnamese politics as its primary focus. Looking back to the earliest days of the French colonial project and moving through the early years of Ngo Dinh Diem’s rule, I argue that southern Vietnam was a distinct region with a heterodox frontier character that made it supremely difficult to govern through any form of centralized authority. As the French worked to establish control over the south, powerful organizations like the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao politico-religious groups and the Binh Xuyen crime syndicate emerged out of a culture of syncretic Buddhism and a Chinese-influenced tradition of political organizing through secret societies. Rather than allow themselves to be subsumed under the Viet Minh banner after 1945, they waged civil war against Viet Minh commanders and eventually aligned themselves with the French to preserve their autonomy.

By the time Ngo Dinh Diem took power in 1954, the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen were entrenched within the cultural and political fabric of southern Vietnam. They boasted control over large autonomous zones and offered serious nationalist political platforms that were critical of both the French and the Viet Minh. To date, scholars of the Vietnam War have dismissed them as somewhat of a three-ring circus that Ngo Dinh Diem effectively silenced after the sect crisis in spring 1955. The premise of Cauldron is that they were, in fact, Ngo Dinh Diem’s primary antagonists during his first two years in office, and that his decision to annex them rather than share power had tremendous consequences for Vietnam’s political future. The southern leader established the structure of his government and disseminated his political ideology in response to their challenges and even after the Saigon government crippled their militaries and set them on the defensive, they continued to conduct significant antigovernment activity in the countryside that would make them central to Hanoi’s decision to establish the National Liberation Front in 1960.

Attention to this southern political sphere reveals just how poorly Washington’s Cold War outlook fit conditions within Vietnam. Removing the “Cold War lens” has become quite a popular exercise among international historians of late, and for good reason. By sidestepping the framework that guided American policymakers in their dealings with the world for a good forty-five years, a project made possible by the opening of a number of foreign archives, we can see many of the local and regional nuances that they missed. In Vietnam, Washington’s misconception of a dualistic divide between communism and anti-communism obscured a much more complicated political contest that had more to do with a mix of related concerns only peripherally linked to the Cold War, such as nationalism, decolonization, regionalism, and religion.

Frankum, Jacobs, Masur, and Strate all embrace my decision to shift focus away from the United States toward southern Vietnam and to remove the distorting Cold War lens that guided American policy and has since shaped a great deal of historical writing about the Vietnam War. In their words, the resulting analysis is “important,”
“transformative,” “innovative,” “refreshing,” “thoughtful,” “original,” “readable,” “fair-minded,” and “significant.” I am humbled by the generosity of these comments and would be remiss if I did not note my appreciation before delving into spirited engagement with my colleagues’ more critical observations. Alas, in keeping with the nature of these roundtables, it is incumbent upon me to devote the bulk of my remaining comments to debating those points.

Strate observes that “it is difficult, perhaps even impossible, to write an explanation of the Vietnam War that does not partially rest on an interpretation of Ngo Dinh Diem’s personality and policies,” a sentiment echoed in one way or another by each of the reviewers in this roundtable. He credits Cauldron with taking “an innovative approach to a common question” by focusing on the relationship between Ngo Dinh Diem and his noncommunist domestic opposition. Jacobs concludes that the result of that approach is an evisceration of the “Miracle Man” myth surrounding the southern leader. And Masur, who rightly points out that Cauldron “is not solely, or even primarily, a book about Ngo Dinh Diem,” judges my depiction of the southern leader as “a bold and aggressive politician capable of outmaneuvering his most dangerous rivals” to be “fair minded.”

Frankum, on the other hand, asserts that my analysis of Ngo Dinh Diem “followed the standard historiography of the past forty years” and that “the argument that Ngo Dinh Diem deserves the same agency as his opponents seems reasonable and is not offered here.” He would have liked to see “a more nuanced view of Ngo Dinh Diem’s politics and vision for the Republic of Vietnam.” I have to confess that I find it difficult to respond to Frankum’s critique, as he does not offer any specific challenges to my reading of Diem, but only a broad claim that my “position toward and perspective on Ngo Dinh Diem still needs to be refined.” I suspect that he objects to my treatment of Ngo Dinh Diem in large part because I am highly critical of the man and his government—a judgment derived not only from extant scholarship and well-worn U.S. sources, but also from a broad range of Vietnamese, French, and U.S. archival materials.

While it would be a fool’s errand to try to shake all of the conclusions about Ngo Dinh Diem posited in forty years of historical writing, I find curious the assertion that one singular image of the man emerges from that massive literature. As Jacobs muses, “It is hard to believe . . . that the Diem excoriated by Carter is the same man lionized by Mark Moyar.” This observation underscores the fact that there really is no standard view of Diem in extant historiography. James Carter and Mark Moyar have staked out polar opposite positions on the enduring question of whether Ngo Dinh Diem was an American puppet or a sage leader, and each has earned high praise from some reviewers and castigation from others.2 This disagreement speaks to the ongoing dispute among historians over how to understand Ngo Dinh Diem and his relationship to American advisors. There remains ample room for debate over the nuances of our portrayals of the southern leader and his government—a debate that I suspect will be fueled by the nearly simultaneous publication of Cauldron and Miller’s Misalliance. The two portraits of Ngo Dinh Diem that emerge from these books bear some marked similarities but just as many important differences.

To me it is self-evident that agency should be reclaimed for Vietnamese actors across the board, Ngo Dinh Diem included. However, I maintain that his “politics and vision for the Republic of Vietnam” can only be meaningfully assessed when we examine them in the context of southern Vietnam’s broader domestic political framework. Moreover, it is important to recognize that reclaiming agency does not necessarily lead to redemption. In Ngo Dinh Diem’s case, attention to his governing record fosters not only a deeper understanding of how he conceived of and exercised his leadership, but also of how he undermined his own power. I do attribute to the southern leader a great deal of agency in his pursuit of a nation-building agenda that followed his unique and sincere ideological vision for postcolonial Vietnam. As dependent as he was on aid from Washington, it is certainly true that he was no mere puppet of the United States. In many ways he sat in the driver’s seat of the U.S.-RVN alliance, but I ultimately conclude that he was largely responsible for driving that vehicle off the political cliff by implementing policies that were authoritarian, violently repressive, and—in the eyes of his own people—hypocritical.

While Frankum suggests, reasonably, that Ngo Dinh Diem might have been right to target the politico-religious organizations, “as they had already proven themselves more interested in power and had ambitions beyond the health of the Republic,” the evidence overwhelmingly supports Jacobs’s contrary observation that “a wise ruler ought to have conciliated” politico-religious leaders, venal and unsavory as they may have been. As Strate notes, “Unlike Diem, the Politburo [in Hanoi] understood that coalsitions could be used to absorb, neutralize, isolate, and eventually destroy political obstacles.” By eschewing such coalitions, refusing to share power, and moving straight to the violent oppression of all of his political opponents, Ngo Dinh Diem inspired anti-government sentiment throughout the country. Thus, after examining South Vietnam’s leader in light of his domestic political milieu, I found it difficult to reach any conclusion but that his own exercise of agency contributed as much as any other factor to his grave political failures.

By eschewing such coalitions, refusing to share power, and moving straight to the violent oppression of all of his political opponents, Ngo Dinh Diem inspired anti-government sentiment throughout the country. Thus, after examining South Vietnam’s leader in light of his domestic political milieu, I found it difficult to reach any conclusion but that his own exercise of agency contributed as much as any other factor to his grave political failures. It strikes me that one of the ways in which I do ascribe agency to Ngo Dinh Diem may have contributed to Strate’s primary criticism of my analysis. He finds odd the claim that Ngo Dinh Diem, in the October 1955 referendum to depose Bao Dai, “believed in the virtues of his particular brand of democracy,” and he suggests that modern scholars (and Ngo Dinh Diem’s contemporary political opponents) may be right to be cynical. This critique, I suspect, may stem from my determination to explain the nuanced—albeit convoluted—thinking behind Ngo Dinh Diem’s political project, while also pointing out the reasons why he failed to achieve his desired goals. In fact, I agree wholeheartedly with Strate that the southern leader’s political opponents were right to conclude that his democratic promises were in no way meant to include them in the political process and that modern scholars are accurate when they note that such exclusivity had negative ramifications for his nation-building project.

As I detail in Cauldron, there was a gaping chasm between Ngo Dinh Diem’s understanding of democracy, inspired by the arcane philosophy of personalism, and that of his American patrons (as well as his political opponents who derived their expectations from Western democratic models). He deplored what he saw as the dehumanizing effects of mass politics, and he envisioned a society governed by moral elites in which individuals’ responsibilities rested in the realms of personal conduct and communal duty rather than in the arena of political participation. His vision...
was homogenizing, and in order to pursue it, he had to flush out forces of immorality and disorder, which to him meant eliminating political opposition altogether.

For Ngo Dinh Diem, the 1955 referendum was a vehicle for silencing challengers and legitimizing his leadership. He also saw it as an opportunity to propagate broadly about the virtues of his personalist democracy. In the short term, he had more success with the former than the latter. However, the disconnect between his democratic promises and his insular, oppressive approach to governance fueled the flames of dissent that contributed to his ultimate downfall. He never succeeded in educating the bulk of his constituents about the fundamentals of personalism. That failure would become an ever-deeper problem as he moved forward with policies that were intended to help build a personalist democracy but seemed to his people and his American backers blatantly authoritarian. If anything, U.S. officials should have been much more concerned than they were about the long-term political ramifications of the prime minister’s sweeping democratic promises, which seemed hypocritical to all but the few members of his close circle of advisors who understood and embraced the abstruse personalist philosophy that guided his efforts.

Although Jacobs seems to find my arguments generally persuasive, he too identifies a few instances in which I strain “to impart depth to events that were . . . less profound” than I believe. The first of these pertains to an episode at the height of the sect crisis in which “Lightning” Joe Collins characterized his interactions with leading Hoa Hao Generals Nguyen Than Phuong and Trinh Minh The as “trying to reason with two stubborn four year old children.” I concur with Jacob’s assessment that Collins “drew upon long-standing American notions about Asian immaturity to explain his failure as pacificator”: in fact, I might credit Jacobs with greater insight on that point in *Miracle Man* than he is willing to grant himself.4 Admittedly, my argument that Collins’s ethnocentrism prevented him from realizing that the generals deployed an “intentionally noncommittal political strategy” designed to “lull American, French, and South Vietnamese officials alike into positions of defensiveness and indecision” does depend on a degree of speculation, as discussions of motives often do. While I did not find any smoking guns to reveal Nguyen Than Phuong and Trinh Minh The’s master plans on this occasion, their larger patterns of political behavior leading up to the crisis—particularly the ways in which they maneuvered among and between all of the major players in southern Vietnam in an effort to strengthen their political hands—inform my reading of their intentions in this case. Collins’s dismissive assessment of these two Hoa Hao leaders failed to account for a broader context that belies his claim that they were “alarmingly stupid.”

Jacobs and I may be closer to agreement than he realizes regarding our assessments of the politico-religious leaders who threw their lot in with Ngo Dinh Diem during the sect crisis. While I claim that the decision to rally troops was regarding our assessments of the politico-religious leaders who threw their lot in with Ngo Dinh Diem during the sect crisis. While I claim that the decision to rally troops was

Frankum raises interesting questions about how Ngo Dinh Diem’s clashes with the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen may have been affected by the contemporaneous resettlement of roughly 810,000 refugees from North to South Vietnam. No doubt, that process contributed to the political and social upheaval that marked Ngo Dinh Diem’s first two years in power. While he did much to encourage the migration, hoping that it would serve as a propaganda victory in his competition with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and facilitate his consolidation of power, the results were much more complicated and challenging for his government than he anticipated. I am confused, however, by Frankum’s assertion that “approximately one-third of the refugees were Catholic, though perhaps the number could be as high as half.” The most authoritative work on this subject, by Peter Hansen, puts the percentage at over three-quarters.5 I would be curious to know more about the sources from which Frankum draws his drastically lower numbers. That puzzle aside, scholars may well find it fruitful to examine Vietnamese sources to ask more directly how the sect crisis and the process of refugee resettlement influenced each other and affected Ngo Dinh Diem’s approach to governance.

Masur also identifies possible avenues for future research suggested by *Cauldron of Resistance*. He notes that in my account, “power politics tends to overshadow the human element” of the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen. He would have liked to know more about the rank-and-file supporters of these groups, what motivated them, and how they thought about the events that unfolded around them. Such a project would be invaluable, albeit difficult, given the limitations of Vietnam’s archival holdings, the bureaucratic red tape involved with conducting research there, and the ongoing political conflicts between the current government in Hanoi and religious figures, conflicts that make the latter reluctant to speak openly about their political activities. Still, difficult does not mean impossible, and I hope as much as Masur does that someone will take up this important research.

I offer my sincere thanks once again to Frankum, Jacobs, Masur, and Strate for their serious and thoughtful engagement with my work. My hope is that *Cauldron* will serve as a platform for furthering the internationalization of scholarship on the Vietnam War. Internationalization is part of a most welcome trend in the broader field of diplomatic history, which now features a wide range of scholarship by scholars who no longer presume that all of the answers are to be found in the halls of great powers.

Notes:
Please plan to join old friends and new at the 2014 SHAFR annual meeting in Lexington, Kentucky, the Horse Capital of the World!

The conference will be held June 19-21, 2014 at the Hyatt Regency Lexington and the Lexington Convention Center. Nestled among the beautiful rolling hills of horse country, Lexington is serviced by Blue Grass Airport (LEX), which is just 15 minutes from downtown. Larger airports in Cincinnati Lexington and Louisville are about a 90-minute drive from Lexington.

The Hyatt Regency is attached to the Lexington Convention Center. Hotel amenities include a complimentary airport shuttle, a 24-hour fitness center, a heated indoor pool, and an outdoor sun deck. The SHAFR rate for reservations at the Hyatt Regency is $122/night single or double occupancy, plus 13.4% tax. You can visit the conference website, listed below, to book online, or call the hotel directly at 859-253-1234 and request the SHAFR rate.

The Bluefire Bar and Grill in the Hyatt lobby is a full-service restaurant operating from 6:30am to 10:00pm daily. The bar is open from noon until 11:00pm daily, and serves a late night menu until closing. You can grab a Starbucks to go at the bar all day until 11:00pm. The bar area features several large flat-panel TVs and the staff has promised to broadcast World Cup games during the conference upon request!

The Shops at Lexington Center includes a food court featuring fast casual eateries like Cosí, Arby’s, and Subway, as well as Yesterday’s Bar and Grille, a full-service restaurant and bar open nightly until 1 am and another nearby spot to watch the World Cup.

There are also many restaurants, bars, and shops in downtown Lexington within close walking distance of the conference. You will find the following places in a three block by four block area just a short 10-15 minute walk from the Hyatt Regency and the Lexington Convention Center:

- deSha’s, 101 North Broadway, at the corner of East Main Street.
- Horse and Barrel, next door to deSha’s and a good place to sample local bourbon.
- Saul Good Restaurant and Pub, 123 North Broadway between Main and Short.
- Shakespeare & Co., 367 W. Short Street near Broadway.
- Table Three Ten, 310 W. Short Street near Mill. Focused on small plates and a local, seasonal menu.
- The Village Idiot, 307 W. Short between Broadway and Mill. Lexington’s first gastropub.
- Parlay Social, 257 W. Short between Mill and Market.
- Goodfella’s Pizzeria, 110 N. Mill Street near Short Street.
- Wild Cat Saloon, 123 Cheapside between Main and Short, another place likely to have sports on the TV.
- Cheapside Bar and Grill, 131 Cheapside at West Short Street, features a large outdoor seating area and would be another good spot to catch World Cup broadcasts.
- McCarthy’s Irish Bar, 117 S. Upper between Vine and Main.
- Alfalfa, 141 East Main between Limestone and Martin Luther King Blvd. Focused on local food, vegetarian-friendly.
- Lexington Beerworks, a bit of a longer walk at 213 North Limestone between 2nd and 3rd Streets, but a good spot for craft beer lovers. Outdoor seating available.

For those feeling a bit more adventurous, another popular area with an up-and-coming restaurant scene can be found along Jefferson Street, about a 15 minute walk from the Hyatt.

- Nick Ryan’s Saloon, 157 Jefferson Street between Short and 2nd, fun neighborhood feel.
- The Grey Goose, 170 Jefferson Street between Short and 2nd, popular for pizza.
- Lexington’s burgeoning food truck scene is known to congregate in this area on weekend evenings.
Both of the above districts are serviced by COLT, Lexington’s free downtown circulator service. COLT has two routes: the Blue Route, which operates 11:30am – 2:30pm Monday through Friday and Thursday, Friday and Saturday from 6:00pm – 1:00am, and the Green Route, which runs Thursday, Friday, and Saturday nights from 9:00pm – 3:00am.

The 5/3 Bank Pavilion at Cheapside Park hosts Thursday Night Live, a free community event every Thursday from 4:30 – 8:00pm featuring live music. Cheapside Park is also the site of the Lexington Farmers Market, open Saturdays from 7:00am to 3:00pm. Cheapside Park is located at Main Street between Upper and Mill Streets, a short walk from the Hyatt and the LCC.

You can’t visit Lexington without learning a little bit about its rich history in equestrian pursuits. Keeneland Race Course, which hosts world-class horse races every April and October, is a quick 15-minute drive from downtown Lexington and is open daily for self-guided tours. Kentucky Horse Park is a 1,200 acre state park and working horse farm. It is open daily for tours, horseback trail rides, pony rides, shows, and competitions. The Smithsonian-affiliated International Museum of the Horse is also on site.

Lexington has non-equine treasures to share, too. The Aviation Museum of Kentucky is located at Blue Grass Airport, and the Kentucky Military History Museum is a short drive away in Frankfort. Ashland, the Henry Clay Estate, and the Mary Todd Lincoln House are both within walking distance of the Hyatt Regency. Gratz Park is not just a park but a historic district comprised of many lovely 19th century homes. The Art Museum at the University of Kentucky includes many fine works by American and European artists as well as African and pre-Columbian artifacts. Camp Nelson Heritage Park, about 20 miles south of Lexington, is a National Historic Landmark and was a Union Army supply depot during the Civil War where more than 10,000 African American troops trained. And finally, what would a visit to Lexington be without a distillery tour? Town Branch Distillery is just a ten minute walk from the Lexington Convention Center, and distillery tours also include a peek at the brewery that produces Kentucky Ale and Kentucky Bourbon Barrel Ale.

If you are curious about Lexington, download the free downtown audio walking tour! Get the app, download the mp3 file, or watch a video of the tour at http://www.visitlex.com/audiotour/index.php.

If research is on your mind, the University of Kentucky Libraries is a rich resource featuring manuscripts, still photographs, video, and sound recordings related to Kentucky history. It also includes several outstanding special collections, including:

- The Louie B. Nunn Center for Oral History includes more than 8,000 oral history interviews on topics such as political history, Appalachia, the history of broadcasting, World War II, and Vietnam.
- The Public Policy Archives contains manuscript collections related to the history of Kentucky politics and government, including the papers of U.S. Senator and Vice President under Truman Alben W. Barkley; U.S. Senator John Sherman Cooper, who also served as the American ambassador to India and Nepal and East Germany; and U.S. Senator Walter D. Huddleston, a member of the Church Committee.

Visit libraries.uky.edu for more information.

This year’s social event will be held at Buffalo Trace Distillery, the oldest continually operating distillery in the country and a recently designated National Historic Landmark. The distillery sits on 130 acres in the heart of bourbon country. The log cabin-style clubhouse was built by distillery employees during the Great Depression, and features a covered wraparound porch and access to the beautifully maintained grounds. We hope you will join us for a casual social event featuring picnic-style fare, complimentary beer and wine, bluegrass music, and, of course, a bourbon tasting. This will be a uniquely Kentucky experience!

We hope you can join us in Lexington in June! Visit the conference website for up-to-date information on the program, conference logistics, and ticketing: http://www.shafr.org/conferences/annual/2014-annual-meeting/, “like” us on facebook at www.facebook.com/shafr, or follow us on twitter @SHAFRConference, #SHAFR2014. You may also contact the Conference Coordinator, Jennifer Walton, at conference@shafr.org.
It “Jes Grew:” A Roadmap of the Cultural Turn in U.S. Foreign Relations History

M. Todd Bennett

In Mumbo Jumbo, his 1972 novel set in the 1920s, Ishmael Reed characterizes jazz as Jes Grew, an infectious virus that causes everyone who contracts it to lose social inhibitions, dance uncontrollably, and have fun. Jes Grew spreads quickly. Nobody can say for sure why, other than that jazz offers a liberating alternative to the prevailing straight-laced culture. It Jes Grew. And as it grows, it loosens social strictures. Midwestern youths defy their parents’ prohibitions; whites and blacks co-mingle in Harlem nightclubs. It even invades the White House, where President Warren Harding is rumored to be afflicted. All of which leads the villainous Wallflower Order, a secret society composed of white male elites, to try to put a stop to the Jes Grew epidemic, which threatens to undermine white power.

The development of the cultural approach to U.S. foreign relations history resembles Reed’s account of jazz’s rise. The analogy is not perfect. Unlike jazz in Mumbo Jumbo, culturalism arose and spread for readily identifiable reasons, and I in no way mean to imply that its opponents are bigots. The comparison is apt in many respects, however. Like Jes Grew, culturalism came out of nowhere thirty years ago to exert a Pied Piper-like effect on mesmerized historians. Many were junior, female, and/or non-white scholars who defied the powers-that-be by taking the cultural turn. Moreover, members of diplomatic history’s Wallflower establishment resisted that turn in part because it appeared to threaten their dominion over the field. And their fears proved justified: culturalism Jes Grew, quickly overrunning and revitalizing diplomatic history by bringing fresh ideas and new subjects, jazz and race included, into the fold.

The cultural turn’s history requires little elaboration here, as it will be familiar to Passport readers. Suffice it to say that U.S. diplomatic history, from its inception after World War I until the 1980s, generally disregarded cultural analyses, which appeared irrelevant to the field’s traditional, realist focus on the exercise of hard national power (that is, economic, political, and military muscle), along with state-to-state relations and the diplomats who conducted them. Several prominent critics attacked diplomatic history as the Cold War drew to a close, however, denouncing the field as a “parochial, ethnocentric, and hidebound” scholastic “backwater.” Diplomatic historians lacked foreign language skills, neglected non-U.S. archives, and ignored international perspectives, they charged, producing narratives that uncritically mimicked Washington’s worldview. More to the point, they implied that diplomatic history’s myopic focus on state-to-state relations conducted by elite white males not only excluded women and minorities from the historical record but also overlooked the full scope of foreign relations.

Although somewhat overstated, those criticisms traumatized diplomatic history and presented it with an existential crisis. But they had a salutary effect, touching off a period of soul-searching that ultimately rejuvenated the field. Diplomatic history became more international. It also took the cultural turn. Influenced by the new cultural history that swept the historical profession at large, Emily Rosenberg, Akira Iriye, Michael Hunt, and others published groundbreaking studies in the 1980s that revealed the cultural bases of U.S. foreign policy or traced the export of American culture. In so doing, those pioneers legitimated culturalism by demonstrating that people relate to one another across international boundaries in any number of ways, thereby broadening the scope of diplomatic history to encompass not only economic, military, and political affairs but also cultural ones. Culturalism Jes Grew thereafter, and its rapid growth can be measured by comparing the first two editions of Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, the field’s methodological guidebook, whose ecumenical title (“foreign relations” rather than “diplomatic” history) reflected the change that had already occurred. The first edition of Explaining appeared in 1991 and included just four essays outlining cultural approaches to American foreign relations history. The second edition, published in 2004, featured no fewer than seven essays devoted to cultural issues such as ideology, race, and gender. Several other essays in the volume—on borderlands or modernization theory, for instance—engaged culture at some level.

Culturalism has only grown since 2004. Culturalists reflect diplomatic history’s Janus-faced nature in that they look inward, outward, or both ways at once. Those who look inward examine the attitudes, ideas, images, prejudices, and values—known collectively as mentalités, worldviews, or the zeitgeist—that frame American perceptions of and responses to the wider world. Some continue to see America’s ideology or national identity as key to understanding the missionary zeal that has often characterized U.S. foreign relations. Others focus on religion, once an understudied topic, by investigating the influence of faith and faith-based groups on U.S. foreign policy. Still others study race, documenting the many instances in which white racism and domestic race relations shaped U.S. foreign policy, especially with respect to non-white others. Scholars also view foreign relations through the prism of gender and find that feminine or masculine norms exert a powerful effect on popular worldviews as well as diplomatic decisions.

America impresses an enormous cultural footprint on the planet. Those U.S. diplomatic historians who look outward chart the transmission and reception of American culture overseas. Why has American culture become so omnipresent? How was it received abroad? Does the United States exert soft (or cultural) power as well as hard power in the world? Several works published since 2004 address such questions by studying the U.S. government’s attempts to manage the nation’s image through public diplomacy. Others focus on private cultural institutions, including Hollywood movies, whose outsized role in U.S. foreign relations history continues to draw academic attention.
American culture's ubiquity means that the issue of Americanization overhangs many investigations of U.S. foreign relations history. Does the United States exert cultural imperialism over others? Do others influence us? Are foreign consumers victimized by America's cultural and commercial onslaught or do they have agency? Those are some of the questions addressed by scholars of cultural transfer who treat imperialism as an unequal, albeit mutual, exchange of goods, ideas, and identities. While Victoria de Grazia's *Irresistible Empire* argues that American mass consumption easily overwhelmed European alternatives throughout the twentieth century, most other works published since 2004 have reached more modest conclusions. To be sure, America dominated cross-cultural encounters, they concede, but those encounters were also conversations, not monologues, in which American participants listened as well as spoke, gave as well as received. In *Satchmo Blows Up the World*, for example, Penny Von Eschen shows that jazz ambassadors such as Louis Armstrong were influenced by foreign musical even as they carried Jes Grew abroad while touring the globe on the State Department's dime.11

Together, the cultural and international turns have revitalized foreign relations history. Several bullish assessments of the state of the field issued over the last decade conclude that diplomatic history is more "vigorouz," innovative, and "pluralist" than ever before.12 Not everyone is so sanguine, however. Although culturalism has earned a measure of respect, the field's version of Jes Grew continues to encounter stiff Wallflower resistance. Examinations of how historical actors perceived themselves, others, and their respective places in the world may well be interesting, critics maintain, but they do not necessarily explain why people acted as they did. Moreover, as culturalist Andrew Rotter writes, the opponents of culturalism complain that it neglects power, U.S. diplomatic history's primary concern: "Oppression is not, they say, about ridicule, stereotype, or ideas based on gender, race, or religion. Language does not kill people; war is not a discourse." Traditionalists insist that only treatments of economic, military, or political issues can illuminate the causes as well as the consequences of the exercise of state power on the international stage.13

Stung by culturalism's rise to and revisionism's fall from post-Cold War academic fashion, scholars of the Left are among the sharpest critics. Culturalists have prioritized race and gender over "class analyses of international affairs," laments Elizabeth McKillen. Moreover, according to Robert Buzzanco, culturalism neglects the essence, or "material basis," of U.S. foreign policy, which he takes to be capitalism's expansionary drive to acquire materials, labor, and markets overseas. Cultural studies "often omit the class backgrounds of policymakers, overlook the economic imperatives conditioning their prescriptions for American action, [and] ignore the material relationships between business, the state, and elites in other lands," he writes.14 Buzzanco's concerns complement those of mainstream scholars. David Reynolds and Thomas Schwartz worry that the cultural turn distracts diplomatic historians from addressing war and peace, domestic and alliance politics, intelligence collection and analysis, and other traditional topics that remain nonetheless vital to the field as well as the world at large. In taking the cultural "detour," Schwartz concludes, diplomatic historians "have abandoned some of what made us distinct, and dare I say, relevant, to the larger society."15

Culturalists respond by maintaining that power and culture are inseparable. "Power is everywhere ... because it comes from everywhere," observed French social theorist Michel Foucault in *The History of Sexuality*. That influential work reinforced the "conviction among historians that culture as much as economics or politics is central to maintaining power," according to historian Lawrence B. Glickman. Power geopolitics derive from culture in at least two ways: through the socially manufactured values and perceptions that determine, in Rotter's words, "how people see other people, how they construct and imagine them, [and also] how they treat them"; and, in the formulation of political scientist Joseph Nye Jr., through the "soft power" of attraction that nations exert in the world by virtue of their cultural exports. And culturalists point to the mountain of scholarship published since Iriye's seminal 1979 essay "Culture and Power" that empirically documents that connection. Collectively, that literature has performed an important intellectual service insofar as it has expanded our modern appreciation of how and why power is acquired, enacted, or opposed on the world stage to include cultural as well as economic, political, and military elements. Yesterday's archetypal realists are idealists today. That maxim is exemplified by none other than Henry Kissinger, who recalls in his self-congratulatory *Ending the Vietnam War* that he and his colleagues who opposed the communist takeover of Southeast Asia "sustained America's idealistic tradition" in "defending the cause of freedom against a brutal enemy."16

Culturalists do still wrestle with the problem of causation, because cultural influence is harder to quantify than that exerted by, say, the number of boots the U.S. armed forces have on the ground. The latest word comes from Frank Ninkovich, whose *Global Dawn* concludes that culture "is not a cause in the commonly understood scientific sense." Rather, culture defines "the field of possibility for what can or cannot be done." In other words, Americans' newfound globalist outlook, the subject of Ninkovich's study, did not cause late nineteenth-century U.S. expansionism. Instead, as Christopher Endy notes in his introduction to the H-Diplo roundtable on *Global Dawn*, that outlook "merely made imperialism conceivable to Americans in 1898. Culture defined the parameters of what was possible, even if it did not determine the choices people made within those cultural boundaries."17

Any imprecision regarding causation "hardly disqualifies culture as a meaningful category of analysis," says Rotter, who observes that "straightforward explanations . . . don't always suit the complexity of history. Cause and effect are surely important, but it is by no means clear that so-called 'traditional' explanations of U.S. foreign relations, including strategy, economics, or national interest, do any better at figuring them out." What caused the Cold War? If the answer to that question were so obvious, then non-culturalists—from realists to revisionists to post-revisionists—would have achieved consensus long ago. Yet scholastic debate about the Cold War's origins continues more than sixty years after the fact, enriched by lessons learned from culturalism, it should be noted. Consider Melvyn Leffler, who conceives that his earlier work prioritizing strategy as the determining factor in U.S. Cold War decision-making "understated the role of ideology." "Ideology, not to mention historical memory, "shaped perceptions of threat, the selection of friends, the assessment of opportunities, and the understanding of what was happening within the international system itself," he writes. Others are reaching a similar conclusion, and the litany of the causes of the Cold War now routinely includes ideology as well as interests.18

Having mapped where the cultural turn has gone, I would like to suggest some directions it could take in the future. Let us begin with the causation problem that, if left unsolved, will continue to diminish cultural analyses in the eyes of critics. Culturalists must press ahead in the search for more satisfying answers, perhaps by borrowing...
methods developed by behavioral scientists to gauge more precisely how and why humans acquire, process, and act upon information. Culturalists could also profit from the work of such international economic historians as Thomas Zeiler, who reminds us not to lose sight of the many negotiations conducted by the U.S. government on behalf of the American entertainment and information industries—negotiations that have done so much, over time, to lower boundaries limiting the “free trade” of American culture, Americanize the world, and profoundly shape the everyday experiences of the “common man.”16 Investigating the cultural components of such deals as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade would go some way toward responding to the concerns of historians of the Left, who correctly point out that culturalists have heretofore treated American culture more as culture and less as an economic commodity produced at home and distributed abroad by entrepreneurs, often with support from U.S. trade representatives.

Ronald Reagan’s ideological prosecution of the Cold War looms large, as his administration’s foreign policy records are declassified and diplomatic historians tackle the 1980s. Did Reagan’s labeling of the Soviet Union as the “evil empire” and anti-communist insurgents as “freedom fighters” put the Kremlin on the defensive? Did Western consumer culture accelerate communism’s fall by stimulating Eastern Europeans’ desires for Western consumer culture, as has been claimed? Did U.S. propaganda penetrate the Iron Curtain? Culturalists should remember that cultural relations are not a one-way street: Washington does not monopolize the conversation, which involves listening as well as speaking, receiving as well as giving.

Culturalists appear well positioned to address such questions. In so doing, however, they should remember that cultural relations are not a one-way street: Washington does not monopolize the conversation, which involves listening as well as speaking, receiving as well as giving. The extant literature on public diplomacy is mostly silent regarding the activities of countries other than the United States, as pointed out by the editors of one recent anthology, who note “that the United States has than the United States, as pointed out by the editors of the History of American Foreign Relations by encouraging other participants in the global cultural conversation. To some extent, that is as it should be. We are talking about U.S. diplomatic history, after all, and American culture is unusually mighty. But privileging America’s voice over that of others not only diserves the historical record—the United States was just one among many cultural powers in the world—but also replicates U.S. cultural imperialism. Our globalized age calls for studies that decenter the United States from and incorporate non-American powers into the transnational history of cultural relations, revealing not only how our governmental and non-governmental organizations affected them but also how theirs affected us.

Non-European cultural actors remain the most understudied. Editors Michael Hogan and Thomas Paterson conclude their introduction to the 2004 edition of Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations by encouraging historians to “extend their analysis to non-Western nations.” Yet too few culturalists have acted on that charge. Consider Japan, for instance. Diplomatic historians know that, though middle- or even lightweights relative to Japan, have received less scholarly attention than their geopolitical positions merit. How has their historical memory of, say, Western imperialism shaped their worldviews and informed their diplomatic relations with Washington? What about ideological or religious differences? Have public diplomats from Beijing to Brasilia successfully managed impressions of their countries in the United States? The list could go on, but the point is that more historians need to surmount the not inconsiderable archival and linguistic barriers that stand in the way of gaining fuller appreciations of the cultural bases of what promise to be among the twenty-first century’s most consequential relationships.

During the Arab Spring of 2011, pro-democracy protestors in Cairo’s Tahrir Square used such services as Twitter to record and slip news of their demonstrations to followers inside and outside Egypt. Their actions ultimately toppled Hosni Mubarak’s regime, with a little foreign help. According to reports, Twitter was scheduled to power down for routine site maintenance amid the protests. But the U.S. Department of State intervened and persuaded the company to wait because Twitter was playing an outsized role in sustaining the pro-democracy movement.22 That episode illustrates how critical modern information technology is to international affairs. It also suggests that studying that technology’s effect on foreign relations may be the next big thing for diplomatic historians. Reagan’s National Security Council staff began using email in 1982, and electronic communication has only proliferated among U.S. officials since: George W. Bush’s administration reportedly left behind some eighty terabytes of electronic records, thirty-five times the amount of digital data generated during Bill Clinton’s tenure in office. The explosion of electronic records presents culturalists with a promising new resource. Because email and text message exchanges are less formal than, say, policy papers or even memoranda of conversations, they may provide us with policymakers’ relatively unguarded views. As with Richard Nixon’s White House tapes, on which the president and Kissinger can be heard making disparaging remarks about women, people of color, and ethic groups—Kissinger famously referred to Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi as a “bitch” during a November 1971 Oval Office conversation, for instance—they could well reveal the emotions and assumptions underlying foreign policy decisions.23 And if that proves to be the case, then digital correspondence will be a boon to culturalists.

Has digital communication affected crisis management? Past experience may serve as a guide. Telegraphy’s introduction altered the culture of diplomacy in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, reports historian David Nickles. Among other things, the telegraph speeded communication, accelerated the pace of diplomacy, and inflamed passions when international disputes arose, causing policymakers to make quicker, less reflective, more
emotional decisions than before.24 Nickles' findings lead one to wonder if the telegraph's modern analogs have had similar effects.

In any event, the information revolution has already shifted the geopolitical balance and altered statecraft. The World Wide Web operates largely on American-branded hardware and software developed by Apple, Microsoft, and other multinational corporations headquartered in the United States. Silicon Valley's innovations have given the United States such a competitive advantage in the information age that Nye foresees a new era of soft power ahead, backed by the "U.S. culture of openness and innovation." And Washington has acted, with mixed results, to fully seize its advantage even as competitors try to close the gap. The U.S. intelligence community has tapped into the Internet, as was made plain by the 2013 revelations of the National Security Agency's extensive digital surveillance. Cybersecurity experts scramble to protect the nation's secrets from unauthorized leakers, hackers, and spies. Diplomats negotiate international agreements governing the rules of cyberwarfare that military forces are planning. And public affairs officials are adapting, albeit slowly, to the information age by practicing "public diplomacy 2.0"—that is, digital or online diplomacy—to get the U.S. government's message across to overseas audiences, especially younger ones. To date, foreign relations historians have devoted little attention to such developments.25 That will surely change as additional documentation becomes available, because information technology's geopolitical ramifications demand thorough scholarly investigation.

Lastly, foreign relations historians have similarly ignored the latest iteration of Jes Grew. Rap music may be a materialistic, misogynistic, homophobic, vulgar, and violent assault on the ears, as the genre's many critics claim. Like it or not, however, hip-hop—encompassing not only music but also breakdancing and graffiti art—is a global phenomenon that stands among America's most significant pop cultural exports. In Foreign Policy magazine, journalist Jeff Chang likened hip-hop to a "virus" that, like jazz generations ago, Jes Grew from humble beginnings to infect the planet. International from the beginning, hip-hop originated in New York City in the 1970s among African-American musicians who mixed Jamaican reggae with Bronx slang over funky Afro-Latin-influenced grooves." Exported by touring American musicians, commercial interests, and the TV show Yo! MTV Raps, hip-hop has since grown to become "a lingua franca that binds young people all around the world," writes Chang, adding that non-American (and also often non-black) performers and fans are drawn to the music's infectious rhythm as well as its empowering message of resistance to the status quo. That is not to say that Americanization has necessarily followed, however, as many foreign artists, although deeply influenced by American styles, have developed their own riffs that incorporate non-American musical traditions and rhymes that address local conditions.26

What hip-hop's remarkable growth means to U.S. foreign relations—if indeed it means anything—remains to be seen. U.S. public diplomats have maintained a studious distance from the hip-hop scene, and it is unclear if hip-hop's negative reputation among the Wallflowers of the world has worked to the United States' advantage in the court of public opinion. At the same time, however, hip-hop has extended America's cultural reach to new generations of restive youths, and its backstory speaks to the complex intersections of music and politics, commerce and consumption, and race and identity in a globalized world. For those reasons alone, hip-hop deserves serious academic treatment akin to Von Eschen's analysis of jazz in Satchmo Blows Up the World. May culturalists add it to their research agenda alongside topics such as the Internet, non-American actors, the Cold War's end, trade, causation, and power.

Notes:
1. Ishmael Reed, Mumbo Jumbo (New York, 1972).


The following colleagues were elected in the 2014 SHAFR election:

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**Fredrik Logevall**

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**Tim Borstelmann**

**Council:**
**Bob Brigham**

**Council:**
**Alan McPherson**

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**Penny Von Eschen**

**Nominating Committee:**
**Barbara Keys**

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**Congratulations!**

**Passport January 2014**
Introduction, Roundtable on Max Paul Friedman’s Rethinking Anti-Americanism: The History of an Exceptional Concept in American Foreign Relations

Bradley R. Simpson, Salim Yaqub, Klaus Larres, Sheyda Jahanbani, Bevan Sewell, and Max Paul Friedman

C certain core ideas in the history of U.S. foreign policy, through their very invocation, tell us as much about the person uttering them as they do about the things they purport to describe (or prescribe): freedom, development, stability, exceptionalism, and democracy come to mind. They serve as markers of American self-identity, as discourse, and as ideology, and therefore call for an analysis of their enduring meaning.

Anti-Americanism serves this function, ceaselessly invoked by policymakers, commentators, intellectuals and others to describe the purported and irrational hatred of all things American by a litany of foreigners: nationalist politicians, writers, dissident intellectuals, mobilized masses of ordinary people, and assorted radicals. One of the great achievements of Max Paul Friedman’s Rethinking Anti-Americanism: The History of an Exceptional Concept in American Foreign Relations is to provide a coherent intellectual and interpretive framework for understanding a concept whose meaning over time is inherently unstable.

This wide-ranging and ambitious book starts by investigating the emergence of the popular myth of anti-Americanism from the early Republic through the end of the 19th century, and the enshrining of anti-Americanism “as an enduring—and misleading—analytical category, whose dual effect of stifling dissent at home and distorting Americans’ perceptions of foreign behavior would develop in scope and power over the course of the twentieth century.”(51) In five tightly argued and chronologically arranged chapters, Friedman then charts the persistent deployment of the term in the World War I era, the early Cold War, in U.S. relations with Latin America, in relations with France during the Vietnam War, and in the so called “age of protest” that followed.

As all four reviewers here agree, this is an important book. Sheyda Jahanbani characterizes it as “a damning account of the parochialism and downright paranoid behavior of a century’s worth of American foreign policy ‘experts.’” The reviewers also laud Friedman for the power and persuasiveness of his overall argument, and for the “thoroughness and skill with which he dismantles [the] myth” of anti-Americanism. Time and time again, in truly exhaustive fashion, Friedman shows that purportedly “Anti-American” critics couched their opposition to U.S. policies in the context of broader admiration of American ideals or institutions, while directing equal or greater fire toward the domestic failings of their own societies.

This is an inventively researched account—multilingual, multinational, ranging across five languages, nine countries, and a dizzying array of newspapers and secondary sources. Friedman, however, has done far more than simply catalog the reaction of distressed policymakers and elites to foreign criticism. He provides nuanced appraisals, for example, of German, British, and Latin American reactions to the 1954 U.S.-sponsored overthrow of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala (131-138), as well as the ridicule that greeted Washington’s assertion that the tiny Central American nation posed a threat to Western interests.

While admiring of Friedman’s overall effort, the reviewers did raise a number of criticisms and questions. One concerns his emphasis on Europe and Latin America as geographic regions that best exemplify the character of anti-Americanism. Salim Yaqub wonders whether the differences between the two regions outweigh their similarities, and how different Friedman’s argument would look were he to include other areas, such as the Middle East or East Asia, where the histories of colonialism, war, and U.S. intervention

Though Friedman engages deeply with the literature on anti-Americanism, especially in political science, some reviewers felt that he offered “no clear definition of precisely what anti-Americanism actually is … what the difference is between, for instance, anti-Americanism and un-American behavior,” and by what yardstick the historian can measure its extent. Friedman, however, argues that his goal is not to join the periodic chorus of authors purporting to define
anti-Americanism, except to show that even according to their own definition “very little genuine anti-Americanism has existed.” Rather, he attempts to demonstrate how anti-Americanism has been used over time as a tool of boundary-drawing, inscribing the limits of “acceptable” criticism of the United States in general and its foreign policy in particular.

One of Friedman’s most provocative claims, and one that engendered the most disagreement among his reviewers, is that reflexive dismissal of foreign critics of U.S. foreign policy as anti-American shaped concrete policy outcomes, prompting policymakers to dismiss otherwise viable options due to their provenance. Friedman makes his case most strongly with regard to the Vietnam War, arguing that successive U.S. administrations’ obsession with Charles de Gaulle’s alleged anti-Americanism led them to dismiss out of hand the French leader’s proposals for disengaging from Vietnam as not only misguided but irrational and motivated by animus. Not all readers are persuaded: Bevan Sewell rejects the notion that “it was an entrenched sense of French anti-Americanism that prevented U.S. policymakers from adopting the recommendation for withdrawal that was being put forward by Charles de Gaulle,” rather than the broader constellation of considerations that scholars such as Fred Logevall and Andrew Preston have identified.

Friedman’s contention that a dismissal of anti-Americanism in Latin America as irrational and misguided blinded U.S. officials to the legitimate concerns of their southern neighbors likewise strikes Sewell and others as less important than the U.S. commitment to development and the conscious protection of geopolitical and economic interests in the face of determined opposition. Here the author faces the challenge confronted by other scholars of slippery concepts: whether or not to ascribe causal power to an idea without obvious policy implications, and, if so, how to fit it into the landscape of the more traditional concerns animating foreign relations history.

Klaus Larres observes that “all global hegemons in world history have been resented and have attracted hatred, not because of their domestic policies, structures and wealth, but because of their foreign and military policies” If this is the case, he suggests, Friedman might have grounded his sophisticated analysis in a more comparative framework, asking, for example, did British or Roman observers at the height of their respective imperial power fret about “anti-British” or “anti-Roman” sentiment? Sheyda Jahanbani and Salim Yaqub raise a set of related questions: is anti-Americanism a creature primarily of the American right, and, if so, is there a progressive counter-narrative of cosmopolitanism or globalism which might stand in its stead?

These are not questions that Friedman himself set out to ask, and the reviewers note that it is because the author has provided such a capacious interpretive framework that they were moved to meditate on some of its broader implications. This certainly will not be the last word on the topic of anti-Americanism, but the readers assembled here (including this one) agree that Friedman’s account is by far the most well argued, thoroughly researched, and conceptually sophisticated attempt thus far.

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Friedman looks specifically at criticism emanating from Western Europe and Latin America, and at U.S. perceptions of such criticism, the implications of his treatment extend well beyond those regions. After all, he writes, “there is no global anti-American conspiracy uniting the Left Bank with the West Bank and Baghdad with Berlin” (240). The sooner we stop imagining one, the better off we will be.

One way that Friedman challenges the critics of anti-Americanism—or the anti-anti-Americans, as he calls them—is by holding them to their own definition of the phenomenon. Anti-anti-Americans, he writes, generally concede “that criticism of the United States in itself is not necessarily anti-Americanism, and they specify that at least two elements are necessary to make it so: particularized hostility toward the United States (more than toward other countries), and generalized hatred of the United States (in most if not all its aspects).” Anti-Americanism, in short, entails “hating the country more than any other, and hating everything about it” (5–6).

Yet by this definition, Friedman argues, very little genuine anti-Americanism has existed. He makes the point by surveying a century and a half of social, cultural, and political commentary on the United States by foreign critics widely seen as “anti-American”—Europeans like Frances Trollope, Charles Dickens, Jean Paul Sartre, and Herbert Marcuse; Latin Americans like Francisco Bilbao, José Martí, Enrique Rodó, and Carlos Fuentes (31–4, 43–5, 109–118, 156, 203–4). Friedman maintains that none of these figures focused exclusively on the United States; they directed their criticism at other countries as well and usually reserved their harshest words for the ills of their own societies. Nor did the foreign critics issue blanket condemnations of the United States; rather, they found much to admire...
in its political institutions, social arrangements, economic vitality, or cultural achievements. Their criticism tended to fasten on specific American problems or on instances in which the United States failed to live up to its professed ideals (which, admittedly, happened fairly often).

Indeed, the notion that most international criticism of the United States has arisen in response to the behavior of its government or the performance of its institutions, rather than reflecting a wholesale rejection of its values (or simple envy over its wealth and power), is a recurring argument of this book. Friedman cites numerous instances in which foreigners’ impressions of the United States switched from favorable to unfavorable, or vice versa, in response to American actions or the lack thereof. Early in the nineteenth century, the South American independence leader Simón Bolívar had high hopes for an alliance with the United States but grew disillusioned when his “brothers to the north” declined to aid his struggle (41). In 1952, when a logjam at Beirut’s airport left thousands of Muslims stranded on their pilgrimage to Mecca, U.S. military aircraft ferried nearly 4,000 hajjis to Saudi Arabia so that they could complete the journey, reaping gratitude from erstwhile Muslim critics of the United States (91).

Similarly, surveys of West German opinion from the 1960s to the 1980s show that fluctuating attitudes about the United States closely correlated with shifts in U.S. foreign policy. U.S. policy stances that were popular with the West German public, such as John F. Kennedy’s statement of solidarity with the people of Berlin and Jimmy Carter’s promise to restore morality to foreign relations, boosted America’s favorability ratings, whereas unpopular U.S. positions, like Lyndon Johnson’s escalation of the Vietnam War and Ronald Reagan’s aggressive nuclear policies, caused those ratings to dip (218–19). “[T]he United States was not ‘damned if you do, damned if you don’t,’ as the anti-anti-Americans claim,” Friedman writes; “it was damned when it did something unwelcome” (220).

Americans’ obsession with anti-Americanism is not simply an irritant in international affairs, Friedman argues. It has led to concrete, and highly negative, diplomatic consequences. In his treatment of the postwar period, the author recounts several international episodes that illustrate the point. One of the more extended Latin American case studies involves Guatemala in the 1950s. This story is a familiar one, but Friedman reinvigorates it with fresh insights and truly impressive multilingual and multichannel research. In the first half of the decade, President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán’s pro-Soviet “anti-American” policies and cooperative relationship with the local communist party drew charges of pro-Soviet “anti-Americanism” from the United States. Few other governments shared this view; Friedman shows that a wide swath of Latin American and European diplomats privately ridiculed the notion that Guatemala was falling under Soviet domination.

In Caracas, the United States convened an inter-American conference designed to isolate Guatemala and secure hemispheric support for the removal of Arbenz. Despite U.S. blandishments and pressure, the Latin American delegations passed a resolution affirming “the inalienable right of each American State freely to choose its own government and economic system” (128–39). The United States launched its coup d’etat against Arbenz anyway, provoking an outpouring of anger from the region that it dismissed, naturally, as irrational anti-Americanism. Arbenz’s successors unleashed a reign of repression that eventually killed 200,000 Guatemalans. “What we’d give to have an Arbenz now,” an anonymous U.S. official admitted in 1980—before probably being replaced by someone far less inclined toward this sort of introspection (139–45).

Friedman’s longest European case study involves American attitudes toward French President Charles de Gaulle, whose frank criticisms of U.S. foreign policy, especially concerning the Vietnam War, made him an archetypal type of American “anti-Americanism.” Mindful of his own country’s disastrous adventure in Indochina, de Gaulle believed the United States was making a terrible blunder in escalating the war. Initially, he confined himself to private warnings. Only after U.S. officials ignored his advice did de Gaulle go public with his views, earning the familiar epithet from the U.S. government and media. Convinced it had nothing to learn from such an “anti-American” source, Washington continued down its ill-chosen path (172–7).

Actually, de Gaulle was—or at least tried to be—much more helpful to the United States than were those other Western allies who shared his apprehensions about Vietnam but declined to speak up. “We do not want the Americans to follow what seems to us a dangerous and mistaken course,” Britain’s ambassador to the United States privately remarked in 1964, “but still less do we want to incur the odium of persuading them to cut their losses.” Britain suppressed its misgivings and publicly backed U.S. actions in Vietnam; West Germany did the same. “[O]ne might well ask,” Friedman concludes, “how ‘pro-American’ it was to offer insincere support for an ally’s futile and self-destructive policy in full knowledge that it was doomed to failure” (180–4). Friends don’t let friends get into a land war in Asia.

In these ways, Friedman brilliantly demolishes “anti-anti-Americanism” as an intellectual proposition and amply demonstrates its baneful impact on international affairs. Where he is somewhat less successful is in constructing his own affirmative model for understanding the phenomenon. Why, readers might wonder, does Friedman focus his study on Western Europe and Latin America? The author justifies the decision by noting that those two regions have been “long understood as the most vital areas of U.S. interest, where an American presence in the form of political ascendancy, trade ties, military power, and cultural tradition has been the longest lived . . . . As regions with a shared cultural tradition firmly located in ‘the West’ or ‘the Free World’”—as contested as those expressions may be—they have posed a dilemma that has perplexed Americans for generations: Why has so much conflict arisen where common values and shared interests seem to exist?” It is easy enough, Friedman writes, to account for anti-U.S. criticism emanating from countries that have been geopolitical rivals of the United States. “The epistemological challenge for this book is . . . to understand why many Americans have seen their own country . . . where they expected to find compliance and gratitude” (13).

While this passage captures some similarities between European and Latin American interactions with the United States, it glosses over a crucial difference: the much higher degree of military, diplomatic, and economic domination that the United States has exercised over Latin America. The point emerges clearly in Friedman’s quotation from a satirical 1951 article by the Mexican economist José Iturriaga, who, purporting to explain his hostility to the Soviet Union, condemned “the Czar of all the Russians, James Polkov” for dispatching “Winfield Scottisky to make war on us in order to annex the province of Texas” (124). A similar piece by a European would have made no sense. Friedman quotes private statements by U.S. officials denigrating Latin Americans’ capacity for democracy (129, 146). Americans don’t seem to have harbored such doubts about Europeans, and even if they did, they refrained from acting on them, apart from some covert electoral meddling in the late 1940s that pales in comparison with the Latin
American experience. The structural difference between the two relationships emerges, willy-nilly, over the course of the book. (Note that Washington’s disputes with Arbenz concerned Guatemalan domestic institutions, whereas its tussles with de Gaulle were over foreign policy.) It is puzzling that author’s introductory framework does not capture this difference.

Friedman also could have done more to explain why the obsessive concern over “anti-Americanism” arose in the first place and has acquired its peculiar character over the decades. He ventures answers here and there, but they tend to raise more questions than they resolve. “Because national identity in the United States is linked to a set of values rather than a myth of ethnic origin as in many other countries,” Friedman writes, “opposition to those values could be more readily labeled as hostility toward the nation itself.” Fair enough, but this still does not tell us which values associated with Americanism should be singled out for defense. One might expect the charge of anti-Americanism to be hurled at the opponents of democracy, pluralism, and social justice; and indeed, Friedman writes, early nineteenth-century champions of those values did call their political foes “anti-American” (23). For most of U.S. history, however, the epithet has been monopolized by those favoring an exclusive, hierarchical, and jingoistic vision of the country. Why is this so? The question becomes all the more pressing when we recall (after Friedman reminds us) that reactionary forces have taken positions that are anti-American in the most literal sense of the term. In 1861, the proponents of slavery took up arms to dissolve the American union (35); following the attack of September 11, 2001, the televangelist Jerry Falwell declared that America had gotten its comeuppance (226).

Perhaps the answer lies in the greater affinity that many (though certainly not all) conservatives have for a Manichean view of human affairs, and in their corresponding distaste for nuance and deviation. The subtle parsing that Friedman engages in to explain the perspectives of figures accused of anti-Americanism—such as his elucidation of Sartre’s “idiosyncratic moral compass” (109–118)—probably comes more easily to the reader’s temperament. To be sure, there are some areas, such as race and gender relations, where liberals and leftists can be quick to judge and are intolerant of departures from accepted notions and etiquette. Conservatives denounce this policing as oppressive; progressives say it is essential to ensure that all people enjoy equal dignity, opportunity, safety, and wellbeing. One suspects that most progressives would also insist that rhetoric of “anti-Americanism” are kindred sentiments (11–12). It would have been good to see him extend that discussion and embed it in a more sustained exploration of the historical causes of anti-Americanism.

But I quibble. I doubt readers will mind that Friedman hasn’t articulated his conceptual model quite to my specifications, or even that he doesn’t fully explain why the myth of “anti-Americanism” has evolved in the way that it has. But they surely will delight in—or gnash their teeth at—the thoroughness and skill with which he dismantles that myth. Or maybe they will simply shake their heads in amazement that such a concept could have acquired this much prominence in our national discourse.

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Mexico, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and he concludes quite rightly that the notion of anti-Americanism “contributes nothing to understanding” U.S.-Mexican relations (66).

Friedman also looks at the tense and highly complicated relationship between France and the United States during the reign of Charles de Gaulle. He convincingly shows that U.S. policymakers during the Johnson and early Nixon years were totally focused on de Gaulle’s anti-Americanism, which allegedly drove French foreign policy. Therefore, de Gaulle’s often quite rational and sober analysis of the blunders and unhealthy tendencies of U.S. foreign policy was largely dismissed out of hand. My own research confirms this. For instance, in conversation with the newly inaugurated Nixon in Paris in February 1969, de Gaulle expressed his skepticism about Washington’s policy in Vietnam. Nixon kept talking about ending the Vietnam War in a responsible way by not rushing out “in a panic,” as otherwise “the credibility of the US in the world would suffer badly.” De Gaulle thought this argument was utter nonsense. He believed that a settlement of the war could be achieved as American “power and wealth was so great that it could do this with dignity. It would be better to let go than to try and stay.” Nixon and Kissinger dismissed de Gaulle as inherently and quite irrationally anti-American; they failed entirely to see the wisdom of his words.

Refreshingly, Friedman rejects the notion that between the United States and the Islamic world of the present there is a clash of civilizations, as the late Samuel Huntington would have put it. And eventually, on page 233, Friedman makes it unambiguously clear that even those “people who strongly disfavor the United States” “are objecting not to American society or values but to its actions as perceived abroad.”

But Friedman downplays somewhat the reasons for this disfavor: U.S. airstrikes, NSA espionage activities and the CIA’s extraordinary rendition policy in the wake of 9/11 are of course not matters of perception, they are very much matters of hard fact. Is it surprising that the world’s only superpower and its at times ruthless foreign and military policies are resented abroad? Despite the perhaps vital and necessary role a global hegemon performs, as explained to us by hegemonic stability theories, all global hegemons in world history have been resented and have attracted hatred, not because of their domestic policies, structures and wealth, but because of their foreign and military policies. The Roman Empire and the British Empire fared no better than the United States, Switzerland, a freer, wealthier, and far more democratic country than the United States, does not seem to be the target of terrorist attacks.

The second strand in Friedman’s interesting and well-written book is the somewhat less convincing attempt to show that Americans often exaggerated the degree of anti-Americanism in the world at large. He quotes a great number of foreign politicians and experts expressing themselves as great supporters of the United States, but this is merely anecdotal evidence. It makes good reading, but these sections of the book do not provide a yardstick to measure the extent of anti-Americanism at certain crisis points in time.

On the whole Friedman’s book is certainly worthwhile reading. It has revived the longstanding debate about anti-Americanism in contemporary history and politics. Although Friedman gives few clear answers and not all of his argumentation is convincing, he certainly has written a stimulating and at times provocative book. What more can a good history book be expected to do?

Note:

Review of Max Paul Friedman, Rethinking Anti-Americanism

Sheyda Jahanbani

On a recent rainy May evening in Vancouver, BC, at a table strewn with mounds of spot prawn shells and a few nearly empty wine bottles, I found myself involved in a heated discussion about the role of the United States in the Canadian imagination. Present were three American historians—all of us U.S. citizens—and one Canadian historian, a native of Toronto. Responding to a seemingly innocent query about why her fellow Canucks appeared to be so “obsessed” with the United States, our Canadian hostess asserted that such a question could be asked only by citizens of an imperial power. What to an American might appear an obsession was, she said, a simple reality to a Canadian: the United States’ presence colonized the Canadian imagination because the United States colonized North America (and, indeed, much of the rest of the known world).

Feeling defensive, the Americanist who first posed the question responded by pronouncing his *bona fides* as an “anti-American”—a position with which the other two of us identified ourselves approvingly. He then asked the original question again, assuming that his declaration of anti-Americanism would protect him from charges of imperial hubris. Undeterred, our hostess good-naturedly noted that anyone wearing a Mickey Mouse shirt—as her interlocuter was—probably couldn’t understand. “But,” she shrieked, looking wounded, “I’m wearing it ironically.” We uncorked another bottle of wine, put more prawns on to boil, and started talking about the latest Mad Men episode.

After reading his insightful *Rethinking Anti-Americanism*, I wish Max Paul Friedman had been sitting at that table. Fluent in French, English, Spanish, and German, and competent in Italian, Portuguese, and Arabic, Friedman, professor of history at American University, has written a powerful account of what he calls the “myth” of “anti-Americanism” from the late eighteenth century to the present day. He seeks to understand not “why they hate us,” but why we *think* they hate us and what impact that assumption has had on the history of U.S. foreign relations. He has produced a damning account of the parochialism and downright paranoid behavior of a century’s worth of American foreign policy “experts.”

But Friedman has also offered an explanation for why the Americans at that dinner table in Vancouver felt compelled to identify ourselves as “anti-Americans.” In the process of critiquing “anti-Americanism,” Friedman explains, American policymakers and intellectuals have constructed a reactionary discourse of “anti-anti-Americanism.” This illiberal ideology, which explicitly endorses muscular nationalism and demands willful ignorance of the interests of other countries and peoples, has, he argues, choked sensible and informed policymaking and, perhaps even worse, robust debate about American society and its relationship to our vaunted values. Indeed, as Friedman shows us, dominant voices in American foreign policymaking—transcending party identification and generational experience—have made a world in which we are *all* either “with” the United States or “against” it. He convincingly argues that they have done so to the great detriment of America’s national interests and international prestige.

Friedman’s study is the most intellectually ambitious in a series of fairly recent books attempting to make
historical sense of anti-Americanism. Rather than explore episodes of “anti-Americanism” in different contexts, as these valuable treatments do, Friedman takes on the idea itself. Having evolved into something that many Americans see as an objectively “real” ideological category, “anti-Americanism,” he explains, is an idea that possesses a social history we do not yet know. He fills this gap by tracing the concept’s strange career from the last decades of the eighteenth century to the first of the twenty-first. To make such a project manageable, he focuses our attention on the disconnect between the perceptions of American policymakers about rampant “anti-Americanism” in Western Europe and Latin America and the real (often admiring) attitudes that masses and elites in both regions have toward the United States.

Friedman’s archival research is dazzling. He scoured collections in nine countries and five languages—an achievement that he should have tattooed on his forehead rather than leave buried in the book’s introduction! Yet Rethinking Anti-Americanism does not merely showcase those labors. It reminds this reader of Richard Hofstadter’s best work (Social Darwinism in American Thought and Anti-Intellectualism in American Life come to mind), as it is animated by the same kind of clear intent to explain important things to readers beyond the confines of the academy. Friedman removes the scales from people’s eyes without sacrificing scholarly nuance. It is a tricky balancing act, but he has achieved it very well. For this reason (and many others) I couldn’t help but try to think of ways to assign the book to undergraduates. Neither a potted history nor a tedious accounting, this is the kind of monograph about which one desperately wants to talk.

For a relatively short volume—introduction, five chapters, and epilogue all clocking in at around 250 pages—Rethinking Anti-Americanism feels like a comprehensive history, even though Friedman declares at the outset that it is not. This is the case not only because he takes so many different national perspectives into account, but because he has chosen a cast of characters that seems neither artificially limited nor superficially deployed. The footnotes are replete with references to the “usual suspects” in diplomatic histories—presidents, secretaries of state, ambassadors—as well as a variety of less predictable figures, including intellectuals, artists, and journalists.

Demonstrating intimidating tenacity as a researcher and anticipating easy critiques, Friedman often pairs public documents with private communications. This technique, which only very rarely comes off as gratuitous, goes far to persuade the reader of the totalizing quality of anti-Americanism’s hold on the American imagination, as well as its almost comically misguided attribution to foreigners. It seems that, more often than not, the people in this book really did believe the things they said for public consumption. Not content to stop with elites, Friedman uses polls, anecdotal accounts, and public rhetoric to capture popular attitudes towards the United States and the oftentimes rather uniform (and uniformly incorrect) perceptions Americans have had about their own image in the eyes of the peoples of the world.

Well organized, the book uses the concerns of those who practiced “anti-anti-Americanism” to guide its structure. The targets of their opprobrium become the objects of Friedman’s reconsideration; the values they espoused form the contours that mark the emergence of a distinct ideology. Have the people so many Americans believed to be “anti-American” really been so? And how, in the process of defining “anti-Americanism,” have American nationalists conjured a sense of what it means to be a “good” American?

Staying within a framework bounded by these two analytical concerns, the book briskly charts the origins of the term “anti-Americanism” from its eighteenth century deployment to describe the geopolitics of the American Revolution to the ideologically charged association with European cultural elitism some fifty years later. Charles Dickens and Francis Trollope, who both travelled to the United States in the mid-1800s and came under fire for their supposed disdain for American mores, were, Friedman shows us, actually writing with the same mindset they had when they savaged the values of modern industrial society at home. As reformers troubled by the social costs of industrialization and urbanization, they were disappointed to find rampant inequality (not to mention chattel slavery) in a nation that claimed to incarnate the most egalitarian political experiment in human history.

Next, Friedman goes on to mark the origins of “100% Americanism” as an ideological and, indeed, racial category in the second half of the nineteenth century. He shows how the impulse to exclude immigrants and, increasingly, political radicals from the “mainstream” of American society translated into a division between American and “anti-American” at home. In this guise, it became a bludgeon that could be used by imperialists and nationalists against dissenters—foreign and domestic—who dared question the compatibility of an American empire with American democracy.

Contrary to reason, perhaps, the ascent of the United States to Great Power status in the first decades of what would come to be called the “American century” enhanced rather than defused homegrown paranoia about anti-Americanism. Cataloging American perceptions of European reactions to the United States’ involvement in both world wars, Friedman reveals early glimmerings of the resentment American nationalists felt toward the “ungrateful” Europeans whose lardons were “saved” by the blood of American doughboys. These feelings created a legacy of bitterness, as several Western European countries sought to retain their national identities and pursue their own national interests after 1945.

Friedman shows us that in the tense context of the early Cold War, American policymakers came to see European popular opinion as vital to the national security of the United States. Social science efforts to quantify public opinion in Europe showed dangerously high levels of antipathy toward the United States—a frankly hysterical reaction, Friedman suggests, to the simple reality that Germans and French people were not actually Americans-by-proxy despite the outsized role the United States played in their national defense. If the pursuit of national interests in Europe ratcheted up fears in Washington about a world turning against the United States, nationalism (revolutionary and otherwise) in the Third World caused full-blown panic. Rich explorations of domestic politics in Venezuela, Mexico, and Cuba, as well as reactions to those country’s foreign policies inside the Beltway, illustrate the long legacy of imperial anxieties.

The beginning of the end of America’s postwar empire in the late 1960s forms the last significant topic for Friedman’s consideration. And no one part of this very persuasive book is as convincing as the chapter on Charles de Gaulle and U.S. policy in Vietnam. The contrast between the cartoonish image that American policymakers had of that complicated, shrewdly intelligent man and his persistent, sober attempts to advise the U.S. government on its folly in Vietnam left me slapping my forehead in exasperation. That chapter alone should be required reading for any undergraduate in a history class because of
the ways in which it illustrates the terrible power of a bad first impression! In all seriousness, if Graham Allison’s case study of the Cuban Missile Crisis explicated the bureaucratic politics model at its most effective, the relationship between De Gaulle and seemingly every single stakeholder in the U.S. government who had authority over decisions about Vietnam is its antithesis.

Friedman concludes by looking for traces of “anti-Americanism” in protest movements by students on the Left in Europe and the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and, unsurprisingly, finds almost none at all. In his epilogue, he leaves us with a meditation on the world after 9/11, documenting how Americans squandered the unprecedented outpouring of global solidarity that erupted after the attack on the World Trade Center and the extent to which the American people once again mistook popular opposition to U.S. foreign policy as an existential threat to the “homeland.”

Listing substantive critiques of this book seems unfair, given how much Friedman does right. Yet some questions remain unanswered. The reader comes away from this book thinking that the resistance of American policymakers to the rather obvious fact that other countries have possessed different national interests stems from basic irrationality (we might go so far as to call it “insanity”). If we assume that foreign policymakers have generally been sane, however, what else explains their inability to understand a) that other sovereign nation-states exist and b) that they may have different interests than the United States and still be allies? Ideology seems like the right place to start—but what motivates that ideology?

Michael Hunt might suggest that “anti-anti-Americanism” is merely an offshoot of the enduring belief in national greatness that characterizes American national identity. William Appleman Williams might urge us to follow the trail of material interests, looking for evidence that the United States benefited economically and strategically from isolating its critics. The utility of the latter approach is easily repudiated, for sometimes, as in the case of the Vietnam War, material interest wasn’t served in any comprehensible way. Clearly, Friedman wants us to keep American exceptionalism at the forefront of our minds because, as he suggests, “anti-Americanism” is a truly “exceptional” concept. No other nation-state frets as much about who does or doesn’t like them and why—let alone transforms those impressions into analytical categories. But American exceptionalism as a static phenomenon—or even Hunt’s more precise trinity of national greatness, belief in racial hierarchy, and antipathy to social revolution—doesn’t really serve as a satisfying explanation for such a consistent ignorance of the realities of the world.

Indeed, particularly after World War II, when “anti-anti-Americanism” seems to have entered its most incomprehensible phase, something else must have been afoot. If we believe Elizabeth Borgwardt’s persuasive argument about the United States exporting a “New Deal for the World” after 1945 and Geir Lundestad’s notion that the empire the United States built in the postwar period was, at least for a time, an empire “by invitation,” I wonder to what extent the reactions of American policymakers to criticism from Europe and Latin America make more sense? If, as recent work on postwar globalism suggests, American policymakers in the postwar period understood the United States to be taking on a kind of beneficent responsibility for the rest of the world, then any resistance of foreigners to that leadership, not to mention assertions of sovereignty, might have seemed not just insulting but confusing as well. In a sense, did American policymakers (particularly midcentury liberals) come to see all citizens of the “free world” as constituents of the American polity and thus, like African-Americans, Latinos, and feminists in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as “ingrates” for contesting the American government’s decisions and marking out a separate space for their own interests? How did these policymakers really understand the power the United States possessed—call it “empire,” “hegemony,” or “responsibility”—after 1945? How did they interpret the meaning of the term “leader of the free world”? How did citizens of other countries fit into that picture?

Finally, on a related point, how does the tradition of cosmopolitanism and universalism in American social thought and culture, which inspired an anti-New Deal Republican like Wendell Willkie as well as liberals like Norman Cousins, fit into the picture? Did cosmopolitanism ever serve as a response to the parochialism of the anti-anti-Americans? These and all the other questions mentioned above would have to be dealt with in another volume, but it would be worthwhile reading if they were addressed by a mind as fluent in ideas and politics as Friedman’s.

My father was an Iranian nationalist who counted Mohammed Mossadegh as one of his dearest relations and most revered mentors. He also spent his entire life—even the decades after 1953—truly and often impractically devoted to the United States of America in word and deed. This contradiction, about which I often spoke with him, rested on his belief that Americans and the American government were not one and the same and that despite its understandable pursuit of perceived national interests at the expense of the rest of the world—the prerogative of any nation-state—America was still the “last, best hope on earth” because it kept aspiring to something more noble. He was a cosmopolitan and a universalist (the antithesis of the “anti-anti-Americans”) and yet also a “pro-American” extraordinaire. Thinking of him as I finished Max Friedman’s account of “anti-Americanism,” I was struck by how many intelligent and engaged people throughout the past two hundred years shared my father’s worldview and invited personal harassment and explicit vilification to express it. They called on the United States to live up to the ideals for which it claimed to stand. They called the American government to account for acting like just another nation-state pursuing its interests. The constructive criticism that the United States has attracted from elite and popular quarters across the globe, and not the parochial arrogance of American policymakers, should perhaps be recognized as something far more exceptional than reflexive anti-anti-Americans like me have occasion to realize. That is a topic for another dinner table conversation but, if and when it happens, Max Paul Friedman will most certainly be invited. The prawns are on me.

Notes:
1. Alan L. McPherson, Yankee No!: Anti-Americanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations (Cambridge, MA, 2003). See also McPherson’s more recent volume, co-edited with Ivan Krastev, The Anti-
A central part of Blair’s thinking was driven by a stark political calculation: if he wasn’t with Bush then he would be portrayed as being against him, and he feared that much more than any erosion of his political support at home. In an article in the Independent close to the tenth anniversary of the war, Steve Richards highlights this factor. The simple truth, Richards writes, is that grassroots political opposition had little impact on the prime minister’s thinking; instead, his approach was driven by wider political calculations that, at their heart, had been shaped by the desire not to appear anti-American. Being portrayed as Bush’s poodle, in other words, was preferable to being seen as against the United States. “The reason Blair was relaxed about the poodle accusation,” Richards explains, “was because so many previous Labour leaders had been accused of being anti-American. For him to be seen as a poodle to a Republican president was much safer politically than being accused of being anti-American. He knew also that the opinion formers he cared most about, from Murdoch downwards or upwards, welcomed his close relationship with Bush.”

In one sense, Blair’s perception of anti-Americanism as a phenomenon seems remarkably simplistic for an experienced international operator. In another sense, however, he had only to look at the American response to France’s refusal to back the war in Iraq to see how easily accusations of anti-Americanism could be provoked. President Chirac was against the war; therefore he was against America; therefore he and his nation were anti-American. Politically, Blair’s appraisal was spot-on. His perception of and engagement with anti-Americanism helped to shape his decision to back Bush. Later, as the war brought about further protests against American policy, Blair blasted what he called the “madness” of anti-Americanism during a speech in Australia. “The danger with America today is not that they are too much involved. The danger is they decide to pull up the drawbridge and disengage. We need them involved. We want them engaged.” He argued that if the world continued to subject the Americans to “anti-American” criticisms, they might withdraw from the international system completely.

As Andrew Rawnsley’s forensic account of this period illustrates, Blair was way ahead of the majority of his party on the war. He opposed Saddam, clearly, but he was also determined to stay close to Bush. In part that determination stemmed from his belief that the United States, under Bush, could not be allowed to pursue a unilateral approach to foreign policy; more damningly, it also stemmed from his desire to be seen as a leading world statesman, able to solve matters of great international consequence.

Consequently, in April 2002, a year before the war began, Blair travelled to Bush’s ranch in Crawford, Texas, to convey his wholehearted support for the president’s desire to remove Saddam’s regime from power. He did not raise any number of concerns that his advisors had with American plans in Iraq, nor did he keep his advisors with him for a number of one-to-one meetings with Bush or inform them fully of what had transpired. He was determined to ally himself with Bush. Indeed, he had travelled to Texas, Rawnsley notes, “fearful that he would be dumped by Bush if he showed a scintilla of hesitation.” He explained to one advisor that “you’re either with him or against him. That’s how he divides people. It is very black and white with Bush.” Even when he was compelled to press Bush on the need to explore fully an international solution, Blair, much to the horror of his advisors, reaffirmed his unstinting support. In a letter to Bush outlining his support for an international solution, Blair opened by noting, “You know, George, whatever you decide to do, I’m with you.”

Review of Max Paul Friedman, Rethinking Anti-Americanism

Bever Seewell

As protests gathered in major cities across the world in early 2003 to make a stand against the looming invasion of Iraq, few doubts entered the minds of the two leaders most central to promoting the path to war: U.S. President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Bush and his advisors had had Iraq and the regime of Saddam Hussein in their sights since before the tragic events of 9/11, when the defining context for U.S. foreign policy suddenly changed and military adventurism again became prominent. Blair, for his part, had long opposed Saddam’s rule and had talked up the desirability of ending his grip on power in a prominent address on foreign relations in Chicago in 1999. Now, with war imminent, the two leaders remained convinced that ousting the Iraqi tyrant was the right thing to do.

Understanding Blair’s wholehearted support for Bush’s policies is far from easy. The abiding concept of an Anglo-American “special relationship,” whether one believes in it or not, has often led to close cooperation between London and Washington in times of conflict. Yet for a Labour politician to pursue an alliance with a Republican president to go to war in the Middle East, while a million people protested on the streets of cities across the world, was extraordinary. As Andrew Rawnsley’s forensic account of this period illustrates, Blair was way ahead of the majority of his party on the war. He opposed Saddam, clearly, but he was also determined to stay close to Bush. In part that determination stemmed from his belief that the United States, under Bush, could not be allowed to pursue a unilateral approach to foreign policy; more damningly, it also stemmed from his desire to be seen as a leading world statesman, able to solve matters of great international consequence.

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perfectly in line with what has by now become an accepted part of the American national narrative that acknowledges past injustice and celebrates those who struggled against it.” (110). Sartre was highly critical of the United States, without question, yet he was also highly critical of France. It would be churlish to suggest he was both anti-American and anti-French; his motivations, therefore, need to be considered in a more nuanced way.

Such assessments occur throughout Friedman’s book, as he juxtaposes the simplicity of Americans’ views of opposition with the sophistication and nuance of those making the criticisms. Yet he makes it abundantly clear that Americans’ views did not just connote an inability to accurately assess foreign criticisms. “If the United States is a city upon a hill, a model to the world, and its actions intended to spread the benefits of freedom and democracy, then to oppose it must be irrational or nefarious” (7). Viewing individuals like Dickens, Shaw, and Sartre as anti-American, therefore, was highly important, as it created a context whereby political opposition to the United States—especially from foreign governments—could be situated within a wider discourse. If critical views of the United States generally were irrational and ill-minded, then so, too, were those who disagreed with its foreign policy. Allies disagreeing with a particular course of action, the long-standing animosity toward the United States from countries within Latin America, the desire of present-day terrorist groups to mobilise extremists to attack U.S. interests—all could be explained, and rejected as viable critiques, by anti-Americanism.

Though used in the eighteenth century and common in the nineteenth, the term “anti-American” became more widely known in the twentieth century. Its relevance to policy debates, however, was sharpened in the crucible of the Cold War, when binary “us-versus-them” constructions became the norm. To oppose the United States after 1945 was effectively, in the eyes of American officials, to side with the Soviet Union. Friedman does a superb job of unpicking the way the term developed, noting the ways in which it was incorrectly applied to a host of individuals and nations, and then charting the way that it became part of the vernacular during the twentieth century and beyond. Most important, he makes some telling arguments about the way that perceptions of the anti-Americanism of others impacted U.S. policymaking.

Friedman notes, for example, that the onset of the Cold War saw anti-Americanism, along with its domestic variant, un-Americanism, used to label the nation’s enemies. “Anti-Americanism,” he writes, “became reified as a category of analysis during the Cold War. It was tracked, measured, and interpreted. The policies that emerged from this process were often as ill-suited to a complex world as was the simplifying rubric that shaped official thinking” (88).4

The impact of the reification of anti-Americanism had been especially marked in the developing world, where abiding constructions of local inferiority combined with perceptions of anti-Americanism to create a climate that legitimized force and intervention. This trend and its destructive impact were particularly clear in Latin America—an area where simplistic renderings of pro- or anti American and notions of an East-West Cold War had little relevance. Here, Friedman notes, the trend shaped a period of intervention that accelerated as the Cold War went on. U.S. policymakers, he tells us, were “unwilling to see Latin Americans as independent actors, to view any criticism of the United States as rational or grounded in experience, or to take Latin American opinion seriously” (155).

I differ somewhat from Friedman on a couple of points here. First, my sense is that the Cold War was less important in guiding U.S. actions in Latin America than was the desire to shape the region’s development. Second, U.S. officials were aware of Latin American opposition and, furthermore, did not always explain it away as irrational or unwarranted. The Eisenhower administration knew that intervention in Guatemala would provoke a firestorm of protest yet intervened anyway. Returning to Washington after enduring violent protests in Caracas in 1958, Vice-President Richard Nixon made comments to the press that exemplified the tacit understanding that U.S. officials had of Latin American grievances. “In Latin America,” he said, “we have an area which is in a state of evolution, and as far as the people there are concerned, they are concerned, as they should be, about poverty and misery and disease which exists in so many places. They are determined to do something about it . . . they are moving toward economic progress. And the United States is, and should be, proud to work with them as partners.”

To be sure, Nixon would not always take this line; nor did he or the rest of the administration believe it to be fair that the Latin Americans continued to blame the United States for their problems. Complaints about U.S. policies were still believed to be inherently wrong. At the same time, though, the administration did have a more subtle understanding of anti-American sentiments in the region than Friedman at times suggests. Administration officials understood why the Latin American nations were unhappy; they just did not agree with the proposals those nations were putting forward to alleviate their problems. In their eyes, those proposals were evidence of inherent over-emotionalism and impatience.5

Perhaps the book’s boldest claim is that U.S. perceptions of French anti-Americanism were an important factor in the decision to Americanize the war in Vietnam. “In a self-fulfilling prophecy, or a feedback loop,” Friedman writes, “the conviction that anti-Americanism explained opposition to the United States abroad prevented Americans from taking seriously proposals and warnings that might have saved them from policies that increased foreign opposition abroad, which they read as more anti-Americanism.”

Perhaps the book’s boldest claim is that U.S. perceptions of French anti-Americanism were an important factor in the decision to Americanize the war in Vietnam. “In a self-fulfilling prophecy, or a feedback loop,” Friedman writes, “the conviction that anti-Americanism explained opposition to the United States abroad prevented Americans from taking seriously proposals and warnings that might have saved them from policies that increased foreign opposition abroad, which they read as more anti-Americanism.” (157). In particular, Friedman argues that France’s public criticism of the decisions that the United States was taking in Vietnam, which in Washington was explained as rampant anti-Americanism, stopped U.S. officials from engaging properly with suggestions that, if heeded, could have prevented the war. Other American allies, particularly Britain and West Germany, shared France’s reservations but were dissuaded from making them public by their belief that they, too, would be perceived as anti-American.

To my mind, however, it seems a stretch to suggest that it was an entrenched sense of French anti-Americanism that prevented U.S. policymakers from adopting the recommendation for withdrawal that was being put forward by Charles de Gaulle. Lyndon Johnson and his closest advisors were aware that the French, British and Canadians advised against any escalation of the war; they were also aware of congressional dissent and opposition from prominent non-governmental figures like George
Kennan and Walter Lippmann. Internal dissent was also evident, not least in the powerful critiques of George Ball—inspired, at least in part, by his formative years working alongside French political economist Jean Monnet—and Hubert Humphrey. The latter told LBJ that he had the opportunity to withdraw after his comprehensive electoral victory in 1964 and would sustain only limited political damage. It was not just the suggestions of Charles de Gaulle that were being rejected, therefore. Johnson officials chose war in Vietnam for multiple reasons, but not, in my view, because an entrenched sense of anti-Americanism clouded their judgment.

Applying a framework as wide-ranging as that relating to anti-Americanism, though, is always going to provoke quibbles about how central it was in some cases compared to others. Of greater importance here is the fact that Friedman has produced a powerful and much-needed book that goes beyond the facile constructions of anti-Americanism that emerged in the wake of 9/11 and illustrates the need to study the phenomenon in more scholarly ways in order to understand its importance. Witty, well written and superbly researched, Rethinking Anti-Americanism does what all good scholarship should do: it compels the reader to think afresh about important issues. Most important, it provides a framework that remains pertinent today. “While there is prejudice and hostility today toward the United States,” Friedman notes toward the end of the book, “there is no global anti-American conspiracy uniting the Left Bank with the West Bank and Baghdad with Berlin” (240).

Understanding that basic fact, he argues compellingly, could help U.S. officials take the critiques that they receive from other nations more seriously. With President Obama embracing the efficiency of drone warfare as a way of waging war on America’s enemies, the United States must be able to recognize that such actions provoke enormous anger among those on the receiving end. Opposition toward the United States is based, primarily, upon what the United States does—a lesson that Obama would do well to heed. “As Bush was the Guantanamo president,” writes Stephen Holmes, “so Obama is the drone president. This switch, whatever Obama hoped, represents a worsening not an improvement of America’s image in the world.” As Juan Cole memorably pronounced in an essay a few years ago, “It’s the foreign policy, stupid.”

Notes:
4. Alan McPherson, of course, has also done a lot of work detailing the way that American officials understood and interacted with anti-Americanism. See McPherson, Yankee Not: Anti-Americanism in US-Latin American Relations (Cambridge, MA, 2003); idem, “U.S. Government Responses to Anti-Americanism at the Periphery,” in Bevan Sewell and Maria Ryan, eds., Working to the Margins: The United States and the “Periphery,” 1945–2008 (forthcoming). On attempts to mobilise the entire nation behind this cause see Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence, KS, 2006); for various interpretations of un-Americanism, see the forthcoming special issue on the topic in the Journal of American Studies 47, no. 4 (2013).

Author’s Response
Max Paul Friedman

My deepest thanks to the reviewers for the time and care they took with my work. I am grateful for the thoughtful critiques and the generous praise from these respected colleagues. Salim Yaqub is absolutely right that the United States has treated Latin America more coercively than it has Europe. Having written about this difference in the past, I should not have taken it as such. I am, nor left Francis Billey, José Martí, Venustiano Carranza, Carlos Fuentes, and others to speak for themselves. I am glad to see that the comparison emerges through the course of the book, and I wish I had shown the manuscript to Yaqub before publication, as his critique would have led me to emphasize it more clearly in the introduction. I agree, too, with his analysis of why conservatives came to monopolize the term, even though progressives argued fruitlessly that it was “anti-American” to oppose American values of liberty and democracy by, for example, defending slavery or dictatorship. To claim that it is treasonous to criticize the state is the kind of intolerant nationalism favored by far-right ideologues. It puts Americans in strange linguistic company, from French and German fascists to Russian national chauvinists, when they use the term unreflectively (22–23).

Klaus Larres correctly notes that I give no clear definition of anti-Americanism. That was a deliberate choice on my part (6). My project was a different one: rather than throw my hat into the crowded ring of definitions competing over what scholars of Begriffsgeschichte and speech-act theory have called an “essentially contested concept,” I sought to historicize the term. After all, its meaning is not up to me; it inheres in the way it has been used over time (7). Larres also wished for evidence beyond the anecdotal to show that there has been less hatred toward the United States than we think and for “a yardstick to measure the extent of anti-Americanism at certain crisis points in time.” He may be interested in the extensive discussion of international public opinion polling from the 1930s to the present, including data, charts, and a methodological critique (95–104, 218–221, 235–37). The numbers show that “they” don’t “hate us” at most places and points in time and that it is precisely the fluctuation in foreign public opinion at moments of crisis that confirms we must find something other than endemic prejudice to explain these swings. I agree about the importance of the connection between resentment of the United States and U.S. military operations abroad. That theme dominates every chapter in my book, with examples drawn from the Mexican War, 1898, the 1920s occupation of Nicaragua, postwar troop deployments in Europe, CIA covert actions in Guatemala and Cuba, the Vietnam War, Reagan’s European missile deployments and Central American interventions, and the wars in Iraq. As Larres rightly points out, Obama bin Laden’s “declaration of war” after U.S. troops arrived in Saudi Arabia and more recently the general resentment of drone attacks in Pakistan are
essential to understanding contemporary disputes; readers will find my discussion of those two issues in the epilogue (233–34).

The notion that listening to Charles de Gaulle on the Vietnam War might have led to a better outcome were his diplomatic efforts not thwarted by the label of “anti-Americanism” is persuasive to most but not all of the reviewers. (I thank Larres for adding his own research findings showing that this trend continued into the Nixon administration.) For what it is worth, this position was articulated by Robert McNamara, who, when he looked back with regret at having failed to listen to his critics during his tenure as secretary of defense, singled out de Gaulle and said that he wished he had explored the possibility of neutralization with the French (188). The larger point is that de Gaulle was not just another critic. He was the undisputed international spokesman for the only viable alternative to war: an international conference along the lines of Geneva 1954, leading to a neutralization of Southeast Asia that would be guaranteed by the great powers. American critics of the war such as those Bevan Sewell mentions referred specifically to de Gaulle when they argued with Lyndon Johnson. The French had much to offer: the best-informed Western officials and journalists on Vietnam were French, and they spoke from a position of expertise and experience, which was misread as anti-Americanism.

The history of Franco-American relations shows how damaging the stereotype of the anti-American French can be. We saw it again during the most recent war with Iraq, when the French were the most prominent international critics of American plans and were once again ridiculed as the Americans marched off into the latest quagmire the French had warned them about. Rather than suggest a counterfactual scenario in which Americans turn over their foreign policy to the Quai d’Orsay and peace breaks out, the book offers an empirical study of why the calumny of French anti-Americanism obscures more than it illuminates and why this narrow-minded worldview does not serve the national interest.

Having criticized generations of American officials for ascribing irrationality to their foreign counterparts, I decline to join Sheyda Jahanbani in ascribing it to them. Instead, I join her in observing that in the post-1945 period, when U.S. leaders came to see their sphere of influence as planetary in scope, American exceptionalism took on a global framework that produced the expectation not only of compliance but of gratitude. That expectation gave way to pained surprise when neither compliance nor gratitude was forthcoming. American exceptionalism is not static; like so much in history, it features change within continuity. The post-1945 change in this context is the incorporation of modernization theory (and later neoliberalism) into the belief that the United States was the model for all other societies and that American power should be a catalyst to increase the pace of progress. That was one form of international engagement, but it was unidirectional, bringing American wisdom to the world while denying that the world had any of its own to offer. Cosmopolitanism, as Jahanbani rightly suggests, can be an antidote to the provincialism that feeds suspicion or disdain for foreign knowledge.

It warms an author’s heart to hear reviewers who come to the end of a 160,000-word book ask for another volume or urge me to extend the discussion. (I tried, but I have since come to see the 55,000 words cut before publication as a mercy killing.) Instead of taking up Jahanbani’s kind suggestion of a new volume, I hope that the participants in this roundtable will one day meet around a round table to continue the conversation.
The State of the Field: Two External Assessments

W. Fitzhugh Brundage and Alice O’Connor

Editor’s note: In the wake of the publication of Thomas Zeiler’s article in the March 2009 issue of the Journal of American History, “The Diplomatic History Bandwagon: A State of the Field,” Professors Brundage and O’Connor were asked to assess the state of the field of U.S. foreign relations from an external perspective. AJ

An Appeal Unimpaired

W. Fitzhugh Brundage

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aments about the declining status of diplomatic history have a familiar ring; they echo those muttered by scholars of constitutional, economic, ethnic, military, political, and urban history. There was a time when history departments at major research universities were amply staffed (nay, stuffed) with specialists in each of these subfields. Then, during the 1980s and 1990s, their ranks thinned while legions of cultural and social historians ascended in apparent favor. But five years ago Thomas Zeiler, in “The Diplomatic History Bandwagon,” discerned an overdue revival of fortunes for diplomatic historians.1

As an outsider to the field of diplomatic history, I have observed but not suffered the anxieties that Zeiler’s article addresses. From my vantage point, diplomatic history always seemed to benefit from an inherited prestige and institutional infrastructure that most other subfields of history could only aspire to. In graduate school I envied the research funding and fellowship opportunities available to my diplomatic history peers. Since then I have observed no shortage of postdoctoral or fellowship opportunities for diplomatic historians. Beyond being blessed with an array of specialized journals in which to publish their research, diplomatic historians also have sizeable non-academic audiences—policymakers and lay people—that perhaps only military history can match. And whenever international controversies flare, diplomatic historians have ample possibilities to perform as public intellectuals. In short, the infrastructure of diplomatic history appears, from where I sit, to be robust and well maintained, and its appeal is unimpaired.

A narrow preoccupation with disciplinary anxieties, moreover, obscures the extent to which contemporary students at both the high school and college level are familiarized with the history of the United States’ interactions with the world. At my current institution, undergraduates can take courses that focus on the history of American foreign policy in various programs and departments in addition to those offered by the Department of History. So although it may be true that diplomatic historians, with their inherited disciplinary fea thes and preoccupations, have lost both numbers and a measure of prestige, undergraduates nonetheless probably have greater access to knowledge about the history of American diplomacy than ever. Consequently, I think there is merit in separating the state of the field of diplomatic history from the broader topic of the production and dissemination of knowledge about the diplomatic history of the United States. Against this backdrop, Zeiler’s observation that “[g]one is the era when legions of students were obligated to read diplomatic history . . . to pass their comprehensive exams” seems like so much special pleading. Mario Del Pero, in his response to Zeiler’s essay, asks whether the reintegration of diplomatic history into the larger discipline of history is “disintegrating diplomatic history itself.” Yet why should sub-disciplinary boundary maintenance remain an aim in and of itself?

That the field of diplomatic history currently is enjoying a renaissance is undoubtedly a testament to the creativity of the scholars in the field. As Zeiler’s overview suggests, diplomatic historians deserve more credit for being innovative and theoretically adept than they sometimes have received. Zeiler persuasively traces the extent and speed with which the field has evolved and incorporated new methodologies and concerns. Since his article appeared in print five years ago I have seen no evidence of retrenchment.

If scholars of diplomatic history have a new spring in their step it is partially because of a strong tailwind provided by a pronounced shift in the entire profession’s temporal focus. A half century ago, the liveliest debates, loftiest reputations, and largest graduate cohorts were associated with the study of the nineteenth-century United States. The long nineteenth century—from the Early Republic through the Jacksonian period, to the Civil War and Reconstruction, to the Gilded Age and the Progressive era—was where the discipline’s center of gravity and hottest action was. Those temporal subspecialties now have, at least for hiring purposes, given way to “nineteenth-century history.” Twentieth-century history, in contrast, now is as densely populated by specialists as the nineteenth-century field once was. Here at the University of North Carolina, for example, in some years we receive two or three graduate applications from prospective twentieth-century specialists for each application from a prospective student interested in any earlier period of American history.

This cresting focus on the twentieth century works to the advantage of the field of United States diplomatic history, which already is heavily weighted toward the “American” (twentieth) century. No scholar of twentieth-century American history, regardless of her/his specialty, can afford to be willfully ignorant of recent diplomatic history. Thus, while the field of history was taking the “cultural turn,” which seemingly eroded the secure status of diplomatic history, the field was simultaneously focusing (or fixating, as pre-modern historians often fume) ever more on the modern.

Of course, in the wake of the “cultural turn,” historians have adopted a far broader conception of power and the mechanisms for the use of power than that which prevailed among our predecessors. After all, those historians who defined the field of diplomatic history and history in general during the first half of the twentieth century were witnesses to some of the most brutal expressions of state power in human history. It is easy to understand why they concentrated on what might be called blunt or overt state power. But in
more recent decades we have been reminded repeatedly of the limits of state power, whether in the jungles of Vietnam, the streets of Cairo, or hinterland of the Congo. As Zieler makes clear, the focus of diplomatic historians has necessarily expanded to include questions relating to “soft” power exercised by non-state actors. Consequently, diplomatic historians now find themselves in conversations with scholars in other subdisciplines who may have only the haziest grasp of the intricacies of formal American diplomacy during the twentieth century but who readily appreciate the importance of modern American influence on, for example, global networks of cultural production and consumption.

That the nation-state is central to many of the issues and questions that engage all historians of the twentieth-century United States has aided the renaissance of diplomatic history. The state may not be a central category of analysis for all such historians, but it is almost never absent from their work. However, Frederik Logevall’s proposition, elicited by Zieler’s paean, that all historians of the United States embrace the tenets that “high politics matter, that top-down approaches are worthy and important, and that the projection of American power . . . needs serious and sustained study” is considerably less compelling if our focus shifts to the United States at almost any time prior to the annexation of Hawaii. Jessica Gienow-Hecht observes that the conception of state power that lies at the heart of Logevall’s and Zieler’s brand of diplomatic history has been “largely shaped by Cold War historiography.” As long as the Cold War is the “preponderant narrative in the historiography of American foreign relations,” diplomatic historians will still have work to do to bolster their influence and standing among historians working in periods prior to the late nineteenth century.

Undue attention to the role of the state and “top-down approaches” will likely obscure, if not preclude, sophisticated understanding of Americans’ interactions with the rest of the globe that do not easily fall within conventional definitions of state-to-state diplomatic relations. The dangers of a myopic focus on state power extend beyond just limiting the scope of the subdiscipline of diplomatic history; Gienow-Hecht is spot on when she warns that “to subordinate all relations in which U.S. power did not matter puts an imperialist twist on our analytical gaze.”

Diplomatic historians are well positioned to add significantly to numerous fields of inquiry if they take seriously the varieties of power that state and non-state actors exercised (“deployed”) throughout the history of the United States. The illegal slave trade during the nineteenth century is just one example of a topic that requires the kind of “subdisciplinary dialogue” that Del Pero advocates and that defies a narrow, state-centered approach. Randy Sparks of Tulane University is researching American participation in the Trans-Atlantic slave trade after 1808 and the campaign by American authorities and others to suppress it. The trade was huge in scale, involved sailors, merchants, and commercial interests on four continents, and generated huge profits. Any adequate history of this fascinating but understudied topic necessarily lies at the nexus of military, business, diplomatic, and social history. One could make the state the central category of analysis in this story, but to do so would be to distort the significance of the American state to it. Certainly, diplomatic historians should be contributing prominently to the study of one of the most important forced migrations in human history.

Likewise, shouldn’t diplomatic historians be prominent and essential participants in the study of U.S.–Indian relations from the founding of the republic through the nineteenth century? After all, the diplomatic relations between the indigenous peoples of North America and the expansionist young republic were undoubtedly of equal or more importance than our formal relations with most nations in Europe or the Western Hemisphere.

Shouldn’t diplomatic historians be prominent and essential participants in the study of U.S.–Indian relations from the founding of the republic through the nineteenth century? After all, the diplomatic relations between the indigenous peoples of North America and the expansionist young republic were undoubtedly of equal or more importance than our formal relations with most nations in Europe or the Western Hemisphere.
Notes:

The Global Great Society

Alice O'Connor

From the vast visual archives of the 1960s, few images more vividly capture the tragic fate of twentieth-century American liberalism than a series of photographs from Detroit in July 1967. The photographs are from the military occupation of the neighborhoods surrounding 12th Street, in the heart of the Motor City’s already deindustrialized black ghetto. President Lyndon B. Johnson had ordered federal troops to join local police and the Michigan National Guard in quelling what would go on record as the most violent racial uprising in a decade that would bring new, racialized meaning to the term “long hot summer.” The preceding weeks had already seen outbreaks of civil unrest in Tampa, Atlanta, Cincinnati, Newark, and a number of smaller cities. Only in Detroit, though, would worldwide audiences see federal troops, home from Vietnam and trained for riot control, rounding up suspected looters, searching for snipers, patrolling still-burning neighborhoods, and, after five days of unrelenting violence, standing vigil over recently pacified streets.

Twenty percent of the army troops were African American, in sharp contrast to the overwhelmingly white, notoriously racist local police force and the heavily rural National Guard. African Americans were disproportionately represented among the casualties as well, which included 43 dead, nearly 1200 injured, and 7200 arrested. And although immediately sparked by a police raid of an after-hours party for recently returned Vietnam War veterans, the five-day uprising was fuelled by poverty, unemployment, police brutality, and residential segregation—all rooted in white racism, according to the high-level commission President Johnson appointed Illinois Governor Otto Kerner, Jr. to head in its wake. Civil rights leader Roger Wilkins, dispatched to Detroit in his capacity as a Department of Justice official, was witness to what was being caught on camera and would later recall his growing anger at LBJ’s tepid policy response. “I knew that . . . the government had been responsive—we did have a poverty program in place. Great Society legislation was going into place—but I knew it wasn’t large enough,” he told interviewers for the civil rights movement documentary Eyes on the Prize. “I knew that the great bulk of the money that we had available to us was going into Vietnam. And it seemed to me that if you wanted to strengthen America and you wanted to make America better for the future, you invested in your people and you didn’t invest in war.”

I have had occasion to use the photographs from occupied Detroit in various U.S. history courses over the past decade and a half. I have shown them to my students in lectures on the historical roots of the broader “urban crisis” of the 1960s, on the thwarted hopes of the civil rights movement and LBJ’s War on Poverty, and on what urban geographers have come to refer to as the “militarization” of urban space. But mostly I have used them in my courses on lectures on the historical roots of the broader “urban crisis” of the 1960s, on the thwarted hopes of the civil rights movement and LBJ’s War on Poverty, and on what urban geographers have come to refer to as the “militarization” of urban space. But mostly I have used them in my courses on the history of U.S. social policy—with footage from Roger Wilkins’ interview providing the commentary—to launch a discussion of how the war in Vietnam undermined the War on Poverty at every turn and, from there, to examine the more basic, inherent incompatibility between liberalism’s Great Society and Cold War aims. LBJ acknowledged that incompatibility in his oft-quoted, characteristically crude, and ultimately self-serving remarks about the no-win situation he found himself in as the demands of his two warring passions came to a peak.

I knew from the start that I was bound to be crucified either way I moved. If I left the woman I really loved—the Great Society—in order to get involved in that bitch of a war on the other side of the world then I would lose everything at home. . . . But if I left that war and let the Communists take over South Vietnam then I would be seen as a coward and my nation would be seen as an appeaser and we would both find it impossible to accomplish anything for anybody anywhere on the entire globe.

Martin Luther King Jr. had a less forgiving view of the nature of liberalism’s warring factions and of LBJ’s actions in Detroit. The issue, for King, was not about a choice between guns and butter. The president had essentially declared war on the ghetto; his actions represented “the ultimate,” as he commented in his statement to the Kerner Commission, “in political and social bankruptcy.”

Recent scholarship in the history of American foreign relations has brought new perspective to the intertwined connections illustrated by these photographs and has prompted me to revisit the “warring factions” they depict. As discussed in major review essays by Thomas Zeiler and Erez Manela, trends in the broader historiography have transformed the field by opening it up to new subjects for inquiry and to hitherto unexplored methods and interpretive frames. However tragic the encounter between LBJ’s Great Society and “that bitch of a war,” the new scholarship suggests that both stemmed from institutional strategies, ideological commitments, and approaches to reform that—at least for a time—were more convergent than historians have previously recognized.

In what follows I focus on one strand of the “new” American foreign relations scholarship that is especially promising for exploring these lines of convergence between Cold War and Great Society liberalism: the growing body of literature on the emergence of “development” as a distinct if widely encompassing area of policymaking, expertise, and institution-building and as an often competing collection of reform ideologies in post-World War II U.S. and international politics. “Convergence” is a significant keyword in this literature, denoting a teleology—toward one or another vision of modernity—animating the broadly defined development project for much of the twentieth century.

But other features of the literature make it a useful vantage point for new insights into foreign relations and domestic policy as well as the connections between the two. Like other recent works that are helping to reshape the field, studies of development draw on but look beyond traditional diplomatic government archives; make use of multi-national and international sources; are as attentive to the influence of expertise, discourse, and ideology as they are to the geopolitical dynamics of international relations—if not more so; and make issues of national and transnational identity and culture central to their arguments. They also incorporate more traditional lines of inquiry into the role of and relations between states and the exercise of power through diplomacy and war. And as a body of scholarship that has taken off (to play on another keyword) since the mid-to-late 1990s, the history of development has been shaped as much by the extended reassessment of the degree and exercise of American global power prompted by the end of the Cold War and 9/11 as by the availability of new archival resources and related historiographical trends.

For these and other reasons, historical studies of development offer a distinctive lens through which to
view American foreign relations, while raising intriguing questions about some long-prevailing conventions in the field. As Nick Cullather argues in his study of the Green Revolution, for example, development scholarship challenges standard periodization by emphasizing continuities in core ideas, policies, and practices across what Manela refers to as the “traditional divide of 1945.”

In a theme that also threads through the work of David Ekbladh, Michael Latham, and other development historians, Cullather uses the modernizing mission enabled by breakthroughs in agricultural and nutritional science—the scientific “discovery” of the calorie, to be exact—to point historians toward a broader conception of the instruments of diplomacy.

Picking up from an earlier generation of revisionist historians, Latham, Nils Gilman, David Engerman, and Odd Arne Westad see capitalism as a driving force in development and foreign relations, but they also view it more as set of ideological beliefs and commitments than a set of more narrowly defined material or corporate interests. And development historians do not so much de-center as more fully historicize and contextualize the Cold War, treating it as an extended phase in a longer historical engagement between a globally dominant U.S. and what only in the Cold War context would become known as the “third world.” They shift the axis of Cold War historiography as well, highlighting the centrality of the struggle for the loyalties of the decolonizing global South while also underscoring the degree to which there were other rivalries—within and between competing ideological camps—shaping the course of policy and people’s lives.

In classic post-colonial spirit, moreover, the still emerging development narrative has resisted the dominance of the Cold War—at least as traditionally understood, along an East/West valence—as the framework for understanding the post-1945 world order, while keeping the role of the superpowers plainly in view.

There is, too, a generally agreed-upon narrative taking shape in the development literature that dwells on transatlantic far more than triumph—for the United States and the USSR alike. It begins with the story of development’s late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century origins as a set of ideas about modernity, which was, according to those ideas, an advanced state of existence that the United States had achieved or would soon achieve. It then traces the postwar elaboration of development as a social science and a heavily though not exclusively Cold War-influenced global mission to “speed up” and otherwise engineer the process in “underdeveloped” nations. Finally, it follows development through to its inglorious collapse as a coherent if badly flawed body of ideas in the face of American economic and global decline, growing internal dissent, and an extensive history of failed intervention. For the most part, the narrative treats development as a product of twentieth-century American liberal and its agencies in the loosely organized field of development, which cuts across agricultural, economic development, public health, population control, and related policy domains and relied on overlapping institutionalized networks between public and private in the 1920s and calls it the “associative state.” Nowhere has the role of this associative community of interest been more fully elaborated than in the broadly encompassing field of development, which cuts across agricultural, economic development, public health, population control, and related policy domains and relied on overlapping, often competing networks of experts, advocates, interest groups, contractors, foundation and university officials, and volunteer agencies—many of them religiously defined—to conduct its work. By providing an unusually fine-grained picture of the origins and rise of what, in the phrase used by Nils Gilman, was an inter-sectoral “developmental state,” development historians are contributing to a long line of historical argument that positions civil society as a complementary rather than a countervailing force in American state formation.

Certainly, development scholarship bears this argument out by showing how the official and expanding role of the federal state was not only shaped by but actively relied on the compliance and further expansion of existing institutionalized global nongovernmental sector alongside...
the expansion of federal foreign aid launched by President Harry S. Truman’s Point IV program in 1949. Over time, NGOs collectively came to function in much the same way more permanent colonial and postcolonial ministries did in other first world countries, cultivating expertise, commissioning special reports, and serving as training grounds for cadres of development professionals. They also became the critical organizational base for the creation of an identifiable establishment around a delimited ideological consensus about what development policy could and should be: expert-driven, centrally planned, and designed to put what policy makers understood to be backward societies on a pathway toward the proverbial American way of life.19
The big multi-purpose foundations—Rockefeller, Carnegie, and Ford in particular—played an especially significant role in defining the parameters of the establishment consensus, investing heavily in the specialized research institutes that would reinvent development as an interdisciplinary behavioral science after World War II and frequently serving as way stations for government officials and political appointees temporarily displaced by a change in administration. Foundation and other NGO boards also became important venues for introducing influential corporate elites (and, as Matthew Connelly points out in Fatal Misconception, his study of the population control movement, their wives) to various aspects of the development mission and to public/private policy reform and advocacy coalitions. Equally significant as an avenue for business, of course, was the actual business of development; dam-building was only one among many big-ticket infrastructural projects that produced lucrative contracts for major American corporations.

It was out in the proverbial (if undifferentiated) field, though, that these organizations conducted the ambitious agricultural, health, population control, and community development experiments that would form the basis of American-style development as an increasingly stylized protocol of interventions and practices that was divorced from local context and could be replicated throughout the developing world (or so the thinking went). By the 1960s, these NGO-cultivated practices were rapidly being absorbed into official state policy, both as actual foreign aid and as a set of associationalist (if decidedly state-centered) norms for third world nation-building. All the more ironic, then, that during the Cold War these nongovernment agents of American-style development would come to position themselves as bulwarks against Soviet centralization, much as they had positioned and would continue to position themselves against over-reliance on an impersonal “big government” bureaucracy in the postwar United States. And yet this branch of American civil society became the launching pad for a series of extraordinarily intrusive interventions into third world societies that were aimed at disrupting traditional ways of life to make way for a distant idea of progress.

None of this is to suggest that development’s nongovernmental sector was formed as an adjunct to or was smoothly in sync with the state or that its claims to independence were entirely insincere. The development scholarship instead points to a frequently contested, continually re-negotiated interdependence between state and civil society that is echoed in other parts of the policy history literature as well. Recent scholarship shows that in various areas of social welfare, as in development, the growth of the state did not lead to a diminution so much as to a substantial reorganization of civil society and its various associational networks. Indeed, in major areas of social provision such as health care and retirement, public subsidy led to major expansion of the “private” welfare state.20 Within the United States, the community-based experiments and interventions that became proving grounds for expert ideas overseas had their counterparts in a deep tradition of community uplift and economic development experimentation.21 As much as any particular social or economic intervention, what was being tested in these demonstration projects was an ideology of governance and a theory of planned social change that preserved a central role for civil society—as, among other things, a catalyst for innovation and an incubator of replicable public policy ideas—in an era of what we might call big government, or statist associationalism.

Still, even as it deepens historical understanding of the postwar associative state, development scholarship points to aspects of the role of NGOs in making and shaping public/private markets that have yet to be fully explored. Future research could do more to document how NGOs operated as contractors, brokers, and, in collaboration with public agencies and private financiers, investors in otherwise underserved or emerging markets. Even as it deepens historical understanding of the postwar associative state, development scholarship points to aspects of the role of NGOs in making and shaping public/private markets that have yet to be fully explored. Future research could do more to document how NGOs operated as contractors, brokers, and, in collaboration with public agencies and private financiers, investors in otherwise underserved or emerging markets. NGOs functioned as major employers as well, often in labor markets with comparatively lower wage and workplace standards than their own, raising questions about what norms—other than that they should be capitalist and free—they brought to indigenous market relations. We also need to know more about how NGOs factored into the free market counterrevolution that reshaped late twentieth-century global development in much the same way that conservative movement activists organized to create an associational counterestablishment in domestic and foreign policy.22 These and related issues will only grow in significance as historians turn to the fate of civil society in an era of free markets and big corporate capital.

The Lost Promise of Social Democracy

Much like the Cold War, which remains the primary narrative in American foreign relations, the origins, rise, and fall of New Deal liberalism remains the central framing narrative of twentieth-century social policy and political economy. But over the past two decades or so an important subtheme has emerged within that narrative that centers on the lost or somehow thwarted promise of a whole range of more social democratic policies—progressively redistributive, regulatory, racially egalitarian, feminist—that at key moments gained traction as possibilities for left-labor coalition-building and policy reform. Historians have pointed to various expressions of this thwarted promise—pinpointing especially the racial and gender inequities built into the New Deal social contract and the deliberate rollbacks of labor rights and full-employment Keynesianism after World War II. They have offered competing arguments for when and why the opportunities were lost or whether we can really talk about a single end-of-reform moment at all. But on some matters they substantially agree: that the political and policy order of the immediate postwar decades rested less on consensus than on a series of compromises and political bargains that effectively closed off more progressive civil rights, social...
policy, and political economic avenues; and that even this compromised version of liberalism faced continuous opposition from powerful but as yet unorganized elements of the Right.23

Development historians have a version of this narrative—internal disputes and all—but they add to and complicate it in interesting ways. In the development version of the lost promise narrative, the promise principally revolves around a highly idealized vision of infrastructure-heavy, technocratic planning, itself an expression of what David Engerman has referred to as the “romance” of planned economic development that for most of the interwar period attracted many an American admirer to Soviet five-year plans as well.24 As apotheosized in the New Deal’s Tennessee Valley Authority (Ekbladh calls it a “grand synecdoche” for expansive liberal reform) and celebrated in TVA administrator David Lilienthal’s widely circulated book, Democracy on the March (1945), democratic planning rested on the promise of education, civic improvement, and citizen participation as well as industrial progress. Above all, it promised freedom: from want and from the vestiges of so-called “cultural lag.”25

Social democratic aspirations found expression in other reform visions as well: rural land reform and redistribution; grassroots rural development; community-based urban planning; and internationalized regulation of global commodities markets. Notably, proponents recognized that none of these bolder reform approaches would fly as solutions for the United States, where even modest experiments met with fierce resistance. By the mid-1950s, under pressure from the same agricultural and free trade interests that had resisted regulation at home, administrators were rapidly scuttling or sidelining reform approaches as third world development strategies. Redistributive reform approaches got caught up in the politics of the red scare as well when politically controversial administrators were targeted as security risks—even when the underlying controversies had little to do with their allegedly communist sympathies.26 Growth and markets, not redistribution or participatory democracy, would be the leading edge of U.S.-backed development worldwide, much as they would become the program of a more politically anodyne “consensus” liberalism that came to dominate the political order at home.27

But development historians bring added, complicating factors to the “lost promise” narrative by shedding new light on the role of Cold War liberalization in social democracy’s demise. They offer accounts that underscore the degree to which anti-communist pressure came from within the ranks of liberalism as powerfully as it did from a conservative or populist anti-communist tide. Of course, many historians have written about how the social democratic left got frozen out or reined in with liberalism’s Cold War turn. As the history of development policy reveals, however, social democratic ideas were co-opted as often as they were shut down. Thus, even as left-liberal activists and policy intellectuals were being red-baited or investigated or were exercising pre-emptive self-censorship at home, the more progressive elements of the development project were being systematically diverted—and distorted—to meet escalating Cold War demands.

Development’s conscription into the Cold War arsenal was well underway by the early 1950s, as Latham and Ekbladh demonstrate. But it escalated to new and ever more militarized heights in the 1960s—John F. Kennedy’s “decade of development”—with U.S. support for repressive counterinsurgency initiatives in South Vietnam and Guatemala, where rural development and land reform were brutally deployed for purposes of mass relocation and pacification. Nor did the best-connected academic mandarins of development necessarily resist growing militarism in the Cold War struggle for dominance in the third world. On the contrary, they helped provide the scientific rationalization for it, according to Gilman, by framing even the most authoritarian military leaders as potential allies in modernization. “With the future of the post-colonial world in the balance, American modernizers were determined to direct its progress through foreign aid and development programs where possible, and through violence where necessary,” Latham concludes.28

High mandarins aside, militarization did prove disastrous for the American development project and for any social democratic aspirations it once might have harbored. Yet that still leaves historians to make sense of the persistence and evident allure of the idea that it could be otherwise—that global welfare and warfare were at heart compatible, especially when deployed in the name of the same overarching cause. This idea was frequently invoked in postwar domestic politics on behalf of the desegregated army, expansive veterans’ benefits, and, later on, LBJ’s declaration of “unconditional war” on poverty.29 It speaks to something besides pragmatic, growth-oriented “guns and butter” military Keynesianism in postwar liberalism: a deeply ingrained pattern of using the military and militarized spending as agents of social transformation, a pattern that extended especially to underdeveloped regions and populations in the United States and overseas. Whether this idea should be understood as a distinct strand of liberal thought and ideology or a more pragmatic, pared-back way of pursuing social reform aims is a subject that warrants further discussion and debate. The impact of this way of thinking on the domestic social democratic prospect was in either case much the same as it was abroad. Federal defense spending and the attendant military industrialization of the South and Southwest transformed the Sun Belt economy, but it also brought with it a transformative—if hidden—system of federally funded social provision that subsidized the growth of the region’s white middle class. The great irony, as a substantial body of scholarship has now shown, is that it also fostered the racially exclusive, anti-statist social policies that would eventually send an already fractured liberalism to political defeat.30

The Cold War may have marginalized and co-opted the social democratic planning and reform tradition in American development but it did not necessarily spell the end of it. Neither did the marriage of welfare to warfare. Indeed, as the historical literature points out but has not pursued in much detail, the debacles of the 1960s (and earlier) created openings for a vibrant if not necessarily unified post-development Left that was more deeply grounded in social thought and activism from the Third World. The degree to which it influenced the post Vietnam foreign aid establishment—or not—is only one among many questions for future historical scholarship to pursue in greater depth. So is the prospect, suggested in a small but growing body of research, that ideas and practices sustained within development’s social democratic circles may have filtered back into domestic social policy to a greater extent than historians have previously thought.

The Globalization of Reform

From almost the moment it was declared, the War on Poverty was highly contested historical terrain. Among other things, it engaged historians in debates over whether it—and the broader Great Society—should be understood as an extension or a radical departure from New Deal reform. A growing body of community-based and grassroots scholarship has blurred such distinctions both by bringing labor and civil rights movements politics more fully into the picture and by underscoring how even efforts to extend basic New Deal rights and protections to variously disempowered or “left out” populations met with
fierce resistance and charges of radicalism, both locally and in Washington, DC. The history of development offers a similarly nuanced perspective by suggesting that something else was occurring as well: the globalization of New Deal reform and of the pathways linking the war on poverty abroad to the War on Poverty at home.

Historians of the New Deal and the Great Society have taken note of the connections, making the requisite references to LBJ’s promise to recreate the TVA on the Mekong, Sargent Shriver’s effort to build a domestic Peace Corps, and the penchant among poverty warriors in the Office of Economic Opportunity for generating five- and ten-year plans. Historians of community action have taken note as well, showing how local community activists drew expertise and strategic political support from global anti-hunger and health campaigns in their efforts to build nutrition and public health systems for poor and otherwise underserved populations in the United States. But it is historians of development who thus far have done the most to fill those global reform connections in.

Drawing on an impressive range of U.S. government, NGO, international, and foreign country archives, the literature follows the trajectories of a host of former New Dealers—refugees from the constraints of domestic politics—as they became engaged in what by the late 1940s was shaping up as a globalized (if U.S.-led) policy project for “reshaping foreign societies.”

Nor was this project a simple extension of New Deal-bred ideas abroad. As Amy Staples demonstrates in her history of the big three international development agencies (the World Bank, the Food and Agricultural Organization, and the World Health Organization), New Deal agricultural reformers had an important influence on the early mission of the FAO, but they also refined their thinking once they were part of more internationalized networks—even as domestic pressures reined the more fully internationalist strategies in. Like others in the emerging global development industry, she argues, they turned to the project of “revolutionizing” strategically targeted third world societies only after the political failure of more internationalist and universalistic approaches with the United States—where, as Engerman points out, large-scale development was dismissed as unnecessary as well as subversive—the third world would be a more promising vista for honoring and experimenting with socially transformative ideas in housing, urban planning, health, and family planning that would eventually circle back once reform opportunities reopened back home. Ekbladh captures the dynamics of this process, following the circuitry of academic, applied, and, in the case of New Dealer-turned-corporate-consultant David Lilienthal in particular, entrepreneurial enterprise through which it was carried out. Having established himself as a global expert on dam and infrastructure building projects, Lilienthal proved adept at winning a more diversified portfolio of contracts from the War on Poverty’s Office of Economic Opportunity and other federal agencies in housing, youth development, and economic planning. By then, Americans were being encouraged to think of poor people as denizens of the “other America” in the memorable words of Michael Harrington, who likened poverty to an “underdeveloped country” in their midst. The third world analogy was more immediately relevant for African American scholars, activists, and residents of ghetto neighborhoods, for whom racial and political economic subordination was a form of internal colonialism. For those who had honed their poverty knowledge in overseas development, however, the third world was not just a metaphor. It was a testing ground for intervention and reform.

Despite these and other important inroads, conceptualizing and mapping out what we might think about as the global Great Society is still very much a work in progress. Published scholarship has only begun to trace the looping policy and programmatic connections that sent American experts and ideas overseas and then back again, though more is in the dissertation stage. All sorts of activist and grassroots connections remain to be explored in greater depth. Nor has the literature fully engaged how the actual experience of development on “other shores” fed back to community action and development at home. Here again, scholarship from the grassroots war on poverty is suggestive, showing evidence of collaboration between local activists and service providers and a host of development professionals and volunteers eager to apply what they learned overseas. Clearly, there is a great deal more to be learned by following these collaborations through to their often lasting program and policy outcomes.

For now, though, I will close with a brief thought about how the idea of a global Great Society provides an interesting perspective from which to revisit the question I opened up with: the question of what by the late 1960s was widely understood as the fatal contradiction that had brought the warring factions of Great Society and Cold War liberalism to an inevitable denouement on the streets of Detroit. Historians of domestic policy have long grappled with the corrosive impact of that contradiction, from the military drain on budgets for social programs to the deepening alienation of antiwar protestors. But from the development literature we might glean a more complex reading of the conflicted soul of liberalism and of what was being captured in those images from occupied Detroit.

As I mentioned at the start, what strikes contemporary viewers of the photographs is the shocking juxtaposition between the neighborhood’s evident, unaddressed poverty and the federal government’s heavily militarized response: liberalism’s Cold War arsenal would be the front lines of progressive social change. On this point the Kerner Commission backed him up. Its otherwise hard-driving Report on the conditions that led to the riots made no mention of Vietnam, essentially sideling powerful testimony from Martin Luther King Jr. and others making the link. It did make special mention of the army occupation in its account of unfolding events in Detroit, remarking on the discipline, calm, and apparently enlightened doctrine guiding the troops. Community “rapport,” not loaded weapons, proved the army’s key to restoring the peace—significantly enhanced, in the view of the commission, by the presence of so many African Americans among the troops. The contrast with what the Report depicted as the badly-trained, panicked, trigger-happy—dare I say “backwards”?—local law enforcement
operation could not be more stark. There was even a photograph—the only one in the Report’s photo gallery to acknowledge the army’s presence—to punctuate the point. It pictured a white paratrooper standing protectively alongside an obviously frightened African American boy. The community itself appeared a war zone, lacking any traces of civil society or of the dense network of community action and civil rights organizations mobilized to restore calm. As far as the Kernier Commission was concerned, the army occupation had saved the ghetto from itself. One might ask, in turn, whether such an account would have been plausible had the liberal establishment—and much of the rest of the country—not already come to think of neighborhoods like 12th Street as part of that proverbial “other” America. Much as an earlier generation of New Dealers had come to view the South as underdeveloped, they viewed the ghetto as ripe for modernization by any means necessary or possible, including approaches honed in decades of intervention in the global third world.

By the time the Kernier Commission Report came out in 1968, this understanding of liberalism’s convergent aspirations had been exposed as fatally flawed. Vietnam had been draining funds from Great Society initiatives, and none more than the War on Poverty. The massive attack on ghetto conditions LBJ promised after sending in the troops turned into a scattered array of interventions, as the president himself grew distracted and defensive in the face of intensifying opposition to the war. Nor did the political establishment at any level have much tolerance for seriously redistributive local community action and development strategies.

My aim here has thus not been to question the fundamental conflict between liberalism’s warring factions but to suggest how the view from development enriches our understanding of how it played out in domestic politics and policy. The view runs in the other direction as well. Recent scholarship on the postwar roots of the anti-Keynesian counterrevolution, for example, raises the possibility that the free market opposition to development may have been more sustained and institutionally anchored than the existing literature suggests. The extensive literature on the gendering and racialization of domestic social welfare policy offers a conceptual framework for more in-depth exploration of these processes in development. And what historian Judith Stein refers to as the turn “from factory to finance” in 1970s domestic political economy had implications for global development policy that have yet to be fully fleshed out. These are just a few of the issues historians of domestic policy and foreign relations have to confront if they wish to understand how the now-transformed field should refer to itself. For a sense of the main lines of the debate, see the roundtable accompanying Zeiler’s essay in the March 2009 Journal of American History, 1079–1091.

Notes:
2. A recent online posting of unpublished photographs from the riots captures the flavor of the visual coverage. They can be viewed at http://life.time.com/history/detroit-is-burning-photos-from-the-1967-riots/?sid=lb-gal-view#n1. For a detailed historical account, see Sidney Fine, Violence in the Model City (Ann Arbor, 1989).
4. The quote is from an interview conducted with Wilkins for Henry Hampton’s documentary of the postwar civil rights movement, Eyes on the Prize, in 1988 transcript of Wilkins’ interview for the series at http://digital.lwustl.edu/cgi/t/text/text-id?c=eop&cc=eop&pgn=m
13. Westad, Global Cold War. For an extensive discussion of rival ideologies within one important strand of the development mission, see Matthew Connelly, The Remote Control: The Struggle to Control World Population (Cambridge, MA, 2008).
16. The literature on this cluster of issues and institutional relationships is vast but tends to be scattered by type of institution. For a good overview of recent work in the broader field and an effort to make various subfields speak to one another, see Elisabeth S. Clemens and Doug Guthrie, eds., Politics and Partnerships: The Role of Voluntary Associations in America’s Political Past and Present (Chicago, 2012).
18. Gilman, Mandarins, 17.
28. The literature on this cluster of issues and institutional relationships is vast but tends to be scattered by type of institution. For a good overview of recent work in the broader field and an effort to make various subfields speak to one another, see Elisabeth S. Clemens and Doug Guthrie, eds., Politics and Partnerships: The Role of Voluntary Associations in America’s Political Past and Present (Chicago, 2012).
32. Alice O’Connor, “Swimming Against the Tide: A Brief History of Federal Assistance to Poor Communities,” in Ronald Ferguson and William Dickens (eds.), The Future of Community Development, (Washington, DC, 1999); Alice O’Connor, “Community Action, the Left, and ‘Gray Areas’: The Role of Voluntary Associations in America’s Political Past and Present (Chicago, 2012).
33. Alice O’Connor, “Swimming Against the Tide: A Brief History of Federal Assistance to Poor Communities,” in Ronald Ferguson and William Dickens (eds.), The Future of Community Development, (Washington, DC, 1999); Alice O’Connor, “Community Action, the Left, and ‘Gray Areas’: The Role of Voluntary Associations in America’s Political Past and Present (Chicago, 2012).
34. Alice O’Connor, “Swimming Against the Tide: A Brief History of Federal Assistance to Poor Communities,” in Ronald Ferguson and William Dickens (eds.), The Future of Community Development, (Washington, DC, 1999); Alice O’Connor, “Community Action, the Left, and ‘Gray Areas’: The Role of Voluntary Associations in America’s Political Past and Present (Chicago, 2012).


25. Ekbladh, Mission, 8.


28. Latham, Right Kind of Revolution, 123–156; Gilman, Mandarins, 190.


33. Gilman, Mandarins, 5.


35. Ekbladh, Mission, 229.


37. LBJ quoted in Guian A. McKee, “‘This Government is with Us’: Lyndon Johnson and the Grassroots War on Poverty,” in The War on Poverty: A New Grassroots History, 54.


The United States and China Since World War II
A Brief History
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CONTENTS
Not long after his arrival in Jakarta in 1965 as the freshly minted American ambassador to Indonesia, Marshall Green was the guest of honor at a diplomatic reception hosted by President Sukarno. Sukarno had succeeded in his demands to have the former Dutch territory of West New Guinea returned to Indonesia and had then embarked on a hostile policy of confrontation towards the new Malaysian Federation, believing it to be a neo-imperialist plot to encircle Indonesia. In the years preceding the new ambassador’s arrival the Indonesian leader had begun to ramp up his nationalist rhetoric, trying to divert attention from a struggling economy in an effort to hold a far-flung and fractious political community together. He had also called for a Peking-Jakarta axis, a move that alarmed politicians and policymakers in Washington and of course Canberra and London. Even more alarming for Western observers was the growing power of the Indonesian Communist Party, then the third largest outside Moscow and Peking.

Green’s remarks for the occasion had been carefully prepared by State Department officials, who had tried to focus on the positives in the U.S.-Indonesian relationship. After the speech, Sukarno stepped forward and, as Green recalled, “delivered a terrific blast against American foreign policy.” Although tempted to leave the room, Green decided to stay, and was then introduced to the leading guests. One, a senior Indonesian Foreign office official—the strikingly attractive Madame Supeni—was reputedly one of the president’s many mistresses. Aware that a nearby microphone would carry his next few words to the rest of the room, Green seized the opportunity to return fire at Sukarno. “Madame Supeni,” he gushed, “It’s a great pleasure to meet you. You know with that beautiful raven hair and flashing eyes and green sari I really couldn’t keep my mind on what the president was saying in his recent remarks. Could you tell me what he said?”

After a deadly silence, Sukarno slapped his thigh and laughed uproariously, causing the entire diplomatic congregation to emit a prolonged sigh of relief.

One of America’s most gifted Asia experts and policymakers in the postwar period, Marshall Green prided himself on his quick wit and gift for comic repartee. His diplomatic memoirs even bore the subtitle “Recollections and Humor” and featured countless episodes in which his jokes, as a State Department colleague once recalled, were able to “relieve awkward tension, induce a more friendly mood between opposing negotiators or cut through windy rhetoric.”

There can be no question that Green found a kind of boyish joy in reaching for the nearest pun, but his fondness for jokes might also have been a way of releasing the pressure. After all, his was a diplomatic career spent almost entirely at the coalface of America’s Asia policy from the beginning of the Second World War to the late 1970s. This was a period of extraordinary transformation in the region, in which the assertion of newfound nationalism jostled with chronic poverty and rapid economic development. Green was uniquely placed to observe the way in which these two forces, national self-assertion and modernization, were shaping a new dynamic in East Asia. He was the author of the background brief that informed the Nixon Doctrine and a key player in the remaking of U.S.-China policy, and his career offers scholars an important window onto how the United States negotiated the transition from the rigid, ideological bipolarity of the Cold War to the new, more fluid world that emerged in the early 1970s. Along the way, he himself underwent something of a transformation, from staunch advocate of the American national myth to open skeptic about the reach and range of Washington’s power.

Being present at so many regional flashpoints meant that Green acquired something of a reputation as an Asian “trouble shooter.” During the Taiwan Straits conflict in 1958 he served as crisis manager for Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. As deputy head of mission in Korea in 1960–61, he observed the students’ uprising and the downfall of Syngman Rhee, followed by a military coup d’état that overthrew a democratically elected government and installed President Park. He was consul general in Hong Kong when that mission was the American administration’s eyes and ears on China, and he witnessed the tragic aftermath of the Great Leap Forward, as thousands of Chinese refugees swarmed into Hong Kong. In the early 1960s he was recalled to Washington to lead a review of U.S.-China policy. He recommended the easing of trade and travel restrictions. In Indonesia, his first posting as an ambassador, Green watched as Sukarno and his pro-communist followers were replaced by Suharto, who made it clear that he would welcome foreign investment and would adopt a more cooperative stance toward regional partners. Green then served as assistant secretary for East Asia and Pacific affairs from 1969 to 1973, a period which saw the return of Okinawa to Japan, the bombing of North Vietnam, the Paris Peace Accords and Nixon’s trip to Peking. And he was ambassador in Australia when the relationship, as one American official put it at the time, was “seriously out of whack.”

There was nothing in Green’s background or education that had prepared him for his long service in East Asia. Throughout his formative years he had no exposure to Asian languages or cultures. A self professed “little New Englander,” he often spent his summer holidays as a child travelling with his parents in Europe. Indeed, he once declared that his “whole orientation was towards Europe.”

Educated at the prestigious Groton school and then Yale, he received his first career break in October 1939 when the U.S. ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, needed a private secretary. Green got the job—it was a protocol, not a policy position—because he played bridge and golf and because Grew had also been at Yale. A lifelong fascination with the country began. As he watched the storm clouds
gather in northeast Asia, Green later confessed to have been “spooling” to go to war with Japan. He had travelled through Japanese-occupied Korea, Manchuria and northern China and had seen firsthand the “ruthlessness of Japanese military rule.” The experience also forced him to think about the prevailing mood in his own country. Writing to his mother around this time, Green deplored the isolationist strain in the U.S. debate. Americans had become “over-humored by the good fortune to which we have fallen heir. Where the youth of other lands are aggressive, we are retracted, and our doom, like that of the Greek and Roman civilizations, is sealed when we produce, in our declining years, men not willing to fight for what they have.”

Henry Luce could only have applauded such sentiments. Green left Japan in May 1941 and joined the war effort, serving for the duration in the U.S. Navy as an intelligence officer and, after learning Japanese, as an interpreter.

Entering the Foreign Service proper after the war, Green’s first posting was as third secretary to Wellington, New Zealand, where, despite an appreciation for America’s assistance in the Pacific War, he noted the strong pull of local sentiment back towards Britain, or what the locals called the “mother-country,” especially in the form of bulk exports of primary products to a “hard-pressed England.”

But Japan appeared to exert a kind of gravitational pull on Green: the country was to become, as he declared, a “thread” throughout his career. In 1948 Secretary of State George Marshall sent George Kennan, then head of policy planning at the State Department, on a special mission to Japan, with Green as his sole travelling companion and adviser. The visit resulted in the acceleration of the U.S. government’s shift in emphasis from occupation to economic recovery. The idea, Green said, was to “normalize things as far and as fast as one could to stave off growing, nationalist resentment against the occupation.”

Kennan had also taken issue with the policy of routinely “purging” those sections of the Japanese business or political elite that had been in any way responsible for the war effort, arguing that each case should be dealt with individually. Green admired Kennan enormously; he compared listening to Kennan’s briefings to seeing “an eye…piercing into eternity.”

Out of that experience came a central lesson that was to guide much of Green’s own approach to the rise of Asian nationalism: there was a need for the United States to help its regional allies stand on their own two feet and take care of themselves.

Out of that experience came a central lesson that was to guide much of Green’s own approach to the rise of Asian nationalism: there was a need for the United States to help its regional allies stand on their own two feet and take care of themselves.

As ambassador in Jakarta, Green had made a favorable impression on Nixon. The two discussed regional affairs at length during Nixon’s visit there in 1967, as he geared up for another tilt at the presidency. Once elected, the new president appointed Green assistant secretary of state for East Asia and immediately dispatched him to all corners of the region to take soundings from key allies. He was given a wide brief: in effect, he was to try and give content to Nixon’s ideas—first expressed in Foreign Affairs in October 1967—about what a post-Vietnam Asia might look like. In his report following that mission Green observed that “our ability to help will depend to an important extent upon what countries of the area are doing to help themselves and their neighbours.”

But there was no regional clamour for the United States to leave; Green noted that “virtually all East Asian leaders stressed that premature or excessive withdrawal of U.S. strength could prove disastrous.” Yet in a climate of worsening news from Vietnam and growing public disillusionment in America, Green’s message was on target. “Americans feel,” he wrote, “that they are carrying a disproportionate share of the burden for military security… in areas which, while important to the US, are nevertheless distant. They are asking more and more frequently what other countries are doing to help themselves and to help each other. This mood is intensified by concern over our deepening problems at home.”

Green had set out the basic parameters of what would come to be known as the Nixon doctrine—pronounced by the president on the tiny Pacific island of Guam in late July 1969. That statement affirmed that the United States would not get involved in another land war in Asia and, moreover, that its regional allies had to provide more for their own self-defense. Treaty commitments would be maintained, but the implications were clear: future American involvement in the region would be of a different order. In essence, the statement on Guam was a signal that the United States was abandoning the worldwide struggle against Communism. Washington could no longer be the world’s policeman, and American power was beyond its prime.

Culling some Cold War shibboleths was part and parcel of this adjustment. In a private address to American chiefs of mission in Asia around the same time, Nixon himself confided that “the way the war ends in Vietnam will have an enduring impact on events, although the domino concept is not necessarily valid.” What concerned him the most was the feeling that “we should get out of Asia at all costs,” a temptation he rejected. He feared an “escalation of not just get-out-of-Vietnam sentiment but get-out-of-the-world-sentiment. And this would be disastrous.” The key issue, he stressed, was “how to overcome US disenchantment with Vietnam and growing doubts about our involvement in the world.” Nixon was feeling his way towards a new way of speaking about America’s world role, one that was less prone to singing the praises of U.S. pre-eminence and predominance. In something of a rare clarion call to the diplomatic corps, he added that if he were in the foreign service, he “would choose Asia to serve in. . . . In Asia you have more opportunity to shape the outcome of events than anywhere else on this globe.”

The Nixon doctrine was all the more alarming to allies
like Australia, because without the presence of U.S. troops on the ground in Southeast Asia, its leaders were back to where they had been prior to the Vietnam War: namely, profoundly uncertain about what kind of protection the ANZUS treaty (signed in 1951) afforded them. Yet Green also saw Australia as something of an exemplar for other regional allies. “The new sense of vigor in Australia,” he told Secretary of State William Rogers in 1972, “can be used to advantage in utilizing Australia’s leadership to strengthen regional cohesion and self-help as visualized in the Nixon doctrine.”14 The labor leader in Australia, Gough Whitlam, had interpreted the doctrine in the same way, seeing it as an opportunity for Australia to shed the “stultifying” rigidities of the Cold War and define a more independent role for the nation within and without the U.S. alliance.15

And yet the election of the Whitlam labor government—the first left-of-center government in Australia in twenty-three years—witnessed a rapid and dramatic deterioration in the alliance relationship. Senior labor ministers voiced strident criticism of the December 1972 Christmas bombings; Whitlam pulled Australia’s remaining military advisers out of Vietnam, threatened to abandon SEATO and publicly backed regional calls for Indian Ocean neutrality and a nuclear free zone in South East Asia and the Pacific. According to Green, Nixon apparently felt as if “our great, staunch ally had opted out of the war.”16 During this period Australia was reported to be second only to Sweden on Nixon’s list of detested countries, and American national security officials were prone to label Australian public statements on foreign policy as “gaffes” or “monstrosities.”17 The president ordered that nobody at the rank of assistant secretary or above could meet with any Australian officials, including the ambassador, then Sir James Plimsoll. Green circumvented Nixon’s ban by visiting Plimsoll at home. Some Australians treated Green’s appointment as the new American ambassador in early 1973 as something of a coup. “We got Marshall Green” was the boast of one official in the Foreign Affairs Department, more used, no doubt, to the usual roll call of presidential associates and bag handlers who normally secured the Australian post. Others saw it as an “early pay off from Australia’s changed attitude towards the US.”18

But another explanation is more convincing, Green and national security adviser Henry Kissinger had not always seen eye to eye, with Green’s opposition to the idea of a U.S. ground invasion of Cambodia in 1970 not exactly helping his cause. Originally thought to be the next logical appointee as ambassador to Japan, Green was instead sent to handle the Australian “problem.” The tension between these two policymakers clearly lingered. In an oral history interview in 1995 Green remarked that Kissinger had no “depth of knowledge about East Asia—none” and that “his failure to draw upon the expertise of people who had spent their lives working on East Asia was a great mistake on his part.” He recalled that being “cut out of things” was particularly problematic because “Kissinger knew that you didn’t have the complete picture, and therefore he tended to discredit your views accordingly.” Whitlam believed that “Kissinger resented Green’s professional expertise and verbal brilliance,” contending that the appointment was to remove the diplomat as another source of advice to Nixon. Although Green made all the right noises when he arrived in Australia about having specifically chosen the Canberra post for himself, within two months he was in Kissinger’s office in the White House requesting that he be reassigned back to Washington.19

Green’s plea to come home reflected in part the fact that he had so quickly mended a somewhat rickety alliance fence. First, he had secured Whitlam a much-prized invitation to see Nixon, after the president had for five months steadfastly refused to open the Oval Office to the Labor leader. Nixon’s refusal, of course, was partly due to his fury at the perception that a once-close Cold War ally was breaking ranks. But it was also yet another telling indication of an administration more and more under siege because of the lethal drip of the Watergate scandal. Moreover, Green had assured Whitlam’s concerns about the purpose and function of the American intelligence installations in Australia. While a series of disputes and divergences over Asia policy continued to rile relations throughout 1974–75, in essence Green kept faith with the policy recommended to him just prior to taking up the post: namely, that the United States and Australia need not necessarily march together “in lock-step, against the forces of darkness.”20

His adoption of that policy confirmed that Green, like President Nixon, believed that the turning away from certain Cold War orthodoxies necessarily involved toning down the grandiloquent rhetoric and missions of the past. With the changing circumstances, there could be no more lofty rhetoric about a Pax Americana. During his tenure as ambassador in Australia Green even pointedly rejected the American national myth as expressed in John F. Kennedy’s inaugural address. It was hard, he said, “to conceive of a more sweeping declaration of commitment to the world spoken by a President just elected by the narrowest of margins.” Americans would “still wish to carry out the burden of this message”; however, they had “come to see a serious flaw in an approach that suggests the business of America is world leadership. Leadership is to be shared. Burdens and responsibilities are to be shared. . . . [I]t is far beyond the means and capabilities of any one country to shoulder all these responsibilities; and it is far beyond the wisdom of any one country to supply by itself the answers and solutions to world problems.”21

The new policy had consequences for alliance partners. By the end of his posting Green had declared publicly the alliance policy of previous conservative leaders in Australia—immortalized in Prime Minister Harold Holt’s declaration on the South Lawn of the White House in June 1966 that his country would be “All the way with LB”—to be a “downright embarrassment” to Australia and its subsequent governments.22 But to the very end he was ever the analyst, opining to the British high commissioner in October 1974 that the Whitlam government had “from six months to a year” before it would collapse, since it had no policy to combat rampant inflation. Although he believed a successor conservative government would be no more successful in this regard, he wondered whether it “would open the way to a much more extreme Labor government thereafter.”23 His sentiments showed how much the Whitlam experience had stung the American diplomatic mind. Not surprisingly, the very same sorts of concerns would be aired in 1982–83 as the Reagan administration observed Labor’s return to power.

Writing confidentially to Kissinger at the end of his posting in July 1975, Green summarized in one sentence the essence of the policy dilemma he had encountered over the previous two years. “One of our biggest problems in Australia,” he mused, was “complacency. paradoxically, the Indochina debacle, inflation and unemployment have helped make Australians increasingly aware of their dependence on outside developments and of their reliance upon the United States.” The Whitlam government had “provocatively matured in its views.”24 But this statement also spoke to a certain misreading of Whitlam and his intentions. It showed that America’s encouragement of national self-reliance in Asia had its limits. Whitlam never advocated the abrogation of the alliance, yet so many in Washington saw his policies as a dangerous flirtation with neutrality.

What guidance, then, can Marshall Green offer in today’s flammable world of northeast Asian affairs? Earlier
this year the former national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, suggested that the media’s depiction of Obama’s rebalancing of American foreign policy towards Asia as a “pivot” (with the salient reminder that the president himself has never used the word) misses the point that it was “only meant to be a constructive reaffirmation of the unchanged reality that the U.S. is both a Pacific and Atlantic power.”

That might be so, but few would quibble that the dilemmas facing policymakers in Washington because of the rise of China present a challenge of a different order from those the United States has faced in the past. And the White House still faces an equally formidable set of regional flashpoints—not least with North Korean sabre-rattling, persistent Sino-Japanese antagonism, and lingering India/Pakistan tensions. Moreover, the psychological and political effects of modernization, and their resulting consequences for nationalism, are still very much at play across Asia.

Marshall Green saw both sides of this problem: that even though this new spirit of national self-confidence in Asia could be a force for cohesion, the divisive nationalism of leaders like Mao, Rhee and Sukarno could also be employed to brutally consolidate power at home while making enemies abroad. At a critical time in American foreign relations, Marshall Green recognised that the best role the United States could play in Asia was not that of roving policeman, but stabilizer. It is a role many regional allies look to Washington to play today, despite the message now, as then, that America needs first and foremost to tend to pressing domestic challenges. Of course, no one bureaucratic career, speech or presidential doctrine from the past can point to a sure way ahead: history has a habit of springing surprises. But the path can surely be illuminated by a surer grasp of the history of America’s postwar engagement with the countries in its regional embrace and those who crafted its course.

Notes:
4. Quoted in a State Department Profile of Green, in Box 8, Folder 10, MGP. 5. Marshall Green Papers (hereafter MGP), Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford. The author is grateful to the staff at Hoover for their assistance during a research visit in December 2012.
10. Green, Memorandum to the President, “The President’s Trip through Asia,” July 9, 1969; Box 2, Folder 16, MGP. The memorandum was preceded by a cover note to Kissinger.
11. Memorandum, Green to Kissinger, “A View of East Asia,” April 21, 1969, Box 9, Folder 1, MGP.
12. Memorandum, Green to Kissinger, “A New Approach in East Asia,” August 28, 1969, Box 4, Folder 18, MGP.
13. President Nixon’s Comments to Chiefs of Mission, Bangkok, July 30, 1969, Box 8, Folder 10, MGP.
20. Memorandum for Marshall Green, Meeting with Australian Journalists Samuels and Brenchly, March 19, 1973, Papers of the Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (ASSEAPA), RG 59, Box 32, Lot 74D741, NACP.
24. Correspondence, Green to Kissinger, July 31, 1975, Box 9, Folder 10, MGP.
The organization of this volume of nearly one thousand pages reflects the fact that in the mid-1970s U.S.-Iranian relations were more important than U.S.-Iraqi relations. Twice as many pages are devoted to Iran, and even within the much shorter Iraq section there are many telegrams to and from Tehran concerning the Iraqi Kurds. One might reasonably question the decision to include Iraq in this volume. If it had focused exclusively on Iran, editor Monica Belmonte could have added important documents detailing the shah’s policies in neighboring countries such as Afghanistan, Oman, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia—places that were of great interest to American officials. It seems unlikely that future volumes in this series will present what has necessarily been omitted here.

That concern aside, it is clear that this FRUS volume will be a useful one for scholars. The editor has chosen a balanced selection of documents. (Readers might remember the controversy over an earlier FRUS volume on Iran, covering the Musaddiq years, when that was not the case.) She provides useful introductory notes on the sources and indicates throughout the text wherever material has been withheld. As a result the volume presents a frank, complex account of U.S.-Iran relations for the Nixon-Ford years.

The priority given to Iran by the Nixon administration is evident at the outset. President Nixon appointed then-CIA Director Richard Helms ambassador (he served from 1973 to 1976) and indicated that he would be a kind of super-ambassador, reporting not only on Iran but also on developments in the Gulf region and offering communications on extremely sensitive issues, such as U.S. support for Iraqi Kurds. Helms made good use of this medium. At one point in July 1974, he sent a “Dear Henry” message castigating the loose talk of certain cabinet-level officers (such as Secretary of the Treasury William Simon), which undermined the administration’s foreign policy efforts. They had to understand, he argued, that the State Department was in control and that they were “the tail, not the dog” (67).

By the early 1970s, Iran had become the key to U.S. policy in the Middle East. The records gathered here illustrate the significance of the relationship between the United States and Iran on many levels. American officials interacted regularly with their Iranian counterparts; delegations passed endlessly between Tehran and Washington. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi enjoyed the firm and continuing support of Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford and, of course, their secretary of state, Henry Kissinger.

The mid-1970s proved to be a period of transformation for Iran. The shah was at the apogee of his long reign (1941–1979). In May 1972, during a brief visit to Tehran, President Nixon gave him permission to purchase any American weapons systems he wanted (nuclear devices not included) without the usual vetting by the U.S. Department of Defense. Within a year, the shah found himself in a position to take advantage of the president’s offer. He had played a leading role in OPEC’s decision to raise oil prices, which escalated dramatically beginning in 1973. Suddenly, billions of additional dollars were pouring into Iran’s treasury. From 1973 to 1976, the period covered in this volume, Iran purchased more than $15 billion of weapons, most of them from the United States, making it Washington’s best customer.

The shah relied on his growing arsenal and oil wealth to extend his influence not only within Southwest Asia but also to the Indian Ocean nations, to Africa, and even to Europe. The Americans had urged him to take a more active role in regional defense matters, and he needed little encouragement. He exerted influence among all of his non-Soviet neighbors and throughout the Persian Gulf. He dreamed of making the Gulf an Iranian lake. He sent an expeditionary force to Oman—at the sultan’s request—to help put down a Marxist rebellion in Dhufar. Although the United States pursued a Twin Pillar policy in the Gulf, theoretically relying on both Iran and Saudi Arabia to uphold American interests there, by early 1973 it had become clear that Iran was the stronger of the two nations and that the Nixon administration had come to rely more on Tehran than on Riyadh.

Two issues receive ample and detailed attention in the selected documents: the rapidly escalating price of oil and the shah’s desire to obtain nuclear energy from the United States. The focus on these two contentious issues—neither of which was ever settled, despite the close ties between Washington and Tehran—may reflect current concerns in U.S.-Iran relations as much as the concerns of the mid-1970s. But the focus on oil prices is hardly surprising, given the dramatic changes affecting oil in that decade. To underline the central importance of this issue, the editor wisely directs attention to the earlier volume on the energy crisis, *FRUS*, 1969–1976, Vol. XXXVII, *Energy Crisis*, 1974–1980 (65).

In the documents presented here, the shah ably defends price increases. The Iranian and American positions are clearly set out in letters exchanged between President Ford and the shah at the end of October 1976 (191, 192). This debate represented the most serious area of disagreement.
between the two allies, and the concern was that it might cast a shadow over other areas of cooperation.

Although the documents indicate that the United States wanted to break OPEC's control over oil prices (109, 296), Ford and Kissinger specifically rejected any suggestion of breaking the shah. Kissinger did indicate to him, however, that another lengthy [Arab] embargo of oil would constitute "a grave act of economic warfare" and might force the United States to consider military intervention in the region (96).

The prominent place of nuclear energy in this volume might surprise some readers, but the shah was focused on acquiring this resource. As Helms reported, "I had difficulty in getting beyond the subject of nuclear power because he wanted to get down to brass tacks on that right away." For reasons amply detailed in the documents, these bilateral discussions also failed (56). One other issue receives considerable attention here: the secret U.S. assistance to the Iraqi Kurds, which came to an abrupt end after the shah and Saddam Hussein signed the Algiers Accord in March 1975. Kissinger became anxious to avoid negative fallout over what some might have considered the abandonment of the Kurds (281, 282, 310). His concern about being considered complicit in their fate influenced his decision to allow Kurdish leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani to remain in exile in the United States.

Many documents on the subject of the Kurds appear in both sections of the volume. In fact, it was probably this common theme that led to the decision to pair these countries in a single volume. In spite of all the information available here on the Kurds, the editors indicate that there is more to come, tantalizing us with the statement that this issue "is best documented in the closed CIA files" (xiv).

There is a good deal in this volume confirming difficult personal and bureaucratic relationships within the two Republican administrations. Aside from the ongoing problems with Secretary Simon, there was disagreement between the State Department and the Defense Department over the extent of arms sales to Iran and U.S. dependence on the shah's regime. Documents here confirm what we already know about Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger's testy relationship with Kissinger and his criticism of aspects of administration policy. For his part, Kissinger often expressed concerns to his intimate about Department of Defense officials. For example, he referred to Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements as that "mad man Clements." However, his crudest words were reserved for his former Harvard colleague, Zbigniew Brzezinski, whom he characterized as "a total whore" (166). Such ad hominem remarks appear with some regularity in these pages.

Ambassador Helms became an advocate of consistent U.S. support for the shah's regime, pointing out to Washington the harmful impact of the rising chorus of anti-shah media on U.S.-Iran relations. In a 1976 report from the embassy in Tehran he tried to explain away human rights charges against the regime, even providing a historical justification for SAVAK, the shah's secret police and intelligence service (183, 184). The report prompted an immediate response from the Department of State's Office of Research and Analysis, which warned that it should be read with caution because it contradicted other department analyses of torture and press control in Iran (185). Helms repeatedly reminded his superiors in Washington that they had to respect the fact that the shah was better informed than other Middle Eastern leaders on key issues, especially those relating to energy (78, 85).

A longstanding problem facing U.S. information gatherers in these documents. Too many of the embassy's facts came from Iranian government sources. The shah frowned on U.S. officials meeting with any elements of the opposition, and embassy staff often knew little of what went on outside court circles (see note in doc. 184). In late 1974 one analyst tellingly observed that few Americans had close Iranian friends. Although this statement would have puzzled Peace Corps volunteers in the country, it suggests that diplomats in Iran may truly have been isolated from the Iranian people.4

Contemporary assessments of the shah and his policies are generally well developed, but some other observations seem ill-informed. An embassy analysis from January 1973, for example, declared that there was no group that could conceivably pose a threat to the regime. The traditional clergy-bazaari alliance, it concluded, "lacks the clout" (I). Adding a cushion of reassurance, a May 1975 National Intelligence Estimate observed that even should the shah's regime collapse one day—which at the time seemed unlikely—a more extreme successor would probably not change the relationship with the United States dramatically (121). That same January 1973 analysis also observed that the average Iranian citizen was every bit as corrupt as whomever he chose to criticize (I). This surprising generalization may support the assertion that few American diplomats had close Iranian friends. The analysis concluded, with perhaps even less justification, that His Imperial Majesty was "at least intellectually committed to democracy" (I).

There are ample evidence of U.S. support for Iranian intervention in Saudi Arabia should the Saudi regime be overthrown (119, 124, 125). But there is also a request from the Ford administration for Iranian (and Saudi) financial support for pro-American factions in Angola. Coming just as the Tunney amendment was making its way through Congress, this initiative is evidence of an attempt to nullify legislative restrictions on Angola (150).

A few clouds begin to gather late in the Iran section of the volume. U.S. officials expressed concern about the increasing number of American technicians living and working in Iran. They feared there might be as many as 80,000 by 1980. Tensions and altercations had already been reported, especially in provincial cities such as Isfahan. According to an assessment by the counselor at the U.S. Embassy, such problems were in large part due to "the unique rudeness and discourtesy of the host society" (146, 149).

More ominously, however, by the end of 1975 oil companies were lifting less Iranian heavy crude, which they claimed was overpriced. For the first time in several years the shah was short of funds to carry out various projects (154, 155, 163). Iranian finances would become a growing concern and would be a critical factor in the coming of the revolution at the end of the decade. And yet at the end of the Ford administration, the documents indicate no general concern about survival of the shah's regime. Historians continue to debate whether there was a failure of intelligence or whether internal conditions did not yet warrant alarm.

Whatever the answer, we encounter in these pages a confident shah at the height of his power, who remarks proudly to Kissinger and Helms, both staunch admirers, that "Iran should not be looked at as just another Middle Eastern country. In 5-10 years time, it will be very different and will stand out from its neighbors" (30). And he was right.

The documents on Iraq reveal that this was a decisive period for that nation as well. After seizing power in July 1968, the Baath Party took a few years to establish firm control over the country and especially over the military, which had been the source of several coup d'état since 1958. Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, a former military officer, became president, and Saddam Hussein, his cousin, became his second-in-command. As al-Bakr’s health failed, power increasingly passed into Hussein's hands. He set up the security forces and used these early years to eliminate opponents both real and imagined within the country.
generally and more specifically within the Baath Party. In 1972 the regime nationalized Iraq’s oil resources, and the dramatic rise in oil prices that occurred in 1973 allowed it to carry out a number of important development projects. After the 1967 June War, Iraq had distanced itself from its Arab neighbors. It had already broken diplomatic ties with the United States over its support of Israel, and in 1972 Hussein went a step further and signed the fifteen-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union. By 1973, however, Baghdad was seeking to improve relations with other Arab states and even with some Western nations such as France. Hussein had by this time come to exercise the real authority in Iraq, and it seemed only a matter of time before al-Bakr would resign or be removed from office.

U.S. relations with Iraq were much less extensive than those with Iran. In 1973 a small U.S. Interests Section was established in Baghdad. Arthur Lowrie served as principal officer until September 1975, but he had limited access to Iraqi officials. Much of the information he reported back to Washington came courtesy of ambassadors from Algeria, Egypt, France, and Turkey, whose countries enjoyed full diplomatic relations. The Iraqi regime, of course, was much more secretive than the shah’s, and it restricted news of internal developments and policymaking to a trusted few. These conditions hampered the efforts of U.S. officials in Baghdad and Washington, who often admitted in their reports that they were lacking sufficient and accurate information (317). Given this situation, it is understandable that the Iraq material is much thinner.

Like Helms in Tehran, Lowrie was concerned to put forward a positive image of the regime in order to encourage the improvement of bilateral relations. He cautioned his superiors to ignore Iraqi rhetoric and to focus instead on what Baghdad did, such as negotiating to purchase a number of Boeing civilian aircraft (266). He called several times for Washington to end all relations with the Kurds and to urge the shah to do likewise. Such actions, he believed, would lead to greater stability in the region and would bolster attempts to improve U.S.-Iraq relations (220, 231, 268).

There is much discussion of Iraq’s moving away from dependence on the Soviet Union and trying to reestablish ties with Arab nations. A remaining difficulty faced the regime, however: the war with the Kurds in the north. To resolve this problem, Saddam Hussein boldly decided to negotiate an end to Iranian support for the Kurds. Those talks resulted in the Algiers Accord. From the Iranian side of the border, the accord was seen as a major victory for the shah, but Lowrie interpreted it differently, arguing that Iran had lost its leverage over Iraq (306) and that Saddam Hussein had brought about an internal stability unknown since 1958 (288). This view differed significantly from that of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which claimed that the agreement disappointed elements within the Baath Party and within the army as well (306).

The documents provide an accurate if sobering analysis of Saddam Hussein. They point to his record as a conspirator, a would-be assassin, an underground operator. He also showed himself to be shrewd, ruthless, energetic, and, at times, courageous (288). In other words, he was a formidable opponent.

One of the last documents in this collection is a lengthy assessment of Iraq by the CIA. Agency analysts mentioned that the Iraqis suspected the United States of colluding with the Kurds and conspiring with Syria to promote its intervention in the Lebanese civil war (317). We now know that their suspicions were justified. By the end of 1976 it was clear that in spite of improving commercial ties, there were a number of barriers to substantial improvement of diplomatic relations. Chief among these, the documents attest, was continued U.S. support for Israel. Another factor, of course, was the strength of American ties to Iraq’s eastern neighbor and competitor, Iran (317).

Notes:
1. Numbers refer to documents rather than pages.
2. Iraq recognized Iran’s territorial claims in the Shatt al-Arab, and in return the shah agreed to end assistance to Iraq’s Kurds.
3. According to the Washington Post (October 16, 2012), Brzezinski responded, “Henry is a friend of mine—He must have meant ‘bore.’ ”
4. The author served as a Peace Corps volunteer in Iran from 1968 to 1971 and taught at Alam High School in Mashhad from 1971 to 1973.

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- A Roundtable on Nicole Phelps’ Sovereignty Transformed
- Wilson and World War I historiography
- The Energy Crisis of the 1970s: Two FRUS reviews
- and much more...
The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Negotiating the New French Foreign Ministry Archives

Kathryn C. Statler

The relatively new French Foreign Ministry Archive located at La Courneuve on the outskirts of Paris simultaneously offers the best and worst of French central planning. Before offering a few observations on some major pros and not insignificant cons of this facility, I want to make it clear that I love France and I love the French. My current manuscript celebrates the almost 250-year-old Franco-American alliance, and all of the research I recently gathered underscores the determination on both sides of the Atlantic to keep the relationship healthy and strong. Indeed, as I tell any unsuspecting undergraduate who will listen, much of the current scholarship on the Franco-American alliance overemphasizes its negative aspects, viewing it as cold, conflicted, and downright hostile. I see the relationship as a familial one—two sisters, perhaps, or an old married couple. As French ambassador to the United States Hervé Alphand once noted, “we quarrel over all the little stuff but stand together when the big crises come.” Although hostile rhetoric sometimes arises when the two countries feel themselves drifting too far apart in the diplomatic realm, they are inextricably linked. So despite Hollywood’s tendency to blow up Paris first in any apocalyptic movie, the Franco-American alliance is alive and well.

Still, the new archives can try even the most ardent Francophile’s patience. To begin with, the facility is located in a decrepit northern banlieue of Paris, about a three-minute walk from the half-functioning RER platform. Usually there is a train every fifteen minutes or so, but be sure to avoid one going directly to Charles de Gaulle airport or you will have a long ride out and back. I am proud to say that I am not speaking from personal experience here.

After exiting the RER at Courneuve-Aubervilliers, you walk south on N301 and turn left onto Rue Suzanne Masson. The archives are located at 3 Rue Suzanne Masson. Identifying the building is easy. First, it is the only modern, well-maintained facility in the area, and it stands well apart from the depressing low-rent high rises, the broken-down shops, and the bus stop. Second, it is the only building bristling with security, which the French take very seriously. You have to ring at the door to be allowed into the foyer, then you go through security and show a valid passport or driver’s license to gain entry to the main building. After traversing the courtyard and pushing through the ridiculously heavy sets of doors, you will see the front desk on the left. Here functionaries greet researchers politely and take passports or driver’s licenses in exchange for badges that open all the numerous entry points located throughout the facility. You may enter the building and obtain your badge as early as 9:30, but please note the hours of operation for the research rooms are 10:00-5:00.

You may or may not receive a key with your badge. This is an important detail, as the keys open the lockers that are located directly across from the front desk behind a discreet grey door. If you are late, you may have to take your chances with the combination lockers (I recommend #110). After placing everything but computers, cell phones, wallets, and pencils in the locker, you proceed through yet another security checkpoint to the second level. This level is devoted to researchers and includes a large, well-lit main research room with many, many spots for those working with physical documents, another ample room for those working with microfilm, and a smaller but well-appointed “inventory” room where bound collections such as Documents diplomatiques français can be found, inventories are kept, and documents can be ordered at a number of computers.

All of these rooms have plugins for any desired electronic device, are comfortable and efficient, and are truly a vast improvement over the former archives at the Quai d’Orsay, where people trying to speak to an archivist, order documents or microfilm, or make photocopies were crammed in with those trying to focus on actual research. The days when researchers had to arrive at 9:30 A.M. to be sure to get a spot are also a thing of the past, as is the process of waiting to be escorted every hour on the half hour by functionaries employed only for that purpose. The biggest plus, in my opinion, is that you can now photograph documents, whereas at the Quai you first had to receive approval to photocopy, wait for someone to lead you to and from a copier that worked most of the time, and wait again to pay the “president” of the room. Photocopiars are still available, but given the expense, thirty euro cents a page, who would bother? Another bonus is that you can now order six dossiers, or volumes, each day instead of having to order the day before, and the dossiers usually arrive within thirty minutes. You can also reserve two documents for the next day. While the new system is not as efficient as the one at the British Public Record Office, it is light years ahead of the old one. One last feature: the main research room is supposedly a wifi hotspot. However, as of spring 2013 only those with a French carrier could access it.

Another major improvement is that an archivist is always on duty in the inventory room to help you wade through the various collections, find dossiers, and order them on the computer. Staff members also man the main research room and microfilm rooms at all times. However, in the main room only one person handles the retrieval of documents, so researchers must be prepared to wait during peak research periods (usually right before the archives’ annual two-week closure during the last part of April or before any university holiday). A staff member
from the library is also available at the same main research room desk. Finally, the “president” of the main research room oversees the extensive security apparatuses in place (generally while reading the newspaper). I was assured that the archives are very safe and that I could leave my electronic devices and wallet at my desk, but being a somewhat paranoid individual, I always took them with me when going on coffee or lunch breaks.

The subject of breaks brings me to another very good feature of the facility. No longer are researchers consigned to the miserably cold, smoke-filled, and windowless sous-sol (basement) in the depths of the French Foreign Ministry. They can either go to the small but window-filled break room, with comfy chairs and tables and the ubiquitous vending machines serving all forms of French coffee (40 euro cents for a macchiato—you can’t beat it), various snack items, and sandwiches, or opt for the cafeteria with everyone else marooned at La Courneuve. The food is reasonably priced and not bad at all. Don’t go right at noon, as French government officials have yet to deviate from their rigid dining hours and the place is packed. The third option, which not a single researcher or functionary utilized as far as I could tell during my two weeks there, is to venture outside to one of the dilapidated eateries around the archives—no “McDo” (or its European equivalent, Quick) to be found here. The French government’s plan for urban renewal around the archives appears to be delayed indefinitely. Sometimes land is cheap for a reason.

Although clean, modern, and efficient, the new archives are not particularly warm and welcoming. People are professional, sans plus. No one seems happy to be here except the young stagiaires (interns), who are thrilled to have some sort of employment. Apparently researchers share these sentiments, as I counted thirty at most on any given day, a far cry from the sixty to seventy people who packed the Quai d’Orsay. Are people unwilling to make the trip to La Courneuve? Are French universities no longer requiring documentation? Are fewer foreign researchers interested in France? Whatever the reason, there is plenty of elbow room. The other problem, typical of an ultra-modern facility, is that nothing seems to work reliably—i.e., the combination lockers, the wifi, and, more seriously for this researcher, the computer system. Three quarters of the way through my research trip, I was unable to retrieve any more documents via computer. A “bug” in the system—apparently not the first—was responsible, an archivist notified me. So each day the person working in the inventory room had to request my documents for me. So much for the fancy new system.

For those working on Franco-American relations the newly reorganized “Amérique” series will be very useful. All of it is now categorized under 91QO, followed by the appropriate years and volumes. If I wanted to look at the 1970s, for example, I would request volumes from 91QO, 1971–75 or 91QO 1976–1980. The archivists have made good progress on the declassification process, and the physical inventories are also much easier to use. I was able to power through thousands of pages of documents far more quickly than before, and since photos are permitted, I no longer had to lug hundreds of photocopies around. I estimate that with my iPhone and iPad, I got done in two weeks what usually takes me two months. Not bad at all.

Still, I miss the Quai. I miss walking through the heart of Paris to get to my research; I miss working at the nerve center of French foreign policy. I miss being escorted by a stoic functionary through corridors filled with black-and-white photos emphasizing the French presence abroad; I miss the camaraderie arising from the shared misery of researchers stranded in the basement munching on their baguettes and brie. I even miss the view of the Eiffel Tower from the women’s bathroom. I will get over it, I’m sure. In the meantime, c’est la vie.

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**CALL FOR PROPOSALS**

Host the 2016 SHAFR Annual Conference

Every other year, SHAFR holds its annual meeting in a location other than the Washington, D.C. area. The SHAFR Council would like to hear from members interested in hosting the conference at their institutions in 2016.

The Council requires a brief statement of purpose from any interested party. Please submit a document of no more than two pages with the following information:

1. The location and its attractiveness as a tourist destination: size and diversity of attractions (in town and regionally), dining and accommodations, transportation facilities, research venues in the area, etc.

2. The host institution: quality of the institution (departments, personnel, etc.), programs of interest to SHAFR, institutional support for a conference (accommodations, including variety of hotels, dorms, etc.), conference venue facilities, enthusiasm of administration, funding support, etc.

3. Leadership: explain who you are and who might help you host at your institution, including graduate students and staff.

All finalists will be asked to provide more details in each of these sections, including cost estimates. Please note that SHAFR is not looking for a fancy marketing scheme but simply an expression of interest and some basic information with explanation. Council will consider proposals for ANY location in the United States or another country.

Please send proposals by APRIL 1, 2014 to: Peter L. Hahn, Executive Director, at shafr@osu.edu.
In June of 1966, Senator Robert F. Kennedy visited South Africa to deliver a speech he had been invited to give to members of the National Union of South African Students at the University of Cape Town. He began his “Day of Affirmation” speech with a clever rhetorical strategy:

I come here this evening because of my deep interest and affection for a land settled by the Dutch in the mid-seventeenth century, then taken over by the British, and at last independent; a land in which the native inhabitants were at first subdued, but relations with whom remain a problem to this day; a land which defined itself on a hostile frontier; a land which has tamed rich natural resources through the energetic application of modern technology; a land which was once the importer of slaves, and now must struggle to wipe out the last traces of that former bondage. I refer, of course, to the United States of America.

With this implicit comparison, Kennedy highlighted the strong historical connections between the United States and South Africa, two nations that have faced myriad challenges related to democracy, justice, and race throughout their histories. As Americans were also struggling mightily with racial strife in the mid-1960s, Kennedy’s speech concluded by calling on the youth of South Africa “to strip the last remnants of that ancient, cruel belief from the civilization of man” that “clings to the dark and poisoning superstition that his world is bounded by the nearest hill, his universe ends at river's shore, his common humanity is enclosed in the tight circle of those who share his town or his views and the color of his skin.”

Nearly a half-century after Kennedy’s inspiring speech, I visited South Africa for the third time, bringing with me fifteen students from the University of Wisconsin-Green Bay on a travel course to Cape Town. Immersing ourselves for two weeks in South African history, culture, and society gave us a unique opportunity to confront issues of democracy and justice in a global context, as well as to engage in a comparative exploration of the historical ties and similarities between the United States and South Africa. Leading American students into the larger world for the first time was an exhilarating and challenging experience, one that broadened not only my students’ understanding of important international issues and their place in the world, but mine as well.

My travel course was not the typical study abroad experience in which students enroll in classes at a foreign university and live with local people. Instead, the course was intended to be a brief yet intensive introduction to life outside the United States. As a result, I had complete control over our itinerary and the focus of the trip. My colleagues have taken students to locales across the world, from London to Spain to Jordan to Ecuador, and the subjects of these courses have been as varied as the destinations, from history to linguistics to service learning. Preparing for the course, which would focus mainly on historical and contemporary political issues in South Africa, was both exciting and exhausting. After gaining approval for the course from my department, our International Education committee, and the dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, my year of work began.

I had traveled to Cape Town twice before—first in 2002 for research for my M.A. thesis and then in 2007 for my dissertation research—and was thus familiar with the major offerings of South Africa’s legislative capital (and second-largest city, after Johannesburg). With the assistance of the small but talented staff at our Office of International Education, I began the process by making bids for airline tickets to South Africa. After I had decided on the length of the trip—just over two weeks during our winter interim—and committed to tickets, I began researching activities and lodging possibilities. For accommodations, I decided on a highly rated backpacker (the South African equivalent of a youth hostel) located within walking distance of nearly every major Cape Town attraction.

At the backpacker (with the relatively pedestrian name of The Backpack), the women would be housed in two separate rooms, while the poor men would have to live together in a single eight-bed dorm room. The backpacker offered excellent and affordable breakfasts to start our days, laundry and kitchen facilities, a relaxed lounge and small bar, and as has always been my experience in such establishments, was a crossroads for travelers from across the world. My students interacted with not only South Africans, but visitors from Great Britain, Germany, Australia, Zimbabwe, and many other places. With a large

Cape Town, South Africa

PASSPORT January 2014
group of sixteen I was able to negotiate significant discounts with the backpacker, which helped arrange some of our excursions. The total cost of the trip per student, including airfare, accommodations, all excursions, international health insurance, several lunches and dinners, and a $500 meal allowance, ended up just under $4000.

I chose Cape Town as our destination for several reasons. First, it is South Africa’s oldest city (from a Western or European perspective, of course), founded in 1652 by Jan van Riebeeck and the Dutch East India Company as a refueling station for ships on their way to Dutch colonies in the East Indies. As such, it provides a perfect environment for delving into deep historical themes including slavery, European colonization, the exploitation of natural and human resources, and twentieth-century struggles for human rights and self-determination. Cape Town is also a truly international city, where English is widely spoken, and I felt such a setting would help my students better adjust to living, albeit briefly, in a foreign land. Additionally, Cape Town is the gateway to Robben Island, where Nelson Mandela and various other liberation leaders who opposed apartheid spent many years in prison. Robben Island was a must-see destination, as my students read Mandela’s inspirational autobiography, *Long Walk to Freedom*, for the course.

Finally, Cape Town is simply a beautiful locale. The city, which mixes historical Dutch architecture with modern buildings and has a fascinating blend of cultures from Europe, Africa, and Asia, nestles between the Atlantic Ocean and the towering Table Mountain, and the vistas in the city and the larger area are amongst the most stunning in the world. Cape Town and its environs are home to diverse fauna and flora, much of which is on display at the impressive Kirstenbosch National Botanical Garden. To the north are winding mountain passes and the dry Karoo desert. To the east lies the rich wine-growing region of South Africa, where scenic roadways traverse through endless acres of verdant vineyards and picturesque villages. To the south the curving highway sits atop massive cliffs that hug the Atlantic coast, leading to various seaside suburbs and pristine beaches on the way to the stunning Cape of Good Hope.

Yet Cape Town had its limitations for my course. The city and its encompassing province are hardly representative of the overall demographics or political makeup of South Africa. Cape Town maintains a strong British influence (the British displaced the Dutch as the colonizers of the Cape by 1800) and is 20 percent white, while whites make up less than 9 percent of the whole of the South African population (at the height of apartheid in 1970 they made up nearly 18 percent). Cape Town itself is only 6 percent black (though hundreds of thousands of blacks live in townships just outside the city), while blacks make up nearly 80 percent of the total South African population. Over 70 percent of Cape Town’s population is coloured—a unique amalgamation of various ethnic groups.

Politically, Cape Town and the Western Cape are also rather different from the rest of the country. In South Africa’s last national election, held in 2009, the Democratic Alliance, the official opposition party, won the Western Cape province with 52 percent of the vote. It was the only province that the African National Congress did not carry on its way to gaining just under 66 percent of the seats in the National Assembly. The Cape has been traditionally liberal in its politics, particularly during the near half-century rule of the National Party throughout the era of apartheid, and many of the Democratic Alliance leaders were former anti-apartheid activists in the 1970s and 1980s. Indeed, the Afrikaners left the Cape Colony in the nineteenth century because of the liberal politics of the British settlers. Political grievances led to a century of war and strife that involved both whites and blacks in the South African interior and culminated in the horrific Anglo-Boer War at the dawn of the twentieth century.

After trip logistics, my next task—recruiting students—was the most time-consuming, and also the most nerve-wracking. Our travel courses at UWGB operate on a cost-recovery basis, meaning that a certain number of students must commit to participating for the trip to go ahead. As this was my very first travel course and I was a new professor, I was slightly concerned that it would not draw enough students. Fortunately my fears were unfounded. UWGB’s Office of International Education handled some of the recruiting process, creating promotional material, posting housing information for study abroad opportunities on their website, and hosting a study abroad fair, where I promoted the trip and displayed photographs and artwork obtained on previous trips to South Africa, but the major onus for attracting students was mine alone.

The courses I taught during the fall of 2012—one on the history of South Africa and a senior seminar on the United States and the world—turned out to be the main source of recruits. My university is interdisciplinary in nature, and I teach in the Department of Democracy and Justice Studies. We focus on problem-based learning and attract students who care deeply about issues of democracy, justice, and equality, both in a historical and contemporary framework. It was not difficult to promote the trip as one that would delve deeply into such concerns, offering both historical and comparative perspectives on themes such as human rights, social movements, race, and economic inequality.

To my great delight my course garnered twenty complete applications. Unfortunately I could only take fifteen students with me, as I had originally planned for about ten total applications but did reserve sixteen seats on our flight. Turning students away from such an opportunity was difficult, though as some of my colleagues advised, a ratio of ten students to one faculty member is about as high as one would want to agree to for a travel course. But I decided to take fifteen students, eight of whom were Democracy and Justice Studies majors, and hoped that my previously established relationship and rapport with the majority of the students would overcome any of the burdens of going the trip alone.

During the months before our departure I held two orientation sessions to provide basic historical and political background on South Africa, allow students to introduce themselves to each other and establish relationships before the trip began, discuss health and safety concerns (my solitary unbreakable rule: never, ever walk in Cape Town alone), talk about logistics such as passports and money,
and answer any questions that students may have had about South Africa or international travel in general. Most of my students had very little experience traveling, and only a few had been outside the United States before. One poor student had never flown at all, and I could do little to prepare her for the joys of multiday transatlantic air travel. Most of my students were excited but also slightly anxious, though none had any serious worries or showed any severe trepidation.

After a year of preparation, we finally departed from Green Bay at the beginning of January 2013, making our slow way from the Midwest across the Atlantic to Europe and then south over the African continent to Cape Town. Following a late-night arrival and a much-deserved opportunity to sleep in a bit to recover from jetlag, our course began in earnest with a leisurely stroll in the bright sunshine (to replenish our melatonin) through the Company’s Gardens—a verdant park in central Cape Town where the Dutch East India Company planted fruits and vegetables for its refueling station—followed by an informal talk at the former Slave Lodge from Chris Saunders, a professor emeritus of history at the University of Cape Town. Professor Saunders provided my students with a brief introduction to the history of Cape Town within the larger context of South Africa’s past, then answered some excellent questions from my students on modern Cape Town and South African politics as well as the 2010 World Cup, which was hosted in South Africa’s major cities, including Cape Town. We then explored the Slave Lodge, the original building where slaves transported to the city were housed and sold. It houses excellent exhibits on slavery in the Cape and on topics such as the development of the Afrikaans language.

Our travel course balanced the historical and political with the natural offerings of the area. We visited a wild game reserve, where my students were excited to see lions, elephants, cheetahs, buffalos, rhinos, and other animals in their natural environment; we explored South Africa’s wine country, tasting a variety of high quality red, white, and dessert wines; we visited the Castle of Good Hope, a massive fort that is the oldest remaining colonial building in Cape Town, along with several fine museums; and we successfully hiked to the summit of Table Mountain, where we looked out from great heights over both the city and the ocean.

The academic requirements for the course were fairly straightforward. Students were assessed on their participation—including discussions of two texts—and on a daily journal in which they could record their thoughts on that day’s activities, reflections on South African society, or any other ideas they wanted to express. Basically, I wanted students to engage with both what they were experiencing in South Africa and what it meant for them to be living in a foreign land far removed from the United States.

We talked a lot throughout the trip, both about South Africa and other issues—some of my fondest memories are of watching the sun set over Table Mountain as we talked politics, books, sports, and other topics at our backpacker over a few beers—and students threw themselves with vigor into Africa’s diverse cultural milieu, visiting nightclubs, going to jazz fusion concerts in the park, eating a wide variety of excellent cuisine (including kudu, ostrich, and crocodile) and cheering on soccer teams during the first round of the African Cup, which was being played in South Africa during our last week in the country (host South Africa advanced to the quarter-finals of the tournament, which was eventually won by Nigeria). To give my students a break from our fairly grueling schedule and to maintain my own sanity, I scheduled two free days when the students were completely on their own without group activities or my guidance. To recharge I retreated to the solitude of the natural world, hiking several scenic trails on Table Mountain and at Kirstenbosch National Botanical Garden. My students did a variety of things with their off days, from relaxing by our backpacker’s pool to taking excursions to beaches and nearby towns to experimenting with more adventurous endeavors such as surfing and shark diving (which, thankfully, they survived intact).

While an immersion into South African culture was a critical component of the course, I made sure that the major focus of the trip was historical, with particular emphasis on the apartheid era. From 1948 until 1994, the National Party—led almost exclusively by nationalistic Afrikaners, descendants of the first Dutch settlers to arrive in South Africa in 1652—dominated South Africa’s political, social, and economic worlds. Very briefly, apartheid created a stratified society in which white South Africans benefited from the control and exploitation of the black labor force. Throughout its nearly half-century rule the National Party enacted a variety of oppressive legislation that mandated, among other things, a defined racial hierarchy, petty segregation in public accommodations, tight control of the movement of blacks through pass laws and influx control, the destruction of black education, and the removal of non-white populations from their homes for white development. For decades South Africans of all races fought against apartheid, which remained a powerful force until the end of the 1980s, when a perfect storm—the sudden end of the Cold War, a massive international movement to isolate South Africa from the world community, a widespread internal protest campaign that made the country nearly ungovernable, and a timely change in leadership—created the opportunity for transformation from apartheid to full-fledged democracy.

One of the most vivid representations of apartheid can be seen in District Six, a vibrant coloured community in Cape Town that was declared a whites-only area in 1966. On a hot sunny morning, my students explored the District Six Museum, which contains numerous artifacts from former District Six residences along with poignant photographs, maps, and oral histories of the forced removal of coloured residents. A former resident of District Six then led us on a walking tour of some of the major sights of the area and offered us an account of his life before, during, and after removal. After the end of apartheid, former District Six residents began to move back to their old home, the first returning in 2004, thirty-eight years after the removal process began. The reconciliation of past wrongs is a major theme in South Africa’s post-apartheid history, and we talked a lot about this idea during and after our visit to District Six.

Our visit to Robben Island, located in Table Bay and accessible by ferry from the pleasant but rather touristy...
Victoria and Alfred Waterfront, was a somber and meaningful experience. Our group was guided by a former prisoner who provided us with an intimate history of both his activism and his life on the island prison. In addition to learning the history of the island—which, throughout its long history, served as a prison, leper colony, and animal quarantine station—we visited the lime quarry where Nelson Mandela and other liberation leaders not only broke rocks under the hot African sun, but also politicized the non-political prisoners with daily lessons on history, politics, and philosophy in a small cavern at the rear of the quarry. The visit culminated with a walk through the maximum-security wing and a brief glimpse into the eight-by-seven-foot cell where Mandela spent 18 of his 27 years in prison. After the visit to Robben Island we gathered to discuss Mandela’s autobiography, which was made even more poignant by our visit to the prison. My students were most impressed by Mandela’s commitment to a righteous cause and his willingness to sacrifice his family, his freedom, and even his life for the ideals of non-racism and democracy.

Another favorite excursion was our tour through Cape Town’s Bo Kaap district, a community of hilly streets and brilliant pastel houses, where the Cape Malay population resides. The Cape Malays are descendants of the first slaves brought to the Cape Colony by the Dutch East India Company from its colony in Java. They were the first people to bring Islam to South Africa. We visited a mosque (we also visited a synagogue and a Christian church during our trip) and discussed the importance of religion within South African society (Afrikaners were and remain a deeply religious people). Our day culminated with our group making a lunch from scratch with two local families, and as we ate our delicious meals, we talked history and politics with our gregarious guide, who remained hopeful for a better future for all South Africans.

Our visit to the Houses of Parliament, located in the Company’s Gardens in a beautiful nineteenth-century building featuring a central dome, Corinthian porticos, and pavilions, spurred stark comparisons between democracy in the United States and South Africa. Having lived in a nation that has remained basically evenly split politically for decades, my students found the dominance of the African National Congress to be both captivating and troubling. The ANC controls 66 percent of the seats in Parliament, with the Democratic Alliance and the Congress of the People holding 17 and 7 percent, respectively. Such dominating numbers prompted my students to talk about what democracy means as well as to think about the consequences of a political party with little true opposition. They were also surprised to learn that South Africans do not have direct elective representation. South Africans vote by party, whose leaders then choose who to send to both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces. For all the United States’ political challenges, my students were comforted to know that they still had representatives who were responsible to them and whom they could contact directly on issues they felt strongly about.

The highlight of the trip for almost all of my students was our visit to Langa, a township just outside Cape Town. Created in 1927, Langa was designated a black township as part of the Urban Areas Act, which began to regulate black travel in and out of cities as whites feared becoming outnumbered in South Africa’s large urban centers. Within the township, whose population is around 50,000, we interacted with black South Africans of varying economic classes in a vibrant environment, though it was the poorest sections of the township that were most eye-opening to my students. We visited one woman’s home, a shipping container no larger than seven feet by seven feet, that contained a single bed for a family of five. We also visited a hostel that housed several families within a few sparse and crowded rooms; they paid for electricity by depositing coins into a box on the wall.

Yet not all of Langa is poor. My students were surprised to learn that South African townships, like most cities in the United States, vary in terms of their socio-economic make-ups. While we saw many tin shacks and dilapidated structures, we also visited parts of the township that were home to the more educated and professional township residents such as doctors, lawyers, and teachers and featured houses that would fit in seamlessly into suburban America. My students were also surprised to learn that, despite the repeal of all apartheid’s restrictive laws from 1990 to 1994, township residents rarely move, self-segregating themselves for social reasons. Another surprise was the role played by women in the township. We visited a shebeen, a drinking establishment, where we shared tasty homemade beer from a large tin bucket. We learned that shebeens have historically been operated by women, and that even in modern South Africa, township women are seen as more enterprising and hardworking than men, who continue to struggle with little education and few economic opportunities.

Despite the poverty that my students witnessed, they were pleasantly surprised at the warmth and happiness of Langa’s residents. Everywhere we went in Langa, children swarmed my students, who had brought candy to pass out to the seemingly endless stream of kids. There was nowhere near enough candy, but the youth of Langa were happy to have us visit. Our guide for the day, Chippa, founded a non-profit organization called Happy Feet to provide township youth with an alternative to street life and crime; it focused on promoting the wildly entertaining dancing style called gumboots, a high-intensity routine featuring dancers clad in oversized wellington boots. Our day in the township ended with a rousing performance by the Happy Feet children. We then went to a local barbeque establishment, where we dined on tasty pap (a traditional African porridge), chicken, and sausage, and drank cold Castle lager while chatting to locals.

By far the most difficult challenge for my students was dealing with the poverty they saw throughout Cape Town and Langa. As we drove in from the airport, my students saw townships and shanties for the first time, but seeing them up close in Langa was a humbling experience. As they wandered the streets of Cape Town, they were constantly confronted by panhandlers. South Africa’s official unemployment rate hovers around twenty-five percent, and unemployment affects the black population far more than others, although a growing segment of Afrikaner
farmers are becoming increasingly impoverished. Economic opportunities for poor black South Africans remain limited, as a solid black middle class has not yet been established. Some of my students were shocked at the amount of begging they experienced, and others felt guilty about their relative wealth compared to the poor they saw on the streets. A few students engaged in conversations with these beggars, and one even took a few out for meals. The end of apartheid, my students came to realize, did not mean true equality and the end of economic hardship for all.

Our conversations on apartheid inevitably led to discussions on the role of the United States and its citizens during South Africa’s darkest era. I discussed citizen activism and the global anti-apartheid movement, which led to further questions and discussions on the role that normal citizens can and should play in both U.S. foreign policy and international relations. Many of my students were inspired by the story of divestment movements on U.S. college and university campuses in the 1970s and 1980s, and expressed regret that similar movements do not exist today. I told them that activism is alive and well, though clearly apartheid had united a certain segment of Americans in the 1970s and 1980s more than nearly any other international issue of the era. By the end of the course my students clearly had a much better understanding of both apartheid and South African history than when they began, though they were also left with many questions and doubts, particularly concerning South Africa’s future.

My travel course to Cape Town changed me profoundly. Escaping the confines of the traditional classroom, I learned that there is no greater way to reach students than through experiential learning. Watching my students make connections between the stories from Mandela’s autobiography and their visit to Robben Island itself was tremendously fulfilling. Observing them interacting with local South Africans of all races, engaging in conversations about politics, culture, and society, was thoroughly satisfying. South Africa became a part of them and a part of us and would be difficult to let go of. Watching my students grow, even in such a short period of time, made me wish we could have stayed and learned for much longer than we did. In many ways the course was too short and too intense, and I understood that it would take weeks or months for much of what my students experienced to make sense to them.

In truth my students went to South Africa for different reasons. Some went for an exotic vacation, others to soak up the vibrant Cape Town nightlife or to escape the harsh Wisconsin winter for the warmth of the bright African sun. Others went because they had taken classes with me, including my history of South Africa course, and wanted to see with their own eyes the country they had read about. Most went to learn, to experience a place far removed from their own experiences in Wisconsin, to see the world differently and to come back to the United States with a stronger appreciation for a place that, as Robert Kennedy noted, was in many ways so similar to the United States in its struggles for democracy, justice, and equality. Some students were inspired to return to South Africa in the future, and several hoped to make some kind of contribution to helping South Africa become a better country, a noble goal that I encouraged.

Ultimately, my travel course was the pinnacle of my professional career thus far. I can never forget the images of children in Langa rushing into the arms of my overwhelmed students, or the solemn and introspective looks on their faces as they walked by Nelson Mandela’s cell on Robben Island. I have always believed that teaching is the most important thing we do as academics, and my travel course to Cape Town confirmed this belief. I know my students were changed by this experience, and that is all an educator can really wish for. As one of my students reflected:

My worldview has been forever altered by the few short weeks I was able to spend with the South African people. Their unbridled happiness and love for life was evident everywhere I went, even when I found myself face-to-face with some of the harshest poverty on the planet. Whether it was from the people I met in Langa, or the stories of Soweto and Alexandra, I was taught a lesson about materialism, happiness, and what it means to be successful in one’s lifetime.

I can only hope to continue to be able to offer such opportunities to future students, to introduce them to a world that is endlessly fascinating and full of possibility.

Note:
The year 2014 marks the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of the First World War, a major watershed in world history. The war destroyed the balance of power in Europe, accelerated the decline of Western Europe as the center of global affairs, created grievances that fueled later conflicts, and stimulated the rise of two revolutionary superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union.

The war also gave rise to a powerful set of ideas known ever since as “Wilsonianism.” Advanced by President Woodrow Wilson and his allies during and immediately after the war, this package of sweeping reform measures called for nothing less than the remaking of the international order through collective security, free trade, and self-determination. Although this agenda was largely defeated by 1920, it made a remarkable comeback in the 1940s and became a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and global politics more generally thereafter. Indeed, Wilsonianism remains a powerful current in international relations in the twenty-first century.

These themes will be at the heart of the seventh annual Summer Institute of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, which will take place between June 22 and 28, 2014, almost exactly 100 years after the assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The Institute, which will be held immediately after the SHAFR annual meeting in Lexington, Kentucky, will be hosted by Williams College, in Williamstown, Massachusetts, well known for its excellence in the study of international affairs as well as its scenic beauty and cultural opportunities.

Designed for advanced graduate students and young faculty members in history, political science, international relations, and related fields, the program will feature seminar-style discussions and meetings with top scholars of the First World War and Wilsonianism. The Institute will also explore each participant’s research, discuss how young scholars can prepare themselves for the job market, and help first-time authors prepare their work for publication. Each participant will be reimbursed for travel, will be provided free accommodation and most meals at Williams, and will receive an honorarium.

The deadline for applications is February 1, 2014. Applicants should submit a c.v. along with a one-page letter detailing how participation in the institute would benefit their scholarship and careers. Please send this material to both of the Institute’s lead organizers, Mark Lawrence, associate professor of history at the University of Texas at Austin (malawrence@austin.utexas.edu), and James McAllister, professor of political science at Williams (james.mcallister@williams.edu). Please direct all questions to the same two addresses.
The Status of Women in Diplomatic and International History, 2008-2012: Five-Year Follow Up Report

Prepared by the Committee on Women in SHAFR
Kelly J. Shannon (co-chair), Laura Belmonte (co-chair), Walter Hixson, Katie Sibley, Kathy Rasmussen, and Shannon Fitzpatrick

Introduction

In the summer of 2007 SHAFR President Richard Immerman authorized the formation of an Ad Hoc Committee on the Status of Women. The creation of the committee and its subsequent activities have been part of SHAFR’s larger efforts at diversification. The Ad Hoc Committee on the Status of Women released a report in 2008, which is available on the SHAFR website: http://www.shafr.org/passport/2008/december/Status of Women in SHAFR.pdf.

The SHAFR Ad Hoc Committee on the Status of Women is now the standing Committee on Women in SHAFR. In June 2013, we produced a five-year follow-up report to the original 2008 report on women’s status, which we presented at the SHAFR annual meeting in Arlington, VA. This is an abridged version of that report. The full report is available on the SHAFR website and contains updated data from the five-year period of 2008-2012 on the following: female SHAFR membership, women's participation in the SHAFR annual meetings, women's participation in SHAFR governance, women's share of scholarly contributions in Diplomatic History and H-Diplo, women's status in the field of diplomatic and international history, and their numbers in comparison to comparable organizations (APSA, ISA, AHA). It also contains our conclusions, recommendations, and reporting on the Committee’s activities up through 2013.

The follow-up report shows that women's membership in SHAFR has remained flat during the past five years, so while SHAFR did not lose female members, it also did not attract more women to the organization. In other areas, such as participation in the annual conference, representation in SHAFR governance, publication in Diplomatic History, etc., women have been represented at or above their share of SHAFR membership. Overall, this represents improvement since the last committee report, particularly in areas where SHAFR leadership could take direct action to increase women’s representation and participation in the organization. However, women constitute a far smaller percentage of SHAFR members and diplomatic/international historians than in the field of history as a whole. After outlining the committee’s findings, this report offers suggestions that could help to rectify the potential problems it identifies.

The data in this report were collected by this committee, the SHAFR Business Office, the editorial staff of Diplomatic History, and University of Chicago graduate student Sarah Miller-Davenport. The committee would like to thank SHAFR President Mark Bradley, SHAFR’s Business Office, the Editors of Diplomatic History, and Ms. Miller-Davenport for their assistance.

SHAFR Membership

There is currently no specific data collection on the gender breakdown of SHAFR membership. Rather, SHAFR maintains a mailing list of members’ names for each year, which must then be gender coded manually based on members’ names and/or internet searches. Given the massive data set and amount of time needed to code membership data for each year, for the 2008 report the ad hoc committee coded data on gender from these lists in roughly five-year increments to show general membership trends over time (1967, 1977, 1990, 1996, 2003, and 2007). This report follows that model by using membership data from 2012 to establish general membership trends since the last committee report five years ago.

Women’s membership in SHAFR appears to have remained flat during the past five years; the total number of women and the percentage of women in 2012 are almost exactly the same as they were in 2007. The 2008 report concluded that female membership rose gradually in the decades after SHAFR’s founding in 1967, from the original one woman (1.3%) to 7% of members one decade later. By the 1990s, women comprised between 12% and 16% of SHAFR members, and the numbers have remained relatively steady ever since. In 2003 SHAFR was 17% female, or 248 women, and in 2007 there were 266 women members, which represented 19% of total membership. In 2012 there were
265 women, comprising 19% of membership. Since the mid-1990s, the number of women in the organization appears to have remained fairly steady, ranging from 248 to 286. Women grew from 16% of all SHAFR members in 1996 to 19% by 2007. In 2012, that number remained 19%. This suggests that SHAFR is maintaining its female membership but is not seeing growth there, but it has also not experienced growth among men despite recent efforts at diversification and internationalization.

This may indicate, in part, difficulty attracting new women to the organization. Anecdotal evidence collected by the committee suggests that many women working on topics that fall under the SHAFR umbrella, but particularly those who primarily identify with other fields of history, are deterred from joining SHAFR because of their perception of the organization as highly male, given our history and current demographics. Other women have indicated to committee members that they feel SHAFR is "clubby," so that women who did not complete their graduate studies with a mentor who is a SHAFR member feel like outsiders when they attend SHAFR's annual conference or other events. Another factor to consider is the fact that SHAFR began its initiatives to attract more women to the organization at the same time it began initiatives to broaden its conception of the field and to diversify and internationalize its membership more generally. It is possible that SHAFR's recent efforts to internationalize its membership may attract more men than women, as it is possible women make up a far smaller percentage of historians of U.S. foreign relations and international history in countries outside the United States. However, we lack available data on women's representation in the field of foreign relations history in countries outside the U.S. or on other topics to draw any conclusions about this issue. The committee also has no explanation for why SHAFR has not experienced growth among women and men in the past five years, despite recent efforts at outreach and diversification to grow the organization.

Women graduate students represent a growing proportion of many other academic organizations, including our counterpart organization in political science, the International Studies Association (ISA). However, studies on women in ISA indicates a proportionally declining number of women as they advance through the ranks relative to men. ISA membership of men and women is roughly equal among graduate students (49% women), but there is a precipitous decline in women at the Assistant Professor (43%), Associate (34%), and Full Professor (23%) levels, a decline which ISA found mirrored women in the discipline of political science more generally. Men in ISA, on the other hand, remained more evenly distributed at each rank. The ISA study also found that female members tended to be younger than their male counterparts. It concluded that the field of international relations/international studies suffers from a "leaky pipeline" for female scholars, which likely is due to structural issues in academia and problematic tenure and promotion procedures for political scientists.

Because SHAFR does not collect data on the career status/academic rank of members, the committee does not know whether increasing numbers of women graduate students are joining SHAFR, nor do we have any data on the rates of progress female SHAFR members make as they advance from graduate study through the academic ranks. We currently have no data on the academic rank/status of our female membership. Women (along with minorities) are more poorly represented in history than in most other humanities and social science fields. The latest studies by the American Historical Association indicate that women receive 42% of new History PhDs, and 35% of history faculty are women. The AHA's data reveals that women comprise a lower percentage of history faculty than faculty in other fields of the humanities. Women make up 42% of faculty in all fields, and 51% of faculty in the humanities. While women receiving PhDs in history are closer to the proportion of women in other disciplines, the proportion of female history doctors is still lower than that for other disciplines (46% of all PhDs and 52% of all humanities PhDs are women).

The AHA's studies indicate that women are underrepresented at every level of academia within the discipline of history and that they make very slow progress through the academic ranks. According to their May 2010 report, "[E]ven as the rest of academia has moved toward greater balance in the representation of women, history has lagged well behind most of the other fields." The AHA data does not indicate the tenure eligibility for positions held by female faculty in history. Given the growing number of contingent faculty and decreasing number of tenure-track positions in academia in general, it would be important to know whether women's increasing representation in the history faculty is in tenure-eligible positions or contingent positions. The AHA did find, however, "a dramatic shift in the proportion of women among historians employed outside of academia." It also found that female history faculty earn less than their male counterparts at every rank and that women are overrepresented at the Associate Professor level.

The AHA report suggested that the problem begins with the undergraduate level, stating, "Over the past 20 years history has graduated some of the smallest proportions of female undergraduates of any field in higher education," while women now earn 57% of all undergraduate degrees (compared to just 41% in history). Given the relatively smaller number of women attracted to history at the undergraduate level, it is unsurprising that the number of women earning PhDs and becoming faculty in history has remained flat over time. The AHA concluded, "It seems exceptionally difficult for the discipline to approach parity in the employment of women without changing some of the dynamics that seem to drive women away from study in our subject." As one can see, the representation of women in SHAFR falls far below (roughly by half) the number of women earning history PhDs and the proportion of women history faculty in all disciplines. This may be due to the difficulty in attracting female undergraduate and graduate students to our field, or it may be due to the fact that there are women PhDs who work on topics that fall under the umbrella of foreign relations or international history who choose not to join SHAFR. Based on the 2008 ad hoc committee report, the proportion of women members of both the American Political Science Association and International Studies Association was roughly double the number of women in SHAFR. Our 2008 report found that women in SHAFR tended to cluster more around "non-traditional" methodologies as compared to men, and given their higher representation among IR scholars in the field of political science, a topic similar to diplomatic and international history, we concluded that the proportion of women in SHAFR might rise if SHAFR were perceived as espousing a broad conception of the field. SHAFR does in fact cover a multitude of methodologies and historical topics, and it is welcoming of female membership, but it may continue to suffer from an "image problem" among female historians.

**SHAFR Annual Meetings**

There are signs of improvement in certain categories since the last report. There has been a dramatic increase during the last five years of the number of women appearing on the program for the annual meeting. Since the 2008 report, while about 19% of the membership, women have made up an average of 28.1% of the people appearing on the annual conference program.
The percentage of women on the conference program from 2008-2012 has ranged between 26.1% and 32.6%, with the numbers steadily increasing each year (see Figure 2). Women's conference participation is closer to their representation in the field of history more generally than their representation among SHAFR members. The disparity between women's membership in SHAFR and their participation in the annual conference suggests the possibility either that women who present at SHAFR choose to join the organization at lower rates than men, or that women SHAFR members participate in the conference at higher rates than men.

As demonstrated in the 2008 report, women had consistently been much more poorly represented as panel commentators and panel chairs than as paper presenters. This remained the case over the past five years, although their numbers as presenters have improved (see Figure 2). From 2008-2012, women have given on average 30.5% of papers (including roundtable presentations) at the annual meeting, but have comprised only 22% of panel chairs and 23.5% of panel commentators. Thus, during the past five years, women have appeared as commentators only at 77% of their number as presenters and as chairs at only 72.1% of their number as presenters.

Women consistently appear as both chairs and commentators in considerably lower proportions than their appearance as paper/roundtable presenters, but there has been marked improvement in women's participation in every category of the annual conference since the last report. From 2003-2007, women gave an average of 24.5% of papers; thus, women's participation as paper/roundtable presenters increased five percentage points during 2008-2012. The rate of increase in the percentage of women as commentators and chairs has increased even more quickly, rising from 14.5% (2003-2007) of commentators to 23.5% (2008-2012) and from 14% (2003-2007) of chairs to 22% (2008-2012).

Thus, while women's appearance as chairs and commentators for the 2003-2007 period fell below their representation in SHAFR membership, the general trend has changed. Women now appear as chairs and commentators in proportionally greater numbers than their representation in the membership as a whole. Meanwhile, women's representation among paper presenters is nearly double their representation in the SHAFR membership. There are two main possible explanations for the disparities between women's representation as paper/roundtable presenters and as chairs/commentators. The first is that women may be disproportionately concentrated in junior ranks and hence be less likely to be considered for positions perceived as requiring seniority. The second is that panel organizers (male and female) may prefer male commentators and chairs, possibly because men are perceived as carrying more “weight” in the field. Paper and roundtable presenters are often self-selecting, and any woman wishing to present at the annual conference has the option of organizing and submitting a panel. Panel chairs and commentators, on the other hand, appear at the invitation of panel organizers.

Although the 2008 report did not include figures on women appearing as speakers in special sessions during the annual program, including plenary sessions, breakfast events, and luncheons, the data from 2008-2012 suggests that, although the number of all people appearing in these sessions is small, women's representation in these events appears not to be an area of concern. On average, women make up 28.7% of speakers in conference special sessions, far above their representation among SHAFR membership.

Overall, the marked increase in women's participation at the SHAFR annual meeting at all levels is a bright spot, and SHAFR should work to maintain this momentum. However, given the lack of increase in female membership in the organization, it appears that there may be a pool of women working on topics that fall under the SHAFR umbrella who choose to attend our conference but not to join the organization as members.

**SHAFR Governance**

The 2008 ad hoc committee report on women's status in SHAFR did not include data on women's representation in SHAFR governance, although the dearth of female SHAFR presidents from 1967-2007 was the original inspiration for the creation of the committee. While it is clear that women are participating in SHAFR governance in greater numbers than they did in the early decades of the organization, the committee wished to collect data to document the trends in women's participation to determine whether we need to make recommendations in this area. Thus, all data on women's participation in SHAFR governance comes only from the period 2008-2012. Given SHAFR's lack of specific data retention on this issue over time, the committee was only able to collect data on women's participation in committee membership during this period, and we were only able to collect total numbers of committee members for this period (that is, we do not have committee membership codes by gender for each year of this five-year period). Please also keep in mind that there are certain individuals who have served on multiple committees during this period; we have counted them in the data each time they appeared on a committee roster. Thus, for example, if one individual served on two committees from 2008-2012, that individual was counted twice for the purposes of determining gender representation on SHAFR committees.

We do not have data on women's participation on Council for the period 2008-2012, although we have included a breakdown of the 2013 SHAFR Council roster as published on the SHAFR website. Women are currently represented in the SHAFR Council in numbers far exceeding their proportion of the general membership. The 2013 Council members are 46.7% women (including graduate student representatives). Women's participation as
SHAFR committee members is very strong; in fact, women are represented on the SHAFR Council among committee members in far higher proportion than their proportion of SHAFR membership. From 2008-2012 women comprised 40.7% of all SHAFR committee members (40.1% of appointed committee positions and 57.1% of elected committee positions, namely membership on the Nominating Committee).

However, women and men tended to cluster around certain committees. The SHAFR Committee on Women, for example, has had more women members than men from 2008-2012, while the Ways and Means Committee has had far greater numbers of men than women. The strong representation of women in SHAFR committees suggests a concerted effort by SHAFR to bring women into governance, an effort which is largely successful based on the data.

Women's representation at the highest level of SHAFR, namely the office of the presidency, remains very low. SHAFR has had only three female presidents from 1967-2012, making women's representation in the presidency a mere 6.7%. However, there were only two female presidents up to 2007, and we have had one additional female president in the past five years, who ran against a female opponent for the office, which suggests some improvement. Given the short period of time since the last election, it is difficult to make conclusions about trends in this area of SHAFR governance at this point, but the committee believes this is an area that has shown improvement since our last report.

**Diplomatic History**

The 2008 report indicated a steady increase in women authors appearing in *Diplomatic History* during the previous several decades, and women's representation as *DH* authors and their membership in SHAFR for the period 2003-2007 was roughly equal. The data for 2008-2012 suggests the same trend; women have appeared in *DH* in numbers at or above their percentage of SHAFR membership, and they have published a greater proportion of articles in *DH* during the past five years than they did prior to 2007.

Women have authored on average 22.3% of all *DH* articles for 2008-2012. Articles by women have jumped considerably in the last two years, increasing from 15% in 2009 and 2010 to 26% in 2011 and 35% in 2012. During the past five years, women on average have thus published in *DH* in proportionally greater numbers than their representation among SHAFR membership. This indicates improvement in the number of women publishing articles in *DH* since our last report. Women authored only 17.5% of all *DH* articles from 2003-2007; thus the average number of women article authors has increased by roughly 25% during the last five years.

Women have also experienced higher article acceptance rates in *DH* than have men for the 2008-2012 period. The overall average acceptance rate for articles in *Diplomatic History* is approximately 16%, while the average for women authors has been a slightly higher 18.6% acceptance rate. Given the blind review process for *DH* article submissions, it is unsurprising that women's article authorship numbers are roughly consistent with their representation among SHAFR membership.

It should be noted that the acceptance rate for articles authored by women was roughly proportional to the membership and equal to the average acceptance rate for the journal as a whole for 2008, 2009, and 2010 (between 16% and 18%), but the percentage of articles authored by women that were accepted by *DH* jumped in the past two years (2011 and 2012) to 21% and 22% respectively. The number of articles by women submitted to the journal also jumped during the same period from 13-15 submissions per year for 2008-2010 to 21-23 submissions per year for 2011 and 2012.

Thus, the number of articles published by women 2008-2012 increased 50% since our last report. For 2003-2007, women authored an average of 5 articles in *DH* per year; for 2008-2012, women authored an average of 8.5 article per year. In 2012, women authored 16.5 articles in *DH*, a huge jump since the previous year and well above the 5-year average.

The sharp uptick is likely the result of the *DH* editorial staff and board’s decision to publish special issues and forums. *Diplomatic History* has had forums for years, but in 2012, the journal’s special sections increased dramatically over previous years. Four of five issues included roundtables on film, gender, and music. Most of these drew significantly higher percentages of women as authors of articles and as commentators than average. Women wrote 14 out of 27 roundtable articles, or 53%, which is well above their representation among SHAFR membership, SHAFR conference participants, and *DH* article authorship in general. This indicates a successful push by *DH* to increase women's participation in the journal.

It is worth noting, however, that just as in the 2008 report, women have consistently been better represented as SHAFR paper presenters (30.5%) than as *DH* article authors (in general, combining roundtables/forums with regular articles) (22.3%). SHAFR presentations arguably represent a rough guide to the pool of potential *DH* articles, if one assumes that the presentation of a paper at SHAFR represents one stage in the preparation of an article manuscript in the field of international history. Comparing SHAFR presentations with *DH* articles, we find a statistically significant difference in the proportion of women. In the last five years, women as article authors represent slightly over 73.1% of their numbers as conference presenters.

Among the possible explanations for the disparity are that men are more likely eventually to publish what they present at SHAFR and/or that women publish in venues other than *DH* in higher proportions than men.

It is also worth noting that female article authors continue to cluster around non-traditional topics or methodologies. In the 2008 report, the committee divided the field into two broad categories: policy/security/intelligence/economics (labeled “traditional”) and culture/gender/race/non-governmental international relations (labeled “non-traditional”). These categorizations are necessarily imprecise, given the fluid boundaries among topic areas and the arbitrariness of such classifications. The 2008 report noted that women’s increasing participation in *DH* was the direct result of the journal’s openness to non-traditional topics. This has remained the case during the past five years. When women are writing about non-traditional topics/methodologies, they tend to be overrepresented.

By contrast, there were 19 free-standing (those not part of a roundtable or forum) articles in 2012, and the

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Articles Submitted by Women (includes resubmits)</th>
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<td>2012</td>
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Figure 3: Article submissions to *DH* by female authors
overwhelming majority focused on traditional topics. Women wrote only 1.5 of these articles, or 7.5%. Thus, women’s share of DH articles authored will continue to remain at or above their proportion of SHAFR membership only if the journal continues to espouse a broad conception of the field.

Beyond article authorship, women appear in the pages of DH either by reviewing books or by authoring books that the journal has reviewed. The number of female book reviewers has increased in the last five years, rising from an average of 12.2% of reviewers in 2003-2007 to 15.7% of reviewers in 2008-2012. This means that women serve as book reviewers in the pages of DH in numbers roughly approaching their representation among SHAFR members. This, again, indicates a successful push by DH to include women in all areas of the journal. However, the data on books with female authors reviewed by DH is more mixed. The total number of books authored by women reviewed in the pages of DH increased dramatically, from an average of 5.5 books reviewed per year for 2003-2007 to an average of 8.1 for 2008-2012. Thus, the 40 books reviewed in DH that were written by women represents a dramatic increase compared to the 27.5 books reviewed by DH that were written by women in 2003-2007. However, because DH increased the number of all books reviewed during the past five years, the percentage of books reviewed that were written by women has not increased in any statistically significant way. The average percentage of reviewed books authored by women was 16.5% for 2003-2007; the average for 2008-2012 was 17%. This is approaches the proportion of SHAFR membership that is female, though is still slightly below women’s representation in the organization as a whole. The fact that the percentage of books by women reviewed has remained largely unchanged since the last report may be related to the flat membership numbers for women during the same period.

Last, women have been represented on the Editorial Board of DH in numbers at or above their representation among SHAFR members. The editorial board has included women in at least two posts (out of nine) over the last dozen years, and one of the two DH editors starting next year will be a woman. The percentage of women on the Board since 2001 has consistently been between 22% and 33%. In three of the last dozen years, including two of the past five years, women have comprised nearly 50% of the Board, well in excess of their membership in the organization. This is something to be celebrated.

Conclusions

The data above represent the continuation of investigation of women’s roles in SHAFR. More remains to be done; nonetheless the available data allow us to draw the following conclusions:

1. Women are far better represented in SHAFR today than they were even two decades ago, but their membership numbers remain flat compared to five years ago.

2. SHAFR is still lagging behind other comparable organizations and the field of history as a whole in female membership.

3. Women’s participation in the annual conference has increased significantly, but many of these women appear to be choosing not to become SHAFR members.

4. Women’s article submissions to DH are lagging behind their contributions at SHAFR conferences, but the number

| Average % of DH articles written by women, 2008-2012: 22.3% |
| Average % of SHAFR presentations given by women, 2008-2012: 30.5% |

of articles accepted and published in DH that are written by women has increased noticeably in the last five years.

5. Women’s representation in positions of authority, such as book reviewing, serving as SHAFR conference commentators and chairs, and serving on the DH Editorial Board, has increased noticeably in the last five years and is now roughly equivalent to their representation among SHAFR members.

6. Women are proportionally overrepresented in SHAFR governance, which indicates strong commitment to diversity by the organization.

7. Women continue to contribute to non-traditional subfields at a significantly higher rate than to traditional subfields.

8. Progress for women in SHAFR has been inconsistent year-by-year for 2008-2012, but taken as a whole, women’s representation in all areas of SHAFR has increased steadily during the past five years.

9. In areas where SHAFR leadership is capable of increasing women’s representation – as among conference participants, book reviewers, committee appointments, etc. – SHAFR has experienced much success in increasing women’s representation since 2008.

Recommendations

1. Formalize data collection procedures by the organization on membership so that members fill out information on the following when they sign up/renew through Oxford’s website or via hard copy membership forms: sex; race/ethnicity; current country of residence/country where employed or in graduate school (to document internationalization efforts); and academic rank/status (within and outside academe).

This would make future data collection and reporting much easier. We would need this data to remain paired (though with any identifying information for individuals removed) – i.e., gender, race, rank, etc. for the same individual so we know how many female and/or minority members we have at each rank, et al.

2. Formalize data collection on committee membership and other governing offices by sex and academic rank.

3. Formalize data collection procedures on all annual conference registrants. At present, the committee reviewed the program for each conference and gender coded the names listed; however, there is no data available for conference attendees who come to the conference but do not appear on the program. There is also no data retention on the rank, race/ethnicity, country of residence/employment, etc. for registrants. Data collection for all conference attendees – those appearing on the program and those just attending as audience members - would help with future reports for the organization as a whole.

4. Ask the SHAFR Business Office and DH editorial office to begin and/or continue to keep data on gender, et al. on
5. Continue to develop a networking program for junior faculty, graduate students, and new SHAFR members and conference attendees.

6. Establish a link on the SHAFR homepage to the women's committee with information, including the 2008 report, this report, and subsequent reports, links to other reports, and other resources of interest for women members or others interested in gender and diversity in SHAFR and academia more broadly.

7. Provide DH and H-Diplo with a list of qualified women scholars in the field of international and diplomatic history who could be asked to submit articles (either peer reviewed or commissioned) and write book reviews.

8. Include a list of childcare options at the annual conference venue in the SHAFR conference program and on the SHAFR program website.

9. Continue to produce reports in five-year increments on the status of women in SHAFR.

10. Continue to organize and sponsor panels for the Berkshire Conference on Women's History, which is held every three years.

11. Organize and sponsor panels at other organizations' conferences, such as area studies organizations, to publicize the current work being done by SHAFR members outside of our field and potentially recruit new members.

12. Distribute promotional materials about SHAFR at other conferences, particularly area studies conferences, to help new members with diverse backgrounds and/or diverse methodological approaches/research topics. This could include activities like asking other organizations to include a flyer about SHAFR in their conference welcome packet or arranging to have a table with SHAFR promotional materials and Diplomatic History, as well as books written by SHAFR members, in book exhibits at other organizations' conferences.

13. Publish a brief report annually in Passport containing updated numbers on SHAFR membership (gender, race/ethnicity, internationalization, rank, etc.)

Of all of the above recommendations, the committee feels that formalization data collection procedures and retaining such data is the most important at this time.

Notes:

2. All figures in this report have been rounded to the nearest 0.5. For example, for 2012 women represented 15.95% of membership, and this number has been rounded to 16%.

3. Please note, the committee has not counted institutional memberships and names that could not be gender-coded in the total membership numbers for 2012. There were many library or institutional memberships, which we subtracted from the membership numbers, and two names that could not be gender coded. We left these two names out of the membership numbers, as well. This may account for some of the lower total membership numbers for 2012 versus 1996, since this committee is unsure whether or not the previous committee's report included institutional memberships in its data set. The 2008 report did, however, also exclude names of members that could not be gender coded.


7. Given that some conference panels have one person both comment and chair, the committee has counted each person by role in its data collection. For example, if the same woman served as the chair/commentator for one panel, the committee counted her in the numbers for both chairs and commentators. For the purposes of this report, the committee has also counted round-table presenters in the figures for paper presenters and round-table chairs in the figures for panel chairs. During data collection, the committee was also unable to differentiate whether the same person fulfilled more than one role in the same conference, i.e., both a paper and commented on a panel, so fewer total men and women as individuals likely participated in the annual conferences given the fact that some may have fulfilled duplicate roles on the program.

8. The committee counted both articles and commenter pieces equally as articles for the purposes of determining data on the sex of DH article authors.

A Response to the Report on the Status of Women in Diplomatic and International History

David L. Anderson

One perception of history in general, and diplomatic and political history in particular, is that it is the study of old white men. This welcome update on the status of women in diplomatic and international history reveals a number of positive trends in a gendered analysis of SHAFR’s membership and membership and its actual membership profile, but it is one explanation of why the percentage of women in SHAFR has remained basically flat since the last study issued in 2008. Further, the Committee on Women in SHAFR finds that SHAFR is not alone among historical groups in facing the challenge of overcoming prevailing beliefs. Using the American Historical Association as a benchmark, this report finds that the numbers of undergraduate and graduate women studying history lag behind those in other fields of the humanities. A somewhat different variation on this theme comes from the International Studies Association, another benchmark used by the committee, which reports that female membership in that organization has increased but that the persistence of women to higher ranks in this field of political science does not keep pace with men. The ISA terms this phenomenon the “leaky pipeline.” By contrast, one of the most notable statistics in the SHAFR report is that the numbers of women on the SHAFR Council and on SHAFR committees are “far exceeding their proportion of the general membership.”

Experts in the field of institutional diversity, such as Marilyn Loden, caution against gender profiling because statistical metrics used alone can create perceptions of
unfairness. Allegations of reverse discrimination, for example, often derive from over-emphasis on numbers. In the case of SHAFR and this report, however, the interpretation of the numbers reveals best practices of diversity analysis. The aim of organizational diversity, according to Loden, is to define it in “a broad and inclusive way” so that it is obvious that “everyone is included and therefore everyone’s diversity is valued.” By drawing together data on membership, governance, participation in annual meetings, and authorship in *Diplomatic History*, the committee has provided a balanced portrait. Although it might be concluded from the data that women are over-represented in governance and under-represented as session chairs in annual meetings, the committee analysis of the data shows that SHA FR as an organization is gaining an understanding of what elements of diversity it controls itself and what factors are part of larger trends within the professional academic community.

How SHA FR should utilize the information in this report is clearly the next step. Several of the authors’ recommendations involve facilitating better on-going data collection to provide more accurate portraits of not only the general membership, but also such groups as conference participants and SHA FR committee members. We live in an era of technology that inundates us with too many surveys of all types, but the next status report could benefit from use of specific instruments to survey perceptions. The committee identifies the image of the sub-discipline as a key issue for recruiting members. Surveys and focused interviews are valuable in probing images and preconceived notions. The authors provide somewhat anecdotal observations about traditional and non-traditional methodologies as perhaps making a gendered difference in the level of scholarly interest in the study of diplomacy and international history. Are some subjects and approaches inherently male or female? Many scholars would say no. Both men and women are qualified and motivated to study, for example, arms negotiation and global food security. Neither subject is the province of one sex, but what information do we have upon which to draw conclusions about how interest in subjects and methods shapes decisions to join SHA FR or submit work for publication in *Diplomatic History*? Many members of SHA FR continue to provide seminal work in so-called traditional fields, and many others are doing path-breaking work in the so-called cultural turn in historical studies. SHA FR is both traditional and non-traditional in practice. Do those terms have gender significance? The authors suggest that they do, but precisely what the difference is and what it means remains a challenge to decipher.

Studies have shown that most members of organizations can be placed along what is termed the Diversity Adoption Curve. It is basically a bell-shaped curve with one end being the innovators, who generate the ideas for change, and the other extreme being the traditionalists, who see little reason for change. In between are the change agents, who actively work to implement new ideas; the pragmatists, who are open to new ideas but need persuasion; and the skeptics, who resist change but who can be won over. The authors of this report are the innovators, and they have done their work well. They have offered the ideas. SHA FR members can decide where they individually fit the curve. All parts of the curve serve the well-being of the organization. The change agents and the pragmatists have to make new ideas operative and practical, and the skeptics and traditionalist play the vital role of keeping the organization true to its origins and distinctiveness.

With regard to next steps, a key message of this report is that SHA FR must continue to market itself consciously. Marketing means product development, knowledge of the potential consumer, and promotion of the product to the greatest number of people. SHA FR is not a business, and its goal is not maximizing market share. Its objective should be, however, to attract those scholars and the informed public who share SHA FR’s interests and expertise in the study of the history of foreign relations. The committee recommends outreach through mentoring, networking, the Berkshire Conference on Women’s History, and other venues and approaches. There is no doubt from reading this report that SHA FR values diversity and that, as an organization, it knows the basic lesson that everyone benefits within the group when all are valued. Gender diversity helps makes SHA FR itself a productive and socially responsive organization.

Notes:
2. Ibid., 41-43.
The Historical Advisory Committee to the Department of State (HAC) embraces two principal responsibilities. First, it oversees the preparation and timely publication of the Foreign Relations of the United States series. Second, it monitors the declassification and release of Department of State records.

The Foreign Relations Statute of 1991 (Public Law 102-138 [105 Stat. 647, codified in relevant part at 22 U.S.C. § 4351 et seq.]) mandates these responsibilities. It calls for a “thorough, accurate, and reliable” documentary record of United States foreign policy. That statute evolved from the public controversy precipitated by the Foreign Relations volumes published in 1983 and 1989 that covered the events surrounding U.S. interventions in Guatemala in 1954 and in Iran in 1953, respectively. Both volumes omitted documentation on U.S. covert activities that either was not made available to the Office of the Historian (HO) researchers or was not cleared for publication. Knowledgeable scholars rightly criticized the two volumes for falling short of the standard of accuracy and thoroughness, dealing a serious blow to the series’ credibility and stature.

Since the Foreign Relations Statute of 1991 became law, HO has conscientiously strove to compile and publish volumes which are “thorough, reliable, and accurate.” The HAC appreciates that this standard is a challenging and complex one to meet in view of the explosion of important government documents pertaining to foreign relations produced by a wide spectrum of departments and agencies during the 1960s and later decades, and in view of the parallel requirement that volumes be published no later than 30 years after the events they document. HO has struggled to meet these complementary obligations; until recently, it had more success achieving the quality than the timeliness requirement. But although the gap between its publication of the Foreign Relations volumes and the 30-year target remains substantial, the robust progress made by HO over the past year, and the preceding one, is very encouraging.

The 1991 Foreign Relations statute also mandates that the HAC monitor and advise on the declassification and opening of the Department of State’s records, which in large measure involves the Department’s implementation of the operative Executive Order governing the classification and declassification of government records. E.O. 13526, issued in December 2009, which supplanted E.O. 12958, issued in 1995 and amended in 2003 by E.O. 13292, mandates the declassification of records over 25-years old—unless valid and compelling reasons can be specified for not releasing them. In this area of its responsibility, the HAC is not encouraged by what it observes. The review, transfer, and processing of records are falling further behind the timeline needed to meet their targets, and the leadership of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) does not manifest the sense of urgency required to reverse this trend.

Publications of the Foreign Relations Series

During 2012, the Office of the Historian published six volumes in the Foreign Relations of the United States series. These are:


While this is one less volume published than in 2011, it is double the 2009 total and includes the first published volume from the Carter administration. By December 2012, moreover, HO had completed the declassification of 11 more volumes. This makes 2012 the third consecutive year in which HO declassified more than 10 volumes, and it expects to declassify 11-13 more as well as publish perhaps another 6 volumes in 2013. These include the long-delayed volume on Congo, 1960–1968, and the following year, the Iran Retrospective and Chile, 1969-1973. The unprecedented four consecutive years of declassifying volumes in double figures will virtually eliminate the backlog of more than 30 volumes that dates back to 2009.

This progress reflects the stabilization of HO following multiple years of managerial disruption and internal tumult. The office is finally once again fully staffed and is benefiting from the exemplary leadership of Stephen Randolph, the Historian. It is likewise benefiting from the appointment of Adam Howard as General Editor, the recruitment of a cohort of skilled young historians, innovative administrative restructuring, and greatly improved relations with the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and other elements of government with which HO collaborates for the purpose of declassifying documents. With a strategic plan in place to produce volumes at a rate sufficient to progress toward meeting its statutory timeline, and a move to new offices that offer more working space and secure storage facilities, morale in the office is higher than it has been in years. These developments bode well for the future.
The HAC congratulates HO on these achievements. It likewise applauds the new effort to digitize and make available on the office’s website and in a format readable on tablets and smart phones all Foreign Relations volumes dating to 1861. Nevertheless, especially because HO is now extensively engaged in compiling for the Carter and Reagan administrations, and has begun the research for that of George H.W. Bush, the HAC is not sanguine about the prospects of the series achieving its goal of publishing the majority of the Foreign Relations volumes 30 years after the event in the near future—or possibly ever.

This pessimism evolves from the HAC’s appreciation of the challenges to publishing the Foreign Relations volumes in a sufficiently timely manner. The problem does not lay with HO. HAC expects the office’s impressive performance to continue. Rather, the most salient obstacle stems from the 1991 legislation itself. That statute, and a subsequent Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency, mandated and facilitated research in intelligence files and the incorporation of intelligence documentation in Foreign Relations volumes. A State-CIA-NSC committee established in the late 1990s, the “High-Level Panel” (HLP), provides guidelines for the publication in the series of documentation relating to covert actions and other sensitive intelligence activities that had a major impact on U.S. foreign policy. That more than 40 covert intelligence activities have now been acknowledged for publication in the series is evidence of the success of the HLP. Because the Foreign Relations series serves as the primary venue for publishing documentation on the role of intelligence activities in U.S. foreign relations, it has become renowned internationally for its openness. This universal acclaim well serves America’s national interest.

This barometer of openness, however, has created substantial delays in the declassification and publication processes over which HO has limited control. The office estimates that any Foreign Relations volume with an HLP issue (CIA is but one of multiple agencies with equities in sensitive intelligence-related issues) will spend at least one additional year, and often many more than one, in the declassification pipeline than will a volume which does not contain an intelligence issue requiring consideration, the drafting of guidelines, and clearance by that inter-agency panel. Appealing negative decisions about documents is a time-consuming process.

HO in 2012 developed new internal guidelines for managing HLP issues. The office also developed processes for engaging the other agencies involved in HLP issues significantly in advance of the formal declassification process to mitigate delays to the extent possible. These innovative procedures led to the resolution of 3 issues this past calendar year. Still, the number of HLP issues will increase significantly as compilers work through the Carter presidency and beyond. HO estimates that at least half of the Carter volumes will require resolution of HLP issues; the Reagan administration records at the Reagan Presidential Library contain approximately 8.5 million classified pages. Consequently, while the HAC is confident that HO will do whatever it can to resolve them, and that the annual norm for submitting volumes to declassification will remain in the double-digits, the number of volumes it actually publishes each year, despite HO’s efforts, will probably not be commensurate.

Declassification Issues and the Transfer of Department of State Records to the National Archives

During 2012, the committee reviewed the State Department’s classification guidelines and monitored the application of those guidelines to further the declassification process. It also monitored the transfer of the Department’s records—electronic and paper—to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). To acquire more information and greater insight, the HAC visited the NARA facility in College Park, MD and met with William Mayer, NARA’s Executive for Research, Sheryl Shenberger, Director of the National Declassification Center, William Fischer, Chief of the Department of State’s Office of Information Programs and Services (IPS) Systematic Review Program (SRP) Division, IPS reviewers, and more than a dozen others from their staffs.

The HAC notes with great concern that although it has made commendable progress, the NDC, even with abbreviated indexing which will frustrate researchers, hopes to but probably will not complete its quality assurance review and processing of the backlog of 358,000,000 pages of 25-year or more old yet still classified records by December 31, 2013, as mandated by President Obama’s Executive Order 13526. It is equally concerned that what it understands to be a substantial percentage of those records that have been reviewed by the NDC has not been cleared for release to the public. In the opinion of the HAC, the relatively high number of reviewed documents that remain withheld from researchers and citizens raises fundamental questions about the declassification guidelines.

The HAC notes with even greater concern that the State Department’s SRP was again unable to achieve its annual goal of completing the declassification review of 25-year old top-secret and “bulky” paper records, thus adding to the backlog. Further, the opening of declassified records at NARA is trending toward a 35-year if not longer line. Because of the need for archival processing by NARA’s staff once IPS and the NDC have completed their reviews and transferred the records, making them available to the public once they have been processed by the National Archives takes years longer. The HAC appreciates the challenges caused by underfunding, understaffing, and the increased volume of documents, an increasing number of which are electronic and therefore pose additional difficulties, some of which are technological. Nevertheless, the requirements of a transparent society and informed citizenry demand finding solutions. The HAC perceives a lack of urgency on the part of the NARA administration to find a solution.

The HAC will continue to engage with personnel from NARA, the NDC, IPS, the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), the Office of the Presidential Libraries, and related entities to identify problems and strategies for addressing them. But it needs more help, especially from NARA’s administration. In particular, HAC intends to continue to insist that NARA formulate a clear and coherent plan, which includes the resource requirements for implementation, for making progress toward eliminating the backlog and ultimately complying with its statutory responsibilities. As matters currently stand, it is falling farther behind achieving this goal. What is more, with the dramatic increase in the number
of State Department records, a growing proportion of which are electronic cables and email correspondence, and greater competition for declining government resources, the need for a change in process and institutional culture is immediate.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The HAC attributes the sea change in HO's production, and the salutary effect of that change on the office's morale, to superb leadership and a rigorously conceived plan to achieve well defined goals. NARA requires the same if it is to turn the tide and begin to progress toward meeting its statutory responsibilities. It currently lacks a plan, the backlog is growing, and its morale is the lowest of any government department or agency. NARA's leadership must act now. The fiscal environment is not improving, and the volume of federal records to review, transfer, and process is exploding.

Richard H. Immerman, Chair
Laura Belmonte 
Robert McMahon 
James McAllister 
Susan Perdue

Trudy Huskamp Peterson
Katherine Sibley
Peter Spiro
Thomas Zeiler

Recent Publications of Interest

Ayoob, Mohammed. The Middle East in World Politics (Routledge, 2013).
Engelbrekt, Kjell, Marcus Mohlin, and Charlotte Wagnsson, eds. The NATO Intervention in Libya: Lessons Learned from the Campaign (Routledge, 2013).
Garrard-Burnett, Virginia, Mark Atwood Lawrence, and Julio E. Moreno. Beyond the Eagle’s Shadow: New Histories of Latin America’s Cold War (New Mexico, 2013).
Haqqani, Husain. Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding (PublicAffairs, 2013).
Kipnis, Yigal. 1973: The Road to War (Just World, 2013).


Markey, Daniel S. *No Exit From Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad* (Cambridge, 2013).


Midgal, Joel S. *Shifting Sands: The United States in the Middle East* (Columbia, 2014).


Ross, Andrew A.G. *Mixed Emotions: Beyond Fear and Hatred in International Conflict* (Chicago, 2013).

Roy, Sudeshna, Dana Cooper, and Brian Murphy. *Transatlantic Relations and Modern Diplomacy: An Interdisciplinary History* (Routledge, 2013)


Smith, Jeff M. *Cold Peace: China-India Rivalry in the Twenty-First Century* (Lexington, 2013).


van Minnen, Cornelis A. and Manfred Berg, eds. *The U.S. South and Europe: Transatlantic Relations in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Kentucky, 2013).


Dear Professor Hahn and SHAFR,

I am writing to express my appreciation for the Samuel Flagg Bemis research grant I received from SHAFR this spring. These funds helped support my trip to Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam where I conducted research for my dissertation on military-civilian intimacy during the American War in Vietnam. Thanks in part to your generous funding, I was able to collect a variety of useful sources from visits to National Archive Center II, the General Science Library, and several museums. These materials are allowing me to engage with Vietnamese perspectives in meaningful ways. Thank you for helping to make this possible.

Sincerely,
Amanda Boczar
University of Kentucky

Dear Dr. Hahn,

I want to thank you, the selection committee, and the SHAFR for providing me a Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grant. Thanks to this grant, I am currently in Santo Domingo conducting research at the Archivo General de la Nación and the Biblioteca Pedro Mir at the Universidad Autonoma de Santo Domingo. In addition to research, I have had the opportunity to meet with several leading researchers in my field who have helped me to advance and refine my investigations.

Documents retrieved from several key collections, including the fondos Gobierno Militar and Interior y Policía, helped me to craft a conference paper which has been accepted for the Organization of American Historians (OAH) 2014 annual meeting. In addition, the many sources that I uncovered related to prostitution, public health, and rape during the occupation of 1916-1924 form the basis for an article currently in progress. Documents from the Fondo Antiguo at the Biblioteca Pedro Mir will inform a dissertation chapter which treats the development of latinidad during the 1920s. In sum, my research in Santo Domingo will further the development of two chapters of my dissertation and result in supplementary publications.

I will return to the United States on September 19 and will continue my research in Washington, D.C. and College Park, Maryland next spring. Barring unforeseeable delays, I should have all archival research completed by the summer of 2014. Without SHAFR’s support, these investigations would have been substantially delayed. Should any of them develop into publications in the future, I will gladly acknowledge your generous contribution. Should you desire any further details regarding my work on this trip, or my progress towards the dissertation, I would be more than happy to oblige. Thank you again for providing me this opportunity, which has led me to establish professional contacts, conduct substantive research, and will hopefully provide a path to publication.

Sincerely,
Micah Wright
Doctoral Candidate
Department of History
Texas A&M University

Dear Dr. Hahn and the members of the SHAFR grant committee,

Allow me to thank you once again for awarding me the Samuel Flagg Bemis grant. I used this money to finish the remaining research trips needed for my dissertation. The grant helped cover the costs of my weeklong trip to the Harry S. Truman Library and a shorter visit to the American Jewish Archives. My dissertation analyzes the messages and rhetoric used by Zionist and Arab American organizations during the debate over Palestine. The Truman Library provided a wealth of information on what messages resonated with the White House and State Department, the vast differences in the amount of public messages supporting each side, and the challenges facing the Arab American groups in getting their arguments across. The American Jewish Archives provided some insight into the early struggles of the Zionist Organization of America and conversations between Rabbi Stephen Wise and Nahum Goldmann over issues like funding and how to present their cause to politicians and the American public alike.

The committee was generous enough to provide more money than I had budgeted. While most of these extra funds helped cover photocopying and transportation costs to local archives, it also meant that I could afford to keep my young children in daycare while I traveled at the end of the school year. Being a graduate student parent often adds an additional complication to research trips; not having to arrange childcare around family members’ work schedules and allowing my children to maintain at least one aspect of their normal routine is something for which I am very grateful.

Sincerely,
Denise Jenison
Kent State University
In Memoriam:  
Wayne S. Cole  
(1922-2013)

Wayne S. Cole, a distinguished scholar, an extraordinarily dedicated teacher, and a leading force in the early history of SHAFR, died on September 16, 2013. His books and articles on Franklin D. Roosevelt, isolationism, and American entry into World War II have long been highly regarded within and beyond the scholarly community. After publishing books on the America First Committee, Gerald P. Nye, and Charles A. Lindbergh, he culminated his work on isolationism in his most important and far-reaching contribution, Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932-1945 (University of Nebraska Press, 1983). “I am more proud of that book than of any other I ever published,” he later wrote. Wayne was also the author of a textbook, An Interpretive History of American Foreign Relations (Dorsey Press, 1968, 1974), and he was pleased that it “won respectable numbers of adoptions.” SHAFR recognized his achievements by electing him as its president in 1973 and by presenting him with the Norman and Laura Graebner Award in 1994, which he proudly called “the capstone of my professional career.”

Wayne Cole was born in Manning, Iowa in 1922. He enrolled at Iowa State Teachers College (now Northern Iowa University) in September 1940, but his studies were interrupted by active duty in the Army Air Forces. He was commissioned as a 2nd Lieutenant and awarded his pilot wings in February 1944. He spent most of the remainder of the war as a flight instructor at Merced Air Force Base in California. When the war ended, Wayne told his mother that the only things he would miss from his military career were the “swell fellows” he had met and, “more than you can imagine,” the joy of flying. He remained an avid pilot of small aircraft for another four decades. Despite his love of flying, however, he commented that “nothing I ever did in an airplane surpassed the delights I experienced in historical research and writing!”

After his discharge from the Army in 1945, Wayne returned to Iowa State Teachers College, and after a year of high school teaching, decided to attend graduate school at the University of Wisconsin. He studied under the guidance of Fred Harvey Harrington, by whom he was “awed,” and received his Ph.D. in 1951. He taught at the University of Arkansas for two years and then joined the faculty of Iowa State College in Ames. He stayed in Ames until 1965, when he moved to the University of Maryland, which recruited him as a part of an effort to upgrade its faculty. Wayne chose to leave his native Iowa, where he had very strong family and emotional ties, largely because he was attracted by the proximity of the National Archives and the Library of Congress. He patronized those and other repositories with legendary zeal. He once told a class of undergraduates how much he enjoyed getting paid for “reading other peoples’ mail.”

Wayne’s move to College Park was a great boon for the fifteen students who had the privilege of earning their Ph.D.s under his supervision. He was an exceedingly kind and caring dissertation director; he read and marked up draft chapters with liberal quantities of red ink promptly, discriminately, and when appropriate, disapprovingly. He set high scholarly standards for himself, and because he expected the same of his students, he could be stern and demanding. In the end, his students benefitted enormously, but the process was sometimes painful. When his book on Lindbergh came out in 1974, the jacket had an author photo in which Wayne appeared very grumpy. I assume that the photographer had asked him to strike a serious pose, but I joked that the picture was probably taken right after he read one of my dissertation chapters. Wayne, a delightfully unpretentious person, laughed heartily when I told him that.

In addition to researching, writing, and training graduate students, Wayne was active in helping to lay the foundations for a strong and enduring SHAFR. He served on the first board of directors for the Society after its founding in 1967 and joined with colleagues around the country to firmly establish and expand the organization. As president, he enthusiastically supported the still tentative steps to create the journal that became Diplomatic History.

Although Wayne’s death is felt most keenly by his wife of 62 years, Virginia Rae Cole, their son, Tom, and his students and colleagues, it is also another melancholy milestone in the passing of a generation of scholars who did so much to build, shape, and immeasurably enhance the field of U.S. diplomatic history.

--J. Samuel Walker*

*The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of Larry Kaplan on earlier versions of this essay.
By the time this issue of Passport goes to print, I will be halfway through a theory-based teaching and learning course at University College Cork. In anticipation of the assignments, I returned to my files in search of ways to convert my own research into teaching opportunities, using primary sources to build the students’ analytical skills while drawing young people into a vivid encounter with the past.

Similarly, in courses covering the early Cold War, I try to give students a sense of the tensions within the U.S. government by having them read Senator McCarthy’s jeremiads along with an exasperated—and probably unsent—letter from President Truman to this most outspoken critic. Ending with, “I am very sure that the people of Wisconsin are extremely sorry that they are represented by a man who has as little sense of responsibility as you have,” the letter expresses Truman’s frustration with McCarthy’s attacks on the government in a way that makes sense to undergraduates—even those with relatively little knowledge of that period in U.S. history.2

As the Cold War recedes in collective consciousness, it is becoming increasingly difficult for students to appreciate the fears and tensions of the era as well as the humanity of the major officials involved, and informal documents such as Truman’s letter to McCarthy can give students a way to uncover the emotions of people from this period for themselves. Unfortunately, the very nature of the high-level diplomacy central to détente makes it difficult to connect the negotiations and summit meetings with students’ reality.

Therefore, the next time I teach détente and the summit diplomacy beloved of President Richard Nixon and Dr. Henry Kissinger, I will start with a memorandum produced by Kissinger’s staff for their own and their boss’s amusement. Dated January 6, 1972, and marked “TOP SACRED/COSMIC/ Supernatural,” the memorandum outlines plans for Nixon’s upcoming “Summit Meeting with God”—arranged by the Reverend Billy Graham. Coming as it did in the midst of major foreign and domestic policy initiatives, the memo prompted Kissinger to tell Nixon’s chief of staff H.R. Haldeman that if his staff “worked as hard as this on things that are important, we might have been out of Vietnam by now.”3

Parodying the memoranda drafted by staffers to prepare the president for meetings with heads of state, regular citizens, political supporters, and presidential critics, the memorandum outlines the goals of this summit meeting:

A. To reopen communication after a long period of mutual estrangement, and to confirm the establishment of a new special channel.

B. To reach concrete agreements on the serious issues on which you and He differ.

C. To reassure Him that you will not negotiate with His adversary behind His back or without His participation.

Taking the objectives for meetings between American, Soviet, Chinese, and European leaders to the level of absurdity, this memorandum effectively (if inadvertently) puts the language of high-level diplomacy into words easily understood by students. Elaborating on objective C, for example, Kissinger’s staffers explain that Nixon must alleviate God’s “fears that your [Nixon’s] recent summit with Satan implies an attempt to exploit the Heaven-Hell split.”

Much of diplomacy, and especially détente, depends on the personal relationships between national leaders, so the memorandum goes on to inform Nixon of a recently installed “Hot Line” between himself and God: it is “the sky-blue phone on your night-table with the cord going up through the ceiling.” The parallel to the red phone seen in Hollywood movies (actually a teletype system connecting the United States and the Soviet Union that was installed after the Cuban Missile Crisis) helps emphasize the interconnectedness of phases of the Cold War to students often inclined to see events and presidencies as discrete historical entities.

The memo has the added advantage of conveying Nixon’s personality and the general culture of the White House within the detailed descriptions of the “action sequence” for the meeting. Nixon’s penchant for personal diplomacy and secrecy permeates the memorandum. Kissinger’s aides note that “you [Nixon] and The Almighty will be meeting alone for the first hour, with General Walters interpreting. You will then be joined by Dr. Kissinger and St. Peter, who will slip in by the side door and window, respectively. (We know you prefer one-on-one meetings, and we therefore turned down His bureaucracy’s request that we include His Son and a third figure, who remains obscure).” The memorandum sidelines Secretary of State William Rogers during these negotiations, just as Nixon did during his February 1972 visit to China, noting simply that “there will be counterpart meetings between Secretary...
Rogers and a flight of angels.”

The memo’s detailed plans for the follow-up to the meeting underscore the close ties between diplomacy and domestic politics in the Nixon White House. The staff notes that “wide distribution” of photographs of the meeting would help “ensure the success of the Southern strategy” (an effort to win over Southern states to the Republican Party through racially coded appeals for “law and order”), and the identity of the photos’ distributors—the Republican National Committee and Special Counsel to the President Charles W. Colson, Nixon’s “hatchet man” and domestic liaison—confirms that the publicity effort would be for purely political purposes. These details clearly suggest that an awareness of at least some of the administration’s domestic goals permeated the offices of the national security advisor. In recognition of Nixon’s well-known anti-Semitic sentiments and his resentment of the Ivy League advisors who had surrounded his Democratic predecessors, the staff also warns that “distribution in New York City and the Cambridge area is inadvisable.”

Although Nixon had a preference for personal, one-on-one meetings with world leaders, celebrities, and other important figures (both international and domestic), he also held many so-called “stag dinners” throughout his administration. At these dinners, powerful men who had similar interests, policy expertise, or simply great wealth were wined and dined during seemingly casual (but doubtless carefully scripted) evenings. The meetings gave potential political supporters privileged access to the president as well as detailed advance knowledge of and the opportunity to influence official policies. The memo remarks upon this custom when it refers to plans for a meal after the meeting. Nixon would be hosting “an informal stag dinner for Him and His twelve aides. (You may have seen a picture of this group gathered at an earlier dinner.)”

The memo’s talking points further muddy the line between domestic politics, foreign policy, and Nixon’s personal quirks. Heading the list are items such as “Virtue is not an end in itself”; “You recognize His special interest in the Middle East”; and “We have no desire to exploit the Heaven-Hell split. The issues in that dispute either do not concern us or are not issues we can affect.” These diplomatic points quickly give way to a telling reference to Nixon’s obsessive interest in sports: “You might suggest that before His departure He pay a visit to George Allen at the Redskins Training Camp and discuss the prospects for an improvement in the offensive line next year.” Finally, the memo suggests that Nixon end the meeting by sending his “best regards to General deGualle [sic], President Eisenhower, and Checkers” and advises him to “emphatically” discourage “any expectation of an early return visit.”

The memorandum was intended as a humorous commentary on the quirks and foibles of the administration and its political and diplomatic priorities, and its writers (and likely Kissinger himself) never expected it to be read outside the White House. However, thanks to Watergate, the controversy over the tapes and other records, and the Presidential Records and Materials Preservation Act, the memorandum is now available in Haldeman’s chronological files. Not an inherently important document, it is still useful for scholars and teachers because of the way it captures the mood and personality of the Nixon White House and reveals that insiders recognized some of the key aspects of Nixon’s style in foreign policy and domestic politics.

Such documents also give students a glimpse into the serendipity and excitement of archival research. For so many of them, history is a list of names and dates memorized in high school. Teaching history at the university level therefore involves a fair amount of what could be called “un-teaching,” getting students to question their assumptions and the standard narratives they bring to our classes. Introducing students, at every level, to the raw material of history is an excellent way to spark an interest that will last beyond a single class and get students to appreciate the complexities of the past.

Notes:


2. Harry S. Truman to Joseph McCarthy, undated; President’s Secretary’s Files ca.12/1930-ca.03/1955; Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO. Available at http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/mccarthy-telegram/.

3. “Henry Kissinger to H.R. Haldeman,” April 12, 1972, Henry Kissinger April 1972; Box 95; WHSF: SMOF Haldeman, NPLM, NACP.