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In this Issue

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We Need You!

Passport is not a daily newspaper, but as editors we feel it is important to address issues that are timely and relevant to the SHAFR membership. **One such issue is archival access.** We have been thinking quite a bit about resources such as the Wilson Center for International Scholars' Cold War International History Project.

In the September 2025 issue of *Passport*, we want to hold a conversation about such archives which are crucial to our day-to-day lives as scholars and teachers. Our goal is to demonstrate the importance of these resources and illustrate how broadly they are used. If you have a story or thought to share, please reach out to us at **passport@shafr.org**. We look forward to hearing from you.

Contributors

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A Roundtable on Philip Dow, *Accidental Diplomats: American Missionaries and the Cold War in Africa*

Daniel Hummel, Christopher Jones, James Meriwether, Lauren F. Turek, and Philip Dow

The Radical Values of American Evangelical Missionaries—Review of Philip Dow, *Accidental Diplomats: American Missionaries and the Cold War in Africa*

Daniel Hummel

What does it mean to be an evangelical Christian? A consensus definition is now more elusive than ever, with ongoing debate among historians, sociologists, and others about the various theological, political, and cultural factors that deserve primacy. The historian of American religion, Matthew Sutton (whose 2019 book, *Double Crossed*, intersects with the history of U.S. foreign relations), recently published the latest broadside in this debate, arguing that "*post–World War II evangelicalism* is best defined as a white, patriarchal, nationalist religious movement made up of Christians who seek power to transform American culture through conservative-leaning politics and free-market economics."[1]

Sutton's definition, which represents the leanings of a growing number of historians, contrasts with the previous generation of scholarship on evangelicalism that rallied around the "Bebbington Quadrilateral," offered by British historian David Bebbington, who defined evangelicalism in 1989 as a multi-century, transnational tradition emphasizing theological commitments to Biblicism, conversionism, crucicentrism, and activism. Some of the most significant works studying evangelicals and U.S. foreign relations during the Cold War have relied on the Bebbington Quadrilateral or similar definitions, including those by Andrew Preston, Lauren Turek, and Matthew K. Shannon, among others.[2]

Philip Dow's *Accidental Diplomats* presents a fascinating case to help adjudicate this debate among largely American religious historians.[3] But more than that, Dow's study of American evangelical missionaries in sub-Saharan Africa during the Cold War illustrates how definitional decisions shape how historians of U.S. foreign relations interpret religious actors. Dow demonstrates, through his sources and his contribution to the definitional question, how both poles in the current scholarly debate of whether evangelicalism is "white, patriarchal, nationalist" or "Biblicist, conversionist, activist" miss a more fundamental reality of American evangelicalism that is made clearer in non-American contexts: it is radically committed to the values of "individualism," "egalitarianism," and "volunteerism" (xxvii). These values, which do not produce a consistent reactionary or liberationist politics—they contribute to both extremes and many politics between—and are not strictly theological or religious, have immense shaping power where they are adopted. Dow describes them variously as radical, transformative, and potent, (86, 161, 184) and that they extended "beyond manifestations of concrete politics and into the politics of culture" (160). Their most disruptive effects on Ethiopian, Congolese, and Kenyan societies, as Dow displays, is precisely in their social and political implications.

Not to be lost in this analysis is that the number of Christians in sub-Saharan Africa increased over the course of the Cold War in stunning fashion. It will certainly be one of the evangelical missionaries' most enduring historical legacies of any kind on the region. The remarkable growth of largely evangelical and Pentecostal Christianity in Kenya, Congo, and Ethiopia proceeds apace still decades after the end of the Cold War. As Dow notes early on, in the century spanning 1910-2010, Christianity grew from approximately 9 percent to 63 percent of the population, with more than half a billion Christians now in Africa (xxix). The immense sectarian tensions that have emerged between Christian traditions, and between Christian, Muslim, and folk religion communities, have and will continue to have profound consequences in international relations. Major U.S. initiatives in the past few decades involving sub-Saharan African nations—Operation Restore Hope, the War on Terror, PEPFAR—are informed by the Christian—and not just Christian but distinctly evangelical and Pentecostal—presentation of these societies in the eyes of U.S. policy makers and American culture. This transformation, what historian Philip Jenkins has described as "the largest quantitative change in the whole of religious history" is partially yet significantly due to the missionaries discussed in *Accidental Diplomats* (xxix).

It is to Dow's credit that he pays attention to the ways the values of American evangelical missionaries are derived from specific theological commitments so fundamental to modern Protestantism that virtually no adherent objects to them (or else they would be defined as another type of Christian). *Individualism*, in Dow's treatment, results "from the emphasis on interpreting the Bible for oneself" that prioritizes self over community and tradition (xxvii). Luther's famous dictum defending his personal conscience in front of the Diet of Worms, "Here I stand, I can do no other, so help me God," sets Protestants apart from other Christian traditions just as much as the theological doctrines of *sola scriptura* and *sola fides*. *Egalitarianism*, derived from the Protestant principle of the "priesthood of all believers," undergirds democratic (congregationalist polity) church structures that easily spill over into social and political expectations of equality. *Volunteerism*, the expectation that each Christian gladly volunteer time, effort, and skills to support church ministries, outreach programs, or missions work, derives, as Dow puts it, from the "'opt-in' nature of the Protestant confessional tradition" and, for many evangelicals, aligns with their practices of believers-only

baptism and communion (xxvii).

The values of individualism, egalitarianism, and volunteerism travel, often silently, with their evangelical adherents, even though their consequences can be explosive and radical. In *Accidental Diplomats*, these values help Dow distinguish between evangelical and other Protestant missionaries. While mainline (or "establishment") Protestant bodies like the Lutherans or Presbyterians also had large missionary outposts in sub-Saharan Africa, Dow justifies his focus on evangelicals as a distinct religious group largely on the preponderance of individualism, egalitarianism, and volunteerism that their work assumed and promoted through diplomatic, educational, religious, and political channels. These values were attached to a particular missionary social class and identity: evangelical missionaries were educated at small Christian schools or Bible institutes, attended small or independent churches, and "did not represent the economic, cultural, or political center." As Dow summarizes, "theirs was a movement of the margins, funded by the grassroots, fuelled by salt-of-the-earth spiritual fervour, and largely made up of average Americans" (xviii). The rapid growth of evangelical missionaries (from 14,000 in 1925 to more than 60,000 in the 1980s when they accounted for more than 90 percent of all American Protestant missionaries) was thus not only a change in the type of Christianity that was being shared with sub-Saharan Africans, but in the emphasized values that this form of Christianity brought with it (xxix).

The recurring evangelical missionary organizations studied by Dow such as Sudan Interior Mission, Africa Inland Mission, and Gospel Missionary Society expressed and taught evangelical values through their mission outputs, churches, and schools. They sought conversions like any missionary would, but the way they went about it was typically evangelical: through educating for literacy so that each individual could read the Bible and make a personal decision for Christ. Other typically evangelical missions organizations including Wycliffe Bible Translators, Campus Crusade for Christ, Youth for Christ, and the Navigators followed this same formula and simply assumed the primacy of individualism, egalitarianism, and volunteerism as the subtext of their Christian message, creating what Dow calls a "spiritually rooted affective bond," the "potency" of which lay in its transnational and cross-cultural character not just in the theological propositions of the confession, but in the spirituality and ethos of the attached values (222).

For missionaries as much as their organizations, the aims were "distinctly religious" and often professedly apolitical (xviii). But that doesn't mean their relevance was confined to strictly religious practices or to the individual missionaries Dow focuses on who played important diplomatic or political roles. While the values of individualism, egalitarianism, and volunteerism were often religiously derived, they had further-reaching effects. In the case of Kenya, for example, Dow illustrates how a slew of post-independence political leaders, most prominently the second president of Kenya, Daniel Arap Moi, conceived of their nationalist, anti-colonial politics as indebted to their missionary education and their persistent adherence to evangelical Christianity. Others, like some evangelical missionaries on the eve of the Ethiopian revolution in 1974, broke with the evangelical-friendly Emperor Selassie and "were among [the revolution's] most vocal and politically effective sympathizers" before it became dominated by Marxists (64). Still other revolutionaries credited their missionary schooling for instilling in them radical values of redistribution, equality, and justice.

Curiously, Dow sometimes describes individualism, egalitarianism, and volunteerism as "American" values, writing that evangelical missionaries promoted an "American-flavored version of modernity" (221) and that missionary efforts "were often flavored by a set of peculiarly American perspectives and concerns" (xxvii). This is understandable enough, especially in the cases where American missionaries advanced particular policy or diplomatic proposals at the behest of the U.S. government. But in other cases, evangelicals diverged from other American Protestant missionaries in their views and actions, thus illustrating that, for example, the "egalitarianism" in local, congregational church governance was not an American but an evangelical value (Baptists are no more "American" than Presbyterians or Lutherans). Thus, Dow writes that "the American educational system, and the missionaries who initiated and oversaw that system, also explicitly promoted the democratically-friendly values of individualism and egalitarianism." This is true, but the "Americanness" of the system was less notable than its evangelical commitments to local congregational governance. As Dow says immediately after, "Significantly, these values were also modelled in the culture and governing systems of the evangelical churches in the country" (63).

For missionaries as much as their organizations, the aims were "distinctly religious" and often professedly apolitical (xviii). But that doesn't mean their relevance was confined to strictly religious practices or to the individual missionaries Dow focuses on who played important diplomatic or political roles.

In other cases, the "American" identity of evangelicals worked in the other direction and obscured their commitment to individualism, egalitarianism, and volunteerism. The case of evangelical support for Emperor Selassie is illustrative. Selassie, who ruled Ethiopia from 1930-1974, was "White evangelical America's type of leader and in the religiously infused context of the global Cold War, this religious and ideological affinity mattered." Evangelicals portrayed the emperor's rule "as fundamentally in line with the liberal democratic tradition" and Billy Graham spoke warmly of the emperor, stating he would assure "democratic institutions would prevail in his country" (24-25). Here the very "Americanness" of the evangelical missionaries (and American spokesmen) and their interpretation of Ethiopia through the lens of U.S. Cold War ideology that prioritized anticommunism led them to describe a theocratic monarchy as "democratic." It was, ironically, as Dow points out, some of the Ethiopian Marxist rebels who were "the egalitarian-minded and critical-thinking products of the American missionary schools" who "played a decisive part in both the rise and fall of Ethiopia's communist revolution" (221).

The individualism, egalitarianism, and volunteerism of evangelicalism on display in *Accidental Diplomats* adds another layer of meaning to the title. Unlike some modernist or liberal Protestants in earlier eras who understood their missions work in terms of development and social uplift, the evangelicals in Dow's story claimed to have no such pretentions. Yet by building schools to educate for Biblical literacy, by establishing local-run congregationalist polity churches to embody Christian community, and by insisting that spiritual equality was not conditional on political equality (a double-edged proposition that could be both accommodating to racist structures or destabilizing), evangelicals were crucial links in unintended and inadvertent developments in sub-Saharan Africa. The values they transmitted were politically unpredictable—both helping to prop up theocratic monarchy and inspire Marxist revolution; both encouraging transnational solidarity and retrenching deep ethnic and racial loyalties; both exposing millions of sub-Saharan Africans to

democratic processes and norms and being used to quash proto-democratic movements in the name of stability. Thus, to use American-centric political terms like "conservative" to describe evangelical political commitments may help locate American evangelicals in U.S. politics, but it can cloud as much as it clarifies outside of that limited utility. Such labels do a disservice to understanding the un-conservative and radical potential of individualism, egalitarianism, and volunteerism as operative values in modern societies.

This returns us to the question of defining evangelicalism, and what is at stake with any such definition. In simplest terms, a definition that both 1) de-provincializes evangelicalism from its American context (even when the focus is on American evangelicals) and 2) appreciates the deep social and political implications of evangelicalism even when evangelicals are studiously apolitical, is necessary to understanding the fullest extent of how American evangelical missionaries shaped and were shaped by the Cold War. This means taking seriously the theological categories and arguments of evangelicals that inform their unbreachable commitments to individualism, egalitarianism, and volunteerism, as well as their preferences for church-state separation and eagerness to adapt religious practices to local norms (two other subthemes Dow expertly weaves into his analysis). This means moving deeper than (while not ignoring) the instances of formal religious influence (the personal religious beliefs of politicians and diplomats, missionaries advising politicians or diplomats, lobbying efforts by denominations or religious NGOs) and applying a more sociological lens to understanding the intersection of religion and international history, exemplified in at least one instance by the pioneers of the study of global Christianity including Andrew Walls, Lamin Sanneh, and Dana Robert.[4] It is encouraging that recent studies of American evangelicals and diplomatic or international history, such as the recent volume *Global Faith and American Power*, are highlighting the growing cohort of historians doing just this. Melani McAlister, Emily Conroy-Krutz, Heather D. Curtis, Helen Jin Kim, David C. Kirkpatrick, and many others—including Philip Dow and his impressive *Accidental Diplomats*—are charting an insightful and exciting scholarly course that has great potential to inform not just the history of U.S. foreign relations, but also U.S. religion and much more besides.[5]

Notes:

1. Matthew Avery Sutton, *Double Crossed: The Missionaries Who Spied for the United States During the Second World War* (Basic Books, 2019); Matthew Avery Sutton, "Redefining the History and Historiography on American Evangelicalism in the Era of the Religious Right," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion,* August 13, 2024, https://doi.org/10.1093/jaarel/lfae063. For other perspectives on this debate see Daniel Silliman, "An Evangelical Is Anyone Who Likes Billy Graham: Defining Evangelicalism with Carl Henry and Networks of Trust," *Church History* 90, no. 3 (September 2021): 621–43; Mark A. Noll, David W. Bebbington, and George M. Marsden, *Evangelicals: Who They Have Been, Are Now, and Could Be* (Eerdmans, 2019); Darren Dochuk, "Revisiting Bebbington's Classic Rendering of Modern Evangelicalism at Points of New Departure," *Fides et Historia* 47, no. 1 (2015): 63–72.

2. Andrew Preston, *Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy* (Knopf, 2012); Lauren F. Turek, *To Bring the Good News to All Nations: Evangelical Influence on Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Relations* (Cornell University Press, 2020); Matthew K. Shannon, *Mission Manifest: American Evangelicals and Iran in the Twentieth Century* (Cornell University Press, 2024).

3. Dow cites the Bebbington Quadrilateral and then adds to his definition. See p. xxvii.

4. See, for example, Andrew Walls, *The Missionary Movement in Christian History: Studies in the Transmission of Faith* (T&T Clark, 1996); Lamin Sanneh, *Whose Religion Is Christianity?: The Gospel beyond the West,* 4th Paperback Edition (Eerdmans, 2003); Dana L. Robert, *Christian Mission: How Christianity Became a World Religion,* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).

5. Melani McAlister, *The Kingdom of God Has No Borders: A Global History of American Evangelicals* (Oxford University Press, 2018); Helen Jin Kim, *Race for Revival: How Cold War South Korea Shaped the American Evangelical Empire* (Oxford University Press, 2022); David C. Kirkpatrick, *A Gospel for the Poor: Global Social Christianity and the Latin American Evangelical Left, Illustrated edition* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019); Emily Conroy-Krutz, *Missionary Diplomacy: Religion and Nineteenth-Century American Foreign Relations* (Cornell University Press, 2024); and John Corrigan, Melani McAlister, and Axel R. Schäfer, eds., *Global Faith, Worldly Power: Evangelical Internationalism and U.S. Empire* (The University of North Carolina Press, 2022).

Review of Philip Dow. *Accidental Diplomats: American Missionaries and the Cold War in Africa*

Christopher Jones

Philip Dow's *Accidental Diplomats: American Missionaries and the Cold War in Africa* is a smart, sensitive, and thoughtful examination of the "significant, and at times, central role" played by American evangelical missionaries in shifting relations between the United States and three African nations during the Cold War (xxxi). These missionaries, he argues, are key figures in the history of U.S. foreign policy in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Congo. Though "their political and diplomatic influence was largely accidental—an unintentional biproduct of their religious and humanitarian aims," it was no less significant in shaping "the trajectory of the Cold War" (225). The story told in *Accidental Diplomats* is full of unexpected twists and turns, and nobody involved – the missionaries, U.S. State officials, African leaders, or Christian converts in each of the three nations – acts in wholly predictable or consistent ways. The result is a compelling, if complex, tale of transnational religion and politics in Cold War Africa.

Dow's reasons for opting to write on evangelical missions during the Cold War are straightforward: "the ideologically and religiously charged context of the global Cold War witnessed the greatest surge of Christian missionaries in world history." His justifications for selecting Ethiopia, Congo, and Kenya are equally persuasive: In addition to being "three of the region's most politically significant nations," each boasts a "divergent cultural and political histor[y]" of "geopolitical significance" (xxxi-xxxii). The book is organized into three sections, each taking on the experience of American missionaries in a different nation. Part 1 on Ethiopia highlights the role American missionaries played amidst the turbulent decades of the nation's mid-20th century history, through the years of Haile Selassie's reign leading up to the 1974 revolution, and during the prolonged rule of the Marxist-Leninist Derg. Readers expecting an easy alliance between U.S. governmental influence and missionary activity in Ethiopia will be surprised. Dow persuasively shows instead that missionary influence waned amidst the increased activity of the U.S. government in the years leading up to the events of 1974, and then increased during the rule of the Derg. While the Soviet-backed Derg falsely accused missionaries of being CIA operatives in an attempt to stamp out their influence, the move actually emboldened some missionaries to become more politically active. Moreover, the Derg "came to rely heavily on the American evangelicals missionaries" to provide health care, food, and education to Ethiopians (60). These actions undertaken by the missionaries pushed "American policymakers in directions that they may not have otherwise taken" (69).

Similarly unexpected paths were pursued by both missionaries and state officials in the Congo. Missionaries there initially "help[ed] to influence Congolese public opinion in a generally pro-American direction," "inform[ed]

and influenc[ed] American public opinion on the Congo," and "act[ed] as an important diplomatic bridge between Congolese and American policymakers" (73). This history almost wasn't. When war broke out in 1960, American missionaries received pressure from Congolese rebels, local residents, their church mission boards, and the U.S. government to withdraw. Most (some 70%) did. But 30% stayed, evidencing their Christian love and commitment to the Congolese people they served (93). Because they stayed, those missionaries both further endeared themselves to local residents and became valuable sources of information and intelligence for U.S. governmental officials, propelling one U.S. diplomat to explicitly recommend "interview[ing] as many returning American and Canadian missionaries as possible" to produce an accurate understanding of conditions on-the-ground in the Congo (80). While missionaries "rarely sought or accepted prominent roles in formal U.S. diplomacy," they did provide crucial intelligence to state actors. And there were exceptions to this general rule, including Methodist missionary Howard Brinton, who became the key figure in attempting to negotiate peace between the U.S.-supported Congolese government and the leaders of the breakaway Katanga province (104-5). In Dow's telling, both Brinton and those missionaries who remained independent of government positions, were "accidental diplomats—stagehands drafted into the play, not actors who had tried out for their roles" (146).

The third and final section of the book turns to Kenya, which serves as a counterpoint to both the Congo and Ethiopia situations because of its consistent "and unambiguously, pro-west Cold War orientation" (149). This, Dow argues, can be traced back to the lengthy presence and influence of American missionaries in the region. American missionaries entered Kenya earlier than they did either the Congo or Ethiopia, their presence dating back to the nineteenth century. Their presence, which included several missionary schools, health care and agricultural initiatives, and the translation of the Bible into local languages, endeared the people to the missionaries and helped shape Kenya's decision to ally itself with the United States and other western nations during the Cold War. More than in any other African nation, missionary activities "had influenced the cultural and religious values of [Kenya]" (217).

Accidental Diplomats is part of a still-growing body of historical scholarship that collectively and convincingly makes clear that American missionaries were among the most important non-state actors in shaping U.S. foreign policy, from the early nineteenth century to the Gilded Age, and from the pre-war twentieth century to postwar America and beyond. Dow focuses on Cold War Africa to highlight the ways in which those Christian missionaries assisted (or, occasionally, frustrated) U.S. state interests in newly-independent nations in Central and East Africa.

It makes an especially important contribution to that body of literature in two ways: First, in framing the missionaries as *accidental* diplomats, he recognizes the missionaries' own interests and motivations *as missionaries*. Though they sometimes acted as informal agents of the state, that was not always their intention. And as he convincingly shows, their own desires and goals sometimes conflicted with U.S. foreign policy and frustrated the objectives of government officials in Cold War Africa. Second, the book does a better job than nearly anything else written on American missionaries and U.S. foreign relations in grounding readers in the on-the-ground reality that missionaries lived through in Ethiopia, Congo, and Kenya. Missionaries did not simply report on the famine and starvation they witnessed first hand in Ethiopia in the 1970s, they experienced it (and tried to provide relief). Their counterparts in the Congo, similarly, did not merely alert others to anti-American sentiment amidst the Simba Rebellion of 1963-65, they were among the targets of that violence. Readers come away with a clearer understanding of the conditions of Cold War Africa as experienced by missionaries, combatants, Christian converts, and rival leaders.

Accidental Diplomats also succeeds in laying the groundwork for future studies. While Dow pays attention to the influence of American missionaries' experiences and reports in shaping American understandings and attitudes toward Africa generally, I found myself wondering how that experience shaped American evangelicalism at home and elsewhere around the globe. Among the sources he cites are a handful of missionary memoirs recounting their time in Africa. To whom were these written? How well did they sell? Did they inspire others to take up the cross and volunteer for missionary service? And were the lessons learned in Africa applied by American evangelicals elsewhere in the global Cold War?

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Dow's analysis also points to intriguing questions about the relationships between American missionaries and their evangelical counterparts from Europe and elsewhere. He notes, to cite just one example, that "British, Canadian, and Australian missionaries (and to some extent the Scandinavians as well)" were all active in Cold War Congo, but that they operated "within a larger culture of American evangelical Protestantism" (113n8). Future researchers might fruitfully take up the question of what exactly that means. How did the missionaries from each nation interact with one another? What were the consequences of *their* activity on U.S. foreign policy? Did Canadian or British missionaries ever function as accidental diplomats for their own countries?

Despite the very valuable contributions *Accidental Diplomats* makes, some nagging questions remain. Most notably, it is not fully clear to me that the informal and formal diplomatic actions of the missionaries he describes can all be accurately classified as *accidental*. In chapter 4 on "American evangelical missionaries and the Rise and Fall of the Simba Rebellion," for instance, Dow notes that "a significant amount of the intelligence that originated from American missionaries during the Simba rebellion was not meant for government eyes" and then suggests that many of the letters may have been "pilfered" by intelligence officials or that "the missionaries' superiors … had themselves passed the letter to representatives of the state" (121). But he also holds open the possibility that some missionaries may have willingly shared the information themselves with government officials, in either social settings, "telegrams from Leopoldville to Washington," or through the extensive radio networks pioneered by missionaries in the region (123). While initially intended

to facilitate communication between missionary posts in different locales, it was an "open secret" that state officials regularly monitored the channels and even communicated directly with missionaries through the radio. If the missionaries knowingly sent on-the-ground intelligence about the political and military situation in the Congo or Ethiopia to state officials in any form, can their actions really be accurately described as *accidental*?

A second example is even more revealing. Dow opens chapter 5 on the missionaries' role in "constructing a pro-western Kenya" with an anecdote about the 1909 cornerstone ceremony for the new Kijabe station of the African Inland Mission (AIM), and organization founded by a Scottish missionary but supported primarily by American evangelicals. The speech offered at that ceremony was delivered not by an American missionary or a Kenyan Christian, but rather by Theodore Roosevelt, the immediate past-president of the United States. Yet, Dow called AIM "explicitly apolitical" (149). It is difficult to imagine something more explicitly political than the choice of inviting the noted imperialist Roosevelt as speaker.

Dow's interest in classifying missionaries' motivations as "explicitly apolitical" seems to be closely tied to his classification of *evangelical* as a religious and not political identifier.

This disconnect between Dow's argument and my own reading seems to have to do with motivation. He repeatedly describes the missionaries as "explicitly apolitical" or "religiously-[as opposed to politically-?] inspired." This is fundamental to his (well-reasoned) point that the missionaries had their own spiritual motivations independent of American governmental aims. But it is not clear that this distinction necessarily matters. The missionaries' attitudes and actions were indeed political, whether they acknowledged that or not. Anti-communism is a political stance, even if it's drawn primarily from one's reading of the Bible as opposed to the writings of a political philosopher. So is opposing the political programs of extremists on the right or the left and advancing a more moderate path to peace and stability, as so many American missionaries in Cold War Africa advocated.

Dow's interest in classifying missionaries' motivations as "explicitly apolitical" seems to be closely tied to his classification of *evangelical* as a religious and not political identifier. "The evangelical label," he explains in the book's introduction, "was not primarily an intellectual, cultural, or political one. 'Evangelical' was, first and foremost, a theological label" (xxvi-xxvii). Dow cites David Bebbington's well-known quadrilateral of essential evangelical beliefs – conversionism, crucicentrism, Biblicism, and activism – as the impulse behind evangelicals' missionary activity abroad. That may very well be the case, though as he notes, those beliefs existed within the context of the heightened politicization of religion during the Cold War. It seems difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle theological and political motivations from one another. It also seems unnecessary to the central argument of Dow's book. Regardless of intent (and "Cold War era evangelicals," Dow notes, "were not a monolithic bloc" (xxvi)), American missionaries' attitudes and actions in Africa had political consequences. They reveal the complex web of state and non-state actors in shaping American foreign policy and highlight the centrality of Christian missionaries in that story. *Accidental Diplomats* convincingly makes that case.

Review of Philip Dow, *Accidental Diplomats: American Missionaries and the Cold War in Africa* (William Carey Publishing, 2024)

James Meriwether

Some years ago, while spending a Fulbright year at the University of Nairobi, I found myself at an all-day high school invitational volleyball tournament hosted by Rift Valley Academy, a Christian boarding school high above the valley floor. During one of those chance conversations one has in the bleachers with parents whose child plays on an opposing team, I heard one couple's story about being missionaries in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where one of their children had been struck by lightning and survived. They had been considering a return to the United States but decided to remain with a renewed conviction that their child's survival resulted from God's intervention — a sign for them to continue their mission work in Africa. We eventually turned back to the competition on the floor, and our paths never crossed again, but the conversation remained with me.

I was reminded of this encounter while reading Philip Dow's *Accidental Diplomats*: *American Missionaries and the Cold War in Africa*, with its exploration of evangelicals who journeyed to East and Central Africa to spread their faith and found themselves involved with the shifting dynamics of the world they entered and altered.

Dow provides an interesting contextual framing: as the twentieth century progressed, most especially after World War II, common people to an unprecedented extent "had the capacity to voluntarily spread out across the globe in large numbers" not as immigrants but as part of a globally engaged, populist transnationalism (xvi). He situates American evangelical missionaries as part of that global movement, arguing they played a particularly critical role in what he believes has been the underappreciated and not fully understood "largest outpouring of Christian missionary activity in history." Dow sees these individuals as playing a "decisive role" in U.S. Cold War engagement in Africa (xviii). For many readers this last point may be of the most direct interest, even as it seems these actors were one more facet — not necessarily a "decisive" aspect — of the Cold War in Africa.

The book is divided into an introduction and then three sections focusing on evangelical missionaries in: Ethiopia, 1918-1991; Congo, 1959-1967; and Kenya, 1895-1991. While the title indicates a focus on the Cold War, the dates here reflect the pattern of the book, to examine matters related to evangelical missionaries across rather unequal periods of time that either extend well beyond the Cold War era or, in the case of the Congo, cover a time span rather less than the Cold War proper. Readers may gain insights about earlier evangelical influences, even as the material may have limited connection to the Cold War. Dow's work in many ways stands as a rich resource on evangelical missionaries in these years.

Similarly, while the emphasis is on evangelical missionaries, Dow not infrequently switches to a larger tent and includes mainline Protestant missionaries, particularly within the Congo, offering the view of these missionaries as mostly "theologically conservative" (perhaps making them "evangelically adjacent"). All of this makes for a methodologically fluid canvas and focus, one on which Dow acknowledges that during the Cold War there were distinct ebbs and flows to evangelical influence, and that at

times there were extended periods of declining influence, such as in Ethiopia. This last point is not a criticism but rather a recognition that Dow himself sees an uneven role for these accidental diplomats, depending on the time period.

One of the book's strengths is Dow's use of less familiar sources, including deep dives into underused archives of faith-based organizations; oral interviews of lesser-known actors; and an exploration of some less noticed material from national and presidential archives. Readers will notice, though, that when it comes to secondary sources, with few exceptions, the monograph appears to have drawn from a slightly older catalog of scholarship (mostly prior to c. 2012) that leaves the reader seeking some further engagement with more recent literature. This occasionally marks the text, too (for instance, the reference to Jimmy Carter's "recent interview" that comes from a book published in 2007, 22).

As Dow grapples with actions and views of evangelical missionaries, an evident empathy for them and their work permeates the text. That is neither inherently a good nor bad thing, but at times I found myself thinking that a stronger analytic questioning of evangelical actions and views was in order. To use one example from the time of Congo's independence, as the situation rapidly became fractured and fraught, many American missionaries fled the country. One group of some 118 members of the American Presbyterian Congo Mission reached Johannesburg, where the American Consul staff interviewed them. Some of the missionaries' views were reported back to Washington. "The missionaries to whom the reporting officer talked were unanimous in the view that the present situation in the Congo is inspired by communists. They stated that

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Lumumba was a thief who had been imprisoned for stealing some time in the not very distant past ... that he could not possibly have written the speeches he has made, and feel that he tipped his hand in the offensive remarks made in the presence of King Badouin."

If Dow is correct in his assertion that missionaries were critical intermediaries in shaping perceptions and views, further critical interrogation of the views and prejudices they brought with them, and how these may or may not have shifted on the ground, would have been welcome. The diplomatic cable reads on, saying: "One of the Mission group expressed the belief that the incidents had occurred throughout the Congo too simultaneously to be the result of chance, and stated that the Congo natives were not capable of organization of this kind."

Certainly Cold War anticommunism is apparent in these assessments, but so are appalling racial prejudices. "Some of the missionary group attributed the attacks against the Belgians less to Belgian injustices (which some of whom had been in the Congo for 20 years or more said were very rare), than to the fact that the Belgians had for several years past permitted indignities offered to them by lawless natives to pass unnoticed thereby lowering respect in which the mass of Congolese held them."[1]

There is room to further interrogate such attitudes and actions, which would deepen our understanding of these actors, and would critically enrich what is a central point to his work: the role of missionaries as "accidental diplomats." To be sure, Dow notes that "by the standards of today, many American missionaries in the Congo appear to have been racially insensitive at best" yet that sidesteps a major cultural precondition that deserves further critical analysis, especially as the sentence continues "but within the context of pre-1959 Belgian-Congo where Congolese were entirely excluded from positions of leadership and in which, by design, virtually no political education was taking place, the Africanization and democratization of the Congolese Protestant Church initiated by American protestant missionaries was paradigm altering" (87). Reflective of the book generally, Dow here chooses to emphasize what he sees as more positive dimensions.

Readers are also left to wonder just how "paradigm altering" the missionary presence proved to be as events unfolded in the Congo. As Dow elevates the role of evangelical missionaries, arguing for instance that "the CIA and American missionaries proved to be equally critical to their nation's Cold War triumph in the Congo" (73), at the same time we see evangelical missionaries advocating for Katangan secession. Dow credits "a small group of American missionaries and their evangelical supporters at home in the United States" with enabling Katanga to hold out for more than two years (99-100). One wonders not just about the ways this flew in the face of U.S. policy, which Dow touches on, but how paradigm-altering.

Dow does acknowledge this all was problematic, but one is left uncertain how this all helped advance a "Cold War triumph" in the Congo.

As Dow highlights an egalitarian and democratic evangelical missionary vision of the world, he leaves room for others to consider questions of gender and gender roles among the evangelical missionaries and their flocks.

Perhaps the book's most extensive section is that on Kenya, where Dow's chapters provide a way of looking at a long arc of events with evangelical missionaries centered. In all three countries, but perhaps especially Kenya, we see evangelical missionaries rolling up sleeves in clinics and schools -- and Dow provides a vivid sense of the work in these fields throughout the book. We see missionaries in close contact with grass roots people as well as African elites, and who they rubbed elbows with at dinner parties and consular events.

These interactions ultimately provoke an essential question: to what extent do interactions equate to influence? One of the strengths of Dow's work is detailing interactions -- in person, through speaking and fundraising efforts, through the written word, and otherwise -- while the extent to which U.S. Cold War approaches and policy were influenced by those interactions remains a more open question.

As I read through the last passages of the book, I found myself reflecting on its relatively triumphalist history of evangelicals spreading the Christian gospel and helping secure pro- Western values and attitudes among both grass roots people and leaders. Dow notes that "in a few cases, such as Kenya's Mau Mau war, the Katangan secession, and Ethiopia's communist revolution" events did not always align with the wishes of the missionaries or the U.S. government, yet "thanks to their biblically-inspired deference to authority and their explicitly apolitical worldview, American evangelical missionaries generally encouraged a moderate form of pro-Western democracy" (221). I would argue that these "accidental diplomats" did not have an "apolitical" worldview as they sought to achieve their ends. At the same time, it seems there is room for further interrogation of what it meant to advocate in America for authoritarian or secessionist leaders such as Haile Selassie and Moise Tshombe alongside Dow's message of evangelical missionaries playing a "critical role in their nation's ultimate Cold War triumph" (225).

Note:
1. Telegram from Arthur Beach to Department of State, "Movement of American Refugees from the Congo Through Johannesburg," 1 Aug. 1960, Box 2311, 811.411/8-160, Central Decimal File (CDF) 1960-63, RG 59, NARA II.

Review of Philip Dow. *Accidental Diplomats: American Missionaries and the Cold War in Africa*. Littleton, CO: William Carey Publishing, 2024.

Lauren F. Turek

With *Accidental Diplomats: American Missionaries and the Cold War in Africa*, Philip Dow offers readers three well researched and richly textured case studies that reveal the considerable influence U.S. evangelical Christian missionaries exerted on Ethiopian, Congolese, and Kenyan politics during the twentieth century. Dow is thorough and detailed in his analysis, and the engaging and often surprising history of Christian missionary work in Africa that he shares adds considerably to our understanding of how transnational religious networks operated and how religious non-state actors served state interests during the Cold War.

The rapid expansion of Christianity on the African continent after World War II foregrounds Dow's study. In 1970, the influential scholar of Christian missions David Barrett published an article titled "AD 2000: 350 Million Christians in Africa," which argued that "Christianity in Africa [had] been expanding at a remarkable rate" over the preceding few decades, despite the concerns expressed at the famous 1910 World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh about "the rapid advance of Islam" on the continent. Barrett reported that this outcome had not come to pass and that, rather, "Africa may well have become in the main a Christian rather than a Muslim continent, and the home of one of the largest Christian communities in the world."[1] He then projected that this growth would continue to accelerate to the year 2000, with predictions that ended up corresponding fairly well with recent statistical analyses of the African Christian population.[2] These observations about accelerated growth in African Christianity sparked considerable excitement and purpose among evangelicals in the 1970s, as it seemed to affirm both the efficacy of their evangelistic outreach and the urgent need to refine and improve their techniques for the changing cultural context of postcolonial Africa.[3]

Dow's book provides crucial insight into how and why this accelerated growth occurred in the first place, focusing both on the vital role of local converts as well as on the missionaries who, he argues, "were almost always the spark that ignited this spiritual and cultural revolution" (xvii). The animating questions of the book center on the characteristics of both the geopolitical moment and of the missionaries under study, asking "if Christianity has always had a strong missionary impulse, what is special about the post-World War II world?" and "why did American evangelical missionaries, in particular, play such a critical part?" (xvii). Dow suggests that "a biblically rooted spiritual worldview" and commitment to sharing the Gospel motivated those U.S. evangelicals who served as missionaries in Africa during the Cold War (xxvii). He explores their mindset in depth and with great sensitivity throughout the book. Drawing explicitly on Melani McAlister's concept of "enchanted internationalism," or the romanticized belief amongst some U.S. evangelicals that Christians in the Global South possessed "a spiritual wealth" that Christians in the West lacked, Dow contextualizes the optimistic assumptions that many of these missionaries held about the people and leaders they encountered in Africa.[4]

Even though these missionaries were "ordinary" individuals who he contends "were not self-consciously political," he acknowledges that religiously inflected Cold War anxieties about the advance of atheistic communism influenced their perspectives about the urgency of their evangelistic task (xviii, xxvii). Although these missionaries ostensibly did not seek to shape politics in their mission fields, the U.S. ideology that infused their worldview along with the power they (informally) represented as Americans abroad meant that they often did. Dow's framing of the story thus complements the exciting body of recent work on evangelicals and global politics—and on Christian missionaries and diplomacy more broadly—while breaking considerable new ground in uncovering the nature of missionary work in Africa during the mid-twentieth century.[5]

The book is divided into three parts of two chapters each, with each part making up a case study on U.S. missionaries in a given African country: Ethiopia, the Congo/Democratic Republic of Congo, and Kenya. Dow explains that he selected these countries in particular because they each had substantially different experiences with colonialism and post-colonial independence, they each had a strong presence of U.S. evangelical missionaries, and they each played significant roles in the Global Cold War.

In Part One, Dow credits evangelical missionaries for the warm relationship that developed between the United States and Ethiopia during the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie I. In addition to providing crucial intelligence that informed President Roosevelt's foundational 1945 meeting with the Emperor, U.S. missionaries also met regularly with Selassie, discussing their shared Christian faith as well as conveying information about the remote parts of Ethiopia where they evangelized and "about which [Selassie's] government had little reliable knowledge" (19). Evangelical missionaries were also key conduits for shaping a positive U.S. public opinion about Ethiopia, as they spoke to hundreds of church groups across the United Staes about their missionary experiences during their periodic furloughs. Although Dow does not show any direct links between this evangelical engagement and specific U.S. foreign policy decisions, he suggests that warm feelings between Selassie and the United States developed in part because of Selassie's Christian faith. He argues that "Selassie anchored his Cold War politics in the presumption of a transnational religious kinship," and contends that this created a sense among Americans that Selassie was "one of us," particularly (but not just) in the context of the Cold War (31, 36). According to Dow, this affective sensibility helps to explain why the United States provided Ethiopia with a considerable amount of military aid between the early 1950s and 1975.[6]

Dow is particularly convincing in demonstrating that U.S. evangelical missionaries influenced Ethiopian domestic politics. He details how evangelical schools in remote parts of the country created a well-educated and growing indigenous evangelical movement that the predominantly Orthodox Ethiopian government came to see as threatening. He links the substantial number of evangelicals (and especially evangelical college students) that took part in the Ethiopian revolution with the principles that they had learned in missionary schools, including "the democratically-friendly values of individualism and egalitarianism" (63). When it became clear that the Soviet-supported Derg regime that toppled Selassie in the 1974 coup was violating human rights and violently persecuting evangelicals, U.S. missionaries worked to bring "international attention to the atrocities" (66). They also provided crucial relief during the 1983-85 famine, raising

global awareness about the disaster as well as the Soviet Union's inability to help effectively. As Dow concludes, "American missionaries…played a major, if ironic, role in both the early success of the communist revolution during the mid-1970s and its ultimate demise" in 1991 (69).

Dow provides similarly compelling evidence that U.S. missionaries influenced domestic politics in the Congo. He details the religious and ethnic tensions of post-Independence Congo, as well as strong anti-Western and anti-American feeling amongst the Congolese. Yet he notes that "the longstanding and intimate relationship between significant portions of the Congolese population and American missionaries [fostered] a considerable residue of pro-U.S. sentiment" (83). According to Dow, the missionaries nurtured this pro-U.S. sentiment through the primary education and medical care that they provided, as well as through the political values that he argues were inherent to Protestant church structures and beliefs. Dow suggests that, despite the racist beliefs that many U.S. missionaries held, "the Africanization and democratization of the Congolese Protestant Church initiated by American Protestant missionaries was paradigm altering" given the political and material realities the Congolese people had lived under during the brutally repressive era of Belgian rule (87).

Dow also reveals that, as in the case of Ethiopia, U.S. missionaries in the Congo informed U.S. public opinion about the Congolese people and provided intelligence to diplomats and policymakers about conflicts and developments on the ground. United States intelligence agents as well as Congolese leaders listened in on information shared over missionary radio stations, and during key moments, such as the Simba rebellion, U.S. officials may have "pilfered" missionary letters or received them from mission supervisors (121). Missionaries also lobbied Congress on behalf of Katangan secession during the Congo crisis in the early 1960s, though U.S. policymakers vehemently opposed their efforts and their lobbying came to naught. Dow's narrative is especially lively and exciting when he delves into the stories of influential missionaries such as Dr. Paul Carlson, whose violent death gripped U.S. public opinion, and Dr. William Close, who functioned as an intermediary between U.S. and Congolese leaders. These cases allow Dow to tease out the spiritual motivations of these individuals and the religious networks that they built through their evangelism, illuminating how they managed to ingratiate themselves with African leaders and opposition movements alike.

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Perhaps even more exciting and ambitious are the final two chapters of the book, which cover the history of U.S. missionary work in Kenya from 1895 through the end of the Cold War in 1991. Dow focuses on the policies of key missionary churches, such as the Gospel Missionary Society, which in the early twentieth century deferred to Kenyan elders rather than the British colonial government on matters of land grants and provided mentorship to converts to encourage local church leadership. He argues that their mentorship, egalitarian principles, and "assumption that the land was African land" aligned the missionary church with local interests and (inadvertently) prepared converts to lead "the way in the initial fight for African self-determination" (157). When the Mau Mau uprising began in 1952, U.S. missionaries and Kenyan Christians alike "played a central role," with some though not all working actively against the Mau Mau (176). Dow argues that the values of U.S. missionaries contributed to the emergence of a Kenyan nationalism that "was ultimately both moderate and pro-West"—though he notes that "the radical religious conversion" that some missionary groups demanded triggered a "militant and anti-colonial response" among some Kenyans that contributed to support for the Mau Mau (184). Regardless, the influence of the missionaries on the political situation was noteworthy.

Dow provides considerable detail about how U.S. evangelism and mission schooling infused the political views of Kenyan leaders Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel arap Moi and in turn contributed to their domestic and foreign policy decisions. For example, Dow contends that "Kenyatta, like most Kenyans whose education had been steeped in the biblical teachings of the missionaries, had come to identify his own story with that of the story of Israel," which, along with the "strongly pro-Israel sentiments within the evangelical missionary community" contributed to Kenyatta's decision to support the Israeli Entebbe raid in 1976 (198). Dow argues that Kenyatta's successor Moi similarly made policy decisions that reflected the influence of his U.S. missionary education, including his close relationship with President Jimmy Carter and his willingness to "allow the U.S. navy full access to the Mombasa port" as well as boycott the Moscow Olympics in reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 (205). These decisions, Dow implies, would be inexplicable for these leaders in light of both internal and external pressures were it not for their Christian sentiments and corresponding U.S. sympathies.

It is evident from these case studies and Dow's careful archival work that U.S. missionaries played a role in the political development of these three African nations. There are points in the book where Dow also asserts that these missionaries influenced U.S. policy, or at least, as he states in chapter 2, "poked and prodded American policymakers in directions that they may not have otherwise taken" (69). These are inferences, however, as Dow does not dig into the policymaker side in substantive detail. This is not to suggest that U.S. officials are absent from the story; Dow is clear throughout that intelligence agents received essential information from the missionaries and that the State Department and executive branch were aware of missionary activity and the potential help or harm it might provide to U.S. objectives in Cold War Africa. Yet the story of *how* U.S. officials made use of that information is not fully developed.

In addition, there are points in the book where a more critical lens on gender, race, or even the missionaries as political actors might have further enriched the analysis. Dow makes mention of race and racism at moments throughout the book, and there is at least one missionary wife who receives attention for her influential role as Haile Selassie's palace coordinator, but the book does not explore evolving racial theologies or the role of women in evangelicalism more broadly. Instead, he focuses on the "egalitarianism" and democratic values that he sees as inherent to the Protestant faith. Similarly, he routinely describes the missionaries as "apolitical" because they described or saw themselves as such, despite the fact that they brought with them and promulgated very specific (and American) political beliefs about democratic governance, religious liberty, and the Cold War. Perhaps they were not partisans and perhaps they saw themselves as fundamentally focused on otherworldly rather than worldly concerns, but they were nonetheless political actors. Dow does at points address this—indeed the book is a powerful testament to the considerable political influence they exerted—but he might have more consistently

qualified claims that they were apolitical.

To be clear, this book is an excellent work of historical scholarship that provides a nuanced picture of missionary work and politics in modern Africa, a topic that remains woefully understudied. Dow's research is rigorous and the personal interviews he conducted add tremendous depth to the stories he shares. This is a tremendously valuable text for historians of U.S. foreign relations, especially those who are interested in Cold War African politics, non-state actors in international affairs, modern U.S. evangelicalism, and Christian missionary work more generally. It is lucidly written and exciting, which makes it eminently assignable, in whole or in its individual parts, for undergraduate and graduate courses. Dow is a talented and insightful historian, and his vivid treatment of his subjects clarifies how the often-nebulous on-the-ground interactions between U.S. missionaries, local African Christians, and African leaders shaped everyday life and political change in Ethiopia, the DRC, and Kenya.

Notes:
1. David Barrett, "AD 2000: 350 Million Christians in Africa," *International Review of Mission* 59:233 (January 1970): 39.
2. Ibid, 45-49; Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, "Global Christianity: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Christian Population," 14.
3. R. Pierce Beaver, "Christian mission, a look into the future," *Concordia Theological Monthly* 42:6 (June 1, 1971): 350; Donald McGavran, "Great debate in missions," *Calvin Theological Journal* 5:2 (November 1, 1970): 176–77.
4. Melani McAlister, *The Kingdom of God Has No Borders: A Global History of American Evangelicals* (Oxford University Press, 2018), 211.
5. See, for example Michael Graziano, *Errand into the Wilderness of Mirrors: Religion and the History of the CIA* (University of Chicago Press, 2023); Laila Ballout, "Vanguard of the Religious Right: U.S. Evangelicals in Israeli-Controlled South Lebanon," *Diplomatic History* 46:3 (June 2022): 602–26; Benjamin Young, "Soldiers of Fortune, Soldiers of God: Evangelical Mercenaries and the Making of the Rhodesian-American Religious Lobby, 1965–1980," *Cold War History* 24:3 (Summer 2024): 379–400; Emily Conroy-Krutz, *Missionary Diplomacy: Religion and Nineteenth-Century American Foreign Relations* (Cornell University Press, 2024).
6. Dow spends some time discussing Selassie's visit to the United States in 1954, and also dedicates a small part of the first chapter to considering African American missionaries and church perspectives on Selassie. For a more detailed treatment of the diverse African American views of Selassie and reactions to his visit, see Brenda Gayle Plummer, *Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960* (University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

Author's Response

Philip Dow

Before I respond to the reviews of my book by James Meriwether, Lauren Turek, Christopher Jones, and Daniel Hummel, I would like to thank Andrew Johns for putting this roundtable together and express my gratitude to Silke Zoller and Brian Etheridge for guiding the process to its conclusion. Space does not allow me to adequately address all the points raised in the roundtable. Instead, I will limit myself to one or two elements that I found particularly important or interesting raised by each reviewer, beginning with Christopher Jones's thoughtful review.

Jones raises a series of substantive questions that are either not addressed in my book or are addressed in ways that lead to further inquiries regarding influence and impact. For instance, while I do describe the role evangelical missionaries played in creating interest in African nations for the American public, I do not consider whether there was any lasting influence from the missionary experience on domestic American society more broadly. Lauren Turek's and Melani McAlister's highly regarded works demonstrate a clear connection between the missionary project and evangelical international human rights activism and affective transnationalism respectively.[1] However, to my knowledge, no one has done a comprehensive study of the influence of evangelical missions on domestic American culture as a whole. There is certainly no evangelical equivalent to *Protestants Abroad*, David Hollinger's remarkable study of the mainline missionary project's influence on American culture.[2]

Jones's main concerns relate to my prominent use of two terms - "accidental" and "apolitical." To begin with, Jones suggests that the term "accidental diplomat" is not as universally applicable as I suggest it is, and that it places unnecessary emphasis on the hard to decipher motives of the missionaries. Jones argues that, contrary to my claims of apolitical motivations, there were multiple examples within the book where missionaries acted in intentionally political ways. One instance he highlights is the choice by the Africa Inland Mission to invite the former American president, T.R. Roosevelt, to speak at the dedication of their new mission station in Kenya. As Jones reasonably points out, "It is difficult to imagine something more explicitly political than the choice of noted imperialist Roosevelt as speaker."

There are, of course, numerous examples in *Accidental Diplomats* of evangelical missionary actions that had political *consequences*. That is the basic premise of the book. But Jones's concern is not whether there were political *consequences*, but if (at least sometimes) the *intention* of the missionaries' actions was primarily political. For instance, in the years surrounding the Katangan secession in the DRC (1960-63), there were a number of evangelical missionaries whose actions were, without question and to the frustration of the State Department, intentionally political. But my point is that these were exceptions that prove the rule. Indeed, despite the highly charged political environment of independence-era Africa, what is remarkable is how rarely evangelical missionaries seem to prioritize political over spiritual concerns, and how rarely they engaged in what could be described as political activism. For better or for worse, their behavior stands in stark contrast to that of their "mainline" missionary counterparts whose rhetoric and behavior was, by the 1960s and 1970s, becoming virtually indistinguishable from that of explicitly political and secular NGOs like Amnesty International or Greenpeace.

Jones's concern with the use of the terms "accidental" and "apolitical" is also philosophical. He reasonably argues that disentangling religious and political motivations is nearly impossible and unnecessarily distracts from the contributions offered by the book. Jones is right that discerning motivation is challenging but it is also something historians engage in regularly. In his work regarding plot and character, Aristotle proposed a simple framework for discerning motive that is applicable to the work of historians. He argued - and I am paraphrasing very loosely here - that in trying to determine motive, words matter, but actions matter more. If someone's words and actions align, you should trust their words as an authentic description of their motives and their character. If their words and actions do not align, ignore the words and trust the actions. What struck me as I sifted through the archives was the high degree of consistency between what the evangelical missionaries said and what they did during this period. They said they were in Africa for spiritual (apolitical) reasons, and their actions - even during the most intensely political moments - largely (if not universally) mirrored their words.

The tone of James Meriwether's review is one of polite skepticism. There are a few small quibbles he has, such as correctly noting that, by and large, I don't engage with the most recent historiography, and that the varied time

frames I use for the three case study countries could give the impression of an uneven methodology. Regarding the time frames, in each case study, I begin my story when the first evangelical missionaries begin to arrive in the region. However, the dates I chose for the titles and the table of contents do not reflect this consistent framework and probably should have.

Meriwether's most significant critique, however, relates to an "evident empathy" for missionaries and their work that he finds in my book. He points out that while this empathy is "neither inherently a good nor a bad thing," in my case, he believes it leads to a "relatively triumphalist history." It is a truism that we all approach our craft from a uniquely personal perspective shaped by (among other things) our beliefs, values, life experiences, and the political-cultural context within which we live, work, and think. And, most would acknowledge that our perspectives inevitably influence the way we interpret our sources. At the same time, academics from widely divergent perspectives often share a commitment to something akin to "truth-seeking" (regardless of our beliefs as to whether objective truth exists or is even remotely attainable). Academics also typically claim an allegiance to truth-corresponding values like intellectual curiosity, fair-mindedness, carefulness, and intellectual humility. As a result, in a healthy intellectual climate, a diversity of perspectives is indispensable to the development of a richer and (hopefully ultimately) more accurate understanding of the past.[3]

Thus, in the end, the more important question is not one of empathy, or lack thereof, but whether there is a strong evidentiary basis for the historian's narrative. Does the story fairly and faithfully correspond to the evidence at our disposal? Does it provide a viable and compelling description of the past? If it does, the question of empathy, while relevant, is of secondary significance. Towards this end, the question then is not whether *Accidental Diplomats* is "relatively triumphalist" but whether it is firmly and fairly rooted in the historical record. I would contend that it is, but that is for future studies to confirm or dispute.

As an addendum to Meriwether's point, I would be curious to know the percentage of historians whose worldview would make them naturally sympathetic with the cause of the evangelical missionaries. My hunch is that the percentage is relatively small. If this is true, then my apparent empathy towards evangelical missionaries could be seen as a helpful and needed corrective to the potential antipathy latent in the majority. It might also serve the purpose of providing an intellectual foil to the narrative of the majority. Indeed, few of us would relish a world in which every historian sang from the same hymnal.

The central theme of Daniel Hummel's review is the importance of definitions, because he notes, "definitional decisions shape how historians of U.S. foreign relations interpret religious actors." Hummel argues that "*Accidental Diplomats* is a fascinating case study to help adjudicate (the) debate" between historians whose definition of evangelicalism is rooted in its theological distinctives and those who see evangelicalism primarily as an American political category.

Hummel suggests that *Accidental Diplomats* allows us to observe American evangelical missionaries working outside of their American political context, thereby giving historians the opportunity to better differentiate between what is core to evangelicalism and what might be American-culture-dependent. What he finds are a set of values "derived from specific theological commitments" that form a core of evangelicalism but that do not consistently lead to the political commitments associated with American evangelicals. Hummel cites evidence throughout the book of a *consistent* transnational evangelical commitment to the values of individualism, egalitarianism, and volunteerism, but notes that they lead to radically *inconsistent* political outcomes, "helping to prop up theocratic monarchy and (inspiring) Marxist revolution… encouraging transnational solidarity and retrenching deep ethnic and racial loyalties… exposing millions of sub-Saharan Africans to democratic processes and norms and being used to quash proto-democratic movements in the name of stability." In Hummel's reading, the transnational context of *Accidental Diplomats* reveals a theological consistency and a political inconsistency in African evangelical converts that undermines claims that evangelicalism should be defined primarily in political terms. I am convinced by Hummel's argument and wish I had made that point as clearly in the book as he has in his review.

Historians must have the freedom and intellectual independence to observe, critique, and make sense of the subjects of their study. Even more to the point, historians have an important role to play in adjudicating between rival definitions offered by historical (or contemporary) actors. However, it also seems clear to me that there are significant dangers in consciously redefining groups in our own image—that is, from the vantage point of our own worldview.

Hummel's commentary provokes a still larger question. Whose perspective should matter most when it comes to narrative-shaping definitions like "evangelical"? In a recent interview regarding *Christianity's American Fate*, David Hollinger seemed to argue that the ultimate authority should rest with academics. "We historians," Hollinger claimed, "should be in charge of our own episteme. And if we want to define what is Christianity from a historical perspective, we should go ahead and do it." "Historians should not be intimidated by definitions offered by the pope, offered by any church…"[4]

There are few historians who I hold in higher regard than David Hollinger and, not surprisingly, I agree with his basic argument that historians must have the freedom and intellectual independence to observe, critique, and make sense of the subjects of their study. Even more to the point, historians have an important role to play in adjudicating between rival definitions offered by historical (or contemporary) actors. However, it also seems clear to me that there are significant dangers in consciously redefining groups in our own image - that is, from the vantage point of our own worldview. When historians override the definition that groups construct for themselves (even when those definitions are contested within that group), we are more likely to construct narratives that do not provide a viable explanation of historical reality.

Because the rhetoric and the actions of evangelical missionaries during this period are largely consistent (and rooted in theological distinctives), that was my starting point, and it is a premise that, I contend, is most likely to provide the most viable and compelling historical narrative. Other historians may approach the same sources based on a different definitional framework, and this will shape the narrative that results from their research. In the end, the question is which narrative provides the most viable description of reality.

Having enjoyed Lauren Turek's *To Bring the Good News to All Nations* immensely, I was particularly interested to read her perspective on *Accidental Diplomats*. Turek is an observant, rigorous, and fair thinker and so it was encouraging to see that, by and large, she finds significant value in my project and sees the book as an attractive option

for undergraduate or graduate courses. The two principal criticisms Turek makes are the relative lack of emphasis on race and gender in the book. In both cases, I can, to paraphrase former President Clinton, offer an explanation, if not a justification.

Race is, appropriately, a central theme in almost every book related to Africa's interaction with European colonialism and the vestiges of colonialism (including the colonial and post-colonial Anglo-American missionary project). It is also a potentially all-consuming topic that already has a rich and ever-growing presence in the historiography of the 20th century. Therefore, while recognizing that race needed to be an important theme in my work, I was also wary of allowing it to overwhelm the novel contribution I was hoping to make to the literature of Cold War foreign relations. My solution was to weave race-related themes into the larger story unfolding in each case study. Among other places, that is seen in my description of Black America's fascination with Haile Selassie's Ethiopia, and in the complicated engagement of southern, white evangelical, missionaries in the racial cauldron that was independence-era Congo. There is certainly more that I could have said, and some will argue, should have been said; but every project needs boundaries to be coherent, and I drew mine where I did.

I resonate even more with Turek's disappointment that gender did not play a bigger role in *Accidental Diplomats*. There are examples where women are prominently featured in my book. Most notable is the story of Della Hanson, the missionary housewife, who ended up becoming Emperor Selassie's Palace Chief of Staff and a confidant to the emperor and his family. Because it weaves together religion, gender, politics, and race, in my view, this is one of the most revealing stories in the book. That said, stories in the book that prominently feature women are few and far between. A point that I failed to make in the book is that this apparent absence is the result of their absence in leadership and, therefore, the sources. By and large, American evangelical missionaries held to traditional gendered roles. There were many evangelical women who served as missionary nurses, but very few doctors. There were untold numbers of women who taught in missionary schools or were the leaders of missionary church Sunday schools, but vanishingly few served as pastors and church leaders. And yet, my suspicion is that if we were to tabulate the number of evangelical missionaries active in Africa during the Cold War, women would outnumber men - probably by a significant margin. I would not be surprised in the least if American missionary women were decisive in many stories of African communities converting *en masse*, because they often were the ones developing close relationships with the African women who formed the invisible backbone of many indigenous groups.

In sum, the topic I chose - the influence of American evangelical missionaries on American relations with Africa during the Cold War - is a topic where women were often invisible. This reflected the strongly traditional gender roles held by most African communities at the time, but it is also, broadly speaking, a reflection of American cultural values at least up through the 1960s. Of course, that relative invisibility (which my story does reflect) simply means that there is an important story that still needs to be told. Like the one-time hidden sources telling of the gold-rush brides and the homestead wives of 19th-century America, the stories of American evangelical missionary women need to be told.

Let me conclude by, once again, thanking James Meriwether, Lauren Turek, Christopher Jones, and Daniel Hummel for their thoughtful reviews, and Andrew Johns, Silke Zoller and Brian Etheridge for putting this roundtable together.

Notes:

1. Lauren F. Turek, *To Bring the Good News to All Nations* (Cornell University Press, 2020); Melani McAlister, *The Kingdom of God Has No Borders* (Oxford University Press, 2018).
2. There are a small number of places where the influence on the "home front" is considered including Charles Van Engen's chapter, "A Broadening Vision," in Joel Carpenter's 1990, *Earthen Vessels*, but no sustained monograph-style study exists to my knowledge.
3. For a summary of the debate around truth-seeking in the field of history, see Jay Martin, "Historical Truth and the Truthfulness of Historians," in Christian B. Miller and Ryan West, ed., *Integrity, Honesty, and Truth Seeking* (Oxford University Press, 2020).
4. Washington History Seminar, October 18, 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=osHG8fG97ZI&t=2304s.

A Roundtable on Sergey Radchenko's *To Run the World: The Kremlin's Cold War Bid for Global Power*

Seth Bernstein, Michael De Groot, Alexandra Sukalo, James Graham Wilson, and Sergey Radchenko

Introduction to Roundtable on Sergey Radchenko, *To Run the World: The Kremlin's Cold War Bid for Global Power*

Seth Bernstein

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was an inflection point for historians. It has generated a new impulse to reflect on the legacy of the Cold War and the motivations of leaders in Eastern Europe. Sergey Radchenko's *To Run the World*, a history of Moscow's foreign policy from 1945 to 1991, is a landmark new book grappling with these issues.

Of course, Radchenko was writing this book well before 2022, so its publication in 2024 was opportune on multiple counts. The provocative title invites a comparison with the current aspirations of Vladimir Putin, but the timeliness of the study is based in its sources. Historians writing on the Soviet Union know that there are now major obstacles to working in Russian repositories. Until the COVID-19 pandemic, the trend at diplomatic and political archives in Moscow had largely been to broaden access. Radchenko's book benefited from the declassification of a vast number of documents in multiple archives and from the author's diligent work in those repositories. Today, many researchers cannot or will not go to Russia for archival research, and those who do will face increasing obstacles. *To Run the World* is a product of what in retrospect seems like remarkable access to archives. The documentary record presented in the book is nothing short of "juicy," in the words of reviewer Michael De Groot.

To Run the World is also exemplary of historians' increasing focus on the Soviet relationship with countries beyond the United States in the Cold War. Radchenko, the author of two books on the Soviet Union's diplomacy in Asia, is well suited to contribute to this shift in the field. The inclusion of China as a player in the Cold War story is the most notable development both in the field and in Radchenko's book, but *To Run the World* goes to locations throughout the world and includes regional actors as players in its account of Soviet diplomacy. As in the case of the Russian archives, Radchenko was able to leverage the temporary openness of Chinese repositories to support this work. As reviewer Alexandra Sukalo notes, Radchenko's archival findings give important correctives to well-worn stories. The revision of the infamous swimming pool meeting between Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong is just one example.

If Radchenko's work was simply an up-to-date textbook on Cold War history, that would be enough to merit a review forum. Yet the core of the book, to quote Sukalo, is "a new interpretation of Soviet foreign policy, which argues that Moscow's global ambitions and desire for recognition as a great power is at the root of all of its foreign policy decisions." Above all, recognition meant the acknowledgement by the United States of the USSR as an equal. That all the reviewers distinguished this argument as the central thrust of the book shows how doggedly Radchenko sustains this thesis over 600 pages of text.

Was the argument convincing to the reviewers? De Groot and James Graham Wilson observe that the framework is more appropriate in certain parts of the narrative than in others. Leonid Brezhnev's aspiration for world leadership is the best example of the Soviet search for prestige. Tellingly, the book's title comes from Brezhnev's suggestion to Henry Kissinger that their respective countries should rule together. Sukalo writes that the book "hits its stride" in the section covering the period of Khrushchev's leadership. The reviewers disagree, however, on the application of the main argument to Mikhail Gorbachev's foreign policy. Wilson agrees with Radchenko that "status mattered a great deal" to Gorbachev, while De Groot finds that Gorbachev's diplomatic stance was based in a real commitment to "a revised Soviet ideology that was not posturing or window-dressing."

Developing an overarching interpretation in a long, complex history is an ambitious enterprise but, as the reviewers find, the rich source material also provides evidence for competing arguments. The question is not whether prestige was a factor, but whether it should hold "primacy of place," as De Groot writes. A large portion of the reviews consider explanatory alternatives.

Strategic considerations are an obvious contender. De Groot quotes Radchenko's assessment of Stalin: "security mattered more" than legitimacy in dealings with the United States. De Groot also includes Khrushchev's actions in the Cuban Missile Crisis as part of this discussion, whereas Radchenko "downplays the strategic importance for Khrushchev of the Soviet missiles deployed to Cuba." Radchenko, in response, explains that the difficulty of making an argument about strategic considerations lies in knowing "just how to define security." Yet regardless of how Stalin or Khrushchev conceived of security and how closely strategic considerations may have been entwined with legitimacy, it seems clear that the aims of defense or expansion stem from motives beyond world recognition.

Similarly, ideology is a likely explanation for Soviet actions but it is also difficult to separate from prestige and recognition. Wilson asserts that there may be a tension between Radchenko's titular argument that Soviet leaders hoped to run the world alongside the United States and the attention the book pays to Soviet desires for preeminence among communist countries. It is possible to resolve this problem by saying that recognition as the leader of the socialist world would mean de facto division of the world into socialist and capitalist spheres. In any case, real

ideological commitments were important factors in how leaders in socialist states accrued legitimacy.

De Groot and Sukalo hint at a bigger problem of the place of ideology in the work. Soviet leaders sought legitimacy, but to what end? The argument in *To Run the World* is that ideology mattered little, that it is prestige all the way down, whereas the reviewers suggest that Soviet leaders had principles that extended beyond the aggrandizement of their own authority in the world.

Finally, the reviewers point out aspects of Cold War history that do not appear in the book. De Groot points out that *To Run the World* focuses on "human agency, diplomatic history, and flashpoints" at the expense of "structure," including systems of exchange in the areas of trade, science, and technology. Sukalo asserts that Radchenko "romanticizes" Gorbachev's refusal to retain Soviet control over East Central Europe by force while ignoring state violence within the USSR, particularly in the Baltic republics. These observations are valid but, to my mind, do not approach the book on its own terms as a work that tries to explain the foreign policy decisions at the highest level of Soviet politics. As Radchenko writes in his response, "no book can cover every important subject." Of course, I have condensed the reviewers' arguments here considerably, so readers will want to study the evidence behind these critiques to make up their own minds.

This is a book worth discussing for all the stimulating questions it raises. The reviewers agree that *To Run the World* is a consequential work, rich in empirical detail and with a provocative new argument that scholars cannot ignore.

Sergey Radchenko,
To Run the World: The Kremlin's Cold War Bid for Global Power

Michael De Groot

It has become axiomatic that Russia's second invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked an inflection point in the post-Cold War period. In *To Run the World*, however, Sergey Radchenko encourages readers to think about the continuities instead. Reminiscent of Stephen Kotkin's argument about Russia's "perpetual geopolitics," Radchenko identifies the Kremlin's chronic ambition to "run the world" and craving for external recognition of the right to do so as the thread that links the Soviet era to other periods in Russian history.[1]

In twenty erudite chapters spanning the end of the Second World War to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Radchenko contends that the drive for recognition and legitimacy from allies and adversaries alike motivated Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War. He focuses on "Moscow's narratives of legitimacy, and on how these narratives were negotiated through constant interaction between Soviet ambitions and those who recognized and so legitimized them, or those who refused to recognize them and, through their refusal also (unexpectedly) legitimized them" (3). This theme has long existed in the Cold War historiography, but few scholars go as far as Radchenko in placing it at the top of the causal hierarchy.

The Soviet quest for global recognition created a contradiction that Moscow could never reconcile, Radchenko contends. On the one hand, Soviet leaders wanted the United States to acknowledge the USSR as a peer competitor or even, particularly during the era of détente, a partner. On the other hand, they sought recognition from China and revolutionary nationalists in the developing world as the leader of global communism, which undermined their efforts with the United States. Radchenko explains the paradox: "American recognition of the USSR as its major adversary supported the notion that the Soviet Union was the leader of the revolutionary forces, while a Soviet-American partnership exposed the Soviets to criticism…that they were not in fact as revolutionary as they claimed" (7).

Radchenko buttresses his argument with an impressive collection of recently declassified Russian archival documents. Indeed, the source base is one of the real strengths of the book, and Radchenko quotes the documents at length. Even as relations with the West deteriorated in the aftermath of Russia's first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, Russian archives quietly entered a period of relative openness and accessibility that offered new possibilities for researchers. Authorities released thousands of new documents, and the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), the major depository for Cold War-era documents from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's Central Committee, documents reopened in late 2018 after moving to a new building overlooking the Kremlin. Conditions improved across the board. Researchers were permitted to take pictures of documents on microfilm and microfiche, which allowed scholars to work through the new material more quickly than they had been able to previously. This window of opportunity shut for many scholars based in North America and Europe because of the twin shocks of COVID and the second Russian invasion of Ukraine and will not likely open again anytime soon, but *To Run the World* is one of the fruits of this brief era.

Drawing on this meticulous research, Radchenko offers readers a peek behind the curtain in the halls of Soviet power. There are also moments of unexpected levity and amusement. A personal favorite was Khrushchev's preparation for his meetings with Dwight Eisenhower at Camp David in September 1959. The first secretary practiced his arguments as if "talking to a mirror," Radchenko writes, going back and forth about topics ranging from Germany to Iran with the imaginary Eisenhower. He expected that Ike would put up a fight but would inevitably "yield to the logic of what Khrushchev was saying" (238). The book also draws on an array of Chinese archival documents and shines especially bright in the treatment of Sino-Soviet relations, which will not surprise readers acquainted with Radchenko's earlier trailblazing work on the subject.

Consequential books stimulate debate and motivate new research, and Radchenko's provocative argument should clear the bar with room to spare. The book makes a persuasive case that recognition and legitimacy mattered greatly to Soviet leaders, but some readers may not accept that they deserve primacy of place. Indeed, certain sections of the book fit Radchenko's paradigm better than others.

Radchenko's discussion of the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, illuminates the paradox at the heart of Soviet Cold War foreign policy. He downplays the strategic importance for Khrushchev of the Soviet missiles deployed to Cuba, arguing that it ranked lower than "the symbolic satisfaction of acquiring a missile base under America's nose." Instead, defending Cuba became important to the first secretary because "it bolstered his self-perception as an equal of the United States" and gave him an opportunity to show the world that the Soviet Union, not Mao's China, played "first fiddle" for global communism (326). Scholars may contest Radchenko's decision to relegate the strategic angle to a secondary concern, but his explanation aligns with the book's framework.

Recognition assumes secondary importance and the argument about its primacy appears forced at other points in the narrative. Radchenko contends, "Soviet leaders were often willing to trade some basic needs for other basic needs and would compromise security for the attainment of recognition and through recognition, legitimation" (9). His treatment of Joseph Stalin during the early Cold War, however, points in a different direction. Radchenko contends that Stalin, whom he casts in "Russia's *realpolitik*

tradition" (38), sought U.S. endorsement of Soviet postwar claims, for example, but consolidated his sphere of influence once he realized that the Harry Truman administration had no interest in doing so. The author explains: "In this world, security mattered more: control without legitimacy was far better for a paranoid and insecure leader like him than legitimacy without control" (110). This conclusion rings true but inverts the claim above and exposes a different ranking of priorities: Stalin forewent recognition from the United States to pursue security, not the other way around.

Although crafted thoughtfully, the two chapters on Mikhail Gorbachev fit the book's model awkwardly. Radchenko repeats the claim about the overriding importance of recognition, but his evidence paints a different picture. For example, he describes Soviet permissiveness during the Eastern European revolutions of 1989 not in terms of recognition but of Gorbachev's aversion to violence, acknowledgement of imperial overstretch, and "self-perception as a prophet of reformed socialism who would bridge the divides of the Cold War by sheer magic of a powerful vision" (560). This last clause in particular helps elucidate much of Gorbachev's behavior, and Radchenko's subsequent claim that Gorbachev "did nothing as his clients were toppled in Eastern Europe" (566) during the 1989 revolutions is a bit misleading. Even as the dramatic events unfolded in Eastern Europe, Gorbachev retained his optimism about the superiority of his values and worked hard to convince the world that the collapse of the dictatorships was his idea. The revolutions demonstrated the inevitability of his vision of a common European home and new world order, he claimed. He was wrong, but his constant promotion of a revised Soviet ideology was not posturing or window-dressing; Gorbachev firmly held these beliefs, repeated them publicly and privately, and applied them as he crafted policy.

The picture that emerges from the narrative and the evidence is that a complex interplay of factors animated Soviet foreign policy, and their relative importance varied over time.

The picture that emerges from the narrative and the evidence is that a complex interplay of factors animated Soviet foreign policy, and their relative importance varied over time. Mapping the various vectors in the introduction might have helped clarify the relationships and circumstances that would determine policy choices. This would have been particularly helpful for clarifying the roles of Marxist-Leninist ideology and ideas, the importance of which is initially downplayed in the introduction but play key roles at various points in the narrative, including the chapters on Gorbachev. There is also the question of whether the quest for recognition was a motivating force in and of itself, or whether it is better understood as a means of achieving more fundamental needs such as security and regime stability. Radchenko floats the possibility of a hierarchy of priorities and wonders in the introduction whether "security needs…serve as a prerequisite for higher needs" like recognition, but he does not come to a clear decision (8-9).

Writing a book inevitably requires making difficult choices about what to include and exclude. Radchenko elected to "cover some of the well-known ground—all the major 'crimes, follies, and misfortunes of mankind' one would expect in a history of the Cold War" (11). *To Run the World* provides a kaleidoscopic Soviet diplomatic history of the Cold War that follows a predictable arc, though the inclusion of China as a central actor in shaping Soviet strategy goes beyond the traditional U.S.-Soviet model and distinguishes it from many other books on Soviet foreign policy. Indeed, China specialists will benefit greatly from Radchenko's learned treatment of Beijing's role.

The focus on human agency, diplomatic history, and flashpoints, however, comes at a cost. Other aspects of Soviet engagement with the world receive little attention. Domestic politics and economic issues make brief appearances, but their trajectories generally unfold offstage. Same for technology and the information revolution that increased the contrast between the West and the Soviet bloc.

These issues were not secondary dimensions of the Cold War and, what's more, they had a direct bearing on the core issue of the book: external recognition and legitimacy. Economic growth surged in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe during the postwar period, rivaling rates in the industrial democracies. Khrushchev gloated about his system at the so-called Kitchen Debate in June 1959, teasing Vice President Richard Nixon that the USSR would "wave 'hi'" as it passed the United States on the road to modernity.[2] The Soviets also basked in the prestige of their raw material abundance. At the Moscow Summit in May 1972, Brezhnev boasted to President Nixon that the Soviet Union had the resources that would "make it possible to solve major problems for the U.S. in terms of large supplies of gas and oil, timber and other products."[3] Soviet economic successes (mostly measured in quantitative, not qualitative, terms) in the early Cold War outwardly legitimized the system, among other factors.

Yet economic problems mounted in the 1970s and 1980s. Economic growth slowed, and shortages increased. As the United States became the epicenter of the information revolution and accelerated globalization, the Soviet system became more anachronistic. The gap was obvious to all and impacted how international audiences viewed the Soviet Union. How did Soviet officials handle their quest for recognition and legitimacy as it became obvious to external observers that while the USSR was a military peer of the United States, it trailed far behind in most other areas?

Historians explicitly or implicitly adopt a theory of why history happens that considers factors such as human agency, contingency, and structure. While Radchenko's narrative is very strong on the first two, the relative neglect of the third makes it more difficult to understand change over time in the book and understand the international system in which Moscow operated. In most chapters, Soviet officials become preoccupied with a crisis, engage in a flurry of diplomatic activity, and then move on to another problem. This approach makes each chapter easily digestible (and attractive for assignment in advanced undergraduate courses) but makes it challenging for the reader to understand what drove the Cold War along its trajectory, why it evolved, and why it endured as long as it did.

Future scholars will wrestle with Radchenko's arguments for years to come. There is no doubt that his tour de force has set a new standard in the literature on Soviet foreign policy. The tome is "very long" (11), the author cautions in the introduction, but the book's contemporary relevance, engaging prose, bold argument, and juicy archival findings will encourage readers to keep returning for more. *To Run the World* is essential reading not only for scholars of Soviet foreign policy but of twentieth-century international history more broadly.

Notes:
1. Stephen Kotkin, "Russia's Perpetual Geopolitics: Putin Returns to the Historical Pattern," *Foreign Affairs* 95:3 (May/June 2016): 2-9.
2. "The Kitchen Debate-Transcript," July 24, 1959, CIA Electronic Reading Room.
3. "Memorandum of Conversation," May 23, 1972, *FRUS*, 1969-1976, vol. XIV, doc. 259, 998. After boasting about Soviet advantages in raw materials, Kosygin interjected: "not to mention vodka." Brezhnev agreed, "America is indeed backward in vodka."

Sergey Radchenko, *To Run the World: The Kremlin's Cold War Bid for Global Power*

Alexandra Sukalo

Sergey Radchenko's *To Run the World: The Kremlin's Cold War Bid for Global Power* offers a new interpretation of Soviet foreign policy, which argues that Moscow's global ambitions and desire for recognition as a great power is at the root of all of its foreign policy decisions. Radchenko meticulously crafts this argument and tests it repeatedly over the span of his 600-odd-page monograph. Radchenko's exacting approach proves highly effective, and by the end of his monograph it feels evident that the Kremlin's drive to be seen as a legitimate global power guided its policies. Considering the way that the Soviet Union came into existence, through what historian Peter Holquist has termed a "continuum of crisis," the Bolshevik's innate insecurity led them to pursue, above all else, both power and the recognition that power provides.[1] Specialists will value Radchenko's contribution to the historiography of the Cold War with his emphasis on the psychological characteristics of the Soviet leadership while generalists will be captivated by Radchenko's skill in storytelling.

Covering the period of 1944 to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Radchenko divides his work into four parts: Ambition, Hubris, Decline, and Collapse. This division of the work also maps onto the distinct periods of leadership of the Soviet Union's more prominent General Secretaries: Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev, and Mikhail Gorbachev. Radchenko begins with Stalin's foreign policy, bolstering the view of scholars like Norman Naimark, who demonstrate that while Stalin wanted influence and control, he did not have a "blueprint" to Sovietize Eastern Europe. Stalin's policies thus must be considered on a case-by-case basis.[2] Radchenko does just this. He examines shifts in policies towards Iran, Turkey, Greece, Czechoslovakia, and Germany, to name a few, to illustrate that Stalin was both pragmatic and opportunistic in his approach to these countries.

In his analysis of Soviet foreign policy, Radchenko shows that Stalin's focus on territorial gains was initially as much about great power recognition and the legitimacy it would confer as it was about security. However, with the growing antagonism between the Soviet Union and the United States that culminated in the Marshall Plan, Stalin abandoned his belief that the two nations could peacefully coexist and instead began to view all opportunities for expansion as a zero-sum game. By 1947, this view was further solidified when Stalin came to recognize that indigenous communists were unlikely to take power in most countries without Soviet assistance. Though he still yearned for these communists to be elected with a veneer of legitimacy, Stalin was not opposed to intervening and manipulating the domestic politics in places deemed essential for Soviet security.

In his analysis of Soviet foreign policy, Radchenko shows that Stalin's focus on territorial gains was initially as much about great power recognition and the legitimacy it would confer as it was about security. However, with the growing antagonism between the Soviet Union and the United States that culminated in the Marshall Plan, Stalin abandoned his belief that the two nations could peacefully coexist and instead began to view all opportunities for expansion as a zero-sum game.

In the book's second part, Radchenko hits his stride, demonstrating a remarkable ability to integrate primary sources from various perspectives into a cohesive dialogue. This is painstaking work, and the reader benefits from Radchenko's dedication to the craft of narrative. He skillfully and seamlessly weaves these documents into a compelling story, which captivates the reader by revealing how positions and policies were debated and reified internally among allies on both sides of the Iron Curtain. For instance, in the book's chapter on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Radchenko draws on drafts of Khrushchev's reaction and final response to Kennedy's letter, warning the Soviets of the repercussions for basing the missiles in Cuba. In citing these drafts, we are given a glimpse into the evolution of Khrushchev's emotions as he moves from anger to embarrassment and ultimately to panic, grappling with how close he himself came to instigating nuclear war. Radchenko affords Khrushchev's expression plenty of space on the page, offering a fascinating look into the psychology of the Soviet leader. Khrushchev's struggle as he endeavors to maintain the Soviet Union's prestige while also navigating his worsening relationship with China provides additional context for many of his actions, which at first glance appear irrational.

His effective incorporation of primary sources continues as Radchenko takes advantage of the recent declassification of Cold War-era documents by the Russian archives. He uses these documents to introduce a more nuanced view of the assumptions and motivations undergirding the Kremlin's decisions. These records contain the personal papers of key decision-makers in the Kremlin, including speeches, conversations, and drafts of letters and memoranda. By tracing the patterns that emerge from these sources, Radchenko sheds light on the proclivities, worldviews, and ambitions of the men in charge of crafting Soviet foreign policy. Radchenko's careful reading of these documents, for example, helps to explain what informed Brezhnev's ideas about Asia, and China more particularly. Brezhnev's frequent references to Soviet writer Aleksandr Maksimov and his perspectives on Asia only become evident over the course of several meetings with leaders such as Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. In excerpts taken from these meeting transcripts, Brezhnev parrots Maksimov and his pronouncements on China, which, as Radchenko notes, were "shockingly racist." This insight into Brezhnev's perception of Asia matters, Radchenko asserts, because it underscores how Brezhnev's understanding of the Soviet Union as part of Europe and culturally aligned with the United States made détente possible.

Radchenko's detailed analysis of Brezhnev and his worldview reinforces the book's emphasis on the personal psychological characteristics of Soviet leadership. The result is a political history of the Cold War that reveals the influence of Soviet rulers' mentality on how they crafted their foreign policy. Radchenko is right in also noting that such a focus does not necessarily preclude the importance of ordinary people, as the Soviet leaders were themselves a product of their social environment. Radchenko is perhaps less successful in including these voices, but his work does not suffer as a result. He clearly delineates the parameters of his study, and as he correctly observes, during the Cold War, the destinies of entire nations were often shaped by a single individual. Radchenko's consultation with so many new archival sources created by these individuals provides valuable insight into how their decisions were made.

Though the Soviet Union is at the center of this book, Radchenko also draws on an array of documents from North American and Chinese archives. His work stands apart in his examination of the Sino-Soviet relationship and benefits from access to some Chinese documents that

unfortunately remain unavailable to other researchers. For instance, Radchenko cites three Memoranda of Conversations between Mao and Khrushchev in which the two leaders infamously discussed the Middle East while treading water in Mao's swimming pool. From these conversations, it becomes clear that, despite later interpretations, Khrushchev did not feel unsettled as he awkwardly paddled while Mao showed off his swimming prowess. Further, the dialogue reveals that Khrushchev then believed that the Soviets had won in the Middle East. Radchenko's ability to describe the ebb and flow of the Sino-Soviet relationship is unsurprising for a scholar known for his work on the subject. He skillfully exposes the interpersonal dynamics between Mao and counterparts in the Kremlin that explain some of the deeper currents swirling beneath the surface of these interactions.

In *To Run the World*, Radchenko considers the mindset of Soviet leaders but does not overreach with speculation. Rather, he employs a staggering amount of primary evidence to illuminate motivations, insecurities, and—however fleeting—moments of satisfaction on the part of Soviet leaders.

In his fourth section, Radchenko details Gorbachev's attempts to save the Soviet Union through reforms and by prioritizing peaceful coexistence with the United States. Radchenko avoids the trap of seeing Gorbachev's "New Thinking" as an abandonment of Soviet principles, and notes that at his core, Gorbachev was not dramatically different than his predecessors. Gorbachev still craved the acknowledgment that the USSR was a great power. He never abandoned the Party's ideology. Instead, he tried to adapt it, much like Lenin had done with the New Economic Policy, to give the Soviet Union the breathing space required to make the structural and social reforms necessary to survive.

Radchenko perhaps romanticizes Gorbachev's new world order a little too much, citing it as the reason Gorbachev refused to forcibly keep Eastern Europe in the Soviet's sphere of influence. Countries like Poland and East Germany may have been able to walk away from the Soviet Union without bloodshed, but Gorbachev had no such qualms about using violence internally. Radchenko quotes Gorbachev saying that he wanted to restructure the Soviet Union without civil war. But Gorbachev was willing to take more drastic steps to ensure that nationalism did not destroy the USSR.

In January 1991, Soviet troops and a KGB special operations squad drove tanks into a crowd of pro-independence protestors in Vilnius, Lithuania. They killed fourteen people that night and injured another 700. A week later, they took similar action in Riga, Latvia against protestors but with fewer causalities. Archival documents show that while Gorbachev may not have sanctioned the violence, he likely knew about it and supported restoring control to prevent the Baltics from breaking away.[3] Radchenko cites Gorbachev in a confidential meeting in early January, where Gorbachev justifies the situation by saying, "Victims are inevitable. Some people are being killed here and there, can't get away from it" (571). This is nonsense, of course. Gorbachev could have stopped the brutal repression in the Baltics, but he chose not to. Radchenko argues that using force in Eastern Europe would have been the death knell of Gorbachev's international legitimacy. However, Gorbachev was less concerned with the optics of supporting violence internally if it kept the Soviet Union together. There were limits to Gorbachev's willingness to be a good example to the world.

Given the value of Radchenko's analysis it is easy to wish that he had extended his study past the Soviet collapse. For instance, Russia's foreign policy under Putin increasingly lends support to the argument that a re-periodization of the Cold War may be warranted. However, Radchenko restrains himself to looking only to the past. His claim that a yearning for recognition was at the heart Soviet foreign policy is incisive and well supported; it is difficult not to draw parallels between the stories he tells and the events of today. In a move that only serves to whet his reader's appetite, Radchenko examines Putin's relationship to the United States and the West in five pages of the book's conclusion. Though Radchenko says nothing particularly revelatory about Putin's conviction that the West blatantly ignores Russian exceptionalism, applying his book's argument to the present day promises to provide insight on Putin and his motives. Moreover, Radchenko's claim that the Sino-Soviet alliance was doomed to fail because neither Moscow nor Beijing could agree on their respective positions in the relationship hierarchy is compelling. Russia has become increasingly dependent on China to maintain its global standing. How long can Putin and Xi Jinping's partnership of convenience last if Putin refuses to acknowledge that he is now playing second fiddle? Radchenko raises questions like this in his important work and establishes new lines of inquiry that will hopefully be taken up by other scholars.

Notes:
1. Peter Holquist, *Making War, Forging Revolution: Russia's Continuum of Crisis, 1914-1921* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).
2. Norman Naimark, *Stalin and the Fate of Europe: The Postwar Struggle for Sovereignty* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2019).
3. Ainius Lasas, "Bloody Sunday: What Did Gorbachev Know About the January 1991 Events in Vilnius and Riga," *Journal of Baltic Studies* 38:2. (June 2007): 188.

Review of Sergey Radchenko, *To Run the World: The Kremlin's Cold War Bid for Global Power*

James Graham Wilson

**The views expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of State or the U.S. government*

Sergey Radchenko's *To Run the World* is a magnificent book that encompasses Soviet foreign policy throughout the entirety of the Cold War. Here the author identifies legitimacy and prestige as the primary objectives of Soviet leaders—their lip service to revolutionary communism notwithstanding. Merely acting as a great power did not suffice. By Radchenko's account, Soviet leaders aspired for U.S., British, French, German, and other allied leaders to recognize their superpower status to compensate for their own perceived lack of legitimacy. Recognition on the part of U.S. leaders mattered above all. "Look, I want to talk to you privately—nobody else, no notes," Radchenko quotes Leonid Brezhnev telling Henry Kissinger in May 1973. "Look, you will be our partners, you and we are going to run the world" (384).

When I read this Brezhnev quote, I thought of the psychiatrist's observation of Basil Fawlty, in the episode of (the 1970s British television series) Fawlty Towers entitled "The Psychiatrist": "there's enough material here for an entire conference." In *To Run the World*, Radchenko considers the mindset of Soviet leaders but does not overreach with speculation. Rather, he employs a staggering amount of primary evidence to illuminate motivations, insecurities, and—however fleeting—moments of satisfaction on the part of Soviet leaders. Committed

communists did not acknowledge how dependent they were on the capitalist world. But they were reliant on the West, as Radchenko convincingly shows. As with Nikita Khrushchev, dependence seldom meant cooperation. As with Brezhnev—especially in his evocative phrasing to Kissinger—it meant cooperation up until the events of the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, from which Radchenko contends Brezhnev felt a sense of U.S. betrayal (and from which he never physically or mentally recovered).

Then there was Mikhail Gorbachev, to whom concepts of legitimacy, prestige, and status mattered a great deal—especially when it came to his interactions with Western leaders. I agree with Radchenko that Gorbachev's *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, as the late Soviet leader titled his 1987 book, was a bid for "global leadership," as opposed to an attempt to retrench Soviet power and influence to focus purely on domestic reforms. I also agree with the connection that Radchenko draws between the time Gorbachev spent traveling in Western Europe in the 1970s and his aspirations in the 1980s for Margaret Thatcher, Francois Mitterrand, Helmut Kohl, and Ronald Reagan, among others, to treat him at least as an equal. "Imagine that an alien spaceship approached Earth and sent the message: 'Take me to your leader.' Who would that be?" wrote the editorial page of the New York Times on May 21, 1989. "Without doubt, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev." I suspect Gorbachev concurred.

In earlier chapters of Radchenko's book, however, his intended parameters for global leadership are not always clear to me. Sometimes he writes less about the entire world and more about Soviet leadership within the communist world, which also included Mao Zedong and Fidel Castro. Given that Radchenko is foremost an expert on the decline and fall of the Sino-Soviet alliance, it is perhaps unsurprising how much China appears in this book. Still, extended passages from chapters on the late 1940s and 1950s read as if they were intended as a prequel to his 2009 book, Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962–1967.

Here and in subsequent chapters, three questions came to my mind. The first is that I wonder if Radchenko could elaborate a bit more on the relationship between nuclear weapons and Soviet leaders' appetite for risk taking. According to Radchenko, Khrushchev took a risk on Suez in 1956 feeling newly emboldened in possession of a hydrogen bomb. How did the quest for recognition shape nuclear policies after the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis? Was it catch up or surpass? As Radchenko and other readers here probably know, this topic generated considerable debate within U.S. foreign policy circles. Members of the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), for instance, insisted that Soviet leaders exploited the language and optics of détente to pull ahead in the strategic arms competition. With the SS-9 (and later SS-18) intercontinental ballistic missile, they argued, the Soviets possessed the ability to launch a first strike against U.S. Minuteman silos. As Paul Nitze and others contended, nuclear superiority would allow Soviet leaders to take greater geopolitical risks. The Kremlin denied this intention publicly—so too would it have denied Radchenko's main argument, however. In short, what was the purpose of the Soviet nuclear buildup after the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis?

Second, I read Radchenko's coverage of the period from October 1973 until March 1985 with fresh wonder that for nearly a quarter of its existence the Soviet Union lacked a leader who was physically and mentally competent. While Radchenko does a fine job accounting for the decision to invade Afghanistan in December 1979, it remains unclear to me who decided to retain the Soviet biological weapons program and greenlight construction of the Krasnoyarsk Radar—both in flagrant violation of Soviet commitments to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. These (unwise) decisions resonated throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. Moreover, during the period 1981–1982, when Ronald Reagan and Brezhnev were corresponding with each other, I have always wondered who was writing on Brezhnev's behalf. One surmises that long-time Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and then KGB Head Yuri Andropov were greatly involved. If that is true—and Radchenko can say if it was not—there is another matter for him to consider, which is whether his argument to explain the actions of Soviet leadership at the very highest level also explains those within the Soviet diplomatic and national security community. At the very least, the question remains, who was running the show during the mid-1970s and early 1980s?

A third matter is how Radchenko conceives of Soviet leaders' view of alliances. Did they ever truly accept the concept of an allied country with a shared sense of destiny? Whether it is Khrushchev and Mao or Khrushchev and the Albanian foreign minister, many of the interactions that Radchenko describes in the book come across as absurd. Every Soviet alliance besides that with Cuba fell apart. One could even argue that the story of the Soviet Union in the Cold War is that of collapses of nominal alliances—first with China, then Egypt, the countries of Warsaw Pact, and finally the constituent republics of the USSR. Along these lines, one could argue that the story of the United States in the Cold War is that of sustained alliances culminating in the reunification of Germany within NATO during the period 1989–1990.

Dealing with allies is always complicated. Using the framework of Radchenko's argument, I would say that tending to alliances gave U.S. presidents a sense of legitimacy and prestige especially when they were unpopular at home.

Dealing with allies is always complicated. Using the framework of Radchenko's argument, I would say that tending to alliances gave U.S. presidents a sense of legitimacy and prestige especially when they were unpopular at home. And it helped that they shared a sense of common purpose, the public articulation of which was frequently to defend the world from Soviet aspirations to lead it. To its NATO allies, the United States extended nuclear deterrence, an extraordinary pledge to defend other countries at the risk of inviting devastating retaliation to the American homeland.

In seeking to lead the world, did Soviet leaders share such a commitment to its own purported allies? That question resonates today, when Vladimir Putin's Russian Federation acts in common cause with the People's Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. As in the Cold War, antipathy toward the United States and its allies unites an unlikely coalition. In 2022, Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping famously pledged "no-limits" to their friendship. Such public pronouncements also appear in Radchenko's account of the Cold War. However, it is less clear to me that Kremlin leaders believed in them.

Response

Sergey Radchenko

I am grateful to the three esteemed reviewers for taking the time to read the book and engage with its arguments. I am also grateful to *Passport* and its co-editors, Brian C. Etheridge and Silke Zoller for organizing this roundtable.

All three reviews are exceedingly generous. I am deeply

humbled by the positive assessment of my work and the constructive criticism it has received. I am also delighted that the book has generated so much debate. I would like to briefly address some of the issues raised by the reviewers.

Michael De Groot posits that while the book's core thesis about the importance of external legitimation works for some of the Cold War episodes recounted in the book, it doesn't always work and even appears "forced" in places. He reasonably questions whether there was a hierarchy of motivations among which the desire for external legitimation was one, but not necessarily the most important one?

I share De Groot's frustration. In assessing Soviet foreign policy behavior, I was at times bewildered by just how difficult it was, both in theoretical and practical terms, to untangle motivations—to discern security concerns apart from ideological or perhaps related domestic problems. In the introduction, I probed an analogy – Maslow's hierarchy of needs – and found his theoretical framework helpful but unsatisfying.

But there is something to the idea that basic security needs somehow preceded all else. The problem, as I note in the book, is just how to define security, since security meant different things to, say, Stalin and Gorbachev. Therefore, to argue that security or strategic considerations always came first is to invite a follow-up question: security for whom or what; security meaning exactly what?

The same criticism can also be applied to legitimacy, which arguably meant different things to our polar opposites, Stalin and Gorbachev. Or did it? For example, the legitimacy (through external recognition) of Soviet claims to global leadership may well have meant something similar to both Stalin and Gorbachev, providing a useful thread of continuity for the entire Soviet era, extending back to the historical experience of imperial Russia, and forward to current policies and Putin's revisionism. Alexandra Sukalo highlights this exact point in her review.

Meanwhile, De Groot argues that I pay insufficient attention to economic factors and the technological revolution. Both themes do appear in the book. Thus, I argue that the Kremlin's failure to deliver economically ate away at the foundational claims of the Soviet regime and made external recognition that much more important (détente is a case in point). I note also how the Soviets began to realize already in the 1960s that they were losing the Cold War, but were temporarily bailed out by the oil crisis, which helped sustain the standards of living and lessened the pressure to initiate painful reforms.

On the other hand, I agree with De Groot that I could have pursued this side of the Soviet experience even more decisively. Indeed, while working through the archival materials, I was impressed by the enormous importance of the economic underpinnings of the Cold War, something that De Groot's own work so helpfully shows.[1] I have resolved to investigate this issue in my next book, and must for now leave reader of *To Run the World* with the humble platitude that no book can cover every important subject in equal detail.

I was delighted by James Graham Wilson's positive assessment of the book. As a distinguished U.S. diplomatic historian, he has tackled many of the problems I address in my narrative from the "other side."[2] It was reassuring to see that my interpretation of Gorbachev's desire for global recognition resonates with his own views, in particular because it's that last part of the book that many fellow historians (including Michael De Groot among reviewers of this roundtable) find difficult to accept. (Sukalo, however, believes that I could go even harder on Gorbachev, which I could have, but chose not to, because I do believe that for all the continuities I highlight, there were unique qualities about this last Soviet leader).

In his turn, Wilson poses a number of interesting and difficult questions. Why did the Soviets continue their nuclear build-up after the Cuban Missile Crisis? There is no clear answer, although Brezhnev at one point blamed the rapacious appetites of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. "Give me more money, he [Soviet Defense Minister Andrei Grechko] says…," Brezhnev complained. "What am I supposed to tell him?... So I give, again and again" (445). It is curious that unlike his predecessor Nikita Khrushchev who often ignored his own military, Brezhnev, the skillful bureaucrat that he was, was always attentive to what Grechko and, later, Dmitri Ustinov had to say.

Yet it does strike me that there was more than just bureaucratic pressure (though of course one must never underestimate this formidable force). There was a certain connection in Brezhnev's mind between Moscow's great power pretensions and the size of its nuclear arsenal. In talking détente to Richard Nixon, he cited the ability to destroy the world multiple times as the reason why Moscow and Washington had to cooperate, or, to cite the title of the book, to "run the world" together.

My description of Brezhnev's mental decline after 1973 left Wilson wondering who was running the USSR. Who was responsible for foreign policy? Who was making and breaking agreements? The answer is that it was anyone who could access Brezhnev, in particular his various advisers.

My description of Brezhnev's mental decline after 1973 left Wilson wondering who was running the USSR. Who was responsible for foreign policy? Who was making and breaking agreements? The answer is that it was anyone who could access Brezhnev, in particular his various advisers. People like Andrei Aleksandrov-Agentov and Viktor Golikov of whom no one in the world (bar a few Russia hands) have ever heard acquired enormous power as the eyes and the ears of the failing General Secretary. Anatolii Chernyaev who replaced Aleksandrov-Agentov as Gorbachev's key foreign policy aide gives a remarkable account of these twilight years of Soviet policymaking in his diary, on which I relied extensively in the book.[3]

This hijacking of policymaking, I argue, negatively impacted détente (a love project of Brezhnev's) and generally shows the impact of age and poor health on power.[4] American readers of *To Run the World* will find disturbing parallels to America's more recent experience of having an ailing leader at the helm, though the Soviet case was incomparably more grave.

Finally, Wilson argues, persuasively in my view, that "the story of the Soviet Union in the Cold War is that of collapses of nominal alliances." He contrasts this failure to the American success at building up their alliances. The contrast is staggering. In his time, Geir Lundestad rightly compared America's empire by invitation to the Soviet empire by imposition. That said, the Soviets did not impose themselves on China, and still their alliance with the Chinese fell apart.

What was it specifically about the Soviet method of alliance-making that failed to work? I do not really answer this question in the book, but as Wilson justly points out, this question is pertinent to our present situation when, once again, the Kremlin is looking for friends to join its ancient crusade to defeat the West. This time, the Russians are not signing formal defense treaties with China or Iran, however they did sign one with North Korea to be sure. Maybe they have learned from history that supposedly eternal and unbreakable alliances are the ones that crumble first.

Continuities between the past and the present is a

subject also highlighted by Alexandra Sukalo in her detailed review of *To Run the World*. Sukalo notes that applying the book's core thesis to the present "promises to provide insight on Putin and his motives." She is right, and I tried to do just that in the epilogue. One of the interesting points that emerged from the study, as she notes perceptively, involves the dividing lines between the Cold War and our own predicament. Today's Russia is a very different beast compared to the Soviet Union of old. But there are certain parallels in Putin's desire for external recognition of Russia's "greatness," similar to the ambitions of his Soviet predecessors.

There is also another parallel: nuclear weapons, and the feeling of might and entitlement that they produce in those who have their hand on the button. I argue in the book that the nuclear revolution reinforced the Soviet claim to greatness. Putin fully shares his predecessors' fascination with nukes, and he has skillfully deployed nuclear saber-rattling to intimidate the West.

The book's insights about Russia may also be applied to China. Does the Chinese leadership have an ambition to "run the world"? We can't tell. But whether or not Xi Jinping has the ambition, he may have the means, which neither the Soviets nor the Russians ever came close to having. This brings back De Groot's point about economy and technology: does China today have the wherewithal to challenge the United States globally? I think it does. It may be already doing so, meaning that we may be on the brink of a slippery slope to another cold war.

Notes:
1. Michael De Groot, "The Soviet Union, CMEA, and the Energy Crisis of the 1970s," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 22:4 (Fall 2020): 4-30.
2. See James Graham Wilson, *The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev's Adaptability, Reagan's Engagement, and the End of the Cold War* (Cornell University Press, 2013), and, most recently, Wilson, *America's Cold Warrior: Paul Nitze and National Security from Roosevelt to Reagan* (Cornell University Press, 2024).
3. Available in English through the valiant translation effort of the National Security Archive: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/anatoly-chernyaev-diary.
4. See Evgeny Chazov, *Zdorovye i Vlast* (Novosti, 1992).

CALL FOR NOMINATIONS

SHAFR's Nominating Committee is soliciting nominations for elected positions. The 2025 elections will fill the following positions:

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Please submit nominations (including self-nominations) to the members of the Nominating Committee by e-mail. Nominations must include the nominee's name, e-mail address, institution (if applicable), and a statement of the nominee's qualifications. The committee particularly seeks nominations that offer specific details about the nominee's service to SHAFR and commitment to the field. It is helpful to indicate whether you have contacted the nominee about his or her willingness to serve.

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Seven Questions on…
World War II

Beth Bailey, Andrew Buchanan, Susan Carruthers, Zach Fredman, and Ruth Lawlor

Editor's note: *"Seven Questions On..." is a regular feature in* Passport *that asks scholars in a particular field to respond to seven questions about their field's historiography, key publications, influences, etc. It is designed to introduce the broader SHAFR community to a variety of perspectives for a given field, as well as serving as a literature and pedagogical primer for graduate students and non-specialists.* **BCE and SZ**

This year marks the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II (conventionally understood). To mark the occasion, we asked five experts on the subject to answer seven questions about the current state of scholarship on WWII.

1. What drew you to this field and inspired you to focus on your specific area of World War II?

Beth Bailey: As with so much history, it was mainly contingency. As newly-minted PhDs in 1987, my husband and I went on the job market. He—David Farber—got a tenure-track position at the University of Hawai'i. I got nothing. Did I mention we had a new baby? So David's teaching a crazy assortment of courses, including World History, the "first half," to a room of 300, and I'm doing much the same, but as an adjunct, and to smaller classes, and at three different institutions that had little in common with one another. Living in Honolulu was shockingly expensive, and what we could afford was a basement apartment in an economically-challenged and very local neighborhood. It was fun. We were young—still in our twenties—and our neighbors were great. Perhaps for the first and last time, we escaped the university bubble. We also escaped the *haole* bubble. But there were rats between our ceiling and the floorboards above, and entertaining our senior colleagues was a challenge.

With an infant, dozens of new lectures to write, manuscript revisions (mine on the history of dating; his on Chicago '68), and nothing but a shared 64K Kaypro for that task, by Friday nights we were completely exhausted. There was no Netflix (or internet, for that matter). Our TV screen measured 8 inches . . . diagonally. And babysitters were expensive! So we took walks.

Soon enough, in our wanderings, we discovered The Tasty Broiler, down by the piers, a place we could get just-caught fish and green beans out of a can for a price we could afford. (If I remember correctly, a dinner cost $3.25, which still works out to less than nine 2024 dollars.) Dinner at The Tasty Broiler became our Friday tradition. And every Friday, we walked there along Hotel Street, Honolulu's traditional red-light district. David and I started to speculate about what it must have been like during World War II, flooded with servicemen on their way to the Pacific War. That persistent conversation was the beginning of *The First Strange Place: Sex and Race in World War II Hawaii*, which we wrote together in very happy collaboration.

Andrew Buchanan: I was born in London in 1958, so I grew up under the immediate overhang of WWII. The war was very present in my life—in family histories, in the 'bomb sites' that dotted the urban landscape, and in the general ambience of popular culture. From a young age I was also very aware that there was a class dimension to the story: my mother's childhood home, pushed up against the steelworks in working-class Sheffield, was destroyed by bombing, while my father's house in a leafy middle-class suburb, was entirely unscathed. I found the war endlessly fascinating, and I spent a lot of time reading popular histories and comic books and recreating the battles in endless tabletop wargames. In my teens, my interest in the war intersected with my growing revulsion with capitalism and in a commitment to radical politics. The difficult process of grasping that the war was nowhere near as morally clear-cut as I had always assumed it to be and that Britain and the United States had both fought for their own (different and conflicting) imperialist interests was an important part of my becoming a Marxist.

I didn't learn about World War II at college—I don't think that Oxford quite considered it history—but I did have the good fortune to study Clausewitz with Michael Howard. We argued over a lot of things but bonded on an understanding of the materialist basis of Clausewitz's military theory. That gave me a great grounding in the subject! I also got a broad understanding of the war and its outcome from my political life, some of which was captured in Dan Robert's 1959 article "Three Wars in One" and in Ernest Mandel's 1980 book *The Meaning of the Second World War*. After graduating, I left academia for many years, but when I went to Rutgers to do my PhD early in the new century, I knew that I wanted to work on World War II. At Rutgers I had the opportunity work with Warren Kimball, one of the main historians of America's wartime foreign policy, and with leading global historian Michael Adas, who was also very interested in military history. That—and discovering the Roosevelt archive at Hyde Park—led to my focus on American grand strategy in the Mediterranean during World War II, the subject of my dissertation and (in 2014) my first book.

Soon after this book was published, Wiley approached me to write *World War II in Global Perspective: A Short History*. This was the project that allowed me to pull together and systematize some of the ideas about the nature of the war and the breadth of its temporal and spatial frameworks that had been floating around in my head for a while—the accumulated product of the life experience I have

just described. There was also the additional challenge of doing this in just 80,000 words—Wiley were serious about the "short" in the title—and that forced me to think carefully about focus and balance (200 additional words on *Barbarossa* meant 200 less on Pearl Harbor) and on keeping close to the big thematic questions. I like long books, and some of my friends write very good ones, but it is all too easy to lose the plot amid an avalanche of detail. This can be a particular danger with books on the Second World War, where the quantity of detailed research can be overwhelming. As I was working through these questions, I was able to spend a lot of time talking with Mark Stoler, in some ways my predecessor at the University of Vermont and the leading historian of U.S. wartime strategy, and with Susan Carruthers, who helped me think about the broader cultural dimensions of the war.

Susan Carruthers: Born in Britain in 1967, I grew up in a society fixated (as it still remains) on "The War". Television shows and movies, from slapstick comedies to sudsy melodramas and combat epics, supplied a constant stream of images and stories about this conflict, as often obfuscating its core features as illuminating them. In my early teens, I never anticipated that this war would become a central preoccupation of my adult life. But then I went to university. As an undergraduate studying International History and Politics at the University of Leeds, I opted to take a course on Propaganda in the Second World War. Whereas most of the curriculum was beholden to the "chaps and maps" school of diplomatic history (in Zara Steiner's memorable phrase), this course was interdisciplinary in nature. It involved studying "ordinary people", including *female* people—their attitudes, behaviours, and motivations—as well as the many media that wartime authorities employed in their attempts to manipulate the affect and actions of their own citizens, as well as enemy populations. In the late 1980s, it was still considered either daringly innovative or horribly ill-advised, depending on the historian's perspective, to include *film* as suitable primary source material for undergraduates. My instructors squabbled, but I was hooked. And, without a doubt, it was this course that set me on the road to becoming an academic historian.

Over the past 35 years, my interests in World War II—and conflict more broadly—have kept evolving. From an initial focus on media and propaganda, my research more recently has foregrounded emotional life in wartime, exploring the "private" (or ostensibly private) channels which people caught up in war use to sustain connection across space and time. Intimacy formed the focus of my book *Dear John: Love and Loyalty in Wartime America* (Cambridge University Press, 2016). I have also repeatedly returned to the murky interzone between war and "postwar"—that unsatisfactory shorthand applied to whatever followed war, which rarely merited the designation "peace". Two of my books deal with World War II's untidy endings and aftermaths in different geographic contexts: *The Good Occupation: American Soldiers and the Hazards of Peace* (Harvard University Press, 2016), and another volume, due to appear this spring/summer, *Making Do: Britons and the Refashioning of the Postwar World* (Cambridge University Press, 2025), which proposes that garments formed a crucial medium of exchange in the great shake-out of who owed what to whom after the most lethal conflict ever.

Zach Fredman: I started grad school with plans to become a historian of U.S.-China relations, but I had no idea what I wanted to write my dissertation about. I took a traditional diplomatic history approach for my MA thesis, relying on nearby archives to examine Kennedy administration perceptions of Chinese intentions in Vietnam. While I enjoyed writing the paper, I felt like this sort of project wouldn't be enough to sustain my interest for the long-term, something I could see through to a dissertation and then my first book. Before starting my Ph.D., I had worked in China for five years. This gave me the opportunity to travel across the country and much of the surrounding region, allowing me to interact with people from all walks of life. As a grad student, I wanted to find a dissertation topic that matched the variety of human experience I had encountered while living in Asia.

A directed study course on the Cold War helped me figure things out. While reading about the origins of the Cold War in Asia, I learned that more than 50,000 American marines had deployed to the formerly Japanese-occupied regions of China after World War II. This was news to me, so I wrote a research paper on this topic, drawing on sources from the U.S. National Archives and Harvard University's Yenching Library. This project involved a much larger cast of characters than the Kennedy administration paper and turned out to be more fun to write about. It seemed like a good fit for my dissertation.

I broadened my project to cover all of World War II and the Chinese Civil War after reading innovative studies of the Second World War by Hans van de Ven, David Reynolds, Petra Goedde, and Mary Louise Roberts. Van de Ven's work was particularly important, because he was the first scholar to take advantage of archival opening in China during the 1990s to overturn the conventional narrative on high-level U.S.-China relations during World War II. I wanted to follow his model but look at the lower levels, doing for China what Reynolds, Goedde, and Roberts had done for the UK, Germany, and France. This approach eventually led to my first book, *The Tormented Alliance: American Servicemen and the Occupation of China, 1941–1949* (UNC Press, 2022) and my co-edited porject with Judd Kinzley, *Uneasy Allies: Sino-American Relations at the Grassroots, 1937–1949* (Cambridge University Press, 2024).

Ruth Lawlor: I have always been interested in war, but it took a long time for me to think of myself as a military historian or as a historian of World War II specifically. Growing up in Ireland at a time when national education remained stubbornly parochial, I was hungry for a sense of the world beyond and longed for proximity to the places where I imagined history to be really "happening." Irish history has often been taught as something static—if you have seen the *Banshees of Inisherin* (Martin McDonagh's 2022 film) or, more recently, the Hulu production of Patrick Radden Keefe's *Say Nothing*, you'll get a sense of what I mean. In one, the Irish Civil War is a mere backdrop that none of the characters understand, preoccupied as they are with their daily squabbles; in the other, the war is front and center, but the first line of the series rejects the possibility that the Troubles can be understood historically: "The Irish have been fighting about the same thing for 800 years." I always found these portrayals deeply frustrating because I had a keen sense from a young age that war was the motor of historical change—"force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one," as Marx famously put it—but in Irish history it had been deeply mythologized and therefore totally abstracted. At the same time, an alternative focus on the minutiae of ordinary life in the past left much social history completely divorced from large-scale processes and in so doing made those ordinary lives appear quite inconsequential. This was especially true of gender history, where efforts to include the experiences of women extended only to endlessly repeated accounts of domestic drudgery. Surely there was more to history than this!

Aware of my desire to escape the confines of nationalism and get to where the action was—and perhaps also eager to dissuade me from the career choice I had decided upon in light of these frustrations: war correspondent—my

parents nurtured my interest in military history early on. We travelled to the landing beaches and battlefields of Normandy and later to the concentration camps of Eastern Europe, collecting scores of books and DVD documentaries at museums along the way. It was at the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum in 2008 that my mother came across Raul Hilberg's seminal book, *The Destruction of the European Jews*. Hilberg had passed away about six months previously, which is perhaps why it was so prominently displayed at that time. I devoured it, alongside several important memoirs by women, including two Hungarians—Olga Lengyel, a surgical assistant, and Gisella Perl, a gynaecologist—who had been forced to aid in the performance of medical procedures on fellow inmates. Around the same time, I also came across books about women in the Greek and Chinese civil wars. Together they opened up a world for me, bringing social and military history together in ways that were undeniably globally significant—and which included women as central actors in the history of war and revolution. I went on to write about the Sonderkommando Revolt of 1944 for my final history project at the end of high school and spent my undergraduate years studying modern Germany, China's long civil war, the history of antisemitism, and nuclear politics and strategy. Then, finally, during my Master's degree I turned to U.S. foreign policy and military history and wrote my dissertation about sexual violence and military law in the U.S. Army during World War II, the subject that became my PhD thesis and now book.

In hindsight, I can discern several junctures at which I was deterred—by various people and for various reasons—from pursuing military history proper. In some quarters, military history, not to mention World War II (!)—was considered passé, while I am certain that my interest in weapons, strategy and violence appeared disturbing to others, who channelled those energies into "safer" social history topics. Colleagues in the field will be familiar with the distaste military historians often encounter, even today, and so for a while I drifted quite far from the things that had initially interested me about history: the sense of possibility, of acceleration, and the twin processes of creation and destruction that are so tangible in the context of war. Now that I'm in a job with a great deal of autonomy to decide what I will teach and write about, I am happy to say that I have found my way back to my first love—the revolutionary potential of war to drive historical change—and am teaching my own class on the Second World War.

2. Which scholars do you see as having laid the groundwork for the study of World War II?

BB: Yikes. Best I can do is tell you which scholars motivated me, which means I'm focusing on the United States and on "war and society" (much as I hate that label). Scanning my shelves . . . . Here's my copy of John Dower's *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (1986). I loved that book because he took culture seriously, and because he showed that a concept can take multiple forms: he argued that both the United States and Japan used notions of race—very different but equally powerful notions—in conceiving and fighting the war. John Costello's *Virtue Under Fire: How World War II Changed Our Social and Sexual Attitudes* (1985) has lost its cover. That may be in part because I bought it used at a Brandeis book sale. It still, close to 40 years later, has a whiff of mildew about it. But I carried it from place to place, job to job. Looking back, I'm pretty sure that much of my work on gender and sexuality was in conversation with it. Ron Spector's *The Eagle against The Sun* (1985) is there; it was key as I thought about the Pacific War, and as I realized too many of my students in Hawai'i found the east-coast focused U.S. history of my scholarly youth distant and uninteresting. And Leisa Meyer's *Creating G.I. Jane* (1996). It's a new copy, maybe my third. Graduate students keep walking off with them.

AB: This is a tough question—World War II must surely be the most written-about event in history—but if we're talking about genuinely *world* histories, I would have to go with Gerhard Weinberg's 1994 *A World at Arms.* Now there's a big book—nearly 1200 pages—and one with its own wood-for-trees issues, but a truly ground-breaking work that showed that a global history was possible. Richard Overy's 1995 *Why the Allies Won* was also hugely significant, not only because of the scope of the question it posed but also because it foregrounded the material and economic dimensions of the war. Reviewing these path breaking books today, however, one can't but be struck by their fundamentally Eurocentric—or perhaps German-centric—focus, and from that point of view I would include Rana Mitter's 2013 *China's War with Japan, 1937-1945* among the books laying the groundwork for a *global* appreciation of the war. Other expansive regional or imperial histories also play a role here: I'm thinking, for example, of Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper's 2006 *Forgotten Armies* and 2007 *Forgotten Wars* on war and revolution in the great crescent of Southeast Asia, Ashley Jackson's 2006 *The British Empire and the Second World War*, and S. C. M. Paine's *The Wars for Asia, 1911-1949.* Given the importance of integrating the Holocaust into the broader history of the war, I would say that Raul Hilberg's 1961 *The Destruction of the European Jews*, the Ur-text of Holocaust Studies, is a foundational text for thinking about the global war. Finally, to some extent the work of globalizing the Second World War stands on the shoulders of the numerous scholars who did the same for the Great War, and here the work of Robert Gerwath and Erez Manela is particularly significant, as is that of Adam Tooze, whose 2014 *The Deluge* discusses the rise of the United States and the remaking of the world order in the aftermath of World War I.

SC: As an undergraduate in the late 1980s, I was assigned Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint's *Total War: Causes and Courses of the Second World War*, as a starting point: a wrist-achingly hefty one-volume overview of the conflict. In addition, we read scholarship by Gerhard L Weinberg, whose later tour de force, *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II* (1995), many scholars consider the best single overarching treatment of the war. Studying the war's propagandistic dimensions, I was impressed by Ian Kershaw's hot-off-the-press *The Hitler Myth: Image and Reality in the Third Reich* (1987)—the precursor to his highly acclaimed biography of Hitler and many other works. I was (and remain) particularly interested in war's gendered dimensions. Arthur Marwick's and Penny Summerfield's work on British women was foundational in the UK. Other foundation-laying works on women's experiences of World War II include Leila J. Rupp, *Mobilizing Women For War: German and American Propaganda* (1979), Claudia Koonz, *Mothers in the Fatherland: Women, the Family, and Nazi Politics* (1986); Maureen Honey, *Creating Rosie the Riveter: Class, Gender and Propaganda during World War II* (1984) and Susan M. Hartmann, *The Home Front and Beyond: American Women in the 1940s* (1982). With regard to other dimensions of American war experience within and beyond the U.S., I would cite Morton Blum, *V was for Victory: Politics and American Culture during World War II* (1976); Paul Fussell, *Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War* (1989); John W. Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (1986); and Akira Iriye, *Power and Culture: the Japanese-American War, 1941-45* (1981).

It's worth recalling that many foundational texts on the war weren't written by scholars (if that term requires a

university appointment). I'm thinking here, for example, of classic oral histories such as Studs Terkel's *"The Good War": An Oral History of World War II* (1984), Svetlana Alexievich's *The Unwomanly Face of War* (1985), and Allan Bérubé's *Coming Out under Fire: The History of Gay Men and Women in World War II* (1990). Indeed, many of the most widely read books in the U.S. on World War II have been produced outside the academy by authors such as Rick Atkinson, Anthony Beevor, Iris Chang, and Laura Hillenbrand.

ZF: I don't think any topic has been studied as much as World War II, which was the largest event in human history, so this is a tough question to answer. You could fill entire bookstores with just biographies of Stalin, Churchill, and Hitler. With such a massive amount already written, I guess it depends on what part of the conflict one is interested in.

When it comes to looking at the history of World War II beyond the battlefield, Reynolds, Goedde, and Roberts are crucial sources. Reynolds's book, *Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain, 1942–1945* (Random House, 1995), was one of the first scholarly books to focus on the tensions that emerge when armies are deployed in allied countries. Goedde's *GIs and Germans: Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945–1949* (Yale, 2002), examines the postwar occupation of Germany, using gender as an analytical framework. In *What Soldiers Do: Sex and the American GI in World War II France* (Chicago, 2013), Roberts shows that the Greatest Generation was no greater than any other generation, a conclusion that held true in my own research on U.S. forces in China.

Looking specifically at the China Theater, Hans van de Ven's work laid the foundations for the scholarly reevaluation of the Republic of China's role in World War II, beginning with his book *War and Nationalism in China, 1925-1945* (Routledge, 2003). His more recent book, *China at War: Triumph and Tragedy in the Emergence of the New China* (Harvard, 2018) is a great place to start.

RL: Gerhard Weinberg's *A World at Arms* remains the best global history of the war that we have. Of course, it is hard for any one person to write such a mega-history (on which more below). But scholars working in other areas of the war, while their focus may still have been largely European, structured their work in such a way as to open up questions both about the global processes at the heart of the war and about the relationship between the war itself (the military history) and political and social developments. Here, credit is due to Richard Overy for his work on air power (indeed, for a body of work which charts his changing views on the air war over time) and the multiple fronts involved in fighting and winning global war (*Why the Allies Won*); Omer Bartov, Norman Naimark and Christopher Browning for their work on the Nazi-Soviet War and the Holocaust—historicizing the latter especially as a contingent outcome of Nazi colonialism in the East, a point ably developed later on a more global scale by Adam Tooze in *The Wages of Destruction* (2006); and, of course, Svetlana Alexievich, whose moving portrayals of women's wartime experiences (*The Unwomanly Face of War* was published in 1983) paved the way for generations of scholars after her who considered gender central to the prosecution of the war itself, not merely incidental.

3. Discuss how the field has evolved to include different approaches to analyzing the Second World War.

BB: It's such a vast and sprawling history and historiography! Perhaps no surprise, given the scale of the war. I'd say that the scholarship on World War II has evolved in parallel to, or as part of, the broader trajectories of historical scholarship over the course of the past five or six decades. In terms of U.S. military history, the more traditional strategic/operational analyses were joined by works in the "new" military history, which brought the emerging insights of social history into the study of the war itself, and then by a range of "war and society" studies that demonstrated profoundly important connections in an era of total war. Cultural histories raised questions of meaning, even as the continuing momentum of social history chronicled the experiences of ordinary people and made clear the limitations (here, again, U.S. focused) of American notions of democracy and equality and the nation's commitments to them. Historians asked questions not simply about the experiences of women, ethnic and racial minorities, and LGBTQ people, but about the construction of race, of gender, of sexuality. Authors pushed back at the notion of "the greatest generation." They returned to the importance of the state, and of institutions (including the U.S. military). And throughout it all, they told stories. World War II is a goldmine for narrative history.

AB: That's an interesting question, because applying the 'global turn' to World War II—by definition a worldwide event—demands two apparently contradictory moves. On the one hand, it requires decentering traditional U.S. and British-centric narratives and narrowly military accounts. This enables us to encompass entire regions of the world, like Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa that are largely overlooked in conventional narratives, and to integrate a broad range of questions, including the centrality of women's involvement, mass migration, the mobilization of colonial armies, the forging of global connectivity, the environmental impact of the war, and many others. On the other hand, globality also requires understanding the ways in which the involvement of the United States bound together a series of disparate regional conflicts into a genuinely worldwide conflict. Moreover, Washington's victory enabled it to structure a new hegemonic postwar order, manifest in U.S. military predominance, in the political and economic arrangements made at Tehran, Bretton Woods, and San Francisco, and in the construction of a worldwide network of bases, that began to emerge even before the fighting was over.

Scholarship in this broadly defined field is evolving on many fronts. In terms of expanding the war's spatial framework, for example, we have books like Rebecca Herman's 2022 *Cooperating with the Colossus* on Latin America, while the 2015 collection edited by Judith Byfield and Caroline Brown begins to bring Africa more fully into the frame. One could point to numerous other books that advance specific subfields: on women, for example, we have the work of scholars like Vina Lanzona (*Amazons of the Huk Rebellion*) and Mary Louise Roberts (*What Soldiers Do*), while on environmental questions there are pathbreaking studies by Simo Laakkonen, Richard Tucker, and Timo Vuorisalo, by Micah Muscolino, and—on food—by Lizzie Collingham. Meanwhile, other historians—I'm thinking in particular of Brooke Blower's recent *Americans in a World at War*—are using intertwined microhistories as a way to explore the vectors of transnational connectivity.

This is all really good stuff, but the challenge of integrating this scholarship into the big-picture global history of the long war is in many ways still before us. Not that there's been no progress—I'm thinking, for example, of Daniel Hedinger's work on the common imperial-autarkic projects of the Axis powers or of Philips Payson O'Brien provocative new look at the war's military-strategic dimensions in his 2019 *How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II*. There's also some great comparative work on the long and ragged ends of the war, such as Susan Carruthers' 2016 *The Good Occupation: American Soldiers*

and the Hazards of Peace and—focusing on decolonization—Martin Thomas' brand new *The End of Empires and a World Remade: A Global History of Decolonization*.

SC: The study of World War II has broadly followed the historical profession's late twentieth- and twenty-first century social, cultural, gendered and transnational turns. The field has expanded to broaden our understanding of the war's imprint on multiple domains of human (and non-human) existence, including the ramifications of conflict for millions of people who, though far from the battlefield, nevertheless found their lives profoundly shaped, uprooted, and sometimes ended, by this globe-spanning cataclysm. Scholars such as Brooke Blower and Aaron Hiltner have convincingly unsettled the U.S. home-front/war-front binary, showing how many phenomena formerly associated with the war "over there"—particularly sexual violence perpetrated by uniformed Americans—also afflicted residents of American towns and cities "over here" that provided a temporary home or transit point to legions of men in uniform.

Recent scholarship has deepened our appreciation of the racialized dynamics of war-making and military service: for instance, Takashi Fujitani, *Race For Empire: Koreans as Japanese and Japanese as Koreans during World War II* (2011); Thomas Guglielmo, *Divisions: A New History of Racism and Resistance in World War II* (2021); Matthew F. Delmont, *Half American: The Heroic Story of African Americans Fighting World War II at Home and Abroad* (2022). This is a dynamic field, but it's also important to note that the foundations for this work were laid *during* the war, by Black journalists, writers, activists and archivists, such as Roi Ottley, Langston Hughes, Walter White, and the Schomburg's inaugural director Lawrence D. Reddick, who initiated a ground-breaking oral history project.

A related turn seeks to advance a more thoroughly global understanding of the *world* war, overcoming an engrained tendency to split the war into discrete theaters that could be analysed more or less in isolation. Proponents of the global turn draw attention to the complex intermeshing of local, regional, internecine, intra- and inter-imperial conflicts that were ultimately constitutive of *the* war, accentuating locations that often hitherto failed to receive due attention (especially from North American and European scholars): from the Caribbean and South America to sub-Saharan Africa, China and Burma, India and Indonesia. Again, it's worth noting that the foundations for a critique of World War II as unequivocally imperial in nature and racial in character were laid while the conflict was at its height—for instance in the work of Merze Tate, the first Black woman to earn a PhD in government and International Relations at Harvard.

ZF: One of the biggest changes of the twenty-first century is that the study of World War II has evolved to become truly global. Scholars in the West often treated the war in Asia as a sideshow or an appendix. That's no longer true. You can now find first-rate scholarship drawing on local sources about any region of the conflict. For example, the journalist Peter Harmsen just published a book on Greenland, *Fury and Ice: Greenland, the United States and Germany in World War II* (Casemate, 2024).

Like other subfields, military history—including the study of World War II—changes as new sources become available and new generations of scholars pose fresh questions. Because World War II is still the axial moment of our era, I'm sure the conflict will continue to be the focus of new approaches to historical scholarship in the coming years.

RL: New regional and thematic histories have brought the field in a variety of new and original directions and, importantly, shown that even if World War II is the most written-about subject in the world, it is still far from exhausted. I could list endless works here, so I will confine myself to a brief tour of a few geographic and thematic areas:

Yasmin Khan, Naina Manjrekar, and Tarak Barkawi's work on the war in South Asia has added a rich new strand to the global history of trans-imperial connectivity, anti-colonial resistance, and the complexities of thereof, including Axis relations with Indian nationalists and the thorny legacy of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal (especially the questions it raised about sovereignty) in comparison to the Nuremberg Trials. Here I would also add the fascinating new histories of Berlin's foreign policy in the colonial world, such as David Motadel's 2014 book, *Islam and Nazi Germany*. Scholars like Rebecca Herman and Alexandre Fortes have done similar work to integrate Latin America into the history of the global war—including by emphasizing inter-imperial competition between the Allied and Axis powers in the Caribbean and Southern Cone—in ways that make traditional accounts which ignored the region simply untenable today.

Notwithstanding the important early debates about the efficacy of the Combined Bomber Offensive pioneered by the likes of Richard Overy, new critical histories of strategic bombing have placed the development of air power in a broader historical context and added important social, legal and moral dimensions to the debates about its use. Tami Biddle's work here is exemplary, especially her article on the fire-bombing of Dresden, to which an excellent counterpart is an older article by Thomas Searle, titled "'It made a lot of sense to kill skilled workers': The firebombing of Tokyo in March 1945," published in the *Journal of Military History* in 2002.

Historians increasingly recognize that one of the war's most significant consequences was its setting in motion the great acceleration, or anthropogenic climate change. Many new histories of food, the environment, logistics, materiél and manufacturing, labour and especially the integration of new areas of the world—like the Pacific islands and their indigenous populations—into global commodity production and consumption have allowed us to see this process in a new light. These works include Judith Bennett's *Natives and Exotics* (2009), Lizzy Collingham's *The Taste of War* (2012), Judith Byfield's work on rice cultivation and Gregory Huff and Micah Muscalino's studies of famine in Vietnam and China respectively.

4. What are some of the challenges faced by scholars working in the field?

BB: My library at the University of Kansas lists 13,083 books currently available on World War II. Worldcat (I got curious) lists over 274,000. Sure, plenty of those 274,000 aren't scholarly; many aren't even non-fiction. But that number does give a sense for how difficult it is to join the conversation. Lots of voices. Lots of noise. A crowded room.

For scholars of the U.S., there's also the mixed blessing of more-than-ample documentation. Hundreds of thousands of boxes of documents, shelved and catalogued everywhere from the National Archives-College Park to small historical societies and archival collections throughout the country. New digital platforms offer more: *The American Soldier* project (see #7), for example, gives us the uncensored comments of American soldiers in the midst of war. Oral history collections proliferate. Newspapers.com lets us move beyond the major papers-of-record; David Farber and I recently wrote an analysis of Americans' immediate responses to the Japanese attacks of December 7th based almost entirely on research done through newspapers.com.

With so many possibilities, where to stop?

Of course, there are more significant hurdles and challenges: as we increasingly acknowledge the limitations of researching a single nation in a *world* war, we have the challenge of working in multiple languages and understanding multiple cultural, social, and political contexts. We have the challenge of access; not all documents were preserved, not all archives are welcoming.

AB: If we're talking about studying the global history of a worldwide—and world-changing—series of events stretching from the early 1930s until the mid-1950s, then I think that there are two intersecting sets of challenges. The first is simply how to do it. How is it possible to master a vast quantity of material, in numerous languages, and across many sub-disciplines of history, including economic, social, political, military, gender, cultural, environmental, and diplomatic history, not to mention questions of migration, connectivity, heterogeneity, and comparison? No individual can hope to do this. That fact alone poses a direct challenge to the egocentricity that is endemic to our profession and points instead towards the absolute necessity of finding ways of collaborating, and of forging collaborative projects, that draw together the work of scholars from different countries and from a range of sub-fields. I don't claim to have solved this challenge, but I do think that the response to Covid—the use of technology to break out of isolation—did give us a glimpse of what is possible. For me, the product of that experience was the rolling online international seminar that gave rise to the collection of essays on *The Greater Second World War: A Global Perspective* that I have coedited with Ruth Lawlor. It will be published by Cornell University Press around the time that this article appears. This project opened the door to other collaborations—a conference on "The Good Neighbor Policy in Time of War" in Rio last summer and a similar gathering on the Mediterranean in the Global World War II in Naples this year. Others will surely follow, generating new webs of friendship and scholarly connection, exchanges of information, ideas and perspectives, and—ultimately—collaborative research and writing. There's nothing inherently novel about international collaboration, of course. Historians like David Reynolds, for example, reached out to scholars in post-Soviet Russia to generate indispensable new insights into the workings of the Grand Alliance. But I do think that the possibilities for genuinely worldwide collaboration are now opening up in exciting new ways.

This relates to the second major challenge, which is to break out of the pervasive national frameworks within so much of the history of World War II has been conceptualized and written, particularly in the United States and Britain. The often-unexamined assumptions of the 'Good War' still run very deep, and they are constantly reinforced by the separation of World War II—and its apparent moral clarity—from the more morally troubled years of the so-called 'postwar.' This separation, of course, is refined in the conventional 1939-1945 timeframe and by the idea that the atomic destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought all the fighting to an end. From this point of view, it is striking that the emergence of truly global histories of World War II coincides with the moment at which the U.S.-led world order established during and after the war is visibly coming apart at an accelerating pace. This, I think, helps to facilitate a more objective appreciation of the war itself, particularly as our own work becomes more directly international and permanently connected to historians in other countries who necessarily view World War II from quite different points of view.

SC: The most obvious challenge arises from the vast geographic scope and multi-dimensional nature of conflict(s) which generated a correspondingly enormous volume of verbal and visual documentation, along with mountains of material *stuff*, as well as an ever-expanding body of literature devoted to probing it retrospectively. It surely goes without saying that scholars who work exclusively in the English language face a substantial linguistic hurdle if they're unable to access sources in and from non-English speaking parts of the world.

Another challenge relates to the unevenness of archival holdings in terms of whose experiences have been preserved. Then there's a prior issue of who was empowered to document their wartime experiences—through letter-writing, diary-keeping or photography—in the first place. I encountered the telling asymmetries of many American archival collections as I researched the experiences of U.S. personnel for my book *The Good Occupation*. Letters sent home by literate service personnel at war tended to be preserved by their recipients, and sometimes subsequently bequeathed to archives, far more frequently than correspondence sent *to* Americans in uniform by loved ones at home. Active duty personnel deployed in war zones were routinely instructed to destroy the mail they received rather than clinging onto correspondence—a sentimental encumbrance that might also divulge valuable intelligence should these letters fall into enemy hands. Furthermore, so long as postwar societies continued to reify "combat" as *the* pre-eminent form of wartime service, archives correspondingly tended to focus their collections on certain martial artefacts to the detriment of others: notably, the letters and diaries of women and other minoritized groups relegated to non-combat roles.

And what of the millions of people whose lives were deeply imprinted by war who were not literate? For this reason, in addition to those outlined above, certain individuals' and communities' experiences are much harder for scholars to excavate or recreate. Oral history projects have proliferated in recent years, galvanized by an awareness of the rapidly dwindling number of those who still remember the war and a desire to capture their testimony while it can be recorded. But we still know far less about how, say, British colonial subjects recruited in sub-Saharan Africa experienced the Burma campaign—or how their home communities dealt with absence, loss, and the various possibilities and problems created by the creeping incursion of wartime colonial bureaucracy—than we do about many other wartime experiences that left greater accumulations of textual evidence.

ZF: The biggest challenge is the state of the historical profession. Fewer jobs open each year, particularly in fields like military and diplomatic history, so younger scholars with an interest in World War II don't have many options for finding work as historians.

For those fortunate enough to have the time and resources to do research, one has to deal with challenges like archival access restrictions in places like China and Russia. The research I did in Chinese archives for my first two books wouldn't be possible today as a non-Chinese citizen because archival access has tightened. That being said, the overall, global trend has been toward greater openness and access, particularly as a result of digitization.

For younger scholars, it's crucial to build the confidence to do the sort of project that will sustain one's interest over the long haul. A topic that seems trendy now might not appear so innovative once the project is done. Finding a research question that one is really passionate about and then doing excellent work is a better approach than trying to guess what hiring committees might be looking for five or six years down the road.

RL: Two things stand out here: one is the problem of scope

and the other is the hardening of nationalist narratives under the weight of current political preoccupations, the latter perhaps a somewhat unexpected development (though perhaps we were too naïve on that front).

Managing scope will require increased collaboration—along the lines of Tim Harper and Christopher Bayly's work in *Forgotten Armies* (2004) and *Forgotten Wars* (2006), sophisticated and much-valued books within the field. I feel optimistic about the prospects for this kind of collaboration in the future, aided by the increased connectivity of our contemporary world. Technologies like Zoom have enabled more and more scholars from different parts of the world, especially outside of the global north, to come together to plan out new volumes and engage with each other's ideas in real time and before publications come into being, giving these new books greater coherence and thereby allowing them to make weightier interventions backed up by genuinely international research.

The other problem is harder to solve. Although rich new histories of the Second World War come out every year, many of them focused on parts of the war we still know very little about and areas of the world that remain neglected in the overall history of World War II, and even though historians have been proclaiming the death of the "good war" narrative for years now, I think our overall picture of the world war—what it really "was", who fought and why—might actually be less clear now than it was before the fall of the Berlin Wall. For all the scaremongering about the red menace, many of the writings of that period ring out with a frank clarity that is rarer today: I'm thinking, for example, of Thomas McCormick's 1989 book, *America's Half-Century*, which still holds up pretty well. McCormick described the U.S. wars in Korea and Indochina as "wars of [capitalist] integration on the Pacific rim": aggressive counter-revolutionary wars launched by Washington to suppress twin social revolutions against partition, occupation, and being assigned a bottom place in the new global free-trade order which the U.S. intervention in the Second World War was designed to bring about. Deeply scarred by the worldwide economic collapse of the Great Depression, American strategists waged war against all kinds of autarky—including fascism, European colonialism, and communism, and therefore would not tolerate any "closed" economic development of the kind contemplated by subaltern nationalists who wanted more for their countries than to be the supplier of raw materials to the industrialized world. Contemporary framings of these two conflicts as Cold War contests between the great powers or, more generously, as nationalist civil wars in the era of decolonization, improperly divorce them from Second World War itself, obscuring their ultimate causes and allowing for an unsustainable historiographic break between the "just" war fought by the United States against the Axis and the "unjust" wars of the period that followed, as though Washington's decision-makers merely lost their way somewhere between 1945 and 1947.

But William Roger Louis' *Imperialism at Bay* (published in 1977 and later summarized in article form with Ronald Robinson as "The Imperialism of Decolonization" in 1994) or Walter LaFeber's "Roosevelt, Churchill, and Indochina: 1942-1945" (1975) do not balk at describing the U.S. intervention as an effort to remake the world and, ultimately, as imperialist.

Although the global history of the Second World War is receiving renewed and welcome attention at this very moment precisely because of the shifting geopolitical landscape we currently find ourselves in—see Richard Overy's *The Last Imperial War* (2021) or Paul Chamberlin's forthcoming *Scorched Earth* (2025)—historians and popular audiences alike still struggle to see past what I and a group of collaborators have termed "the 1945 watershed": the image of finality that attends the atomic bombings and artificially divides the conclusion of the World War from the onset of the Cold War.

Indeed, it's for the very same reason that we're discussing the "end" of the Second World War (rather than merely the end of the Allies' war against the Axis states) now and not in, say, 2033, even though fighting continued in many parts of the world—especially those places where anti-fascism was never a persuasive or popular framework for understanding the war—well after May 8 and September 2. This reality is made very clear in Martin Thomas' important article on the Sétif massacre in Algeria, and when we remember that the Nuremberg Charter was signed on the same day that Washington deployed the second atomic bomb against the largely civilian population of Nagasaki. Some wars ended in 1945, while others went on.

5. What are some of the significant questions in the field that you feel need to be addressed in greater detail or, alternatively, which questions need to be reconsidered by contemporary scholars?

BB: Lately, for obvious reasons, I've been thinking about the America First movement, and the U.S. entry to the war. Time for an updated analysis? I know that several historians have described the experience of combat, but I still haven't found exactly the book I'm looking for. Something compelling on technology and human experience? And a good history of how the U.S. military filled its ranks and trained and mobilized its forces. Me? I'm looking for a good story. I think it's time to leave Vietnam and return to this war.

AB: This is another huge question! The 'long' or 'greater' Second World War that I and my colleagues and collaborators have been working on envisages a 'central paroxysm' of genuinely worldwide war (1941-1945) that is defined by the participation of the United States. This is framed on the one side by a series of overlapping and intersecting wars, beginning with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, that were driven by responses to the Great Depression, and on the other by a set of 'ragged endings' as the world war dissolved into regional wars and revolutions, anticolonial uprisings, and—of course—rapidly deepening conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Clearly, this 'long war' framework opens numerous potential avenues of inquiry, but here I'll just focus on two key questions that need to be addressed: the role of the Soviet Union in the transition from war to postwar and the place of the Chinese Revolution as a *wartime* event.

Since the 1990s we have made tremendous progress in our understanding of the scale and character of the fighting on Germany's Eastern Front, registered in particular in the work of David Glanz and in David Stahl's series of books on the great campaigns of 1941-1942. But despite important work by Mark Edele and others, understanding of the political role of the Soviet Union under Stalinist leadership has lagged behind, particularly in relation to Moscow's role in tamping down the popular insurgencies in Western Europe that unfolded as the German occupations came to an end. The European Communist parties, under orders from Moscow, thus played a critical role in the postwar restabilization of capitalism in Western Europe, underscoring the significance of the agreement struck between Stalin and Roosevelt at Tehran in November 1943 for the shape of the postwar order in the West as well as in the East. There is some great work on Soviet policy in this regard—I'm thinking of that by Geoffrey Roberts and Norman Naimark—but there is still more to do on the implications of Moscow's counter-revolutionary and pro-

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capitalist intervention in Western Europe.

The clearcut partition of Europe, underscored on both sides of the divide by massive military occupations and the containment of popular insurgencies, stands in sharp contrast to the situation in East and Southeast Asia. Across great swaths of this region, the Japanese surrender took place well in advance of any Allied military presence, opening the door both to the great wave of popular anticolonial uprisings from Korea to Indonesia, Indochina, and the Malay Peninsula, and to the rapid deepening of the Chinese Revolution. In China, the relative weakness of the Guomindang regime and the popularity of Communist-led land reform, combined with Washington's wartime reluctance to commit combat troops produced a profound and unexpected crisis for U.S. policymakers. Washington's difficulties were underscored by the wave of GI protests demanding rapid demobilization in early 1946, a worldwide mutiny that effectively precluded sending U.S. troops into China. Many of these connections are lost when the traditional '1945 barrier' erects an unbreachable barrier between 'war' and 'postwar,' breaking the real continuities and consigning the Chinese Revolution to a new and separate historical period. Again, there is some great work on this—for example that by S. C. M. Paine and Hans van der Ven—but anticolonial and Chinese revolutions are still largely absent from the mainstream historiography of 'the war.'

Reconsidering these questions—and the broader postwar anticolonial struggles to which they linked—will go a long way towards advancing the reevaluation of the ragged endings of the world war that I have been discussing here. They also help us to see the incompleteness of America's new global predominance as well as its obvious reach and strength.

SC: In answer to question 3 above, I noted recent scholars' efforts to accentuate the "world-ness" of this world war, focusing both on racialized communities within the belligerent states and on their heavy reliance on colonial recruits and conscripts; see, for instance, Tarak Barkawi, *Soldiers of Empire: Indian and British Armies in World War II* (2017); David Killingray, *Fighting for Britain: African Soldiers in the Second World War* (2010) and Gregory Mann, *Native Sons: West African Veterans and France in the Twentieth Century* (2006). I look forward to the imminent publication of a volume edited by Andrew Buchanan (UVM) and Ruth Lawlor (Cornell) who have played a leading role in drawing together a transnational collective of "global World War II" scholars. Buchanan's recent book, *From World War to Postwar: Revolution, Cold War, Decolonization, and the Rise of American Hegemony, 1943-1958* (2024) proposes a simultaneous expansion of boundaries—geographic and temporal—to better appreciate a protracted period of ultimately convergent crises, conflicts, wars and civil wars that stretched from the 1930s to the 1950s. It should surely go without saying that "the war" didn't come to a juddering halt in May or August 1945. But many studies of World War II terminate their narratives abruptly at the very moment of the Axis powers' surrender, as though Allied declarations of victory spelled *Finis* to the whole global cataclysm. Peace emphatically did not "break out." So, there's still more work to be done in exploring not just the war's sequelae, but the larger, long-term processes that gave rise to such globe-spanning turbulence in the first place—particularly Washington's pursuit of global hegemony, and the victorious imperial powers' fitful attempts to reconfigure empire after a war rhetorically waged in the name of "freedom for all the men in all the lands", in the Churchillian argot of the Atlantic Charter.

Given the drastic, topography-altering, existence-imperilling impact of bombing, battle and base-construction on urban, rural and marine life, environmental studies of World War II remain strikingly thin on the ground. Another forthcoming book by a SHAFR member which I await eagerly is Gretchen Heefner's study of U.S. military engineers in, and engineering of, extreme environments. The victorious Allies' heedless—and often profoundly hazardous—disposal of *War Junk* (in the title of Alex Souchen's recent study of Canada's program) calls for further attention. "Total mobilization" created inordinate amounts of *materiel* in need of disposal, redistribution or repurposing: everything from munitions, planes, tanks, mines to surplus garments and footwear, a topic I tackle in my forthcoming book. Sometimes, war waste was recycled for postwar purposes. But swords were rarely turned into ploughshares. More often, cavalierly discarded war waste rusted or mouldered into toxic decrepitude.

ZF: I've moved away from World War II in my new project, so I'm not in the best position to answer this question. In my narrow area of wartime Sino-American relations, anything that can make creative use of newly available sources would be welcome. With more restrictive access at national, provincial, and municipal-level archives in China, smaller repositories and libraries might be better source bases for new scholarship focused on smaller regions.

I'd also be interested in seeing more granular-level studies about war memory and patriotic education in China, building on excellent, big-picture studies like Rana Mitter's *The Good War: How World War II is Shaping a New Nationalism* and Zheng Wang's *Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations*. Anything that can deftly and persuasively puncture nationalistic myths will find a spot on my history of U.S.-China relations syllabus.

RL: There aren't enough studies of women, especially female combatants—when I was researching the horizons of possibility opened by the war for the world's women, I realised it was actually very difficult to find good histories of this kind, especially studies that were comparative. I think such a global history of women's experiences of the war or of the belligerents' management of sex and gender relations—one which does not focus solely on sexual violence—is crying out to be written, although scholars like Chiara Bonfiglioli (Yugoslav partisans), Reina Pennington (Red Army combatants), Sabine Frühstück (comparative histories of German and Japanese policies on sexuality), Urvi Khaitan (Indian workers), Regina Mülhäuser (rape as a weapon of war deployed by the Wehrmacht) and Vina Lanzona (Filipina Huk rebels) have made important contributions here already.

There are other areas that still warrant greater scrutiny and revaluation, though I've covered them elsewhere—these include more attention to the inter-imperial dimensions of the war, the layering of different wars within the great power war (such as the Greek civil war and Chinese revolution, for example), the relationship between the global processes of capitalist expansion and the form of the nation-state, and Moscow's policy towards Communist parties outside of Europe—in Iran and Malaya, for example, the sites of important early Cold War conflicts in which Stalin's posture in this respect was consequential but remains understudied—as well as the Soviet occupation of Manchuria and the interconnected social worlds of Manchu, Mandarin, Russian and Japanese speakers there.

6. For someone wanting to begin study of World War II, what 5-8 books do you consider to be essential, either as the "best" or most influential?

BB: Again, scanning my bookshelves . . . . I'd say the sweeping overviews offered by David Kennedy (*The American People in World War II: Freedom from Fear, Part II*) and Williamson Murray and Alan Millett (*A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War*) are a great way to situate oneself.

Some books I particularly value? Will I. Hitchcock's *The Bitter Road to Freedom: A New History of the Liberation of Europe*, for its empathy and power, layering over the story of Allied triumph and Europe's liberation with the human tragedy, the cost, that the Allied push for "liberation" exacted. Thomas A. Guglielmo, *Divisions: A New History of Racism and Resistance in America's World War II Military*, not simply for his story of racism and resistance, but for laying out the "complex tangle" of color lines the U.S. military constructed.

Thomas Childers, *Soldier from the War Returning* (2009), along with William Tuttle's *Daddy's Gone to War* (1993), show us a different sort of human cost of war. And I strongly recommend Susan Carruthers's forthcoming book, *Making Do: Britons and the Refashioning of the Postwar World*, for her creativity: she uses a history of clothing to bring to life the aftermath of war.

But let me make an immodest pitch, too: Take a look at *Beyond Pearl Harbor: A Pacific History* (2019), which I co-edited with David Farber. Japan didn't simply attack Pearl Harbor on that "date which will live in infamy"; it also nearly simultaneously attacked Guam, Wake Island, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong, all of them but one Western colonial possessions or imperial outposts. Here, the attacks of December 7/8 belong to a story of clashing empires and anticolonial visions. The collection offers ten great essays, but if nothing else, look at the timeline of attacks in the Prologue!

SC: What a question! This one is especially hard to answer because so much depends on *why* this imaginary "someone" wants to begin studying World War II and which dimensions of this prolonged global cataclysm they're most eager to understand. Which books on the war have been most influential is another matter entirely (broached by Q. 2 above). Stephen Ambrose's many volumes have undoubtedly been highly "influential" in the U.S., inspiring hugely popular movies and TV mini-series, but I doubt many scholars would consider them "the best". I would recommend any of the books and authors mentioned in my earlier responses. Additionally, I'd suggest to anyone wanting to appreciate the scale, depth, and varieties of harm which humans inflicted on one another during these calamitous years two works of fiction that draw on first-person experience: John Horne Burns' Naples-set story sequence, *The Gallery* (1947) and Vassily Grossman's epic novel, *Life and Fate* (1959), and two diaries: Anonymous, *A Woman in Berlin: Eight Weeks in the Conquered City: A Diary* (2005 [1954]); and Michihiko Hachiya, *Hiroshima Diary: The Journal of A Japanese Physician, August 6 – September 30, 1945* (1955 [1995]).

ZF: I have to begin with Overy's *Blood and Ruins*, which I mentioned in question two. At nearly a thousand pages, it's not an easy read. But it's worth the effort: *Blood and Ruins* is a masterpiece, a remarkable, no-filler, genre-defining achievement. Anyone with an interest in World War II should start here and see global history at its best.

For the China-Burma-India Theater, I recommend starting with three memoirs. The first is Herbert Yardley's *The Chinese Black Chamber: An Adventure in Espionage* (Hodder and Stoughton, 1984), based on Yardley's experience setting up a cryptanalysis program for the Chinese Nationalist government in Chonqgqing before Pearl Harbor. While heavier on gambling, boozing, and womanizing than actual intelligence work, Yardley's memoir is highly entertaining and revealing in its portrayal of the American racism that would undermine the Sino-U.S. alliance. Though not available in English-language translation yet, Huang Shang's *Guanyu Meiguo bing* [On American Soldiers, Shanghai 1946], which covers Huang's work as an interpreter stationed alongside U.S. forces, is the best on-the-ground account of wartime Sino-American relations. E.B. Sledge's *China Marine: An Infantryman's Life after World War II* (Oxford, 2003) covers the postwar Marine Corps occupation.

The most influential book about the Pacific War is probably still John Dower's *War Without Mercy: Race & Power in the Pacific War* (Pantheon, 1987). Although this study is nearly forty years old, it's still a great place to begin.

RL: Andrew Buchanan's article, "Globalizing the Second World War", became an instant classic when it was published in *Past & Present* in 2023 and is an excellent guide to the *idea* of the global war, that is to say the reason for thinking about the global *processes* in which the war was embedded and not merely the *international* dimensions of the fighting across multiple continents, which are obvious.

I also recommend Ernest Mandel's, *The Meaning of the Second World War* (1986) for an overview of the multifarious nature of the war—not just one conflict but five: the Soviet Union's war of self-defense against Nazi Germany; China's struggle for national liberation from Japan; the colonial freedom movements waged in Africa and Asia; partisan wars against fascism in Europe (including Jewish uprisings in the Warsaw, Krakow and Bialystok ghettoes as well as the 1944 revolts in the Treblinka and Auschwitz death camps) and the social revolutions and civil wars which raged alongside them; and, finally, the inter-imperial war between the great powers, which included Washington's ultimately successful drive for world hegemony.

Similar macro-level analyses include Adam Tooze's *The Deluge* (2014) which is the best history of the crisis of the interwar economic and geopolitical order, and essays by Daniel Hedinger and Reto Hoffman on the character of fascist imperialism. I also like David Reynold's essay on "the origin of the two world wars," which historicizes the naming conventions for the war in different parts of the world, revealing the different conceptions of what the war was fundamentally about for different states and peoples. For regional histories that help to shape the contours of the global war, Sarah Paine's *Wars for Asia* (2012) and Jeremy Yellen's *The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere* (2019) are essential, as are Ashley Jackson's *The British Empire and the Second World War* (2006) and the volume, *Africa and World War II*, edited by Judith Byfield, Carolyn Brown, Timothy Parsons and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga. My hope is that the book I recently co-edited with Andrew Buchanan, *The Greater Second World War* (2025), will be added to this list in due course.

7. For someone wanting to teach a course on World War II or emphasize World War II in an existing course on American foreign relations, what core texts (written or otherwise) would you suggest assigning?

BB: When I teach this war, I want students to understand its scope and scale, the tens of millions dead, the horror of combat and the face of human evil. I want them to

understand, as much as possible, the contexts in which people made impossibly difficult decisions. I want them to consider the different ways nations understood the world and saw their own interests within it. I want them to have some grasp of the war itself—battles and strategies, how it was fought. I want them to consider what it means, in terms of U.S. history, that the United States emerged from a war that left much of the world in ruins more prosperous and powerful than when it began. I want them to know that unity appears stronger in retrospect than it was in the moment. And I also want them to recognize the variety of experiences: that defense work was demanding and dangerous but not all sacrifice was equal, and that not all who served, fought. That's a lot.

But as to resources, before I get to books let me recommend the TeachingMilitaryHistory.com website that I created with Marjorie Galelli (Kansas State University), soon joined by Amy Rutenberg (Iowa State). It's a place for professors and instructors to share syllabi and assignments, and a place to look for inspiration. You can find syllabi for undergraduate World War II courses under the undergraduate - chronological tabs. The site includes contributions from exemplary scholar/teachers as well as a variety of approaches to the topic. And we are actively seeking contributions! Use the "contribute" tab on the site, or email Marjorie, Amy, or me.

And again, before I get to books: The American Soldier in World War II is an interactive digital archive of the qualitative responses to a large set of surveys conducted during World War II, offering 65,000 pages of uncensored responses to questions ranging from ground combat to war aims to race, gender, and the homefront. It's an amazing resource for teaching (and research), and we owe a great deal to Ed Gitre (Virginia Tech), who conceived, secured funding, built a team, and carried out this massive project, as well as to the thousands of volunteers who transcribed the hand-scrawled responses.

As to books: E. B. Sledge, *With the Old Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa*, is undeniably powerful. I like to pair it (perhaps excerpts) with the gentler and more reflective Samuel Hynes, *Flights of Passage: Reflections of a World War II Aviator*, as a way to suggest the variety of experiences in the U.S. war. To that end, as well: if you can get students to watch *The Best Years of Our Lives*, please do!

I've had success with Michael C.C. Adams's *The Best War Ever: America and World War II*, in part because its unrelenting negative-ness prompts students to engage, and in part because it allows me to help them see how a specific historical moment (in this case, the first Gulf War) may shape the questions historians ask.

I have a special fondness for George Roeder's *The Censored War: American Visual Experience during World War II*. Donna Knaff's *Beyond Rosie the Riveter: Women of World War II in American Popular Graphic Art* offers great lecture material and images. Honestly, I'm still a fan of a good textbook, as—used well—it can give students enough context to make classroom discussions more productive or offer instructors more freedom in creating lectures, because less pressure on coverage means more time to delve deep and challenge students to engage with the key problems at the heart of this war.

AB: I would like to answer these questions (6 and 7) together as I have already pointed to a number of books that, especially if read together, will give a great introduction to the Global Second World War. To these I would add the contemporary account by Leon Trotsky, written prior to his murder on Stalin's orders in August 1940. This commentary, available in the Pathfinder Press collection of his writings (and in the 1940 volume in particular), is very useful in thinking through the big questions of world politics as they unfolded during the 1930s.

For teaching the global world war, I would start—false modesty aside—with my own *World War II in Global Perspective* and *From World War to Postwar: Revolution, Cold War, Decolonization, and the Rise of American Hegemony, 1943-1958* (Bloomsbury, 2024). Both were written as introductory overviews for advanced-level undergraduates, graduate students, and interested general readers, and I assign the former as the textbook in my own classes on World War II. In addition, I would recommend assigning a broad range of articles designed to expose students to different experiences and points of view. I'm thinking, for example, of T. Morris-Suzuki's wonderful article on the wartime odyssey of Matsushita Kazutoshi, who fought in quick succession with Japan's Kwantung Army, the Guomindang and the Communist People's Liberation Army before being captured by U.S. forces in Korea in 1951. Matsushita's nine-year journey through East Asia illuminates the complex and protracted transition from war to postwar, expanding the temporal frame and connecting war and revolution across permeable borders and fluid loyalties. Other articles, such as Urvi Khaitan's account of women coal miners in colonial India, Reina Pennington's story of female combatants in the Soviet Red Army, or Tammy Biddle's shocking history of the Allied bombing of Dresden, present what are often vivid and unexpected new perspectives. Throughout, it is important to try to get students to set aside their national-centric assumptions and received understandings, at least for the duration of the class. With this in mind, David Reynolds "The Origins of the Two 'World Wars': Historical Discourse and International Politics," with its review of what 'World War II' is called in different parts of the world is a great place to start a class discussion!

SC: Again, this question is tricky, since these are two distinct pedagogical challenges. In a course specifically on World War II, some (if not all) of the books I listed in response to Q.6, or excerpts from them, might work very well. For an existing survey of U.S. foreign relations, I'd point to some articles that have engaged my students in the past, including: Laura McEnaney, "Nightmares on Elm Street: Demobilizing in Chicago, 1945–1953," *Journal of American History*, 92: 4 (March 2006); Thomas A. Guglielmo, "A Martial Freedom Movement: Black G.I.s' Political Struggles during World War II," *Journal of American History*, 104:4 (March 2018); Andrew Buchanan, "Globalizing the Second World War," *Past & Present*, 258:1 (February 2023); and (a salutary corrective in anticipation of rose-tinted 80th anniversary of VJ-Day festivities,) Brooke Blower, "V-J Day, 1945, Times Square" from *The Familiar Made Strange: American Icons and Artifacts after the Transnational Turn*, edited by Brooke L. Blower and Mark Philip Bradley (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015).

I would advocate incorporation of visual material into any course on World War II. There's a super-abundance from which to choose. With appropriate contextualization, an instructor might screen Frank Capra's Know Your Enemy: Japan (1945) to dramatize the extreme racialization of an Asian "enemy Other"; or to illustrate how U.S. authorities rationalized strategic bombing, as well as the emotional strain aerial warfare exerted on ground crew members "sweating it out" and on aircrew, William Wyler's, *Memphis Belle* (1944). To highlight the psychological toll of war on service personnel, and how Americans understood "invisible injuries" before PTSD was recognised as a diagnosis, I recommend John Huston's Let There Be Light (1946). Writing this for a 20 January deadline, I'm struck that Dorothea Lange's photographs of so-called Japanese-American "relocation centers" may resonate eerily with students confronting a new age of mass detentions and

deportations. And since I can never say enough in praise of the Veterans History Project at the Library of Congress, I'll also highlight an oral history interview with a Japanese American veteran, John Junji Katsu, who, having been released from incarceration to serve with the U.S. army in postwar Germany, surmounted the experience of injustice with extraordinary grace.

To conclude, I should also note that, in formulating my responses, I decided not to include literature on the Holocaust on the grounds that doing so would require 7 further questions. But anyone teaching a course on World War II would, of course, need to decide how to integrate Nazi policies and practices of genocide into their curriculum.

ZF: The Overy account is too long for undergrads, but any other book mentioned above would be suitable. I've had good experiences assigning the three memoirs listed in question six, but for a more general World War II survey, I'd recommend Sledge's *With the Old Breed: At Pelilieu and Okinawa* (Presidio, 1981) over *China Marine* because of its coverage of the Pacific War.

For other primary sources, I recommend beginning with the Veterans History Project at the U.S. Library of Congress. This repository includes a tremendous number of digitized oral histories, diaries, and letters from World War II, which make great material for student research papers. But the oral histories range widely in usefulness. Start with Jan Alonzo Peeke for the CBI Theater.

The U.S. military's country handbooks for soldiers, the "Pocket Guides," make great in-class primary sources. Examples include *A Short Guide to Great Britain*, *A Pocket Guide to China*, *A Pocket Guide to India*. Written by the Army Service Forces, these pamphlets are usually available online.

RL: Since I suggested some foundational secondary texts in the previous answer, I'll use this one to add a few visual and literary sources which I have found helpful in my efforts to get students to grasp the global dimensions of the war with which they are less familiar. In dramatizing the stakes of the "wars within the war" in different parts of the world, these sources do a good job of encouraging students to escape triumphant nationalist narratives. This seems to me especially important when teaching the Second World War in the United States, where it remains extremely difficult to overcome tired tropes about the "surprise attack" at Pearl Harbor and Moscow's evil designs for world revolution, and where students know (and generally care) very little about the war and its "ragged ends" outside of Europe—in places like the Persian Gulf, East Africa, the "revolutionary crescent" of Southeast Asia, and the Chinese interior, where many large and largely unknown land battles were fought by Chiang's armies.

There are a number of wonderful films which bring these less familiar theatres of the war to life. Many of them are resolutely nationalist in framing and scope—but in ways that are endlessly productive because they place American convictions about the nature and purpose of the war in context. These include: a moving depiction of the American strategic bombing of Japan (*Grave of the Fireflies*), the aftermath of the nuclear bombings (*Rhapsody in August*), the Japanese offensives in China (*Devils on the Doorstep*), the suffering of Soviet partisans (*The Ascent*), the depredations of the German occupation of Belarus (*Come and See*), the forced labor of British P.O.W's (*Bridge on the River Kwai*), the sexual violence of the Allied occupation of Italy (*La Pelle*), the experience of colonial African soldiers in the French Army (*Days of Glory* and *Camp de Thiaroyé).* Documentary footage can add additional real-life dimensions to such films, like Rey Scott's *Kukan*, which features an extended 20-minute scene depicting the Japanese bombing of Chongqing.

I have also made extensive use of novels to capture the surreal quality of wartime violence, especially those atrocities, like sexual violence, which have historically been described as "unspeakable." The graphic novel, *Grass,* which tells the story of a young Korean girl pressed into sexual slavery, is an important text in this category. I also regularly use the novels of fascist writer Curzio Malaparte—*The Skin, Kaputt,* and *The Volga Rises in Europe*—whose ability to capture the absurdity of wartime violence is truly unique; his satire, which sits alongside extraordinarily brutal depictions of violence in the "shatter zones" of war beyond the front lines, is as troubling and confusing as it is richly evocative.

Finally, I want to give a nod to the short and often informal, but endlessly fascinating, writings of Adam Tooze on various aspects of the Second World War, which students find both thought-provoking and accessible. These include a 2017 essay on the logistics of D-Day ("Blitzkrieg Manqué or a New Kind of War?") and a talk on the MG42 Machine Gun—an audio recording with powerpoint slides to boot.

Call for Proposals to host the 2028 SHAFR Annual Conference

Every other year, SHAFR holds its annual meeting in a location other than the Washington, D.C., area. The SHAFR Council would like to hear from members interested in hosting the conference in late June 2028 and is especially interested in hearing proposals from people who would like to host the conference on their campus or at their institution with affordable meeting and housing facilities.

In an effort to provide as much lead time as possible for negotiating with hotels and other facilities, the deadline for submission of applications is **September 1, 2025,** which will allow Council to consider them at its fall meeting. Please send proposals that address the items listed below to SHAFR executive director Richard Immerman (Richard.Immerman@shafr.org).

General Information about the Potential Host City

Please provide a general description of the local area in your proposal: Why is it attractive as a potential site for a SHAFR conference? Has it ever hosted a SHAFR conference in the past? If so, when? Is it home to long-time SHAFR members or important programs in the field? Does it possess research facilities that might be appealing to SHAFR members? Are there local attractions (historic and otherwise) that would appeal to our members? Is it a family-friendly venue with attractions of particular interest to children?

What sorts of venues are available for the usual evening social event (normally held on Friday), either within the potential host city or nearby? Are they accessible to persons with disabilities? And what sort of local transportation companies are available for transportation to and from the social event site? Is disability-accessible public transportation an option? What about on-site parking for attendees who might wish to drive?

Specific Information about Local Arrangements Committee

Please provide information about who specifically will be responsible for local arrangements in the host city. Because hosting the annual conference is a significant responsibility, most recent non-D.C. conferences have relied on a coalition of local and regional hosts from different institutions and organizations (colleges and universities, museums, university presses, other historically based organizations, etc.). Potential hosts are encouraged to think broadly about local and regional partners.

Please also provide information about potential contributions (financial or otherwise) from partnering institutions/organizations. While there is no standard for these sorts of contributions, in the past they have included funds to provide general support for the conference and subsidies to offset the cost of speakers, facility rental/AV costs, refreshment breaks, and the conference social event. Council also welcomes information about potential in-kind support.

Conference Lodging

Feedback from members following the 2022 conference in New Orleans indicated a desire for both hotel lodging that is walkable to the conference site as well as affordable housing (such as dormitory housing). SHAFR works with a professional broker to negotiate hotel contracts for its annual meetings. Therefore potential hosts are not expected to handle arrangements themselves, but Council does want them to provide information about the availability of suitable hotel facilities. In keeping with the recent work of SHAFR's Conference Committee, potential hotels and all other facilities for the conference must be fully accessible for persons with disabilities. Pre-pandemic, non-D.C. SHAFR hotel contracts provided for a block of 150 rooms (half singles, half doubles, and a couple of suites) for Wednesday and Saturday nights and 180 rooms for Thursday and Friday nights. Potential hosts can use those numbers as a guide when formulating their proposals.

Conference Session Rooms

Although the format of each SHAFR conference is a little different, past conference schedules suggest that potential host sites should contain sufficient rooms to allow for at least 10 concurrent panels during any given time slot, with some conferences including up to 12 sessions at any given time. Potential host sites should therefore have sufficient, suitable session rooms for the full run of the conference (usually Thursday mid-day through the end of the day on Saturday).

Plenary Session Room/Reception Space

We usually need a room to accommodate an opening plenary session, which is sometimes held in the late afternoon but more often in the evening of the opening day of the conference. Past conferences have often utilized a hotel ballroom or similar space for this event.

Space is also needed for the evening welcome reception, also normally held on Thursday. If this event is to be held immediately following the plenary session, a separate space will be required. If sufficient time is available for staff to turn around the plenary session space for the reception, then it could be held in the same place. If not, then a second location must be secured.

Exhibit and Registration Space

A large, easily accessible, common space—such as a large foyer or hallway--is needed to house the conference registration as well as 8-12 exhibitors—preferably in the same shared space--for the duration of the conference. This space is also generally used for the afternoon breaks.

Breakfast and Luncheon Rooms

Space is needed each morning for continental breakfast, and for catered luncheons on Friday and Saturday. The SHAFR Presidential Address is delivered at one of the luncheons; the SHAFR president arranges for a keynote speaker for the other. Information about catering costs and arrangements is appreciated but not required at this point.

Business Meeting Rooms

The Society usually utilizes at least one business meeting room that can accommodate 15-18 people for the *Diplomatic History* editorial board meeting Friday morning and other committee meetings during the conference.

Transportation

In an effort to make travel to the annual conference as convenient as possible, the SHAFR Council prefers host locations that are easily accessible via air. Potential hosts should therefore provide information about airport facilities, including distance from potential conference hotels and event sites, number and specific airlines providing service (including international service), local transportation options between the airport and hotel/event sites (taxi, bus, metro/subway), etc. If potential conference hotels provide complimentary shuttle service, please note that in the proposal as well.

SHAFR SPOTLIGHTS

Alistair Hobson

I grew up in Urbana, Illinois. As the oldest of seven kids, I became good at babysitting at a young age. When I was growing up, I was sequentially obsessed with music, then sports: first baseball, then basketball, then tennis. My interest in history came first through my excitement about music history. Since my musician parents were playing music all the time, I was engulfed in it and I became fascinated by the major composers and loved comparing their styles. Despite continuing to love history in high school, I was somehow confused about what to do when I arrived at college, and so I became a chemistry major. It didn't take long, though, for me to get drawn back to history through classes on the Renaissance and Reformation with Dr. Craig Koslofsky (U of I). And so I finished undergrad as a history major, concentrating on early modern European history. After college I was teaching tennis at a sports club in Chicago and somehow that environment confirmed for me that the best way to try to comprehend our strange world was through history. And so off I went to graduate school, fortunately at Northwestern. My most recent publication is "A lot of People Watching: Understanding the Theater of Terrorism," in *Diplomatic History* (September 2023).

What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?

My top three movies I'd say are *Amadeus, Adaptation*, and the TV show: *The Americans*.

What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

Presenting a conference paper after being unable to sleep the night before . . . it's happened a couple of times.

You are exiled to a desert island and can only take five novels. What do you take and why?

I'd say *Infinite Jest, The Count of Monte Cristo, Wuthering Heights, Moby Dick,* and *War and Peace.* *The Count of Monte Cristo* for fun, but also inspiration. *Wuthering Heights* because I'll forget about my exile for a while. Infinite Jest and War and Peace because, I presume, I'd have time to read some great tomes on the island. And *Moby Dick* to mix things up.

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

This is tough. Obviously, there are hundreds on this list. But for now I'd say Ghassan Kanafani, the Palestinian author, because he expressed so much passion through his novels. I'd love to hear about his passion in person. John Dewey because I'd like to hear something hopeful about American democracy while we ate. And Anna Freud, because my guess is that she'd be a good conversationalist.

What would you do if you won the $750 million Powerball?

I'd travel the world and go to every library and archive that would let me in for a couple years. Then I'd come home and build a Frank Lloyd Wright-style rare-book library with a coffee shop and boulangerie attached to it, but one that did not play any music and the only rule was that you had to go off the property to look at or use any Apple products. I'd get all my friends and family season tickets to every musical and sporting event they wanted to go to for five years. Whatever was left over, I'd donate to as many public libraries as I could.

You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

No question about it: Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, Chopin, Brahms and Rachmaninov. I'd get them Steinways, some batons, and a well-practiced full orchestra and tell them to just do their thing.

What are five things on your bucket list?

Go to Wimbledon, go to the French Open, see an opera at La Scala, make the perfect pasta Milanese, drink a hot chocolate in Oaxaca.

What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

I'd be an aspiring writer with multiple day and night jobs.

I grew up in a smallish town in North Idaho. I worked summer jobs for the U.S. Forest Service – everything from surveying hiking trails (awesome) to cleaning pit toilets (not so much). I also spent one summer as a deckhand on a commercial salmon troller in Alaska. I loved history from the time I was a kid. After some initial hesitation in college, when I was taking STEM and political science classes, I majored in history and went from there. Now, I'm an Associate Professor of History and Director of Graduate Studies at the University of Missouri. I live in Columbia, MO with my partner Emily. I've published one book, *Oil Powers: A History of the U.S.-Saudi Alliance* (2020). I'm working on another, about the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission's attempts to "frack" for natural gas in the 1960s and 1970s, but with nuclear explosives instead of pressurized water. (In case you're wondering, it mostly worked, but the gas was radioactive, and the process cost too much.)

Victor McFarland

What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?

My favorite movie is Hou Hsiao-hsien's *The Assassin*. Just gorgeous images – every shot, every color is perfect. Amazing sound design. And such interesting pacing, a wuxia film defined by stillness instead of action.

I grew up without a TV, so I didn't get into watching shows until college and grad school. Two important ones were *Friends* and *Lost*—not great art, but I'm glad I caught the tail end of real mass TV culture. It was the last time everyone seemed to be watching the same thing and talking about it the next morning.

The first TV shows I watched start-to-finish on DVD or streaming were *The Wire, Breaking Bad,* and *Mad Men.* I recently ran into a grad school classmate and fellow SHAFRite, Kate Unterman, who reminded me what an evangelist I'd been for *Breaking Bad* when it first aired. The best recent TV series, I think, is *My Brilliant Friend.* As a huge fan of the books, I was skeptical at first, and the show took about half a season to hit its stride – but after that, it's fantastic. Not quite the same as the novels, but great in its own right.

What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

Being followed by Bashar al-Assad's security services. Damascus, summer 2008.

You are exiled to a desert island and can only take five novels. What do you take and why?

I'll cheat a little and count Elena Ferrante's Neapolitan series as one big novel – my favorite books published in the last couple of decades. Another choice that maximizes reading time per pick is Leo Tolstoy's *War and Peace*. I don't love his philosophy of history, but Tolstoy's characterization and narrative is impossible to top. I'd bring Karl Ove Knausgaard's *A Time for Everything*; the first half, a retelling of the Noah's Ark story in nineteenth-century Norway, is the best climate fiction no one thinks of as cli-fi. Reading about the apocalyptically rising seas would, at least, make me grateful for my little island, high and dry. Plus, the gray, rainy, cold Norwegian setting would make for some nice escapism in the desert heat. For my fourth pick, Tayeb Salih's *Season of Migration to the North.* The writing is stunning, and I could bring it in the original to try to keep up my Arabic. I first encountered that book as an undergraduate having to look up every other word in my Hans Wehr dictionary. And last, Nicola Griffith's *Menewood*. I just got it as a holiday present, after waiting years for the sequel to Hild, and I'm about one-fifth of the way through. If I had to leave for the desert island today, it would drive me nuts if I didn't know what happened next.

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

Marcus Gavius Apicius, Vitellius, and Jie of Xia. They'd bring some amazing dishes. But even though Apicius, Vitellius, and Jie could command people to make lakes of wine and import the rarest delicacies, I could still blow their minds by introducing them to post-Columbian Exchange foods. It would be worth it to see the looks on their faces the first time they tried a tomato, bourbon, or chocolate – let alone a potato chip.

What would you do if you won the $750 million Powerball?

Become a cleantech venture capitalist.

You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

I'd rather use the time machine to visit musicians in their own eras. Wouldn't it be incredible to hear American popular music as each new genre was being created, being part of an audience experiencing something original for the first time? St. Louis around 1900, New Orleans sometime in the next decade or two, Memphis in the 1920s and again in the early-to-mid 1950s, New York in the mid-1970s, Seattle around 1990. Grunge doesn't rank with those other genres for lasting impact, but growing up in the Northwest in the mid-1990s, I was acutely aware that I'd missed the chance to see Nirvana and Soundgarden in their heyday. That was the stuff that the cool older kids listened to, but I was born just a little too late.

What are five things on your bucket list?

Pronounce the French "R" correctly. Publish a sci-fi/fantasy novel. Learn to scuba dive. Get an EV and fully electrify our house. We already have an induction stove and love it, but there's still a gas boiler in our basement. Pull up the last of the invasive wintercreeper in the backyard. We've been at it for five years now and still have a long way to go – that stuff is like the Terminator!

What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

As you might have guessed from the last question, when I was growing up, I dreamed about writing fantasy books. It didn't seem very achievable. But if I were starting out in academia today, becoming the next George R.R. Martin might be a more realistic career plan than landing a tenure-track job.

If I hadn't entered a PhD program, my other post-college option was going to law school—ideally to practice environmental law.



2025 SHAFR ANNUAL MEETING

RENAISSANCE ARLINGTON CAPITAL VIEW

Arlington, VA

June 26 - 28, 2025

KEYNOTE ADDRESS: MAGGIE BLACKHAWK
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

BERNATH LECTURE: ELISABETH LEAKE
TUFTS UNIVERSITY

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: MELANI MCALISTER
GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

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SHAFR 2025 Annual Meeting, June 26-28, 2025, Arlington, Virginia

Updates from Program Co-Chairs Jayita Sarkar (University of Glasgow) & Aileen Teague (Texas A&M)

An International Program Committee

The SHAFR 2025 program co-chairs, Jayita Sarkar (University of Glasgow) and Aileen Teague (Texas A&M) put together an intellectually vibrant and international program committee for selecting proposals for the SHAFR 2025 Annual Meeting. This committee of 13 members, including a graduate student representative, comprises scholars at various stages in their careers, who are longtime SHAFR members as well as those who are new to our organization, those based in North America and the United Kingdom, but also in continental Europe and Southern Africa. Continuing with the goal to maintain the international character of our association, the program co-chairs are also including a coffee break during the 2025 annual meeting, provisionally titled, "A Global SHAFR," to get SHAFR members from across the world mingle with the U.S.-based members at the conference hotel site.

Themes, Anniversaries, and Co-Sponsored Panels

The SHAFR 2025 program will highlight several **anniversaries**, including but not limited to the 50th anniversary of the end of Vietnam War, 100 years of the Geneva Protocol, and 80 years of the end of the Second World War, and involve thematic curation involving **themes** such as belonging, territoriality, genocide, environment/extraction, and others. In addition, in order to showcase the intellectual heterogeneity of our members' scholarship, the program will feature panels co-sponsored with the following professional organizations: the UK-based Historians of the Twentieth Century United States (HOTCUS) and British American Nineteen Century Historians (BrANCH), as well as the Business History Conference (BHC), Peace History Society (PHS), Society for Military History (SMH), and others. The program co-chairs are also in conversation with NAISA or Native American and Indigenous Studies Association (NAISA) and African American Intellectual History Society (AAIHS) for potentially co-sponsoring panels or special events at the 2025 SHAFR annual meeting.

Special Events

In addition to the **Presidential Address** by Melani McAlister (Professor of American Studies and International Affairs at George Washington University), **Bernath Lecture** by Elisabeth Leake (Lee E. Dirks Professor in Diplomatic History and Associate Professor of History, Tufts University), and **SHAFR awards ceremony**, the 2025 annual meeting features several special events.

We are delighted to host Maggie Blackhawk (Professor of Law, New York University) for the **keynote** to foreground connections involving law, foreign relations, and Indigenous histories. For our **plenary policy panel**, on the "day after war", we have invited experts to speak about the War on Drugs, Ukraine, Afghanistan, and Gaza. These specialists include Aaron O'Connell (University of Texas, Austin), Sara Roy (Harvard University) and a policymaker and policy analyst. SHAFR 2025 will also host a **series editors' panel** to showcase the various book series in which SHAFR historians publish, and to demystify the publishing process from series editors' perspectives.

Taking advantage of our location in 2025, we even have a private museum tour (on a first-come, first-served basis) of the exhibit, "Giving in America," at the **Smithsonian National Museum of American History** led by David M. Rubenstein Curator of Philanthropy, Amanda Moniz. We are also screening the documentary, ***Soundtrack to a Coup d'Etat*** (2024) on jazz and decolonization of Congo, followed by a discussion.

Career Workshop and Experts' Panel

As a new initiative, SHAFR 2025 will be hosting a multi-pathways jobs mentoring workshop. Given the variety of careers that historians pursue and the transferable nature of skills that history PhDs have, a multi-pathways approach is timely and essential so that SHAFR is able to provide its members with the much-needed guidance to navigate the job market, broadly defined. We are planning to have 15-21 mentors in total with mentors divided almost equally across three sectors: (a) academia with an emphasis on policy schools, business schools, law schools; (b) policy with emphasis on thinktanks, consulting, nonprofit; and (c) government. The mentoring workshop will be followed by an experts' panel on various career options suitable for history PhDs.

2024 SHAFR Dissertation Research Grant Award Winners

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

This year's Bernath Lecture committee (Paul Chamberlin, Thomas Field, and Kelly Shannon) has selected Professor **Amanda Demmer** of Virginia Tech University to receive the 2025 Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize. An award-winning scholar and teacher, Professor Demmer's two major research projects highlight some of the most exciting new developments in foreign relations history. Her 2022 book, After Saigon's Fall, has been widely acclaimed as one of the best recent examples of how to cross analyze histories diplomacy and migration. Meanwhile, her current project on Ginetta Sagan demonstrates Demmer's sustained interest in the diplomatic agency of nonstate actors while further historicizing our understanding of the contested realm of international human rights. Her work promises to shed a clarifying light on how developments in the 1970s came to define our times. Furthermore, she is a rising star who is sure to point the way for the next generation of foreign relations historians.



The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Research Grant ($4,000)

David Kerry, a student working at Yale University under the direction of Ned Blackhawk, submitted for his dissertation, "American Imperium: Wardship and the Making of American Empire." It examines how, from the late-nineteenth century until the mid-twentieth century, U.S. officials "utilized various conceptions of wardship to structure and govern colonized territories" that included those in the American West as well as the Philippines and Puerto Rico (and three others). He argues the work will prove there was "no singular conception or category of 'wardship' that was universally operable throughout American territories." Kerry will use the Bernath Grant to fund trips to the National Archives in San Francisco and College Park for materials on American Samoa, Puerto Rico, Alaska, and the Philippines.

The W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship ($4,000)

Shelby Jones is a PhD candidate at Purdue University working with Stacy Holden, where she is researching U.S. foreign relations with the late Ottoman Empire, focusing particularly on the role of the diplomat, Lew Wallace. She not only traces the career of Wallace and his impacts on political relations with Istanbul, but also the ways in which Ottoman officials and local American missionaries engaged with him, developing various cross-cultural exchanges. She reveals the ways in which such early U.S. state and non-state actors had long-term impacts on U.S. relations with Turkey and other former parts of the Ottoman Empire. The Holt funds will be used to support several months of archival research in Türkiye.

The Lawrence Gelfand–Armin Rappaport–Walter LaFeber Dissertation Fellowship ($4,000)

Brittany Gittus is a doctoral student at the University of Oxford. Her dissertation title is: 'Some Definite Organisation apart from the League': Geopolitical Challenges and Multilateral Alternatives to the League of Nations, 1935-1939." The thesis argues that the effort to move multilateralism beyond the League of Nations was not the first of the interwar period and would not be its last. The research further questions whether the competition or collaboration that existed between such bodies strengthened or weakened the League and interrogates how they did so. At a time of turbulence in the global order, with ongoing debates as to whether new bodies, such as the G20, undermine the UNO, these questions have contemporary relevance as well as historical importance. The comparative and transnational methodology of this thesis allows for a critical intervention in the historiography and the broader literature on the League of Nations. Gittus plans to use her award to conduct further research at the National Archives in College Park, Columbia University, the [Franklin] Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum in Poughkeepsie, NY, and Harvard University Archives.

The Michael J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) has awarded this year's Michael J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship to **Zachary Tayler**, a Ph.D. student in the Department of History at Ohio University. He will use the $4,000 fellowship to study Vietnamese at the University of Wisconsin, building on the Vietnamese language courses that he has already taken in the last two years. Additional language training will let Tayler incorporate Vietnamese-language sources into his dissertation on U.S.-Vietnamese relations from 1975 to 1995. The fellowship committee was impressed with this ambitious project, which promises to shed new light on the diplomatic engagement between Hanoi and Washington following the end of the Vietnam War. Congratulations to Zachary Tayler on becoming the 2025 recipient of the Hogan Fellowship.

The William Appleman Williams Emerging Scholars Research Grants

Addison Jensen received her Ph.D. from the University of California, Santa Barbara in 2024. She is currently an Assistant Professor of Twentieth Century United States History at Montana State University. In her project, "Blowing in the Wind: Media, Counterculture, and the American Military in Vietnam," Jensen situates the experiences of American servicemembers during the Vietnam War against the backdrop of the stateside countercultural movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Her nuanced approach connects the experience of U.S. troops in Vietnam with the history of contemporary domestic social movements. Antiwar and countercultural impulses that arose in the domestic socio-political environment ultimately permeated the armed forces and undermined the government's ability to continue to wage war. Jensen makes excellent use of both archival records as well as an array of oral history interviews. This well-developed project has the potential to become an important monograph ($2,000).

Ian Seavey received his Ph.D. from Texas A&M University in 2024. He is currently an Assistant Professor in the School of Interdisciplinary Programs and Community Engagement at the University of Texas, Rio Grande Valley. In his project, "Huracán del Norte: Disasters and U.S. Colonialism in Twentieth Century Puerto Rico," Seavey embraces recent calls to put environmental history broadly, and disaster history specifically, into direct conversation with the study of U.S. empire. Based on multilingual archival sources, Seavey analyzes U.S. responses to disasters in Puerto Rico, finding that the policies implemented had the effect of increasing Puerto Rican dependence while simultaneously leaving the island more vulnerable to future disasters. The promising project spans the twentieth to the twenty-first centuries. ($1,000)

The Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grants

Alexandra Southgate is a PhD candidate at Temple University mentored by Petra Goedde. Her dissertation, "Speak Truth to Power: Transnational Quaker Activism, 1945-1975" analyzes the work of U.S., British, and Canadian Quakers as they engaged in international religious activism during the Cold War. The committee found her discussion of their humanitarian and anti-war organizing insightful, in particular her analysis of their shift from apolitical humanitarian aid to political advocacy, plus the multi-archival research, and deep understanding of the intertwined histories of religion, diplomacy, and pacifism. Southgate will use the SHAFR grant to study the work of Quaker internationalists at the Library of the Society of Friends in London. ($2,800)

Nicolas Allen is a PhD candidate at Stony Brook University mentored by Eric Zolov. His dissertation – "The Masters' Voice: the U.S. Recording Industry in Vargas-Era Brazil (1930-1950)" – promises to be a masterful political and cultural history of the U.S. recording industry in Brazil during the populist regime of Getúlio Vargas. In writing this history of cultural exchange, Allen seeks to move beyond the narrative of cultural imperialism to better understand how U.S. companies brought Brazilian "music culture" to domestic audiences. He will use the SHAFR grant to analyze popular magazines and government memos found in the archives of the Instituto Moreira Salles and Getúlio Vargas Foundation in São Paolo. Allen will use his Bemis award to do further research in U.S. record company archives in Brazil. ($3,500)

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Rashida Shafiq is a PhD candidate at Southern Methodist University, under the direction of Jeffrey Engel. Her dissertation, "From Toledo to Tamil Nadu: Gloria Steinem, India, and the Cold War, 1957-1963," examines the ways in which Steinem's experiences in India challenge notions of Western feminist exceptionalism. Steinem's thought and practice were informed by interactions with a range of Indian activists, revealing a bidirectional flow of ideas that ultimately rooted her feminist thought in transnational dialogues, even as Steinem also inadvertently benefited from covert U.S. funding. The SHAFR Bemis grant will help defray research travel expenses to the Arthur Schlesinger Library and Columbia University as well as for hiring a local researcher in India to avoid being a Muslim woman traveling there alone. ($3,700)

Emma Herman is a Ph.D. student in history at Harvard University. Her dissertation is "Indian Country is a Place: Sovereignty, Law, and the Making and Unmaking of Oklahoma,1871-1934." Her thesis excavates the social, legal, and spatial relationships of U.S. and Native citizens in Indian Territory and Oklahoma Territory from the U.S.-imposed "end" of treaty making in 1871, through the creation of the state of Oklahoma in 1907, to the formal reconstitution of tribal governments with the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934. She positions Indian Territory as a late 19th and early 20th century borderland, extending the work that scholars of early America and historians of the American West have done to recenter the importance of Native nations in shaping the course of European and American settlement in North America. U.S./Native relations are international relations, despite the efforts of U.S. politicians and federal officials in the last decades of the nineteenth century—through boarding schools, blood quantum laws, and the forced privatization of tribal lands through the General Allotment (Dawes) Act—to extinguish Native identities and polities. Herman's use of the Bemis Grant will be focused on research travel expenses for work at the Oklahoma Historical Society. ($2,000)



Issay Matsumoto, a doctoral student at the University of Southern California working under the guidance of Lon Kurashige, is working on a dissertation, "Aloha, Incorporated: Trans-Pacific Capitalism and the Rise of Tourism in Hawai'i." It "tells the story of the rise of the service economy in Hawai'i through the eyes of a multiracial cast of local actors whose labor wove the island on the edge of the American empire into the broader trans-Pacific world." Through looking at laborers that included everyone from hotel housekeepers to lei vendors, Matsumoto seeks to show how "residents at the center of this transformation reconstituted grassroots politics across the Pacific, building complex solidarities that challenged, yet just as often sustained official efforts to incorporate life, labor, and ecology into the tourism industry." The SHAFR Bemis funds will be used for travel and research expenses to the Hawai'i State Archives and the Library of Congress. ($2,000)

Michael McGalliard is a PhD candidate at UC-San Diego mentored by Mark Hendrickson. His dissertation – "A Farewell to Arms? U.S. Debates over War and Militarism in the 1920s and 1930s" – analyzes largely forgotten grassroots student, women's, and religious anti-war activism and the government response to it, including bipartisan support from a sympathetic Congress. Connecting issues from disarmament to U.S. occupations in the Caribbean and Central America to the League of Nations, the debates over militarism offer a window into the wide spectrum of political beliefs and sharp divides that inform the U.S. peace movement in the interwar period. McGalliard will use the SHAFR grant to visit the archives found at Swarthmore College's Peace Collection. ($2,000)

Jack Werner, a Ph.D. student at the University of Maryland-College Park working under the guidance of Julie Greene, takes a different focus than many historians of U.S. foreign relations with the dissertation, "Ableist Empire: U.S. Colonialism, Disability, and Labor in the United States and the Philippines, 1898-1916." He plans to show "how racial ideas were mobilized between the United States and the Philippines," particularly related to disability beyond the rhetoric of what constituted ability to examine the healthcare provided to those sick in the colony including Filipinos, whites, and African Americans. The goal is to show it moved beyond race to show "disability as a category of analysis that broadens our understanding of the social, political, and cultural transformations wrought by U.S. colonial rule." Werner intends to use the SHAFR Bemis Grant to support further research in multiple Philippine archives. ($2,000)

Yuan Yan is a PhD candidate at the University of Cambridge working with Andrew Preston, where she is completing her dissertation, "Between Knowledge and Power: Sinologists and the United States' China Policy (1949-79)." In her work, she explores how Sinologists served as intermediaries between the government and the public, informing both foreign policy and popular conceptions. These "middlemen" had unique opportunities to undertake "intellectual diplomacy," with ramifications for both academia and government. This Bemis Grant will be used to defray research expenses to the University of Madison and the Nixon Presidential Library. ($2,000)



SHAFR Code of Conduct

SHAFR is committed to fostering an environment free from discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. Our organization's collective professional and intellectual pursuits can only be realized when we treat one another with dignity and respect. To this end, SHAFR prohibits discrimination or harassment on the basis of sex, gender identity, gender expression, and sexual orientation, race or ethnicity, color, age, religion, disability, national origin, or immigration status. SHAFR also prohibits all forms of unwanted physical contact, including assault. The protections and prohibitions in this policy extend to any guests and members participating in SHAFR-sponsored events. All members and participants, including employees, contractors, vendors, volunteers, and guests, are expected to engage in professional and respectful behavior and to preserve common standards of professionalism.

The following policy pertains to all SHAFR activities, including events associated with SHAFR conferences and any SHAFR-related business occurring throughout the year. It encompasses interactions in person, by telephone, and by electronic communication, as well as behavior that occurs outside of official conference venues during SHAFR conferences.

Sexual Harassment. SHAFR has absolutely no tolerance for sexual harassment. Sexual harassment is behavior (speech or actions) in formal or informal settings that demeans, humiliates, or threatens an individual on the basis of their sex, gender, gender expression, or sexual orientation. Sexual harassment can also take nonsexual forms and includes discriminatory remarks or actions based on an individual's sex, gender, gender expression, or sexual orientation. Sexual harassment includes unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal comment or physical conduct of a sexual nature, including situations in which the request or conduct involves any implied or expressed promise of professional reward for complying; or the request or conduct involves any implied or expressed threat of reprisal or denial of opportunity for refusing to comply; or the request or conduct results in what reasonably may be perceived as a hostile or intimidating environment. Sexual harassment does not refer to occasional compliments of a socially acceptable nature or consensual personal and social relationships without discriminatory effect. It refers to behavior that reasonably situated persons would regard as not welcome and as personally intimidating, hostile, or offensive. According to U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines, the victim of harassment can be anyone affected by the offensive conduct, not just the individual at whom the conduct is directed.

Sexual Misconduct. SHAFR has absolutely no tolerance for other forms of sexual misconduct. Sexual misconduct is a broad term encompassing any unwelcome behavior of a sexual nature that is committed without consent or by force, intimidation, coercion, or manipulation. Sexual misconduct can be committed by a person of any gender, and it can occur between people of the same or different genders. Sexual misconduct may vary in its severity and consists of a range of behavior or attempted behavior. It can occur between strangers or acquaintances, including people involved in an intimate or sexual relationship. It includes but is not limited to: sexual assault (a continuum of conduct from forcible intercourse to nonphysical forms of pressure that compel individuals to engage in sexual activity against their will); sexual exploitation (taking nonconsensual, unjust, or abusive sexual advantage of another person); and sexual intimidation (threatening another person that you will commit a sex act against them or engaging in indecent exposure).

Consent. For the purposes of this policy, consent is a freely and affirmatively communicated willingness to participate in particular sexual activity or behavior, expressed either by words or clear, unambiguous actions. Consent can be withdrawn at any time, and, by definition, a person is incapable of consent if the person is unable to understand the facts, nature, extent, or implications of the situation and/or if the person is incapacitated, which includes incapacitation by extreme intoxication, drug use, mental disability, or being unconscious. Critically, the person initiating a particular sexual activity or behavior bears the responsibility of receiving consent. In examining the existence of consent under this policy, SHAFR will seek to determine, in view of the totality of the circumstances, whether a reasonable person would conclude that the recipient of the initiated sexual activity or behavior was (a) capable of consenting and (b) affirmatively communicated consent to the sexual activity or behavior at issue by words or clear, unambiguous actions.

Harassment. SHAFR has absolutely no tolerance for harassment. Harassment is behavior (speech or actions) in formal or informal settings that demeans, humiliates, or threatens an individual on the basis of their race or ethnicity, color, age, religion, disability, national origin, or immigration status. Harassment can include

discriminatory remarks or actions based on an individual's race or ethnicity, color, age, religion, disability, national origin, or immigration status. Harassment refers to behavior that reasonably situated persons would regard as not welcome and as personally intimidating, hostile, or offensive. According to U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines, the victim of harassment can be anyone affected by the offensive conduct, not just the individual at whom the conduct is directed.

Retaliation against a complainant of sexual harassment or other forms of sexual misconduct a person who reports harassment, sexual misconduct, or other behavior that violates these policies is also a violation of these policies.

Members and other conference attendees should be aware that their home institution's policies (such as Title IX) may require them to report allegations of sexual harassment or other forms of sexual misconduct involving people affiliated with their institution. SHAFR reserves the right to respond truthfully to authorized inquiries received from a member's employer concerning allegations, proceedings, and outcomes under this policy.

This policy will be clearly and prominently displayed on the SHAFR website. All participants in the annual meeting and anyone obtaining or renewing a SHAFR membership will be required during the registration process formally to acknowledge the policy and their responsibility to abide by it.

Complaints

SHAFR will designate a complaints team that will be available to receive complaints from, describe reporting procedures to, provide advice on resources to, and discuss issues with participants in any SHAFR-sanctioned activity who have experienced or witnessed violations of this policy. The team's contact information will be made available on the SHAFR website and in annual meeting registration materials. Neither the team nor any other SHAFR official can provide legal advice to those who make reports under this policy.

Members, staff, or guests who in good faith believe that they have been aggrieved by or witnessed conduct prohibited by this policy should contact the SHAFR complaints team. SHAFR will review each report and endeavor to respond proportionally and fairly. Responses may range from informal resolutions agreed to by the parties to investigations conducted by trained external investigators. SHAFR reserves the right to take interim steps during an event, such as removing the policy violator from the conference or a narrowly tailored "no contact" directive between the parties.

Annual Report

The Executive Director will prepare an annual report of complaints or other evidence of policy violations (with no names used). The report will be circulated to the full Council at the January meeting and made available to the membership on request. The report may also identify how many reports were received, the forms of discrimination and misconduct alleged, how long the matter took to be resolved, and the outcome.

Some text in this policy is adapted from documents produced by the American Historical Association, the Shakespeare Association of America, the Society of Biblical Literature, and the University of Iowa.

2025 April Recent Books of Interest List

Araújo, Sandra. *Spying on Muslims in Colonial Mozambique, 1964-74*. (Bloomsbury, 2025).

Beneš, Jakub S. *The Last Peasant War: Violence and Revolution in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe*. (Princeton, 2025).

Bertilorenzi, Marco, Carlo Fumian, and Giovanni Gozzini. Eds. *A History of the Global Wheat Trade: Actors and Dynamics (1840-1914)*. (Routledge, 2025).

Beverton, Alys D. *Exceptionalism in Crisis: Faction, Anarchy, and Mexico in the U.S. Imagination during the Civil War Era*. (UNC, 2025).

Bhutani, Viney C. *India's Himalayan Frontiers: History and Politics*. (Routledge, 2025).

Chang, Kornel. *A Fractured Liberation: Korea under U.S. Occupation*. (Harvard, 2025).

Cho, Joanne Miyang, Eric Kurlander, and Douglas McGetchin. Eds. *German-Speaking Jewish Refugees in Asia, 1930–1950: Shelter from the Storm?* (Routledge, 2025).

Chunikhin, Kirill. *Shared Images: A History of American Art in the Soviet Union during the Cold War*. (De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2025).

Cieślak, Marta, and Anna Müller. Eds. *Gender and Nation in East Central Europe: An Uneasy History.* (Lexington, 2025).

Costa Pinto, António, and Goffredo Adinolfi. Eds. *Building Dictatorships under Axis Rule: War, Military Occupation and Political Regimes*. (Routledge, 2025).

Crosbie, Thomas. *The Political Army: How the U.S. Military Learned to Manage the Media and Public Opinion*. (Columbia, 2025).

Curatola, John M. *Armies Afloat: How the Development of Amphibious Operations in Europe Helped Win World War II* (Kansas, 2025).

David-Fox, Michael. *Crucibles of Power: Smolensk under Stalinist and Nazi Rule*. (Harvard, 2025).

de los Ángeles Picone, María. *Landscaping Patagonia: Spatial History and Nation-Making in Chile and Argentina.* (UNC, 2025).

De Vita, Lorena, and Constantin Goschler. Eds. *Redefining Reparations: Wassenaar 1952 and the Global Politics of Repair.* (Routledge, 2025).

Denoël, Yvonnick. *Vatican Spies: From the Second World War to Pope Francis.* (Oxford, 2025).

Dhompa, Tsering Wangmo. *The Politics of Sorrow: Unity and Allegiance Across Tibetan Exile.* (Columbia, 2025).

Downes, Earl Richard. *The United States and the Luso-Brazilian Empires: Beyond Coffee, Plow, and Bible*. (Routledge, 2025).

Duus, Peter, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie. Eds. *The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937.* (Princeton, 2025).

Earnshaw, Sarah. *Human Rights and Sovereign Standards in U.S. Security: "Freedom Will Be Defended."* (Routledge, 2025).

Eroğlu, Hale. *Muslim Transnationalism in Modern China: Debates on Hui Identity and Islamic Reform.* (Columbia, 2025).

Gentilini, Ugo. *Timely Cash: Lessons From 2,500 Years of Giving People Money*. (Oxford, 2025).

Gerges, Fawaz A. *The Great Betrayal: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in the Middle East.* (Princeton, 2025).

Gidney, Thomas. *An International Anomaly: Colonial Accession to the League of Nations.* (Cambridge, 2025).

Greenberg, Udi. *The End of the Schism: Catholics, Protestants, and the Remaking of Christian Life in Europe, 1880s–1970s*. (Harvard, 2025).

Haslam, Jonathan. *Hubris: The American Origins of Russia's War against Ukraine.* (Harvard, 2025).

Hemetsberger, Bernhard, and Andreas Oberdorf. Eds. *Go West! Conceptual Explorations of "the West" in the History of Education*. (De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2025).

Hess, Earl J. *War Underground: A History of Military Mining in Siege Warfare.* (Kansas, 2025).

Hewitson, Mark. *European Integration Since the 1920s: Security, Identity, and Cooperation*. (Oxford, 2025).

Hill, Alexander. *The Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies*. (Routledge, 2025).

Isenberg, Andrew C. *The Age of the Borderlands: Indians, Slaves, and the Limits of Manifest Destiny, 1790–1850*. (UNC, 2025).

Jackson, Ashley, and Andrew Stewart. *Superpower Britain: The 1945 Vision and Why it Failed*. (Oxford, 2025).

Jackson, Peter, William Mulligan, and Glenda Sluga. Eds. *Peacemaking and International Order after the First World War.* (Cambridge, 2025).

John, Maria. *Sovereign Bodies, Sovereign Spaces: Urban Indigenous Health Activism in the United States and Australia.* (UNC, 2025).

Kastner, Jill, and William C. Wohlforth. *A Measure Short of War: A Brief History of Great Power Subversion*. (Oxford, 2025).

Kennedy, Hugh, and Fanny Bessard. Eds. *Land and Trade in Early Islam: The Economy of the Islamic Middle East 750-1050 CE*. (Oxford, 2025).

Kiras, James D. *Special Operations Success: Balancing Capabilities and Control.* (Oxford, 2025).

Kisseloff, Jeff. *Rewriting Hisstory: A Fifty-Year Journey to Uncover the Truth About Alger Hiss.* (Kansas, 2025).

Knüsel, Ariane. *China's European Headquarters: Switzerland and China during the Cold War.* (Cambridge, 2025).

König, Daniel G. *Entangled Worlds: 600-1350.* (Harvard, 2025).

Kokosalakis, Yiannis, and Francisco J. Leira-Castiñeira. Eds. *Violence and Propaganda in European Civil Wars: Dimensions of Conflict, 1917-1949.* (Routledge, 2025).

Kott, Sandrine, Eva-Maria Muschik, and Elisabeth Roehrlich. Eds. *International Organizations and the Cold War: Competition, Cooperation, and Convergence.* (Bloomsbury, 2025).

Kressel, Daniel Gunnar. *José Antonio Primo de Rivera in Latin America: The Pursuit of a Fascist Usable Past during the Cold War (1939-1989).* (Routledge, 2025).

Levi, Scott. *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Asian Commercial History.* (Oxford, 2025).

Lim, Jie-Hyun. *Victimhood Nationalism: History and Memory in a Global Age.* Transl. by Megan Sungyoon. (Columbia, 2025).

Lok, Matthijs, Marjet Brolsma, Robin de Bruin, Stefan Couperus, and Rachel McElroy White. *Antiliberal Internationalism in the Twentieth Century: Beyond Left and Right?* (Routledge, 2025).

López Fadul, Valeria. *The Cradle of Words: Language and Knowledge in the Spanish Empire*. (Johns Hopkins, 2025).

Maiolo, Joseph, and Laura Robson. *The League of Nations.* (Cambridge, 2025).

Malanski, Daniel. *Olympic Opening Ceremonies: Memory and Modernity.* (Routledge, 2025).

McClure, Julia. *Empire of Poverty: The Moral-Political Economy of the Spanish Empire.* (Oxford, 2025).

McPherson, Alan. *The Breach: Iran-Contra and the Assault on American Democracy.* (UNC, 2025).

Morgan, Peter. *British Representations of the Armenian Genocide, 1915-23*. (Routledge, 2025).

Moseman, Scott A. *Defining the Mission: The Development of U.S. Strategic Military Intelligence up to the Cold War.* (Kansas, 2025).

Nayudu, Swapna Kona. *The Nehru Years: An International History of Indian Non-Alignment.* (Cambridge, 2025).

Neubauer, Jack. *The Adoption Plan: China and the Remaking of Global Humanitarianism.* (Columbia, 2025).

Nguyen, Lien-Hang T., Edward Miller, Andrew Preston, and Pierre Asselin. Eds. *The Cambridge History of the Vietnam War.* 3 Vols. (Cambridge, 2025).

Nuzzo, Luigi, Michele Pifferi, Giuseppe Speciale, and Cristina Vano. *Legal Responses to Mass Migration: From the Nineteenth Century to World War II.* (Routledge, 2025).

O'Connor, Patricia M., and Fidelma McCorry. Eds. *Continuity and Change: Postwar Migration Between Ireland and Australia 1945-2024.* (Routledge, 2025).

Ogilvie, Sheilagh. *Controlling Contagion: Epidemics and Institutions from the Black Death to Covid.* (Princeton, 2025).

Pappé, Ilan. *The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947-1951.* (I.B. Tauris, 2025).

Passman, Elana. *The French-German Dynamic in an Age of Conflict, 1925–1963: Enemies, Collaborators, Friends.* (Routledge, 2025).

Pau, Pum Khan. *Unconventional Warfare: Small Wars and Insurgencies in the India-Myanmar Borderland (1914–1945).* (Routledge, 2025).

Peskin, Lawrence A. *Three Consuls: Capitalism, Empire, and the Rise and Fall of America's Mediterranean Community, 1776–1840.* (Cambridge, 2025).

Phillips, Matthew, and Naoko Shimazu. Eds. *Cold War Asia: A Visual History of Global Diplomacy.* (Cambridge, 2025).

Proctor, Tammy M. *Saving Europe: First World War Relief and American Identity.* (Oxford, 2025).

Radchenko, Yuri. *Helping in Mass Murders: Auxiliary Police, Indigenous Administration, SD and the Shoah in the*

Ukrainian-Russian-Belorussian Borderlands, 1941–43. (Ibidem, 2025).

Reid, Richard. *The African Revolution: A History of the Long Nineteenth Century*. (Princeton, 2025).

Ro'i, Yaacov, Yehoshua Freundlich, and Boris Morozov. Eds. *Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1954–1967*. 4 Vols. (Routledge, 2025).

Rockwell, Rick. *The History of Journalism in Latin America*. (Routledge, 2025).

Salvucci, Richard J. *An Economic History of Mexico: Contested Conquest, Ambiguous Development: 1519-2000*. (Routledge, 2025).

Samet, Daniel J. *U.S. Defense Policy toward Israel: A Cold War History*. (Routledge, 2025).

Shanahan, Brendan A. *Disparate Regimes: Nativist Politics, Alienage Law, and Citizenship Rights in the United States, 1865–1965*. (Oxford, 2025).

Stiles, Kendall. *Supplanting Empires: Power Transitions Across Human History*. (Lexington, 2025).

Sunderland, David. *Economic Development of Africa, 1880-1939*. (Routledge, 2025).

Tertitskiy, Fyodor. *Accidental Tyrant: The Life of Kim Il-sung*. (Oxford, 2025).

Thomson, Andrew and Rubrick Biegon. *The War on Terror*. (Agenda Publishing, 2025).

Van der Hoog, Tycho. *Comrades Beyond the Cold War: North Korea and the Liberation of Southern Africa*. (Oxford, 2025).

Varricchio, Mario. *Britons to America: Oral Narratives of English, Scottish and Welsh Emigrants to the Land of Plenty*. (Routledge, 2025).

Whiteside, Heather. *Proprietary Settler Colonialism and the Making of North America*. (Columbia, 2025).

Williams, Robert F. *The Airborne Mafia: The Paratroopers Who Shaped America's Cold War Army*. (Cornell, 2025).

Zambelli, Elena, and Betty de Hart. Eds. *Regulating Interracialized Intimacies: Perspectives from Europe and Beyond*. (Routledge, 2025).

Zuelow, Eric G.E., and Kevin J. James. *The Oxford Handbook of Tourism History*. (Oxford, 2025).

From the Chancery: An Apology from the Editors

Silke Zoller and Brian C. Etheridge

Sometimes the best laid plans go wrong. We proudly submitted the draft of our first *Passport* issue, January 2025, to the publishers, only for a technical error at the printer's office to halt the printing process for weeks. As we write this text in late February 2025, we are hopeful that the January issue will be sent out in early March. That is too late, and we apologize for the hassle this delay has caused the SHAFR membership. While we cannot control the printer's office, our emails to them are sharp and witty and ready to be deployed in the future.

SHAFR Council Meeting
January 17, 2025, noon-4pm (Eastern)
Meeting Minutes

Council members present: Melani McAlister, chair (presiding), Megan Black, Brooke Blower, Brian Etheridge, Gretchen Heefner, Ann Heiss, Chris Hulsof, Elisabeth Leake, Mitch Lerner, Kaeten Mistry, Christopher Nichols, Jay Sexton, Alexandra Southgate

Others attending: Faith Bagley, Elizabeth Ferguson, Anne Foster, Petra Goedde, Richard Immerman (ex officio)*, Jay Sarkar, Amy Sayward* (ex officio)*, Aileen Teague*

Introductory matters:

Melani McAlister, SHAFR President, welcomed Council members, orchestrated a short round of introductions, and stated her pleasure in working with everyone this year, which included making new committee appointments. She also explained that graduate students are now members of all standing committees (other than prize and elected committees). She also pointed to a new "consent calendar" at the end of the agenda; this allows for the Council to address and approve routine matters.

Conference matters:

Amy Sayward presented an update on the final accounting for the 2024 Toronto conference. She explained that SHAFR was due to receive a refund of the amount deposited with the University of Toronto; the final amount would depend on the exchange rate. That refund can provide a bit of a buffer toward the projected, balanced budget for this current fiscal year that started on November 1. Sayward also reported that there had been no violations of the code of conduct in the previous calendar year. She notified Council members that they were all potential members of the Sanctions and Appeals committees, and in that capacity, they will be invited to attend the pre-conference, on-line training with SHAFR's ombudsperson. Mitch Lerner highlighted the cost of the president's brunch and *Diplomatic History* breakfast meeting at the conference and suggested that cost-saving alternatives be considered for upcoming conferences. He also praised the Conference Consultant and Executive Director for their work. McAlister commented that she would take cost-saving measures but the *Diplomatic History* editors and staff certainly should get breakfast with their early morning meeting.

Council then moved to discussion of the upcoming 2025 conference. Conference Consultant Kaete O'Connell's report had requested Council consideration of a one-day registration rate for non-academic attendees. McAlister stated that she would like to see some specific language about that rate so that it is not generally available on the registration form, given the high costs that SHAFR pays to put on the conference for everyone. O'Connell's report also presented the budget for AV for this year's conference. Lerner pointed out that Council (in October 2023) had expressed consensus on not including AV for the 2025 Conference due to the cost. Given that Council had affirmed (but not formally voted on) the recommendation of the Ways & Means Committee to support O'Connell's recommendation on negotiating a better AV price at its September 2024 meeting in light of an improved financial outlook, McAlister requested a motion to affirm O'Connell's negotiated cost for conference AV. The motion passed unanimously. McAlister stated that the Ways & Means Committee can review this decision. Sayward also mentioned that a meeting with the Local Arrangements Committee for the 2026 conference in Columbus, Ohio, was upcoming soon.

For the 2027 conference, SHAFR signed a contract years ago with the Arlington Renaissance. However, given the rapidly rising costs at the hotel, Sayward and O'Connell have proposed a potential move to other event space in Arlington, provided by either Virginia Tech or George Mason. In relation to that potential change, Council has discussed keeping the housing block at the hotel. Council expressed consensus on authorizing SHAFR's hotel broker to see whether or how the contract can be amended and what the consequences might be so that Council can take final action at its June meeting.

Sayward then pointed out the draft request for proposals (RFP) for the 2028 conference. McAlister suggested a correction to the due date to ensure that proposals were submitted in time for a September Council meeting.

Financial matters:

Sayward reviewed the fiscal year-end report (ended October 31, 2024) with Council, which showed a budget surplus sufficient to cover the projected deficit for the current fiscal year beyond the Leffler donation. She highlighted that during this fiscal year, royalties from *Diplomatic History* under the new contract with Oxford University Press are significantly lower (which is why Council has worked so diligently to reduce expenditures), and this year SHAFR still has to pay membership fees on last year's contract (which will not be the case moving forward). She also highlighted that the increase in the "office expenses" category was primarily to cover increased costs for software subscription increases (in Member Clicks and Quick Books). As an informational item, she stressed that the "Endowment Draw" is listed under the "income" category—because money drawn from the endowment moves into SHAFR's account to be spent in that fiscal year—but it is not income, simply a transfer from the endowment account to the checking account. Elisabeth Leake asked whether there were plans for *Diplomatic History* to become entirely open access, which would impact the revenue generated from publishing the journal. Elizabeth Ferguson from Oxford University Press later confirmed that that is not the direction that the press is pursuing at this time.

Council then turned its attention to the report of the Funding Task Force created at the last Council meeting to make recommendations to Council about the Leffler unrestricted donation of $100,000. Following Mel and Phyllis Leffler's initial guidance, $7,013 will be deducted from the gift to fully endow the new LaFeber-Wood Teaching Prize. Peter Hahn had chaired the task force to determine how best to steward the remaining gift; the task force recommended a named, endowed travel fund. Council discussed using such travel funds to support the annual conference and potentially the summer institute (especially in future years). There was significant discussion about the task force recommendation that these funds not be used for graduate student travel, as students have potential access to institutional funds as well as Divine travel grants. Leake, who served on the task force, pointed to decreased travel funding for faculty, especially in the United Kingdom, and no travel funding for most precarious faculty. There was also discussion about whether to use Leffler funds for travel to regional conferences (that is, SHAFR-approved conferences or workshops organized in non-U.S. settings such as Asia or Europe). McAlister explained that Council could not make a final decision on this issue

today, because it was lacking a recommendation from the Ways & Means Committee, which was not able to meet before Council. But having had a full discussion in person of this (and other financial issues on the agenda), Council will be prepared to vote over email following the Ways & Means recommendation.

McAlister closed the discussion of financial issues by encouraging all Council members to make a donation to SHAFR as an important first step in developing a culture of giving within the organization.

Council also considered the new memorandum of agreement (MOA) with O'Connell, which would expand her duties and change her title to Deputy Director. As Sayward had included in Council's document packet, a 2020 task force had recommended a similar set-up, and Council had suggested such a move when it hired Richard Immerman to serve as incoming Executive Director. Exactly what duties the new position would be responsible for had been the topic of several conversations between Immerman and O'Connell, resulting in the language included in this MOA. As the MOA calls for an increased stipend, a final Council decision will await the recommendation of the Ways & Means Committee, which can also make a recommendation on the start date. This had not yet been determined, though Immerman affirmed that O'Connell has already started undertaking some of the duties laid out in the MOA; McAlister therefore recommended that the start date be immediate. Council expressed no objections or reservations about the proposed MOA. Council also expressed consensus that it would be up to the Deputy Director to determine through which social media SHAFR messages should be disseminated.

Publication matters:

Anne Foster and Petra Goedde, editors of *Diplomatic History*, and Ferguson, from Oxford University Press (OUP), joined the meeting. Ferguson highlighted aspects of her publisher's report, which had a new format. She noted that about 20% of this year's research articles were published under open access, which will probably increase in the future, especially as OUP is about to sign contracts with some U.S. consortia. However, she expects the number of open access consortia agreements to plateau within five years. Ferguson highlighted that usage of the journal continues to grow, and it is cited heavily across the field.

Foster and Goedde then reviewed aspects of their editors' report. The biggest transition had been in the turnover of assistant editors last summer. But, they stressed, this transition had been seamless. They also commented that many of the rejected articles had been "paper mill" or artificial intelligence (AI) submissions. They added that they had conducted workshops to help new authors submit articles and have better chance of acceptance, which they see as part of their mission. They have also been thinking about how best to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the journal.

Ferguson then discussed how OUP has been approached to "rent" its data to be used to train large-language models to improve the quality of AI models. OUP is considering this arrangement, because it is limited to trusted partners, it generates revenue for the journals (potentially $10,000-$15,000), and the licenses prohibit the summarizing or citing of journal content and ends all access after expiration. Council expressed appreciation for OUP's careful approach and appreciated how working with ethical partners can help them succeed in the larger industry. In response to a query as to whether article authors need to be notified about that their article would be used for the purpose of AI training, Ferguson explained that OUP legal counsel had been consulted and that article agreements do not require this, because OUP maintains full copyright to the work and the articles do not generate author revenue. Chris Hulshof moved that SHAFR accept participation in OUP's proposed licensing agreements, Megan Black seconded, and Council voted unanimously in favor.

Council then moved to discussion of the draft memorandum of agreement (MOA) with incoming *Passport* editors Brian Etheridge and Silke Zoller. Etheridge recused himself from this discussion. Council was in support of the language of the MOA, which the editors had also reviewed, and was prepared to approve it following a recommendation from the Ways & Means Committee. Etheridge then rejoined the meeting.

Sayward reviewed the transition to Sheridan as the printer for *Diplomatic History*, now that OUP will no longer publish it in paper nor will it print *Passport* under its new contract. McAlister asked for two council members to work with the *Passport* editors to make recommendations on moving forward with print publications in order to reduce printing and mailing costs. Alexandra Southgate (who already works with *Diplomatic History*) and Lerner (former *Passport* editor) volunteered. It was also recommended that O'Connell participate in these discussions, since there might be a social media component.

Advocacy matters:

Immerman—after reminding Council that the National Coalition for History (NCH), to which SHAFR had belonged, had dissolved the previous fall—presented the information he had gathered about the National Humanities Alliance (NHA). He emphasized that it does not advocate in the same way as the NCH had, but it does a lot of good work (demonstrated in the year-in-review document) and advocates for the humanities in general. Its membership fee ($1,000) is significantly less than the NCH. Asked for his recommendation, Immerman responded that he was in support of joining.

McAlister presented on the American Council on Learned Societies (ACLS); she serves on the board currently. While ACLS is best known for its grants to individual fellows, it is also working on the future of the humanities and provides excellent training for member societies' executive directors and boards. SHAFR would have to apply for membership; the annual cost is approximately $2,200.

Council members noted NHA's work with admiration, and some thought that its lobby days might meet some SHAFR members' desire to more personally lobby for issues—such as declassification and support for the U.S. National Archives—about which they are passionate. Concrete action needed to await a recommendation from the Ways & Means Committee.

Council matters:

SHAFR's new contract with OUP requires a conflict-of-interest policy, which SHAFR does not currently have. McAlister solicited Council members to work from the draft general policy included in the document packet. Mary Ann Heiss and Jay Sexton volunteered.

Committee matters:

Council then turned to the report of the Bernath Lecture Prize Committee, which had recommended measures aimed at better publicizing the prize and making the application process clearer. Easy adjustments included highlighting the award in SHAFR communications, including *Passport* and the monthly e-blast. Discussion about the nomination process—especially the number of

recommendation letters—opened a larger discussion about how much supporting material is helpful and/or desired by the selection committees across SHAFR, including the Nominating Committee. There was a general consensus to pick up this conversation (with additional information from the affected committees) at the June Council meeting. There was also a mention that the Bernath Lecture Prize Committee's deadline might shift from October to February now that the lecture itself is presented at the June conference meeting rather than the January American Historical Association conference.

McAlister also requested and received support from Council to standardize the expiration dates of committees, which is also a need following SHAFR's withdrawal from formal activities at the AHA.

Council then turned to a series of recommendations from the Internationalization Task Force. Its first recommendation dealt with membership rates, with a number of changes suggested. McAlister highlighted the creation of a rate for those making less than $25,000 per year, which might best represent the need of those in countries whose currencies have especially high conversion rates to U.S. dollars. This recommendation as well as the others will be referred to the Membership Committee, which will make a recommendation ahead of the June Council meeting.

The next recommendation requested the establishment of regional network steering committees. Sayward replied that these could be created by the President (who has authority over all committees under the by-laws) and could then function like all other committees—e.g., being asked if they had a report and any actions requested of Council ahead of each meeting. In considering the question of funding regional activities, Council members expressed some concern that regional conferences could hurt attendance at the main SHAFR conference, especially from international members, which would be the opposite of the goal of the Internationalization Task Force. There was consensus on the need to balance the needs of the central and regional organizations, especially in times when SHAFR has had to make a series of budget cuts over the past decade. Hulshof did, however, talk about his experience with the Association of Asian Studies and the ways in which its Asian-based conferences allowed a significant number of Asian members without travel funding to attend an excellent conference. There were also concerns expressed about whether and how SHAFR could balance funding of three or potentially more regional networks. Leake spoke about the work of the UK-Ireland seminar series that she had organized and stressed how its on-line seminars focused on works in progress and therefore had been significantly different from the conference and had not required additional funding. Gretchen Heefner suggested that there might be a network enhancement fund added to the next budget, and any regional organization could apply to Council for those funds with a budget. A consensus emerged about prioritizing travel funds to the main conference, especially as an increasing number of international and even U.S.-based scholars lack access to travel funds. Hulshof suggested that this might be an area that the Development Committee could focus on in some of its fund-raising efforts. McAlister suggested creating a task force (Kaeten Mistry, Chris Nichols, and Leake volunteered) that would work toward a specific proposal for Council (and the Development Committee).

Program Committee chairs Aileen Teague and Jay Sarkar then joined the meeting. Sarkar highlighted several aspects from their written report, including the international and diverse nature of the Program Committee; the inclusion of a coffee break for international scholars; the emphasis on themes, anniversaries, and co-sponsorships; the keynote from Maggie Blackhawk, which will foreground the intersections between foreign relations and indigeneity; the plenary; the series' editors' panel; a guided tour of the Smithsonian Institution's "Giving in America" exhibit; a film screening; the career mentorship workshop; and a careers roundtable—all of which promise to make the upcoming conference particularly vibrant. Teague reported that they had received a total of 142 proposals, 30 of which were Individual submissions. The Program Committee was currently trying to figure out how best to configure some of those individual submissions into panels.

McAlister commended the Program Committee for its diligent work and also highlighted the welcome reception being at the Spy Museum—and Council also thanked them!

Council then shifted to the request from the Committee on Women in SHAFR for funding for an in-person, second-book workshop at the upcoming SHAFR Conference. McAlister was an enthusiastic supporter, as was Leake. Since the budget could be accommodated within an existing budget line-item, this proposal did not require Ways & Means Committee review. Sexton made a motion to support this proposal, which was seconded by Heiss and received unanimous Council support. Sayward also mentioned that she and O'Connell were already working on the committee's suggestion to facilitate dinner plans for SHAFR members and pointed out how the Program Committee had already integrated a number of mentorship opportunities into the conference program (another suggestion from the Committee on Women in SHAFR).

Immerman then briefly discussed the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation (Historical Advisory Committee or HAC) to the State Department Office of the Historian and its traditionally strong ties with SHAFR, which had become less robust in recent years. McAlister asked him to make further inquiries and report back to Council in June with specific recommendations.

Hulshof then turned Council's attention to the report of the Graduate Student Committee, which had been exceptionally active in recruiting new graduate student members and in hosting webinars on SHAFR's grants, conference proposals, and conference attendance. He especially thanked the outgoing co-chair, Dr. Kelsey Zavelo, and welcomed the incoming co-chair, Alexandra Southgate. He also highlighted the process that McAlister had used in appointing graduate student members to all standing committees, who would then be part of the Graduate Student Committee as a whole. With Council consensus, Sayward affirmed that the document outlining this process would be added to the President's Google Drive folder on committee appointments to institutionalize that practice.

The consent agenda included approval of the minutes of the last Council meeting as well as a resolution thanking all of the volunteers who had worked with SHAFR over the last several years, including those who have rotated off Council, the various committees, and the editorial board of *Diplomatic History*.

The Council meeting adjourned at 4:14pm (EST).

The Last Words: A Tribute to Andy Johns

Andy Johns' tenure as *Passport* editor was long and distinguished. *Passport* was a personal and professional passion, and the publication under his stewardship engaged the SHAFR community in meaningful conversations about our shared enterprise. Andy's commitment to *Passport* remained through the transition, during which he was extremely generous with his time and resources. He even flew down to Atlanta to meet with us to go over everything in person! We invited several colleagues who worked with him over his fourteen years to participate in a special LAST WORDS column, in which they reflect on his impact on the publication, the broader organization, and the field in general.

Brian C. Etheridge and Silke Zoller

SHAFR looked very different three decades ago when I attended my first SHAFR conference with my grad school colleagues Andy Johns and Kathryn Statler. Aside from a heated discussion about the Vietnam War, there was a certain homogeneity in the halls. Few then doubted that the phrases "American Foreign Relations" and "Diplomatic History" aptly described our field. More than a few attendees griped that the social and cultural turns had marginalized them. There was also a certain, shall we say, consistency among attendees. Even in the mid-1990s, SHAFR had a grotesque gender imbalance that contrasted other subfields. Kathryn noticed straightaway that she was, in effect, an underrepresented minority. How times have changed! Over the past thirty years, the field has evolved dramatically as SHAFR has welcomed new disciplines, new approaches, new methods, and an increasingly diversified membership. Through all this, *Passport* has served a unifying purpose, providing a forum to discuss, explore, and debate the meaning of a field in transition. As editor, Andy Johns recognized and embraced change. He used *Passport* as a vehicle for giving voice to junior scholars and graduate students, for promoting deep and spirited discussions about the methods and subjects of our collective research, for inviting colleagues in very different fields and disciplines to engage with our work, and – importantly – for elevating conversations about teaching, including by welcoming the perspectives of colleagues whose careers nobly prioritize instruction over research. As Andy steps down from a long and accomplished run as *Passport* editor, he has left SHAFR with an archive, a record that traces the marvelous transformation of SHAFR during three decades of rapid change.

Ken Osgood

I had the distinct pleasure of writing for Andy Johns on several occasions. Once he organized a *Passport* panel review of my first book I felt I couldn't say no, but truthfully I always wanted to say yes. Each time he was incredibly gracious and kind, and always made my submissions better. Under his editorial guidance *Passport* was a must-read. How many times do we look forward to reading what could seem a chore? I always found it a compelling page-turner. And Andy's pieces were such a treat! They reflected the wicked-smart, funny, and generous man he is. How kind and generous? Let him tell you sometime about a surprise trip to Fresno!

Lori Clune

For as long as I've been a SHAFR member, Andy Johns and *Passport* have been synonymous. This has been to our organization's great benefit. For many of us, *Passport* has been a key portal into the world of SHAFR, a place where we not only explore and produce scholarship, but where we turn to find a more human entry point into the organization. Discursive pieces about archives and teaching give voice to the questions and concerns many of us face on a daily basis, and features like the "Spotlights" or "7 Questions" provide a much firmer sense of the many extraordinary people who comprise our wonderful organization. These components bring humanity and comradery to SHAFR members, who are often off working at far-flung organizations where we are the only U.S. foreign relations specialist in our departments. *Passport* is a publication that is intellectually rigorous, community-focused, and fun. It is no great mystery as to why; we all owe Andy a large (unpayable?) debt.

And most of this work has been behind-the-scenes. It wasn't until I served on the committee to find Andy's replacement that the full scope of his work and contributions came into focus. I'm very pleased that Andy is being replaced by such able co-editors, not only because Brian and Silke bring such unique and complementary qualifications to the post, but because—quite frankly—I'm still not sure how Andy managed to maintain and enhance *Passport* as a solo-run outfit for so long. He leaves big shoes to fill. Thank you, Andy!

Amanda C. Demmer

In early 2016, when I reentered academia after seven years at the U.S. Department of State, one of the first things I did was dive into *Passport*. I found the publication to be the perfect vehicle to reacclimate myself with SHAFR. This was due in no small part to the tireless work of Andy Johns and his shepherding of *Passport* over the years. The varied types of articles touched upon all the different aspects of our field: new scholarship, book roundtables, information on archives, and teaching, to name just some, all packaged in a welcoming format. I also owe a personal debt of gratitude to Andy for the way he immediately welcomed me back into the SHAFR fold and played a large role in getting me actively involved in the organization. I even said yes when he asked me to serve a stint on the *Passport* Editorial Advisory Board! Andy has made *Passport* a must-read for SHAFR members throughout his stewardship and a venue that I was proud to publish in and contribute to in small ways. I hope everyone within SHAFR will work with the new editors to continue the great work Andy has passed on. Kudos, Andy!

Kelly McFarland

In reflecting on Andy Johns' long tenure as *Passport* editor, the words that come to mind for me are kindness and friendly. Andy took many steps to make SHAFR a friendly organization, with the opportunity for members to introduce themselves on a more personal level with the introduction of SHAFR "Spotlights" and "Seven Questions On…" These pieces in *Passport* allowed SHAFR to know more about members aside from their paper title and university affiliation.

Mostly, though, I think of Andy's kindness and support. At a long ago AHA (I have no idea which year or city), I ran into Andy at the book exhibit when he was at Kentucky's booth (not surprising, I know now). He introduced me to Steve Wrinn and within five minutes the idea of an edited book on sport and diplomacy had been discussed. A few days after the AHA, Andy emailed me about how great an idea that was and that he could co-edit the book with me. I was only a few years out from my PhD and still waiting for that first tenure-track job, and Andy guided me through the entire process of editing a book, from inviting authors through creating the index. His support, guidance, and encouragement are what I remember from putting together *Diplomatic Games*, which has become an important book in the area of sport and diplomacy. I have tried to apply those same traits that Andy modeled to me with all of my other edited books – and I guess he taught me really well since I keep editing books! (Three more and counting….)

Heather Dichter

A Work of Heart

Under Andy John's superlative editorial guidance, *Passport* has made us downright proud to be members of our esteemed association.

I'll begin with the erudite and enlightened bit: *Passport* has been as intellectually stimulating and informative as Andy promised it would be when he first assumed the role. Every issue has highlighted the scholarly excellence of SHAFR members and demonstrated their outstanding contributions to the history of American foreign relations. *Passport* has also reminded relevant audiences outside of our association that we have something important to say. Many of *Passport's* articles have addressed SHAFR's role in public advocacy, especially as it relates to the declassification of government documents. Andy relied on *Passport* to build bridges—and knock down walls—in order to reach practitioners in the field, reminding us (and them) of our association's significant mission to inform and have impact beyond our circle of association.

Now to the heart and soul of the matter: Andy managed to realize in a powerfully quiet manner a publication that is as honest and humorous as it is informative and scholarly. Notwithstanding the scholarly weight of *Passport*, nothing can compare (in my view) to the profound ways in which *Passport* has built and reinforced community among its membership. Under Andy's guidance, *Passport* evolved to become a home that celebrates and encourages SHAFR members to learn more about each other's worldviews and whims, woes and weirdnesses. *Passport* invites us to show our true colors.

Andy's own opinion pieces and editorials ("From the Chancery" and "The Last Word") have exemplified this more personal aspect of *Passport*. His contributions offer sensible and often sentimental views on SHAFR, the state of the field, and of the world. But in true Andy form, it has never been "all about Andy." In commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the founding of SHAFR, for example, "The Last Word" featured anecdotes from long-time members about their conference experiences over the years. "Seven Questions On…" highlights the ruminations of SHAFR members on their scholarly expertise and teaching, but the column more often than not shows what makes us tick, why we love to do what we do.

In the January 2019 issue of *Passport*, Andy chose to write about gratitude. "I am grateful that I have been a member of SHAFR for over twenty-five years," he began. For Andy, SHAFR had become "an intellectual home, a community that shares a passion for history and scholarly inquiry." Our association would not be the home that it is, were it not for Andy's extraordinary editorial leadership of *Passport*.

Kim Quinney

As the long-time editor of *Passport*, Andy Johns has provided an incredible service for SHAFR. One need only look at the most recent issue to see how many new scholars he has incorporated from a range of perspectives and disciplines, how many innovative changes he has made, and how many valuable resources *Passport* now includes thanks to his unflagging efforts over the past twelve years.

First, the roundtable book reviews have been indispensable. From Melvyn Leffler's *Confronting Saddam Hussein: George W, Bush and the Invasion of Iraq* to Carol Eisenberg's *Fire and Rain: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Wars in Southeast Asia*, to Frank Costigliola's *Kennan: A Life Between Worlds*, to Marc Selverstone's *The Kennedy Withdrawal: Camelot and the American Commitment to Vietnam*, to Susan Colburn's *Euromissiles: The Nuclear Weapons that Nearly Destroyed NATO,* the many perspectives on each of these works allow for a full understanding of the authors' major arguments, evidence used, and strengths and weaknesses. The regular book reviews, that Andy instituted in 2015, have been equally valuable, ensuring that SHAFR members have even more access to new scholarship

Second, because of Andy, *Passport* includes excellent articles on linking teaching and research. See for example Molly Wood's "Scholars as Teachers: Thoughts on Scholarship in the Classroom" as one among many examples. Pedagogy so often takes a back seat to research but not in *Passport*. Andy has devoted much time and effort in providing us tools to become stronger teachers, and we are all the better for this focus. *Passport* also allows for compelling articles and insights that might not fit in *Diplomatic History* or another journal but that add richness and depth to our thinking about the role of U.S. Foreign Relations in our current context. See for example Kimber Quinney's "Public Intellectuals, We Need You!: Four Lessons from Max Ascoli for Intellectuals and U.S. Foreign Relations," or Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones' "The CIA As A Force for Peace."

Third, *Passport* offers many unique avenues to share knowledge and create community. For example, a fan favorite is "Seven Questions on…" that includes such hits as "Seven Questions on Teaching U.S. Foreign Relations," and "Seven Questions on SHAFR's Future." In "SHAFR Spotlights" we learn more about our colleagues' interests, past and present. "The Diplomatic Pouch," with its focus on professional notes, relevant reports, and books of interest, keeps us up to date. "Dispatches" celebrates recipients of grants, scholarships, and fellowships and allows members to engage with one another. Finally, let's not forget "From the Chancery," Andy's thoughts on the past, present, and future of SHAFR and "The Last Word," which provides a valuable forum to discuss current trends, challenges, and crises facing the profession.

In sum, *Passport* is an essential resource for all members of SHAFR, and we have Andy to thank for that. It's the first publication I reach for to learn about cutting edge research, reviews on the most important books in our field, the latest innovations in pedagogy, tips on negotiating archives, and new ways to incorporate past U.S. Foreign Relations into the present. I have learned so much from the exchange of ideas that Andy has facilitated through *Passport*. For the past twelve years he has provided an inclusive, thoughtful, and balanced publication that represents the very best of what SHAFR has to offer, and for that he has my enduring gratitude. Thank you Andy.

In appreciation,
Kathryn Statler

It's possible I first met Andy Johns in 1996, at SHAFR in Boulder, Co. For both of us, it was our first SHAFR, which we only discovered many years later. But in the "modern era," Andy and I got to know each other when we both participated in the first SHAFR Institute in 2008. When Andy became editor of *Passport*, and I began serving on the newly created Teaching Committee, our conversations at the annual SHAFR conference revolved increasingly around how to better promote and highlight teaching within the SHAFR organization. Andy offered space in *Passport* and urged me to contribute pieces and to encourage others to submit teaching-related material. As editor of *Passport* he served ex-officio on the Teaching Committee, providing stability and experience over the years. I believe SHAFR members have learned to rely on *Passport* for useful information, resources, updates on the state of the discipline (such as the book roundtables), research notes, member news and other features. I appreciate the "Seven Questions On . . ." pieces for quick and useful overviews on historiography and colleagues' recommendations on a variety of topics. I enjoy reading "Spotlight On . . ." to get to know other SHAFR members and as a reminder that we are all interesting and multi-faceted people with lives outside of academia. And, finally, now that he has passed his *Passport* obligations on to Brian Etheridge and Silke Zoller, he and I will have more time at SHAFR meetings to argue about 1980s college basketball and other critical issues we face.

Molly Wood

I remember the birth of my 4th child like it was yesterday. My family had moved to Ohio in 2000 but had not been there for long when that beloved new addition arrived, after a lengthy and challenging birthing process that I will never forget. I am not ashamed to admit that I teared up a bit when that blessed moment finally arrived and I got to hold that 64-page bundle of joy in my arms (before handing it off to the midwife, Peter Hahn). We named it *Passport*, and I spent the next eight years nurturing it through good times and bad, serving as parent but also filling all of those additional roles that define modern parenthood: teacher, protector, financial provider, copyeditor. And I glowed with pride as *Passport* moved from its infancy through childhood and towards teenage status, without even a hint of the pre-pubescent emotional angst or facial acne that had plagued its father's early years.

But as any of you who have dropped kids off at college know, there comes a time when even the youngest child has to leave the nest. In most families, that maturation process happens around the age of 18, but Passport was already advanced and demanding, and so when it was turning nine, I recognized that it needed more than I could give. It was a hard decision, but one that I knew was in *Passport's* best interest. I was thrilled when SHAFR announced that Andy Johns at BYU would become its adopted father, but it was still a difficult moment, and I admit that it was with a great mix of trepidation, hope, and sorrow that I clicked "send" on an email to Andy with all the relevant files, thus delivering *Passport* to its new home. You all know that famous saying, right? "If you love something, set it free. If it comes back to you, it's yours forever. If it stays in Utah, you can go visit it and also catch the Sundance Film Festival so that's cool also." Or something like that.

Clearly, I need not have worried. Andy took *Passport* to places I had never even considered. My simple offspring suddenly had new features, new layouts, and an air of professionalism and sophistication that I never could have provided. Every time I opened an issue, I found something new that I should have thought of but hadn't. The new version was simply masterful. Under my tutelage, *Passport* had been Heath Ledger in 10 Things I Like About You; under Andy, it had become Heath Ledger in the Dark Knight. And it had also become a truly indispensable element of SHAFR, one that stands today as a reflection of the skilled guidance of its mentor.

We were all lucky to have someone as dedicated and passionate as Andy to take *Passport* to the next level. And for the next decade, I look forward to watching its continued development at its new home at Kennesaw State. I just hope that it will come back and visit Grandpa Mitch once in a while.

Mitch Lerner

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