

PASSPORT



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In this issue of *Passport*

International Sport and the 1968 Olympics

Seven Questions on the Vietnam War

SHAFR Spotlights, Elections, Awards

...and more!

Passport

THE SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS REVIEW



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Contributors
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Gregg A. Brazinsky is Professor of History and International Affairs at The George Washington University and Director of the Asian Studies Program in the Elliott School of International Affairs. His books include *Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of Democracy* (2007) and *Winning the Third World: Sino-American Rivalry during the Cold War* (2017).

Tizoc Chavez is Visiting Assistant Professor of Government at Colby College. He teaches and researches the U.S. presidency, diplomacy, and U.S. foreign policy. He is the author of *The Diplomatic Presidency: American Foreign Policy from FDR to George H. W. Bush* (2022), and received his Ph.D. in History from Vanderbilt University in 2016.

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Zachary Jonathan Jacobson received his Ph.D. in Cold War History from Northwestern University. His work has appeared in outlets including the *Washington Post*, *USA Today*, and *Vox*, as well as journals including *Presidential Studies Quarterly* and the *Chronicle of Higher Education*. His forthcoming book, *On Nixon's Madness: An Emotional History*, will be published in spring 2023 by Johns Hopkins University Press.

Addison Jensen is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Her work explores the cultural dimensions of the Vietnam War, including the intersections between foreign relations, popular culture, gender, race, and ethnicity. She is currently working on her dissertation, which examines the experiences of American GIs in Vietnam by considering their awareness of the stateside countercultural movements of the era. She is the newly-appointed assistant editor of *Passport: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review*.

KC Johnson is Professor of History at Brooklyn College, CUNY. His publications include *The Peace Progressives and American Foreign Relations* (1995); *Ernest Gruening and the American Dissenting Tradition* (1998); *Congress and the Cold War* (2005); and *All the Way with LBJ: The 1964 Presidential Election* (2009).

Richard Kimball is Professor of History at Brigham Young University. He is the author of *Legends Never Die: The Afterlives of American Athletes* (2017) and *Sports in Zion: Mormon Leisure and Recreation, 1890-1940* (2003), and the co-editor (with Andy Harvey) of *Sport, Identity, and Community* (2016).

Mark Atwood Lawrence is Professor of History at the University of Texas at Austin and, since January 2020, Director of the LBJ Presidential Library and Museum. He is author of *Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam* (2005), *The Vietnam War: A Concise International History* (2008), and *The End of Ambition: The United States and the Third World in the Vietnam Era* (2021), which received SHAFR's Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize and the PCB-AHA's Tonous and Warda Johns Family Book Award in 2022.

Kelly M. McFarland is a U.S. diplomatic historian and the Director of Programs and Research at Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (ISD). Dr. McFarland runs ISD's research program, heads up its case studies library in diplomacy, manages the *Diplomatic Pouch* blog, and hosts the *Diplomatic Immunity* podcast. He also teaches courses on diplomatic history, globalization, and history's influence on foreign affairs in Georgetown's School of Foreign Service. His writing can be seen in *The Washington Post*, *War on the Rocks*, *American Purpose*, *The Conversation*, *Passport*, and other outlets. Prior to joining Georgetown, he served seven years at the Department of State.

Seth Offenbach is Associate Professor in the History Department at Bronx Community College. He teaches classes in U.S. history, world history, and Cold War history. He is the author of *The Conservative Movement and Vietnam War: The Other Side of Vietnam* (2019), and serves as president of H-Net and editor for H-Diplo.

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Jason Parker is Professor of History at Texas A&M University. He is the author of *Hearts, Minds, Voices: U.S. Cold War Public Diplomacy and the Formation of the Third World* (2016) and *Brother's Keeper: The United States, Race, and Empire in the British Caribbean, 1938-1962* (2008), which received SHAFR's Bernath Prize in 2009.

Jenifer Parks is Professor of History at Rocky Mountain College in Billings, MT, where she teaches a variety of courses on world, European, and Russian history. She received her Ph.D. in Russian and Soviet History at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 2009. She is the author of *The Olympic Games, Soviet Sports Bureaucracy, and the Cold War: Red Sport, Red Tape* (2016). She has also published in the *International Journal of the History of Sport* and edited volumes on sport and diplomacy and Cold War sport. Her current research looks at the role of Soviet sport aid and diplomacy in the developing world, specifically Africa, during the Cold War.

David Prentice is an award-winning instructor at the Osher Lifelong Learning Institute at Oklahoma State University. His work has appeared in *Diplomatic History*, the *Journal of Military History*, and several edited volumes. His forthcoming book will examine America's exit strategy from Vietnam.

M. Elizabeth Sanders is Professor Emeritus of Government at Cornell University. She graduated *magna cum laude* from Auburn University, served in the Peace Corps in Chile for two years, taught in a Black high school in Alabama for a year, developed a health care training program for Navajo Indians, taught as an adjunct professor of international relations at Auburn University, then got her Ph.D. in 1978 from Cornell University. She then taught at Rice University and The New School for Social Research before returning to Cornell as a professor. She has taught and published on subjects including American political development, presidential politics, economic regulation, social movements, urban ecology, southern politics, and domestic influences on foreign policy. Her book on the politics of energy regulation won the Kammerer Prize of the American Political Science Association in 1982. Her book *Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State 1877-1917* (1999) was awarded the 2000 Greenstone Prize of the Politics and History Association.

Nicholas Evan Sarantakes is Associate Professor of Strategy and Policy at the U.S. Naval War College. He earned a B.A. from the University of Texas, an M.A. from the University of Kentucky, and a Ph.D. from the University of Southern California. All three degrees are in history. He is the author of six books, including: *Allies Against the Rising Sun: The United States, the British Nations, and the Defeat of Imperial Japan* (2009) and *Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and the Cold War* (2010). He has also received two teaching awards. He is currently writing a book on the battle of Manila, and another on the home front in World War II.

John Soares teaches history at the University of Notre Dame. His work on Cold War sport diplomacy has appeared in such venues as *Diplomatic History*, the *International Journal of the History of Sport*, the Cold War International History Project Working Paper series, and the *Notre Dame Journal of International and Comparative International Law*.

Kathryn Statler is Professor of History at the University of San Diego. She is the author of *Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam* (2007) and the co-editor (with Andrew L. Johns) of *The Eisenhower Administration, the Third World, and the Globalization of the Cold War* (2006). Her current book project, *Lafayette's Ghost: A History of Franco-American Cooperation and Conflict*, is a history of Franco-American cultural diplomacy from the American Revolution to the present.

Kevin B. Witherspoon is the Dr. Benjamin E. Mays Endowed Chair in the Department of History & Philosophy at Lander University in Greenwood, SC. He is the author of many articles, chapters, and books, most of which focus on the intersection of race, culture, and sport in the Cold War. His books include *Before the Eyes of the World: Mexico and the 1968 Olympics* (2008), and *Defending the American Way of Life: Sport, Culture and the Cold War* (2018), coedited with Toby Rider of California State University, Fullerton. Both books won the North American Society for Sport History Book Award.

Silke Zoller is Assistant Professor at Kennesaw State University. Her research focuses on the international history of counterterrorism. The author of *To Deter and Punish: Global Collaboration Against Terrorism in the 1970s* (2021), she received her Ph.D. from Temple University and has held postdoctoral fellowships at the Dickey Center for International Understanding and the Clements Center for National Security.

ATTENTION SHAFR MEMBERS

The 2022 SHAFR election is upon us. As is traditional, *Passport* is publishing copies of the candidates' biographies and statements by the candidates for president and vice-president, as well as biographies for the candidates for Council and the Nominating Committee, as a way to encourage members of the organization to familiarize themselves with the candidates and vote in this year's elections. Additional information, including brief CVs for each candidate, will be available on the electronic ballot.

"ELECTIONS BELONG TO THE PEOPLE. IT'S THEIR DECISION. IF THEY DECIDE TO TURN THEIR BACK ON THE FIRE AND BURN THEIR BEHINDS, THEN THEY WILL JUST HAVE TO SIT ON THEIR BLISTERS." ABRAHAM LINCOLN

Passport would like to remind each member of SHAFR that voting for the 2022 election will begin in early August and will close on **September 30, 2022**. Ballots will be sent electronically to all current members of SHAFR. If you are a member of SHAFR and do not receive a ballot by the beginning of September, please contact the chair of the SHAFR Nominating Committee, Kathleen Rasmussen (rasmussenkb@state.gov), as soon as possible to ensure that you are able to participate in the election.

"THE EXERCISE OF THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE IS A SOCIAL DUTY OF AS SOLEMN A NATURE AS [A PERSON] CAN BE CALLED TO PERFORM." DANIEL WEBSTER

Last year in the 2021 SHAFR election, only 417 members of SHAFR voted. *Passport* urges each member of SHAFR to take the time to participate in our organization's self-governance this year. As we know, elections have consequences.

"WE DO NOT HAVE GOVERNMENT BY THE MAJORITY. WE HAVE GOVERNMENT BY THE MAJORITY WHO PARTICIPATE."
THOMAS JEFFERSON

2022 SHAFR Election Candidates

President	Mary Ann Heiss, Kent State University
Vice President/President-Elect	Robert Brigham, Vassar College Mitchell Lerner, The Ohio State University
Council (At-Large)	Megan Black, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Theresa Keeley, University of Louisville
Council (At-Large)	Gretchen Heefner, Northeastern University Marc-William Palen, University of Exeter
Council (At-Large)	Jessica Gienow-Hecht, Freie Universität Berlin Andrew Johnstone, University of Leicester
Nominating Committee	Justin Hart, Texas Tech University Penny von Eschen, University of Virginia

Proposed Amendment to SHAFR By-Laws

Article IX: Advocacy

Section 1: This Section establishes two methods by which SHAFR may take a public stand on an issue:

SHAFR's membership may take a public stand on an issue by following these steps:

First, a petition proposing a resolution must be signed by ten members in good standing;

Second, such a resolution must be submitted by SHAFR by electronic means to the full SHAFR membership;

Third, the resolution must be voted on by at least 30% of the SHAFR membership within seven calendar days following an electronic announcement to the membership that voting has begun;

Fourth, the resolution must receive a majority of the votes cast;

Fifth, the resolution must then be submitted to the SHAFR Council. Council may pass the resolution through a 2/3 vote, with 80% of Council Members voting.

Alternatively, SHAFR Council may take a public stand on an issue by following these steps:

First, If Council votes on a motion without any opposing votes and at least 80% of Council Members present, then SHAFR may take a public stand.

If the Council vote is not unanimous, but Council may approves a resolution by a 2/3 vote of the SHAFR Council members, with 80% of Council Members voting, then;

- Second, such a resolution must be submitted by SHAFR by electronic means to the full SHAFR membership;
- Third, the resolution must be voted on by at least 30% of the SHAFR membership within seven calendar days following an electronic announcement to the membership that voting has begun;
- Fourth, the resolution must receive a simple majority of the votes cast for SHAFR to take a public stand.

Section 2: SHAFR's President is authorized to speak publicly on issues of vital interest to the organization in her/his capacity as SHAFR President without broader consultation of the Council or membership, but not as representing the opinions of the members of the organization.

2022 SHAFR Election Candidate Biographies and Statements

President

Mary Ann Heiss is a professor of history at Kent State University. Her research interests focus on the early Cold War period with a particular emphasis on Anglo-American relations. Thematically, her work has explored such issues as North-South relations, the intersection of decolonization and the Cold War, and the interplay between foreign and domestic policy. She has published two monographs, *Empire and Nationhood: The United States, Great Britain, and Iranian Oil, 1950-1954* (Columbia University Press, 1997) and *Fulfilling the Sacred Trust: The UN Campaign for International Accountability for Dependent Territories in the Era of Decolonization* (Cornell University Press, 2020; winner of the 2022 Publication Award of the Ohio Academy of History), coedited four volumes, and published more than a dozen articles and book chapters. Her service to SHAFR includes fifteen years on the staff of *Diplomatic History*, a term on the journal's editorial board, terms on the Stuart Bernath Article Prize, Kuehl Book Prize, and Myrna Bernath Book and Fellowship Committees, elected terms on the Council and Nominating Committee, and chair of the Conference Committee from its inception in 2016 through 2021. She also cochaired the 2008 Program Committee with Amy Sayward and served on the committee for two other conferences. Beyond SHAFR, she's been secretary-treasurer, archivist, and president of the Ohio Academy of History, served on the Harry S. Truman Library Institute's Committee on Research, Scholarship, and Education and Board of Directors, and edited the book series "New Studies in U.S. Foreign Relations" for the Kent State University Press.

As a SHAFR member for more than three decades, dating back to my days as a graduate student at Ohio State, I've seen firsthand how pivotal the organization can be for graduate students and young scholars. I delivered my first major professional paper at a SHAFR conference and benefited from important financial support through the W. Stull Holt Fellowship when I was writing my dissertation. I am also fortunate to count a number of distinguished SHAFR members as informal mentors, research sounding boards, and discriminating manuscript critics.

From my perspective, one of SHAFR's signature strengths has been the willingness of its most senior members to help pull those behind them up the professional ladder. A top priority for me as president is to work with the graduate student members of the SHAFR Council and others to develop this element of the organization's identity more fully. Current initiatives like the job workshop that's become a regular element of the annual summer meeting already support this goal, of course. As president, I will work to create more opportunities for intergenerational interactions and collaborations of all sorts, at both the annual meeting and throughout the year.

SHAFR's most senior members are incredible resources well beyond the formal service they provide to the organization on its various committees and the impressive research they've published over their careers. I'd like to see SHAFR do more to draw on their collective professional experience for the benefit of all of us.

Vice-President/President-elect

Robert K. Brigham: I am the Shirley Ecker Boskey Professor of History and International Relations at Vassar College, where I have taught since 1994. With a research focus on post-1945 US foreign relations, I am author or coauthor of nine books, among them *Reckless: Henry Kissinger and the Tragedy of Vietnam* (PublicAffairs, 2018); *American Foreign Relations* (Cengage, 2015), written with Thomas Patterson, J. Garry Clifford, Michael Donoghue, and Kenneth Hagan; *Is Iraq Another Vietnam?* (PublicAffairs, 2006); and *Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy* (PublicAffairs, 1999), written with former secretary of defense, Robert S. McNamara and James G. Blight.

I have earned research fellowships from the Rockefeller, Mellon, Ford, and Smith Richardson Foundations as well as the National Endowment for the Humanities. In addition, I have been Albert Shaw Endowed Lecturer at Johns Hopkins University; visiting professor of international relations at the Watson Institute at Brown University, and the Mary Ball Washington Professor of American History (Fulbright Chair) at University College Dublin. In 2019, the Alumnae/i Association of Vassar College presented me with its Outstanding Faculty Award. It was my fourth teaching award.

I am a Life Member of SHAFR and have served our organization in several capacities, including: SHAFR Council (2014-17); CoDirector of the SHAFR Program Committee (2016-17); Board of Editors of *Diplomatic History* (2001-04); *Passport's* Editorial Advisory Board (2010-12); Myrna Bernath Book Award Committee (2005-08); Norman and Laura Graebner Lifetime Achievement Award Committee (2018-22); Development Committee (2016-20); and the Membership Committee (2008-12).

One of my first priorities is to help make SHAFR whole. The pandemic has had a devastating impact on all aspects of our organization and our profession. We are likely to see membership challenges and endowment shortages in the next few years. The scholarly publishing world is also facing enormous trials that could impact our two outstanding publications. I hope to use my many years of SHAFR service (particularly on the Council, on both editorial boards, and on the Membership and Development Committees) to help chart a safe and prudent course for us. I also have nearly thirty years of experience at Vassar College in donor relations and development initiatives that could help SHAFR find and sustain new sources of income. My recent SHAFR service as Co-Director of the Program Committee gives me special insight into the many ways that the annual meeting can be used to help us achieve some of our membership and fundraising goals.

I believe these challenges also present SHAFR with enormous opportunities to expand our commitment to internationalize and diversify our membership, annual meeting, and summer initiatives. Our junior scholars and graduate students will need our continued support for their intellectual and professional development. It is also essential that SHAFR strengthen the bridges between our organization and the profession if we are to grow and sustain our vision. One of the ways we can do this is to increase our advocacy for archival access and government record preservation.

Mitchell Lerner: I am professor of history and director of the East Asian Studies Center at Ohio State University, and a fellow at OSU's Mershon Center for International Security. Amongst other things, I have been the Mary Ball Washington Distinguished Fulbright Professor at UC-Dublin; a fellow at the University of Virginia's Miller Center of Public Affairs; associate editor of the *Journal of American-East Asian Relations*; and a Distinguished Lecturer of the Association for Asian Studies. I have won multiple teaching awards, including OSU's Alumni Award for Distinguished Teaching (our highest such honor) and the Ohio Academy of History's Distinguished Teacher Prize. My current work examines the relationship between African American military service overseas and the domestic civil rights movement. Specific examples of my scholarship are on my CV. However, I believe that as SHAFR confronts the significant challenges of today's academic climate, a demonstrated commitment to the organization and a successful record of service to its membership should be the most important criteria. I was the founding editor of *Passport*, a position I held for eight years. I was one of the founders of SHAFR's Teaching Committee, and served as one of its first members. I have been elected to SHAFR's Council and Nominating Committee; in that last position, I led the effort to create a council seat reserved for someone from a teaching-focused school. I have also codirected the SHAFR Summer Institute; served on numerous ad hoc committees; and in 2022, had the honor of winning SHAFR's Distinguished Service Award.

As that great SHAFR fanboy Bob Dylan sings, "The Times, They are a-Changin'." SHAFR remains one of the brightest stars in the history discipline, a tremendous organization that has been critical to so many of us in so many ways. However, the profession faces a tumultuous future, one marked by shrinking job markets, increasing reliance on contingent labor, declining working conditions, and growing political pressures. Because these challenges emerged at roughly the same time that the field was seeing increased diversity, marginalized groups felt their impact disproportionately. SHAFR must therefore continue to be the vibrant intellectual home we all need while also redoubling efforts to engage with these most fundamental challenges of our profession.

Under my leadership, SHAFR would seek to expand programs to assist the most vulnerable amongst us. I envision a greater focus on mentorship and training; increased financial opportunities for those in need; more programs devoted to navigating the job market and the publication and research processes; increased teaching resources; and a continued commitment to support diversity in all forms. We must also seek new sources of revenue and new opportunities for public engagement. Above all, my vision will put the voices of the less privileged at the forefront, knowing that those who have lived these experiences will offer the best guideposts for the future. SHAFR has been a fundamental part of my professional life for three decades. It would be an honor to try to ensure that it remains equally as significant for future generations.

Council

At-Large Seat #1

Megan Black is associate professor of history at MIT, specializing in US and the world, environmental history, and political economy. Her recent book, *The Global Interior: Mineral Frontiers and American Power* (Harvard University Press, 2018), examined the surprising role of the US Interior Department in pursuing minerals across zones, including Indigenous reservations, formal territories, foreign nations, the oceans, and outer space. The book received four top prizes in history, including the Stuart L. Bernath Prize for international history and George Perkins Marsh Prize for environmental history. She has published articles in *Diplomatic History*, *Journal of American History*, *Modern American History*, and *Humanity*. Black previously taught at the London School of Economics and completed postdoctoral research at the Charles Warren Center for Studies in American History at Harvard University and Dickey Center of International Understanding at Dartmouth College. She has been a SHAFR member since 2015. In recent years, she has served on the Marilyn Blatt Young dissertation fellowship committee and the program committee, becoming a co-chair for the latter with Ryan Irwin for the 2021 Annual Meeting. For responding to the COVID-19 crisis and creating the first virtual meeting, the pair received meritorious service awards and lifetime memberships from SHAFR.

Theresa Keeley: I am an associate professor at the University of Louisville. My research and teaching focus on human rights, religion, transnational social movements, gender, and law. My approach draws on my experience as a human rights advocate and attorney. My book, *Reagan's Gun-Toting Nuns: The Catholic Conflict over Cold War Human Rights Policy in Central America*, received the American Catholic Historical Association's John Gilmary Shea Prize and Duke University's Juan E. Méndez Book Award for Human Rights in Latin America. My new project involves medicine, children's health, and war.

SHAFR has been my scholarly home since 2009 and has been instrumental in shaping who I am as an historian. A Myrna Bernath Fellowship allowed me to pursue research in Central America. The 2011 Summer Institute and the 2022 Second Book Workshop encouraged me to think in new ways about my work and just as importantly, helped me to feel a sense of scholarly community. As a SHAFR Council member, I hope to continue fostering this sense of support and community for others. I am currently on the Committee on Women and the Bernath Scholarly Article Prize Committee. I previously served on the Program and Myrna Bernath Fellowship & Book Prize Committees.

At-Large Seat #2

Gretchen Heefner is an Associate Professor of History at Northeastern University. She earned her Ph.D. in History from Yale University in 2010. Gretchen is currently working on her second book, *From the Red Desert to the Red Planet*, about U.S. military engineering in extreme environments. Her first book, *The Missile Next Door: The Minuteman in the American Heartland* (Harvard University Press, 2012), was selected as a Choice Outstanding Academic title in 2013. Her work has appeared in *Diplomatic History*, *Environmental History*, *Endeavour*, and *Modern American History*, as well as in edited volumes such as the *Cambridge History of America and the World* and *The Military and the Market*. Gretchen has served SHAFR in many capacities, including cochair of the Program Committee for the 2020 annual meeting; member of the Bernath First Book Prize committee (2020-23); editorial board member for *Diplomatic History* (2017-20); and member of the search committee for the editorship of *DH*. She is currently on the Ways and Means Committee. Gretchen lives in Brookline, Mass., with her husband, two teenagers, and a pandemic puppy.

Marc-William Palen: I am a Senior Lecturer at the University of Exeter in England and am honored to be nominated for Council. I strongly endorse SHAFR's commitment to diversity and to its support for graduate students and the precariously employed. While among the latter in 2013, I was very fortunate indeed to receive SHAFR's W. A. Williams Junior Faculty Research Grant to support research on my first book, *The "Conspiracy" of Free Trade: The Anglo-American Struggle over Empire and Economic Globalisation, 1846-1896* (Cambridge University Press, 2016). At Exeter, I am editor of the history blog the Imperial & Global Forum, and co-director of History & Policy's Global Economics and History Forum in London. I have been a SHAFR member for over a decade, have published numerous articles in *Diplomatic History* and presented at numerous SHAFR conferences, have reviewed article manuscripts and books for *Diplomatic History* and HDiplo, and, since 2019, sit on SHAFR's Open Access Task Force. I look forward to expanding my service to SHAFR as a member of Council, and to bringing an international perspective through my work in the UK.

At-Large Seat #3

Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht is chair of the department of history at the John F. Kennedy Institute for North American Studies at Freie Universität Berlin. She has taught, among others, at Doshisha University (Kyoto), Sciences Po (Paris), Carleton University (Ottawa), Harvard, Heidelberg, Bielefeld, Cologne, and the Hertie School of Government (Berlin).

A lifetime member of SHAFR since 2000, she has won two book prizes from the society (Stuart Bernath & Myrna Bernath, for *Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany*, 1999) and published several pieces (including two roundtable contributions) in *Diplomatic History*. Her series at Berghahn Books, *Explorations in Culture and International History* (since 2003) seeks to promote junior scholars focusing on groundbreaking topics in the field. Moreover, she has served on five SHAFR committees, including: the *Diplomatic History* Editorial Board, the Bernath Article Prize Committee, the Membership Committee, the Michael Hunt Prize Selection Committee, and the SHAFR Task Force on Internationalization. As a Council member, she would like to focus on the effort to connect SHAFR to similar organisations outside of North America.

For a complete list of publications, research projects, teachings activities and services to the profession, see: https://www.jfki.fuberlin.de/en/faculty/history/persons/TeachingStaff/gienow_hecht1/index.html.

Andrew Johnstone: I am an Associate Professor of American History at the University of Leicester. My research focuses on internationalism and on relations between the state and private spheres in creating and mobilising domestic support for U.S. foreign policy. My current book project examines the relationship between the public relations industry and American foreign relations.

My most recent books are *Against Immediate Evil: American Internationalists and the Four Freedoms of the Eve of World War II* (Cornell, 2014) and, edited with Andrew Priest, *US Presidential Elections and Foreign Policy* (Kentucky, 2017). My articles have appeared in journals including *Diplomatic History*, the *Journal of Contemporary History*, *Global Society*, and the *Journal of American Studies*.

I first joined SHAFR as a Ph.D. student in 2001 and have since seen it as my organisational home. I attended my first conference that same year and have attended and appeared on the programme of most conferences since. In that time, I have seen SHAFR become more diverse in almost every way, and I would like to help it continue on that path. I will also bring a different international perspective to Council. I was previously elected to the Nominating Committee for a three-year term from 2016-2018.

Nominating Committee

Justin Hart: I am President's Excellence in Teaching Professor and Associate Professor of History at Texas Tech University, where I started teaching after completing my Ph.D. at Rutgers. In 2013, I published *Empire of Ideas* with Oxford University Press. I have also published a number of articles and book chapters on the cultural dimensions of U.S. foreign relations and the historiography of our field. I have been an active member of SHAFR for two decades and I have attended every annual meeting for at least the past decade. I have served on the program committee and on the editorial board for *Diplomatic History*. I am particularly interested in teaching issues, on which I have published for *Passport* and HDiplo. I am committed to continuing the recent strides that have been made in diversifying the organization, as well as to ensuring an influx of younger members in our era of heightened professional precarity.

Penny M. Von Eschen is Professor of History and William R. Kenan, Jr. Professor of American Studies at the University of Virginia. My research explores intersections between the Cold War and colonialism/anticolonialism. Publications include: *Paradoxes of Nostalgia: Cold War Triumphalism and Global Disorder Since 1989*, Duke University Press, 2022; *Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War*, Harvard University Press, 2004; *Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937-1957*, Cornell University Press, 1997, winner of the 1998 Stuart L. Bernath book prize. Honors include: Fulbright Specialist, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 2013; The Dave Brubeck Institute 2008 Award for Distinguished Achievement. SHAFR service includes: Council Member, 2014-2016; Women's committee: Mentor for second book proposal workshop, NOLA, 2022; Committee on Access, Representation, and Equity, 2019-present; Task Committee on Membership and Dues, 2016; Committee for Graebner Prize for lifetime achievement, 2012-2016, chair in middle term; Bernath Lecture Prize Committee, 2004-2007, Chair, 2006-2007.

A Roundtable on Tizoc Chavez, *The Diplomatic Presidency: American Foreign Policy from FDR to George H.W. Bush*

Kelly M. McFarland, Jeffrey A. Engel, Silke Zoller, Seth Offenbach,
M. Elizabeth Sanders, and Tizoc Chavez

Roundtable Review Introductory Essay:
*The Diplomatic Presidency: American Foreign Policy
from FDR to George H.W. Bush*, by Tizoc Chavez

Kelly M. McFarland

Presidential diplomacy has arguably been more front and center in the American public consciousness than usual over the last half decade. President Trump made his personal relationship with a multitude of world leaders a key media talking point. Whether it was his use of Twitter to praise, degrade, or threaten another leader, his bombastic actions at NATO and G-7 summits, his secretive discussions with Vladimir Putin, or his eventual BFF relationship with Kim Jong Un, Trump was always quick to place himself at the helm of his administration's diplomatic endeavors. Likewise, albeit with a different tone, strategy, and oftentimes different desired outcomes, President Biden has made much of his personal diplomatic skills, and his belief in the need to use them. Candidate Biden touted his foreign policy experience on the campaign trail, noting that he personally knew many world leaders. Biden has used his experience and full Rolodex to try and repair relationships with allies. This approach has been on full display since the beginning of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

This recent atmosphere of personal presidential diplomacy makes the arrival of Tizoc Chavez's work, *The Diplomatic Presidency: American Foreign Policy from FDR to George H. W. Bush*, all the more important. Chavez makes it clear that presidential diplomacy as we know it today become part of the office, for better or worse, with Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Most importantly, Chavez demonstrates that regardless of a president's personal inclinations, personal diplomacy will come into play at points throughout their presidencies due to any one, or a combination, of four consistent structures. In doing so, he adroitly demonstrates how personal diplomacy became an ingrained part of the modern presidency.

In large part due to the fact that Chavez offers new interpretations on the role of presidential diplomacy, and links multiple administrations together through the four structural forces that he sees driving presidential diplomacy, the reviews are mostly praiseworthy. As Chavez notes in his response, his goal was to "complicate the mundane," which he has done in fine fashion.

In one way or another, Jeffrey A. Engel, Silke Zoller,

and Seth Offenbach note the importance of Chavez's introduction of four key factors that the author argues solidified personal presidential diplomacy, and that continues to drive it today. These factors are, according to Chavez: "international crises, domestic politics, foreign leaders' requests, and a desire for control." (2) This analysis is the heart of Chavez's argument and contribution, and the reviewers rightly highlight and commend it. Zoller notes that "by examining personal interactions as a structural element of the presidency, Chavez sheds new light on well-known episodes of U.S. foreign policy," and that the author's "structural approach highlights commonalities of U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War era that have previously been relegated to the margins of individual presidents' narratives." This linkage between administrations is arguably the book's main contribution to the field, and an important one. Zoller also praises Chavez's use of public polling and psychology to further his arguments.

Offenbach highlights how *The Diplomatic Presidency* fills a void in the literature as it slides nicely into the sweet spot between American foreign policy and presidential history. For his part, Offenbach believes the book really takes off in the Kennedy chapter, and finds the chapter on Reagan especially useful. This chapter demonstrated for the reviewer that "as the most powerful voice, the president can alter the course of the nation's foreign policy."

Besides making us all hum Depeche Mode songs for a few days, Engel also provides strong praise for Chavez's work, applauding the ways in which it "demonstrates... personalities mean much in not only the conduct but the result of international politics at the highest levels of power." As with Zoller and Offenbach, Engel praises the book's broad swath and its ability to demonstrate the different reasons for personal presidential diplomacy, while also "tracing the evolution" of it over decades. Moreover, Chavez's analysis starkly demonstrates for Engel, that for better or worse, personal presidential diplomacy is also here to stay. This is likely to be an especially important point for Chavez's political scientist colleagues, policymakers, and those who seek to glean something for the future.

Although these three reviews are highly laudable, the reviewers also take aim at a few spots that leave them wanting more. In his chapter on Reagan, Chavez notes a diary entry from the president in which he discusses his belief that if he could just meet with Soviet leadership, it would lessen the danger. As Engel points out, Chavez brings this insight out due to his focus on personal diplomacy, but

it also highlights how unique presidential personalities are, which “ultimately leaves the reader unsatisfied. Presidents are people, but they are also, by definition, ego maniacs.” Offenbach and Zoller also bring up the key point of technology. The rise of personal presidential diplomacy coincided with a time of rapid expansion in communications technology, as well as the growing ease of international travel. Both of these reviewers question why Chavez, while noting the increased ease of travel and communication, doesn’t go into further detail regarding technological advances as an explanation for increased personal diplomacy. In his response, Chavez notes that for him “technology facilitated more so than drove leader-to-leader engagement,” but these discussions bring up obvious areas for further study on the role of technology on diplomacy.

The fourth reviewer of *The Diplomatic Presidency*, Elizabeth Sanders, takes a different approach to her review, which is the most critical of the four. While calling Chavez’s work a “useful book,” and not wanting to “discount the significance of Prof. Chavez’s important accounts of presidential diplomacy,” Sanders does not spend much of her review discussing the significance of the book or the important accounts she says that it contains. Sanders instead uses her allotted space to critique Chavez’s work for not being one that instead focuses on the ways in which, apart from using personal diplomacy, “presidents are also the world’s most important instigators and combatants in war.” She goes on to note that “the peaceful and magnanimous aspects of presidential power are, unfortunately, not the most consequential since 1945.” Sanders is obviously not wrong about presidents making decisions that can ultimately lead to war, death, and destruction, but, as the author responds, “she provides numerous examples of presidents’ destructive decisions, but it strikes me as odd to argue that these instances mean presidents were not also still diplomats. Sanders appears to equate diplomacy with peace.” And, as Chavez notes, “war and diplomacy are not mutually exclusive.”

Overall, the reviewers find much to praise in Chavez’s well-written, engaging, and thought-provoking work. Not only does the book describe the similarities and differences between presidents when conducting personal diplomacy, but more importantly, it provides readers with the core drivers that led presidents to undertake personal diplomacy in a sustained fashion over the second half of the 20th century. It is sure to be a staple in many classrooms and on numerous bookshelves.

Review of Tizoc Chavez: *The Diplomatic Presidency*

Jeffrey A. Engel

We live in unstable times. Misinformation is rampant; the environment is in flux; the nationalism that scourged the 20th century has returned; Tom Brady may or may not be retired by the time you read this. The term “fake news” no longer refers just to late-night satire, but instead stands in for a host of problems endemic to our age: the speed of communications has never been faster, yet trust—in ourselves, our government, and the international system—seems strained at best. More likely it is failing. War rages in Europe as I write. A real war, with mass casualties, civilian deaths, and by all appearances, crimes against humanity perhaps reaching all the way to genocide. Conflict was never going to disappear from the human condition even after the overt triumphalism of the Cold War’s end, yet few writers alive in 1989 thought they’d live to see the continent once more wracked by such violence.

Perhaps this is why I was feeling nostalgic when reading, and thoroughly enjoying, Tizoc Chavez’s *The Diplomatic Presidency: American Foreign Policy from FDR*

to George H.W. Bush. The book prompted memories of my reasonably happy childhood, specifically (though not exclusively) Depeche Mode. While not a huge fan of the British pop duo, who among us does not know—and admit it, crack a wistful smile at its synthesized electronic exuberance—the refrain from their 1984 chart-topper?

“People are people so why should it be, you and I should get along so awfully?”

Presidents, you see, are people too. As Chavez aptly demonstrates across nine chapters and a thoughtful conclusion, personalities mean much in not only the conduct but the result of international politics at the highest levels of power. Like people, because they are people, presidents bring personality traits to their time in office. Harry Truman’s insecurity put a chip on his shoulder. Dwight Eisenhower had nothing to be insecure about. Having ‘saved western civilization’ on your resume does tend to help bolster one’s confidence, even if it mutes creativity. Hardly as accomplished yet infused with the confidence bred into those to the manor born, John F. Kennedy was, in Chavez’s assessment, charming and magnetic. Lyndon Johnson made damn well sure you knew he was the life of every party and the focus of every meeting. Richard Nixon was neither charming, magnetic, nor really lovable in any way, though oh how he tried. Jimmy Carter could be intense, a word never applied to his successor. Ronald Reagan required tutoring on even the most basic of strategic fundamentals even well into this second term, and for the sake of all that is thoughtful within the historical profession can we at long last excise those who insist the sincerity spawned by his simplicity obscured genuine strategic savvy? George H.W. Bush carried into office more knowledge than his predecessor but far less confidence. Reagan was popular but had few genuine friends. Even his second wife, to whom he was undoubtedly devoted, doubted her sense of the man from time to time. Bush never enjoyed Reagan’s popular appeal, save for a brief artificial high in the aftermath of the brief Gulf War. Yet Bush counted his friends by the thousands. Indeed, he desperately wanted everyone to be his friend, though more on that momentarily.

Personality traits have always infused presidential politics, but as Chavez aptly notes, not always their diplomacy. Only beginning in the twentieth century could American presidents routinely engage their international peers in person, or through the sound and tone of their voice. Moving from letters and missives to voice and sight required new technologies only invented in the century’s first half, and only made fully practicable for the art of international diplomacy in its second. Most impactful were the telephone and the airplane, affording presidents opportunity to speak for themselves when conversing with foreign counterparts, and ultimately to do so in the same room. Franklin Roosevelt in particular employed these new communications mediums to personalize American foreign policy as no prior Oval Office occupant. “By the end of his presidency,” Chavez writes, “Roosevelt had ushered in not only the modern presidency but also the practice of personal diplomacy” [23]. He had real conversations with foreign leaders, heard them, and met them.

Other presidents had done each of these before, but never before to such an extent. The new technologies fit Roosevelt’s personal style. A chameleon of a leader, he fawned, cajoled, bribed and threatened as befitted each crisis of his presidency, juggling if not the daily conduct than the full contours of the vision of American foreign policy within his own head and inner circle of advisers. Not even his last Vice-President and ultimate successor knew the full extent of FDR’s plans and promises.

Which prompted a backlash against personal diplomacy, Chavez finds, in Roosevelt’s wake. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower met foreign leaders, but “the

practice of personal diplomacy declined" [47]. Bureaucrats throughout the growing Cold War national security state took back the minute control over foreign policy FDR had accumulated, using the rapid growth of the entire national security complex to limit a president's ability to operate without their consent. In truth, neither Truman nor Eisenhower wanted to, the former being insecure of his expertise, the latter having lived every moment of his professional life either as someone's staffer or surrounded by his own.

Opportunities for personal diplomacy soared for ensuing presidents, making their ability to manage foreign relationships more intimate than ever before. "During the second half of the twentieth century," Chavez writes, "personal diplomacy became an indelible feature of US foreign relations and the presidency and a 'way of life' in international politics [208]." You need not take his word for it. Chavez brings the goods to prove his case, including statistics, befitting his training as a political scientist. Harry Truman averaged less than one meeting a month with a foreign leader. By the end of 2007, Chavez reports, George W. Bush averaged six and a half. Which is not to say the growth of personal diplomacy was linear or consistent. Eisenhower visited four foreign countries a year, on average, during his eight years in office, and personally welcomed an average of nine foreign leaders a year to the United States. Travel was easier in Ike's day than in FDR's, though aeronautical advancements were not the only factor at play in the rise of face-to-face presidential meetings with foreign counterparts. George H.W. Bush visited fifteen countries a year during his sole term, but met with an average of forty-nine fellow heads of state.

Eisenhower and both Bushes enjoyed access to the speed and comfort of jet travel, and exceptionally nice mid-flight amenities for their time, but the real reason the senior Bush met more frequently with foreign counterparts than the man he'd grown up admiring—and more than once, playing golf with as junior member of a foursome—was simply that he liked it. More importantly, Bush considered himself good with people. (Eisenhower had a tendency to simply order them around.) Other presidents required reminding. Chavez reports that Jimmy Carter's advisers repeatedly reminded their boss of the potential power of a president's personal attention. "As I consider ways to increase the effectiveness of our diplomacy in [the] coming months," Secretary of State Cyrus Vance advised, "I am struck with the fact that there is often no more persuasive means at our disposal...than ever brief visits with you... personal diplomacy by you could make the significant difference" between success or failure in the international realm [131].

Carter frequently resisted. It was time out of his personal schedule that was at stake, and one does not recall Carter's time in office as particularly care-free. As intensely engaged a president as we've seen since Woodrow Wilson, Carter made great inroads once willing to invest himself in the most complicated of negotiations. His close and mutual friendship with Egypt's Anwar Sadat, and the trust between the two required to make the Camp David accords work, alone proves that point. But Carter rarely seemed to enjoy the task. "This kind of thing should be worked out privately," he told Vance when Japan's leadership desired a greater coupling of personal and public diplomacy. "I resent their taking advantage of us like this [138]." By 'us,' he meant, 'me.' Carter's ire with the Japanese only grew in time—ironically, just as the trade imbalance between the

two grew apace, and not in America's favor. "Tell State— There [sic] will be no extension of [the] 2 hour time!" he wrote his staff, underlining "no" three times [139]. Tokyo had had the temerity to ask him to lunch.

Chavez is at his best tracing the evolution of personal diplomacy across decades, and that is the primary thrust of his book and contribution to our field. His is a nuanced point, and he a nuanced writer. Personal diplomacy doesn't explain everything, he readily concedes, nor serve as a Rosetta stone for deciphering diplomatic decisions. Domestic politics matter. So too the nature of the international system and its crises, both anticipated and unforeseen. Rarely is the solution to any foreign policy quandary simple or mono-causal. His point, therefore, is that we need to recall that the man (and someday woman) who sits in the Oval Office, who rides Air Force One, and who can invite foreign leaders to Camp David or into their own home, matters. "Personal diplomacy," Chavez writes, "thus became part of their job description [208]."

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But presidents, while people, also remain politicians. Which mean they lie. Perhaps you prefer prevaricate? This is not criticism but fact. I, for one, do not want a commander-in-chief devoid of a poker face when international crises reach their boiling point. Bluffing is lying, just done subtly, and ideally through omission rather than bluster. Flattery matters too, and what harm is done in telling the chef his entrée was 'fabulous' when it was merely good, or in taking the time to hear out an ally's advice even if one has no intention of following it? Here I return to George H.W. Bush, whom as Chavez notes, was a master of flattery when dealing with foreign heads of state. "I need your advice and counsel," he told Francois Mitterand [182]. He wanted "the full benefit" of Helmut Kohl's wisdom as well, reiterating his "determination to get advice and suggestions" from the German leader on issues as intrinsically critical to the German as Germany's reunification [182]. During his time in office Bush said much the same to a host of world leaders, from countries big and small, nuclear powers and bit-players alike. He wanted to be liked, and more importantly wanted them to feel important. Neither was he alone in the annals of presidential history for freely buttering-up overseas contacts and leaders, or for believing in his own powers of flattery and persuasion. "I have a gut feeling I'd like to talk to him [Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko] about our problems man-to-man," Ronald Reagan told his diary, and "see if I could convince him [158]." He'd said the same about Chernenko's immediate predecessor, during a period when Soviet leaders enjoyed life-spans similar to fruit-flies. "I felt that if I could ever get in room alone with one of the top Soviet leaders," Reagan wrote, "there was a chance the two of us could make some progress in easing tensions between our two countries [157]." His own powers of persuasion, Reagan thought, could overcome nearly two generations of structural conflict between superpowers. Would that it were that easy.

Here is an insight brought to light by Chavez' work focusing on the personal within presidential diplomacy, but one that ultimately leaves the reader unsatisfied. Presidents are people, and politicians, but they are also, by definition, ego maniacs. How else to explain the irrational confidence required to think that of all the hundreds of millions of Americans, only you are best qualified to lead? And, in the nuclear age, to be personally charged with the means to destroy all human life on earth as well. This is not normal. Such men, (and again, someday soon a woman

too) imbued with such egoism surely know its value, too. Bush and his presidential counterparts wanted foreign leaders to feel wanted, even as they also desired their advice. Chavez cannot peer into their hearts to know when presidential flattery was revelatory or tactical. No historian could. At the least, he shows that the presidents with the greatest experience tended to downplay the importance of the personal touch, at least when confiding to their own close advisers. "I can't change my position because [Soviet leader and reformer Mikhail] Gorbachev might like me," Bush said, "and he damn sure isn't going to change his because I like him [180]." The most diplomatically experienced president in modern history thought precisely the same, knowing enough to know that his own immense talent—and confidence—could not guarantee success. No person's ever could. "This idea of the President of the United States going personally abroad to negotiate—it's just damn stupid," Eisenhower said. "Every time a President has gone abroad to get into the details of these things he's lost his shirt [54]."

Thus the necessity of Chavez's book. The smartest presidents know personal diplomacy matters, and that flattery is a marvelous lubricant, but the personal touch cannot, or at least should not, be the deciding factor in any policy. They know they are not the office, nor the country they represent, but instead merely its temporary spokesperson. As Chavez shows, opportunities for personal diplomacy are quite unlikely to dissipate in any foreseeable future. Couple that with the rise of incompetent and inexperienced presidents, in the foreign policy realm in particular, as the 20th century turned into our own 21st, and we have a recipe if not for disaster, than at least for controversy, confusion, and incompetence. Donald Trump made "perfect" phone calls to foreign leaders, in his own unbiased opinion. They got him impeached. Joe Biden believes "all politics is personal, particularly international relations," adding "you've got to know the other man or woman's soul, and who they are, and make sure they know you [212]." Following decades engaged in foreign affairs as a senator and eight years as vice president, we can only hope he both means it, and knows better.

Review of Tizoc Chavez, *The Diplomatic Presidency: American Foreign Policy from FDR to George H. W. Bush*

Silke Zoller

Lyndon B. Johnson did not particularly welcome his many meetings with foreign leaders during his time in office. He did find ways to make such engagements more enjoyable, including hosting events at his ranch in the Texas hill country. There, foreign visitors could encounter a stereotypical "real" America of cowboys and Western hospitality (88).

But why did Johnson feel that he had to interact frequently with other world leaders? This aspect of a president's job is so routine today that administrations and publics rarely question it. Tizoc Chavez is a visiting assistant professor of government at Colby College. He draws back the curtain in his new monograph *The Diplomatic Presidency* to explain how personal diplomacy—face-to-face interaction with foreign leaders—became a key part of the modern U.S. presidency.

Instead of focusing on variations between different U.S. presidents, Chavez is interested in how personal diplomacy became part of the institution of the presidency. He weaves elegantly through the past ninety years of U.S. foreign relations and highlights how U.S. presidents since Franklin Delano Roosevelt acted from the same set of structural opportunities and constraints to embrace personal diplomacy. Their adoption of the practice institutionalized it and made it a standard and expected

part of the president's duties.

The Diplomatic Presidency is an example of a structural focus done well. Chavez covers a complicated set of factors that he contends motivated presidents to engage directly with their foreign counterparts. He first lays the groundwork by discussing how Franklin Roosevelt introduced personal diplomacy as a practice that a U.S. president could and should partake in. Before Roosevelt's time in office, Americans (and their presidents) did not think that the president should travel abroad or engage directly with foreign leaders; that job was reserved for trained diplomats. Roosevelt introduced many aspects of the modern presidency, and personal diplomacy was one of them.

For better or worse, subsequent presidents emulated Roosevelt's example. To explain why, Chavez traces four key factors. Presidents engaged in personal diplomacy to respond directly to international crises, to gather domestic public support, to control U.S. diplomacy without having to go through unwieldy bureaucracies, and to satisfy foreign leaders who were contending for the president's time. Chavez showcases how these four factors in tandem motivated presidents to pursue foreign policy through personal interactions.

Certain factors weighed more heavily on some presidents' minds. Most of the book's chapters cover case studies describing how one of the four aforementioned factors influenced a specific president. By examining personal interactions as a structural element of the presidency, Chavez sheds new light on well-known episodes of U.S. foreign policy. For example, he emphasizes how Richard Nixon's détente summits with the Chinese and Soviets were shaped by Nixon's obsession with his domestic standing. Emulating a strategy John F. Kennedy used in his 1960 presidential victory, Nixon designed the summits to be media spectacles that would appeal to American voters. He had his aides schedule both the main banquet with Chinese leaders in Beijing and his return trip to the United States on Air Force One so they could be broadcast to Americans live during a primetime television slot (115).

This scheduling, Chavez argues, was part of the pageantry of personal diplomacy and helped secure Nixon's reelection in 1972. In another well-known example, Chavez analyzes how Ronald Reagan bypassed most of his aides as well as the entire U.S. foreign policy establishment to conduct direct negotiations with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. That Reagan engaged with Gorbachev alone in order to have direct control over the results of their interactions is well known. What Chavez emphasizes here is that Reagan's actions were not new: they were grounded in a longer tradition of presidential personal diplomacy. He traces how all of Reagan's Cold War predecessors also cut out the State Department and other bureaucracies when they wanted to retain control over the process of engaging with a particular foreign leader.

This structural approach highlights commonalities of U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War era that have previously been relegated to the margins of individual presidents' narratives. One is the outsized influence of missteps. Because the office of the president is so influential, even the smallest perceived slight or mishap can have foreign policy ramifications. Harry Truman left an unfortunate first impression on Stalin after abruptly postponing their initial meeting in advance of the Potsdam conference (49). U.S.-Iranian relations soured when Roosevelt declined to return a courtesy visit to the Shah of Iran during Roosevelt's 1943 stay in Tehran (39). In a similar vein, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev rebuffed JFK's early attempts to engage him in part because the Kennedy administration responded to Soviet letters too quickly. While Kennedy wanted to signal an eagerness to engage, Khrushchev's impression was

that the new administration was not taking his missives seriously (69).

Another commonality is the proliferation of spectacle meetings, ones that by design do not end in substantive results. Instead, these are meant to make their participants look good. Such meetings can have a strong signaling effect, highlighting the cohesiveness of an alliance, the capacity of a president to act as a statesman, or the willingness of superpower rivals to continue talking to one another. In 1955, for example, Dwight Eisenhower traveled to a four-powers summit that “allowed the Soviets to demonstrate equality with the West, and the United States was pleased that its allies remained united” (55). Such meetings boosted popular support for a president’s policies and could help them both at the polls and in Congress.

However, these spectacles could not overcome significant domestic issues. Richard Nixon’s “Kitchen Debate” with Khrushchev in 1959 was widely publicized, but Nixon lost the 1960 presidential election. Between 1972 and 1974, his summitry could not distract the American public from Watergate. And at the close of the Cold War, George H. W. Bush could not convince voters that his personal diplomacy mattered enough to reelect him. When there is trouble at home, the empty calories of personal diplomacy spectacle can distract from it, but not necessarily overcome it.

The impact of an event is not always an easy thing for historians to pin down, but Chavez deftly showcases how U.S. audiences reacted to decades of personal diplomacy. He interweaves polling results and newspaper commentaries throughout the text to emphasize how the American public condoned or condemned specific presidential meetings with foreign leaders. Roosevelt faced significant public criticism of his personal diplomacy, with Americans opining that such interactions with foreign leaders wasted the president’s time.

By the time Truman and Eisenhower took office these initiatives were gradually becoming more acceptable to ordinary Americans. When Kennedy and Johnson were in office, Americans came to expect that their presidents would meet with foreign leaders to smooth the way to policy agreements through personal contact. For example, the public expected Johnson to seek a summit with Soviet leaders in 1968 even after he had announced that he was not running for re-election and after it was made clear that Americans did not approve of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia (102). Chavez deftly uses polls and newspapers to reveal how Americans went from critiquing personal diplomacy to expecting it.

Another important contribution this work makes is that it elevates the influence of psychology in foreign relations. In recent years, historians have emphasized the importance of emotions within diplomatic interactions, stressing the roles that likes, dislikes, stereotypes, and personal preferences played for those who created foreign policy and those who carried it out.¹

Chavez goes beyond this focus to highlight how U.S. presidents utilized psychology and the latest psychological research to shape U.S. foreign policy to their advantage.

In particular, Chavez analyzes how the Kennedy administration used psychology to conceptualize how the president interacted with other world leaders. He emphasizes that Kennedy and his aides viewed his role as a “counselor,” someone who assuages others’ concerns and helps them alleviate their stress and overcome their worries (67). By taking this role, the president could emphasize U.S. credibility as a good ally to his foreign counterparts.

Another important contribution this work makes is that it elevates the influence of psychology in foreign relations. In recent years, historians have emphasized the importance of emotions within diplomatic interactions, stressing the roles that likes, dislikes, stereotypes, and personal preferences played for those who created foreign policy and those who carried it out.

Chavez includes two strong examples of Kennedy’s interactions with Iran’s Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer. In Kennedy’s view, both men seemed needy, requiring constant reassurances of U.S. support. In the Kennedy administration’s paternalistic view, it was the role of the president to soothe these men. (This view begets an idea for further study: how do changes in the field of psychology influence personal diplomacy?) Chavez aptly demonstrates that Kennedy understood himself as pursuing U.S. foreign policy interests by acting as a counselor for, listening to, and mollifying other leaders.

Because this work is about personal interactions, a key focus is on how leaders leverage friendly connections to one another in the service of their countries. Chavez emphasizes (often) that U.S. presidents pursued contacts with other leaders not for friendship’s sake, but to advance U.S. interests. This statement, while true, invites further evaluation. Chavez analyzes the difference between true friendship, without strings attached, and utilitarian forms of friendship, where one or both sides have something concrete to gain from their interaction.

This analysis appears rather late in the book, however, in the chapter on George H. W. Bush, which begins some fifty years after the start of Chavez’s narrative. An earlier assessment of presidents’ use of labels such as “my friend” might reinforce Chavez’s claims in prior chapters without forcing him to resort to unwieldy reminders that presidents were first and foremost pursuing U.S. interests. The study of “friendship” as a concept also opens new opportunities for research. For example, how often did U.S. presidents deploy this term compared to other world leaders? Calling someone a friend has a distinct place in U.S. culture, and the embrace or rejection of this term in other societies might reveal a new angle to foreign relations in general and personal diplomacy in particular.

Since Chavez examines the institution of the presidency, his analysis is by default centered on the United States and on U.S. foreign relations. His work opens the gate for future studies that could explore how widespread personal diplomacy has been as a practice throughout the world and through time. For example, Chavez discusses how unusual a secret backchannel between Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald was for foreign relations of the 1930s. Yet soon after, the reader hears of Chiang Kai-Shek’s manifold attempts to use personal diplomacy to secure his position in China (25, 41). These examples strongly suggest that there is much research yet to be done on the global use of personal diplomacy.

Another factor that will benefit from further study is how technological changes enabled personal contact at the highest levels of government. Chavez focuses on power and structural factors to explain why personal diplomacy increased over time. Yet tantalizing hints abound in his work about the role that new technologies might have played. In the introduction, Chavez mentions that the 1959 introduction of the new Boeing 707 aircraft enabled the president to travel on Air Force One and yet work and communicate at the same time (10). Two chapters later, the reader hears that Eisenhower increased his foreign travel dramatically at the end of his presidency, and in 1960 went “on multiple world tours, visiting Europe, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia” (58). There is a potential correlation here. Similarly, an increase in the quality and quantity of telephone connections might play a role.

In a slightly different vein, the dissemination of television probably fostered the pageantry and spectacle

associated with state visits. Chavez discusses Nixon's adept use of television cameras during his presidency, highlighting how he played to the camera when he traveled abroad to portray himself as a capable statesman and leader. Chavez's work hints at strong interplays between technology and personal diplomacy that may provide rich ground for future research.

The Diplomatic Presidency is an elegantly written work about the structural factors that promoted personal interactions between the U.S. president and foreign leaders. This study will appeal to historians and international relations scholars alike. Chavez deftly analyzes how all presidents since Roosevelt used personal interactions to serve their own and their country's goals and how, in turn, personal diplomacy grew throughout the latter half of the twentieth century to become a defining feature of the U.S. presidency.

Note:

1. See, for example, Barbara Keys, "The Diplomat's Two Minds: Deconstructing a Foreign Policy Myth," *Diplomatic History* 44, 1 (January 2020): 1-21; and Frank Costigliola, *Roosevelt's Lost Alliances: How Personal Politics Helped Start the Cold War* (Princeton, NJ, 2012).

Review of Tizoc Chavez, *The Diplomatic Presidency: American Foreign Policy from FDR to George H.W. Bush*

Seth Offenbach

In *The Diplomatic Presidency*, Tizoc Chavez posits that "regardless of who occupied the post-war White House, presidents were driven to use personal diplomacy for the same reasons: international crises, domestic politics, foreign leaders' requests, and a desire for control (2)." Chavez's work identifies Woodrow Wilson as a presidential trailblazer (in terms of his use of personal diplomacy) and argues that President Franklin Roosevelt also helped "usher in . . . the practice of personal diplomacy (23)." But it was not until the administrations of presidents Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy that personal diplomacy really became engrained.

The first chapter of *The Diplomatic Presidency* begins with an analysis of Roosevelt. The second covers the administrations of Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower. While the book does an excellent job of chronicling Roosevelt's use of personal diplomacy, chapter 1 is unfortunately its driest chapter, as it relies primarily on descriptions of Roosevelt's letters, meetings, and proposed meetings. Chapter 2 describes the decline of personal diplomacy under the Truman administration, in large part because of Truman's personality. It also chronicles how Eisenhower was reluctant to engage in it until the end of his second term. However, by the end Eisenhower's administration, personal diplomacy was here to stay.

The analysis embedded within *The Diplomatic Presidency* really begins to take off in chapter 3, with Kennedy's administration. It was Kennedy who truly embodied the importance of relying upon personal diplomacy, and under him it became an extremely important part of American diplomacy. *The Diplomatic Presidency* argues that Kennedy, in part because of his lack of experience and in part because of his youth, needed to devote a lot of time to reassuring international leaders (all of whom were his elders) of the United States' commitment and resolve. This task was more important than during previous presidential administrations.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 cover the Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Jimmy Carter presidencies (with a brief detour into the short term of Gerald Ford). These chapters describe how each president's personality meant that he

would use personal diplomacy differently. For instance, Nixon focused more on his domestic audience and on cultivating the publicity (via the U.S. media) that using personal diplomacy created. In contrast, Johnson abhorred the international spectacle of international travel but used other tools (such as meetings with ambassadors and letters to foreign leaders) to help promote American interests abroad.

The strongest chapter, from my perspective, is chapter 7, which covers the presidency of Ronald Reagan. By that point personal diplomacy was already an accepted part of the American presidency. Chavez describes Reagan, whom some viewed at the time as aloof from policy decisions, as "deeply involved, knowledgeable, and the driving force behind his administration's policy (151)." Chavez argues that world leaders were quick to recognize that "the most powerful and authoritative messages come from the White House, not from the sprawling US foreign policy bureaucracy (154)."

This view of presidential power is one of the key reasons personal diplomacy is so important. As the most powerful voice, the president can alter the course of the nation's foreign policy. And alter it Reagan did. By going around the State Department, Reagan was able to move diplomatic mountains quickly. And he was not the only president who was able to use his personal connections with a leader to achieve his goal. In chapter 8, which covers President George H.W. Bush, Chavez describes how Bush helped bring about a peaceful end to the Cold War in part because of his solid relationship with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

While *The Diplomatic Presidency* does a good job of highlighting presidential communications with foreign leaders and diplomacy, it is not perfect. The book describes, in chapter nine, that personal diplomacy was "double-edged" and was able to hurt the president as much as help. However, the work fails to document it hurting a president. The only exception was in the one paragraph devoted to President Donald Trump's attempt at personal diplomacy with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy which led to Trump's first impeachment. While that is a big example of personal diplomacy failing, it is also the only example I can recall Chavez describing. *The Diplomatic Presidency* notes this idea that when presidents engage in personal diplomacy they risk failure, but it offers few examples of failure. I wonder if that is because when the leader takes the reigns of diplomacy, it becomes less risky or if this is merely a byproduct of the United States' economic, military, and diplomatic dominance during the latter half of the twentieth century? This question is not addressed.

The mark of a good book is that it answers many questions while leaving open more questions for future scholars to tackle. *The Diplomatic Presidency* accomplishes this. For instance, while Chavez does an admirable job of documenting various reasons why presidents would push to open and increase presidential diplomacy, the book does not attempt to analyze how changing technology influenced diplomacy. How did improvement of the telephone (and later video conferences) alter and enable personal diplomacy? How did the improvement in airplanes and transportation change diplomacy? How did these technologies shrink the world? How did they make war more deadly and thus increase the need for more diplomacy (both presidential-level diplomacy and State Department-level diplomacy)? And how did U.S. economic power, and the need for the U.S. to expand its economic clout, promote more diplomacy? These are questions which future scholars should investigate.

The Diplomatic Presidency does an excellent job of covering how and why presidents communicated with world leaders. Chavez describes the creation of a custom which was new to twentieth century Americans: that

their president would travel abroad, meet foreign leaders, and actively engage in diplomacy. Chavez succeeds in expanding our understanding of the American presidency. It fits in nicely at the intersection of American foreign policy and presidential history and would be of interest to both historians and political scientists alike. In short, this is a wonderful book to have reviewed in a SHAFR publication!

Are American Presidents Diplomats? A Review of Tizoc Chavez, *The Diplomatic Presidency*

M. Elizabeth Sanders

Tizoc Chavez has written a useful book on *The Diplomatic Presidency: American Foreign Policy from FDR to George H. W. Bush*. It would be advantageous for high school and university students to learn about how Americans at the highest political level interacted with foreign leaders... as long as this is not the only book assigned. Presidents do engage in "negotiating alliances, treaties, and agreements" with other heads of state and the results of such agreements can be very important in shaping other nations' futures as well as improving the president's public support at home. Unfortunately, presidents are also the world's most important instigators and combatants in wars, and those events, too, change history.

The Chavez book has little to say about that side of the office. The peaceful and magnanimous aspects of presidential power have not, unfortunately, been the most consequential since 1945. Presidents have been responsible for millions of deaths in wars that need not have occurred (up to three million in Vietnam, and many who survived the war were permanently scarred --as was their environment-- by terrible chemicals like Agent Orange), and U.S. chief executives have pushed countries like Iran and Guatemala off their democratic paths, permanently.

The Congressional Research Service compiles lists of U.S. uses of force abroad (see <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42738>). Omitting humanitarian/rescue and evacuation missions, there were about 216 U.S. armed forces missions after 1945. The U.S is a war power; its president is a warrior far more often, and more consequentially, than a creative diplomat. The following table contains estimated deaths in those wars.

This is not to discount the significance of Prof. Chavez's important accounts of presidential diplomacy. One might argue that diplomatic actions are intended primarily to excite admiration and enhance personal prestige (as well as electoral prospects), although there have clearly been some altruistic humanitarian advantages to the people of foreign nations targeted by presidents, and some cases in which lives were saved by more altruistic presidential actions. However, inclusion of major non-diplomatic actions for each of the post-WWII presidents would deepen our assessment of presidential contributions to conditions in the U.S. and

the world.

One could start with an earlier president who has long been appreciated for his presumed diplomatic ambitions. Woodrow Wilson's military actions in Mexico, his insistence on preparation for joining the European war, his refusal to call a peace conference as the German chancellor pressed him to do after 1915, his offering of implausible arguments to persuade Congress to join the war, and his unwillingness to compromise on the League of Nations proposal led to millions of additional war deaths and paved the way for World War II.²

The presidents whose diplomacy Chavez analyzes are Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George H.W. Bush. Certainly, Franklin Roosevelt's diplomatic efforts were extremely valuable in World War II. He was highly skilled in his relationships with allied leaders and his own competent advisors. But after his administration, one could argue that only Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter were (or became) diplomats.

However, Reagan's illegal and destructive covert war on Nicaragua was appalling.³ Carter's diplomatic principles and skills were unable to arouse strong American support in the context of a failing economy and weak public attraction to Middle East peace issues. Reagan, on the other hand, made a clear turn from destructive war in Central America to a momentous open diplomatic involvement with the United States' most important enemy, the Soviet Union, and the shift served both the world and his reputation.⁴

More discussion of non-diplomatic coups and wars would be useful for assessing presidential impact on the country, and world. Truman, for example, in his first major use-of-force decision, insisted on dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, devastating actions that were not needed to secure Japanese surrender.⁵ In 1950, he approved the ambitious proposal of Douglas McArthur to expand the Korean War past the 38th parallel North/South Korean boundary in 1950, apparently hoping that such a U.S. advance would garner Democratic votes in the midterm elections. Fortunately, Truman opposed the general's desire to bomb China (and ultimately fired him). But the post-October battles likely cost over a million military and civilian lives, and the North-South boundary remained in place.⁶

Eisenhower put little effort into diplomacy. He relied instead on right-wing advisors like Dulles who had personal interests in the use of force; and he used the new Central Intelligence Agency to organize the overthrow of Iran's first democratic prime minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, in 1953. That was a favor to the British who wanted to prevent Mossadegh from nationalizing their oil company. Since this venture was accomplished so easily and did not attract criticism from the American media, Eisenhower masterminded another coup the following year against a

Deaths in Major Presidential Uses of Force Since WWII

War	U.S. Deaths	Target Country Deaths, Civilian and Military	Total
Korean War	36,568 ¹	1,911,579 ²	1,948,147
Vietnam War	58,177 ¹	1,419,000 ³	1,477,177
Dominican Republic	44 ⁴	2,500 ⁴	2,544
Lebanon, US phase 1982-3, US deaths only	273 ¹		
Grenada	19 ⁵	45 ⁵	64
Panama	23 ⁶	847	Check 870
Iraq	4,489 ^{7,8}	102,464-113,681 ^{9,10,11}	117,801

leftist who had been elected president in Guatemala.⁷

President Kennedy's wars included the attempt to defeat Cuba's communist government and the beginning of preparations for the Vietnam war. His diplomacy, fortunately, prevented a disastrous Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. In the case of Lyndon Johnson, his reliance on hawkish advisors like Walt Rostow, McGeorge Bundy, and Dean Rusk⁸ and his emotional determination to win the Vietnam War had devastating results. The rise of social movements and ensuing congressional action ultimately caused Johnson's decision not to seek reelection in 1968 and eventually led to the end of the war the president had embraced in 1964. His successor, Richard Nixon, not only expanded and prolonged the Vietnam war and supported the Pinochet coup in Chile, but he also provided Israel large-scale military supplies for its war against the Arabs in 1973.⁹ The anger of the Arab nations led to OPEC's oil embargo and a surge in oil prices that cost Jimmy Carter—a true diplomat with a very low body count—any chance of victory in 1980.¹⁰

The Chavez chapter on George H. W. Bush and his move to a more positive relationship with Gorbachev provides a good example of presidential diplomacy at the highest level, but Bush's invasion of Panama in 1989 is more typical of presidential involvement with less powerful countries.¹¹

Bill Clinton, whose administration was not covered in the Chavez book, was hardly a diplomat, and his actions in the first years after the end of the Cold War have raised serious questions. Faced with the opportunity to help guide Russia toward democracy, he supported a group of Harvard economists who were paid by USAID to back an economic transition to democratic capitalism. Instead, they contributed to the formation of today's Russian economic oligarchy.¹² Clinton's Republican successor, George W. Bush, experienced regime invigoration after the 9-11-01 terrorist attacks, which dramatically boosted his administration's public support and led to twenty years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is also difficult to support a presidential diplomacy argument for Barack Obama, given his remarkable investment in drone warfare and support for coups in Libya and Honduras and the Saudi war in Yemen.

Clearly, American presidents have little claim on diplomatic expertise or commitment. One can argue that they have more notably been presidents of war and regime change.¹³ The Chavez book clearly supports an argument for the potential importance of presidential commitments to diplomacy. But it should also lead us to pay attention to questions about the incentives to war in presidential powers and party and interest group politics, and to explore how Congress and social movements might encourage the development of the peaceful side of the presidential office.

Notes:

1. Matthew White, "American War Dead," *Necrometrics*, accessed April 1, 2013, <http://necrometrics.com/warsusa.htm>. In the Korean War, South Korean military and civilian deaths were 595,000; North Korean deaths were 1,316,579 (based on median estimates). As in the Vietnam War, other nations also contributed, and lost, military personnel, but only the US and target country deaths are included in the table.

2. Matthew White, "Death Tolls for the Major Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century," accessed April 1, 2013, <http://necrometrics.com/20c1m.htm#Ko>. See *Korean War (1950-53)*

3. Matthew White, "Death Tolls for the Major Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century." See *Second Indochina War (1960-75)*. Where reputable sources in his lists differ, the table in most cases uses the median estimate of deaths. As an example, in the case of the American phase of the Vietnam War (1965-73), I calculated the numbers for the table as follows ("mw" here references White's median of major published estimates):

SVN military: 224,000 mw; SVN civilian: 430,000 Kennedy Commission, just below mw median; NVN + VC mil: 700,000 one below mw median due to question re Lewy estimate; NVN

civilian: 65,000; The estimated target country total then is 1,419,000, probably conservative.

4. Matthew White, "Minor Atrocities of the Twentieth Century," accessed April 1, 2013, <http://necrometrics.com/warstat6.htm#Dominican2>. See 43. *Dominican Republic (1960's)*.

5. Matthew White, "Minor Atrocities of the Twentieth Century." See 102. *Grenada, US Invasion (1983)*.

6. Matthew White, "Minor Atrocities of the Twentieth Century." See 104. *Panama, US Invasion (1989)*.

7. "Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) U.S. Casualty Status Fatalities As Of: March 12, 2013, 10 a.m. EDT," Department of Defense, accessed March 12, 2013, <http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf>. US deaths in Iraq taken from Department of Defense reports for Operations Iraqi Freedom and New Dawn, as they respectively refer to the US operation in Iraq pre- and post-September 31, 2010.

8. "Operation New Dawn (OND) U.S. Casualty Status Fatalities As Of: March 12, 2013, 10 a.m. EDT," Department of Defense, accessed March 12, 2013, <http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf>.

9. "Incidents," *Iraq Body Count*, accessed March 15, 2013, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/incidents/page85>.

10. "Iraqi deaths from violence 2003-2011," *Iraq Body Count*, accessed March 15, 2013, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/2011/>.

11. "Iraqi deaths from violence in 2012," *Iraq Body Count*, accessed March 15, 2013, <http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/numbers/2012/>. Iraqi civilian deaths based on *Iraq Body Count's* data up until December 15, 2010. Annual deaths in Iraq in 2012 and 2011 based on IBC's reports "Iraqi deaths from violence in 2012" and "Iraqi deaths from violence 2003-2011," which along with a count of IBC's records from December 30, 2010 until December 30, 2012, was subtracted from the present sum.

12. "Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) U.S. Casualty Status Fatalities as of: November 21, 2013," Department of Defense, accessed November 21, 2013, <http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf>. The first line of American casualties in Afghanistan based on DoD's November 21, 2013 figure for Operation Enduring Freedom's Afghanistan-only deaths.

13. "Coalition Deaths by Year," *iCasualties*, accessed March 15, 2013, <http://icasualties.org/OEF/ByYear.aspx>. Since numbers are given per month and per year, I included the parenthetical number in the first row (2292), which is the total number of U.S. deaths from 2001 through mid-March of 2013, to be consistent with the second line, which shows the post-surge total (from the spring of 2010 through 2012) from *iCasualties*.

14. "Afghanistan civilian casualty figures drop for the first time in 6 years," *United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan*, <http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=12254&ctl=Details&mid=15756&ItemID=36445&language=en-US>. The first line of Afghanistan numbers is the sum total of casualties; the US casualties were counted since 2001; the civilian casualties are from the UN's civilian casualties since 2007, when they first started counting. The second line is from the December announcement of Obama's surge (2010-2012). The civilian numbers are from the same UN report.

15. "Covert War on Terror-The Datasets," *The Bureau of Investigative Journalism*, accessed March 16, 2013, <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drone-data/>. Drone strike deaths are from the Bureau of Investigative Journalism. The wide range between the high and low limits is due to the secrecy surrounding their operations. The low limit excludes 277 "possible" deaths, which may be the result of drone strikes, whereas the high number not only accounts for "possible" strikes but also the high estimate of resultant deaths.

16. Elizabeth Sanders, "The Enigma of Woodrow Wilson and the Second Lost Chance for Peace."

Presented at the June 20, 2019 SHAFR Roundtable on World War I.

17. The events that may well have led Reagan to the momentous shift are interestingly described by Beth Fischer in *The Reagan Reversal*; see also Frances Fitzgerald's detailed account (*Way Out Yonder in the Blue*) of the polarization between the "hardliners and pragmatists" Reagan had appointed, and his second-term move toward the latter camp and momentous diplomacy with Mikhail Gorbachev.

18. Sean L. Malloy, *Atomic Tragedy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008). The Malloy book is especially important for its presentation of presidential ability to construct arguments for the use of force—even the first use of atomic bombs—and for its examination of the role played by McGeorge Bundy, later a major presidential advisor for the war in Vietnam.

19. David McCullough, *Truman* (NY: Simon and Shuster, 1982), 798-856.
20. Steven Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2008); Greg Grandin, *Empire's Workshop* (NY: Picador Metropolitan Books), 60-67. See also the eight Latin American cases described in Michael Grow, *U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions* (Lawrence, KS, 2008).
21. David Milne, *America's Rasputin: Walt Rostow and the Vietnam War* (NY: Hill and Wang, 2008).
22. <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/henry-kissinger/2019-08-09/kissinger-told-soviet-envoy-during-1973-arab-israeli-war-my-nightmare-victory-either-side-soviet>
23. <https://www.history.com/topics/1970s/energy-crisis>
24. Jane Kellett Cramer, "'Just Cause' or Just Politics? U.S. Panama Invasion and Standardizing Qualitative Tests for Diversionary War," *Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 32, number 2, Jan. 2006, 178-201. Cramer "finds that this use of force was likely a type of diversionary war...motivated by a need to solve 'domestic political problems' rather than to achieve strategic goals."
25. Janine R. Wedel, "The Harvard Boys Do Russia," <https://www.thenation.com/article/world/harvard-boys-do-russia/> MAY 14, 1998; Marshal I. Goldman, *The Privatization of Russia* (NY: Routledge, 2003).
26. For a list of countries targeted by "Covert United States involvement in regime change" since 1948, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1954_Guatemalan_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat.

Author's Response

Tizoc Chavez

Having read and enjoyed many *Passport* roundtables over the years, I consider it an honor to have my own book reviewed by such accomplished scholars. I would like to thank Silke Zoller, Seth Offenbach, Elizabeth Sanders, and Jeffrey Engel for taking the time to read and critically engage my work and for their thoughtful comments. I would also like to thank Andy Johns for organizing the roundtable.

One of my goals in *The Diplomatic Presidency* was to complicate what has become mundane. Presidential personal diplomacy is so common today that it often goes unnoticed. The media still reports on it, but except for dealings with the leaders of major powers like China or Russia, or major trips abroad, the public is often unaware and uninterested. This was not always the case. But over time, what was once a new and exciting diplomatic practice became routine and an expected part of a president's global leadership.

Personal diplomacy is not a new scholarly topic. FDR's wartime conferences, Richard Nixon's trips to Beijing and Moscow, Jimmy Carter's thirteen days at Camp David, and Ronald Reagan's engagement with Mikhail Gorbachev are well-known stories. But I was interested in what connected them. I was struck by how all modern presidents, regardless of personality, partisan affiliation, or leadership style, engaged with foreign leaders face-to-face, on the telephone, and through correspondence. Personal diplomacy was not unique to any individual president, but rather, as I argue, it became a practice of the presidency. As multiple reviewers note, I see modern presidents as having been motivated to use personal diplomacy for similar reasons: the nature of the postwar international environment, where crises were constant; domestic political incentives; foreign leaders' efforts to establish close and frequent contact; and the desire of presidents for centralization and control of policy formation and execution.

Saying that the same forces operated on all modern presidents does not mean that they all engaged in personal diplomacy in the same way or had the same success. But as a group, modern presidents resorted to the practice with increasing frequency and for similar reasons.

I am pleased that all the reviewers found value in *The Diplomatic Presidency* and that Zoller and Offenbach note its appeal to both historians and political scientists. In her review, Zoller commends the structural approach of the book. When dealing with a topic like personal diplomacy, the expectation is a focus on the "personal." While the book discusses this aspect, as noted, my goal was to highlight commonalities. I am glad Zoller recognized this and thought the book did an effective job.

But while Zoller applauds the book's structural focus, she raises an important question about a more intimate aspect: the concept of friendship. What do leaders really mean when they call each other "friend"? In chapter 9, after having provided case studies of presidents from FDR to George H. W. Bush, I discuss various aspects related to personal diplomacy, such as risks and benefits, the utility of the practice, and the concept of friendship. Zoller states that this analysis of friendship occurs too late in the book. I agree; my evaluation of the topic could have appeared earlier. As she notes, if I had discussed the concept of friendship sooner, I would not have needed to emphasize so frequently in each case study that presidents engaged in personal diplomacy not because of any sentimental attachment, but rather to advance U.S. interests.

I did this often because I wanted to make it clear that despite language used by leaders about close personal ties—sometimes sincere, often merely diplomatic nicety—personal diplomacy is not simply about forming "friendships" as we might do in everyday life. It is not a sentimental activity. Building a bond with another leader is often a goal of American presidents, but the relationship is a means to an end. This often gets overlooked in contemporary media coverage. By emphasizing the point, I hoped to illustrate connections across administrations that might get obscured if the focus was on two leaders being "friends."

Zoller also notes, not critically but as a matter of fact, that my story is an American one. I agree with her that there are many avenues for exploration of personal diplomacy in global and non-U.S. contexts. It would be interesting to see what motivated leaders of other nations to engage frequently in personal diplomacy. I suspect that some of the same factors motivating American presidents were at play for other world leaders. And understanding the role of particular national contexts would further enrich our understanding of what became a global practice in the second half of the twentieth century.

Another point raised by Zoller, as well as Offenbach, is about the role of technology in the development of presidential personal diplomacy. While I do not ignore the issue, both are correct that the book does not focus on it. My interest centered on why presidents resorted to personal diplomacy, and overall, I do not see technology as a driving force. As I discuss in the introduction, technological advances made frequent personal diplomacy possible. However, technology facilitated more than drove leader-to-leader engagement. Just because world leaders could communicate by telephone or fly to see each other did not mean they necessarily would. They needed reasons.

Although new technologies may have made presidents more eager to interact with their foreign counterparts early on, because it was something new and they wanted to try it, over time, the novelty wore off. Thus, those technologies were not enough to explain the long-term growth of personal diplomacy. For me, the simple ability to call or meet another leader, absent other motivating factors, is not a compelling explanation for the proliferation of the practice. That said, Zoller and Offenbach rightly suggest that the impact of technology on personal diplomacy is an important and fruitful area for further study. Both raise excellent questions to explore, because technology certainly shaped the nature and quality of interactions between

leaders and global diplomatic practice in general.

We are witnessing the impact of technology on diplomacy today, as COVID-19 has made virtual meetings commonplace not only for the average person, but for world leaders as well. With video conferencing now widespread, is there really a need for American presidents and other leaders to leave their countries for expensive, time-consuming trips? As a form of personal diplomacy, do virtual meetings produce the same benefits as face-to-face encounters? Furthermore, how have social media platforms like Twitter impacted personal diplomacy? Obviously, this question was raised during the Trump years. Trump occasionally praised, congratulated, and tagged other world leaders in his tweets. However, the personal attacks he launched on various leaders are the ones we remember best. We clearly need further study on how world leaders' use of social media fits into other uses of digital diplomacy.¹⁴

In addition to critiquing the book for its lack of discussion of technology, Offenbach states that it fails to focus enough on those occasions when personal diplomacy was unsuccessful and hurt presidents. Indeed, failure is not the central theme of any chapter. However, I believe the book does not neglect this critical aspect. In chapter 9, I discuss the potential pitfalls of the practice and the dangers involved. Likewise, throughout the book, I cite numerous examples of a president's leader-to-leader engagement failing. For example, I note Harry Truman's inability to bring the leaders of Pakistan and India together over Kashmir; Dwight Eisenhower's failed summit in Paris in May 1960 following the U-2 incident; Lyndon Johnson's often frustrated attempts to deal with a variety of crises; and Deng Xiaoping's initial rebuff of George H. W. Bush's outreach following the Tiananmen Square massacre.

But Offenbach's suggestion that we examine the practice more critically is a good one. Personal diplomacy is not a panacea. But one of the challenges of studying it is defining what constitutes success. Does a formal, written agreement need to be produced? Is constructive consultation enough? Is the generation of "goodwill" adequate? These are essential questions that, while I touch on them, are not at the center of the book. Thus, further study on the risks involved in personal diplomacy and how it can hurt presidents would be valuable.

Like Offenbach, Sanders wishes the book had discussed the darker side of presidential power and highlighted more of the undiplomatic behavior of White House occupants. She rightly notes that presidents are not simply peace-loving diplomats, and their frequent use of military action has had tragic results for millions around the globe. This is a point I could have made clearer.

But if American presidents have been, in Sanders' words, "presidents of war," that does not mean that they have also not been presidents of diplomacy. She provides numerous examples of presidents' destructive decisions, but it strikes me as odd to argue that these instances mean presidents did not also remain diplomats. Sanders appears to equate diplomacy with peace. In doing so, she is in good company, as many scholars emphasize its peaceful aspects.¹⁵ But war and diplomacy are not mutually exclusive.¹⁶ Indeed, diplomacy can further violent objectives. And as I demonstrate in the book, presidents engaged in personal diplomacy for numerous reasons, many of which had nothing to do with producing global tranquility.

Thus, when I speak of diplomacy, I do not see it as synonymous with peace but rather as a method to advance a nation's objectives, whatever they may be. As renowned diplomat and scholar Harold Nicolson wrote, diplomacy is "the management of international relations by negotiation."¹⁷ So a president could use his personal diplomacy for anything from seeking peace in the Middle East (as Jimmy Carter did) to forming a coalition to wage war (as George H. W. Bush did).

In this light, Sanders' comment about Eisenhower putting "little effort into diplomacy" would be true only if "effort" was defined strictly as advancing peaceful policies. But when I use the term "personal diplomacy," I am referring not to peaceful intentions but rather to occasions when a president engaged directly with foreign leaders through various means to deal with a myriad of issues. By that measure, Eisenhower and other modern presidents all devoted quite a bit of energy to diplomatic endeavors.

I was particularly gratified by Engel's praise, as he has written extensively on George H. W. Bush's personal diplomacy. He highlights one of the key points I hoped to convey. He observes that presidents as a group are an egotistical bunch, politicians to their core, and though some are wiser and more skillful than others, they are all going to engage in personal diplomacy. Yet presidents have different personalities and styles, and these matter in the conduct of personal diplomacy, a point also raised by Zoller when commending the book for its discussion of psychology and emotion.

Because presidential authority in foreign affairs is broad, they have wide latitude in their interactions with foreign leaders. But as Engel asks, what happens when a president is inexperienced and incompetent? Or more concerned with his own interests than the nation's? His comments on the dangers of presidential diplomacy echo the question raised by Offenbach about failure.

There are few guardrails in personal diplomacy. And from the beginning, there have been critics. When Woodrow Wilson announced during his 1918 State of the Union address that he would travel to Europe to participate in the postwar peace conference, few in Congress applauded. His secretary of state, Robert Lansing, thought he was "making one of the greatest mistakes of his career."¹⁸ Even after decades of presidential engagement with foreign leaders, enough skepticism persisted that a former U.S. ambassador wrote an op-ed at the beginning of the Reagan years calling personal diplomacy "The Dreaded Diplomatic Disease."¹⁹

Dreadful or not, presidential personal diplomacy has become an expected part of a president's duties. No matter how much some wish this were not the case, it is unlikely to change anytime soon. Thus the need to understand why and how presidents do it.

Notes:

1. Cornelius Bjola and Marcus Holmes, ed., *Digital Diplomacy: Theory and Practice* (New York, 2015).
2. For example, Adam Watson defined diplomacy as "the process of dialogue and negotiation by which states in a system conduct their relations and pursue their purposes by means short of war"; and in his classic work *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, Sir Ernest Satow stated that diplomacy was "the conduct of business between states by peaceful means." See Watson, *Diplomacy: The Dialogue between States* (New York, 1983), 11; and Satow, *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, 4th ed. (London, 1957), 1.
3. Tarak Barkawi, "Diplomacy, War, and World Politics," in *Diplomacy and the Making of World Politics*, ed. Ole Jacob Sending, Vincent Pouliot, and Iver B. Neumann (Cambridge, UK, 2015), 55–79.
4. Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy* (Oxford, UK, 1963), 4.
5. Richard Ellis, *Presidential Travel: The Journey from George Washington to George W. Bush* (Lawrence, KS, 2008), 184; Memorandum, Robert Lansing, "The President's Going to the Peace Conference," November 18, 1918, Papers of Woodrow Wilson Digital Edition, University of Virginia Press, <https://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/WILS.html>.
6. J. Robert Schaezel, "The Dreaded Diplomatic Disease," *Los Angeles Times*, January 13, 1981.

A Roundtable on Heather Dichter, *Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games: International Sport's Cold War Battle with NATO*

Jenifer Parks, Anne M. Blaschke, Kevin B. Witherspoon, John Soares, Richard Kimball,
Heather L. Dichter

Introduction to Roundtable on Heather L. Dichter, *Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games: International Sport's Cold War Battle with NATO* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 2021)

Jenifer Parks

When Heather Dichter embarked on writing *Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games*, she could not have anticipated how prescient her study would be upon publication. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has found a renewed unity and sense of purpose, and sport has again become a key arena for diplomatic policy. In the 1960s, the focus was on Germany which lay at the heart of a divided Europe, and NATO, the Soviet bloc, and the international sporting community struggled to solve the “German question” of how to handle the existence of two separate German states. Dichter’s book takes the reader through the many intricacies of that question, demonstrating not only how the politics of the Cold War influenced sport, but how international sports in turn influenced Cold War international relations.

The “German problem” came to a head when the German Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany) adopted a new flag and anthem and constructed the Berlin Wall. The erection of the wall, effectively cut off East German athletes from the West, and in response, NATO enacted what amounted to a ban on East German athletes traveling to international competitions in NATO countries. International sports organizations responded by downgrading competitions where East German athletes were excluded or moving competitions from NATO countries to neutral or Warsaw Pact countries, depriving host nations of the soft-power benefits of hosting major sports competitions. Meanwhile, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) deliberated whether to recognize a separate East German Olympic Committee or continue to insist on a unified German team. Once the IOC demanded a guarantee that any city hosting the Olympic Games would allow the free travel of East German athletes to the Games, NATO countries with cities bidding for 1968 Winter and Summer Games, namely the USA, Canada, France, and Norway, pressured the alliance to alter its policies on East German travel. East German officials’ attempts to use sport to legitimize their regime ultimately succeeded, and international sports precipitated the official recognition of a separate German Democratic Republic, which would go on to compete in the 1972 Summer Games in Munich under their own flag and anthem as a fully-fledged member of the Olympic Movement. How this unfolded makes for a fascinating read and a compelling discussion.

Dichter’s monograph is also timely historiographically, as scholars of sport, diplomacy, and international relations in every region have developed a renewed interest in Cold War sport.¹ However, all the reviewers of Dichter’s account praise her ability to address this era through a fresh lens. Kevin Witherspoon notes

the new ground that Dichter’s study brings to the 1968 Games, a topic that seems well-covered in the literature. Instead of retelling familiar stories like the Black Power salute or the Tlatelolco Square massacre, Dichter focuses on the maneuvering of diplomats and sports officials, as Richard Kimball notes, “describ[ing] the intersection of negotiation and politicization, but in altogether unexpected and enlightening ways.”

The reviewers are in unanimous agreement that the biggest strength of *Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games*, is Dichter’s ability to synthesize mountains of correspondence and archival documents, housed in eight different countries and produced in four different languages, in a concise, clear, and illuminating way. John Soares complements “the topic deeply researched,” and Kimball commends “Dichter’s impressive research scope,” which includes foreign ministry archives from a half-dozen NATO member countries, correspondence between various diplomats and international sports organizations, IOC documents, and NATO archives, which Dichter “deeply mined,” providing “at times, the day-by-day breakdown of the ebbs and flows of negotiation.” Similarly, Anne Blaschke acknowledges how “Making sense of a web of networks . . . Dichter painstakingly explains the power dynamics at play.” Perhaps Witherspoon captures it best, remarking “One wonders how a single scholar managed to attain, digest, and bring order to such a vast and complicated tangle of correspondence.” Dichter herself acknowledges the long, meticulous, but necessary process to tell the story of the 1968 bids—“a story that could not be told with only the sport or only the diplomatic materials,” requiring, as she notes in the book, “a multilateral approach to [NATO], the German question, and international sporting events” (4). Dichter’s close reading of a variety of document sources reveals the intricacies, inconsistencies, and antagonisms between a variety of actors—municipal and national officials, sports officials, and diplomats from individual NATO countries—who all sought to use international sports to serve their own ends, showing “the many ways sport and diplomacy impact one another and have affected the trajectory of both the Olympic movement and alliance politics” (4).

Though uniform in their praise for the quality of research and analysis, reviewers of *Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games*, also provide some constructive feedback. Witherspoon was left wanting more, in particular a “more thorough discussion of the ‘human stories’ of the athletes themselves, and the competitions impacted by the travel ban and other issues.” Blaschke also lamented the “top-down” approach that pays less attention to “people’s personal circumstances in consideration of their historical impact.” As Dichter, “the sport historian who rarely writes about the actual competition,” explains, the athletes affected by NATO and Eastern Bloc policies are seldom named in the sources, making it difficult to show the impact of these policies on an individual

level. Blaschke also thought the book was too narrowly focused on “quite specialized Iron Curtain sport studies history,” and thought Dichter could have done more to apply lenses of race, class, and gender to “illuminate the profound elitism of white NATO and IOC leaders in a decolonizing world.” In her generous response, Dichter agreed that she “could have done more with whiteness, wealth, and masculinity within the book,” and expressed the hope that scholars working on the period could draw from her analysis “to understand better how the white, male, and privileged international sport leaders responded” to the challenges that new officials from the global south brought into international sports.

In *Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games*, Dichter delves into a particular moment in the Cold War, where western powers were moving cautiously from isolation of East Germany to engagement through détente, and she demonstrates the role of sport in accelerating that process. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the pendulum seems to be swinging back from engagement to isolation, as Russian and Belorussian athletes have been banned from many competitions and high-profile sports events relocated out of Russia. Readers will find in Dichter’s account and the discussion surrounding it not only key insights into the intersection of sports and diplomacy during the Cold War, but also important context for understanding the current moment facing Europe, NATO, and the international sports community.

Dichter argues that although NATO took a hard line against socialist, Soviet-aligned East Germany at the height of the Cold War, sport diplomacy began to soften diplomatic attitudes after the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961.

Note:

1. In addition to numerous monographs about certain sports, specific Olympic competitions, and particular countries, a few recent collected volumes attest to the wide-ranging interest and approaches to Cold War sport. See for example, Heather L. Dichter and Andrew L. Johns, eds., *Diplomatic Games: Sport, Statecraft, and International Relations since 1945* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2014); Robert Edelman and Christopher Young, eds., *The Whole World Was Watching: Sport in the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2020); Arie Malz, Stefan Rohdewald, and Stefan Wiederkehr, eds., *Sport zwischen Ost und West: Beiträge zur Sportgeschichte Osteuropas im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Osnabrück: Fibre Verlag, 2007); Evelyn Mertin and Christoph Bertling, eds., *Freunde oder Feinde? Sportberichterstattung in Ost und West während des Kalten Krieges* (Köln: Gütersloh Medienfabrik Gütersloh, 2013); Toby C. Rider and Kevin B. Witherspoon, eds., *Defending the American Way of Life: Sport, Culture, and the Cold War* (Fayetteville, AR: University of Arkansas Press, 2018); Stephen Wagg and David Andrews, eds., *East Plays West: Sport and the Cold War* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006); Philipp Vonnard, Nicola Sbetti, and Grégory Quin, eds., *Beyond Boycotts: Sport during the Cold War in Europe* (Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2019).

Review of Heather Dichter, *Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games: International Sport’s Cold War Battle with NATO*

Anne M. Blaschke

In *Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games*, historian and sport studies scholar Heather Dichter has undertaken an ambitious project that has cultural diplomacy implications for our time. Her monograph explores the relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Cold War sport in the 1960s. While NATO has historically been understood as a multinational Western military alliance that has no real role in cultural relationships, Dichter introduces sport as a channel of soft power within NATO and its member nations, a channel that officials hoped could be an instrument of East-West diplomacy in the wake of the division of Germany in 1955.

The cornerstone of Dichter’s book is her archival discovery corroborating the communists’ claims that NATO members politicized sport for Cold War gain. NATO “brought politics into sport,” she avers, particularly after East Germany built the Berlin

Wall in 1961 and severed sporting relations among Germans; and “NATO and its member states were incredibly concerned about, and involved themselves in, international sport” (x). She demonstrates that elite international sport—and the Olympic movement in particular—shifted the calculus of relations between NATO and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the 1960s with its demand that all athletes have free access to participation. Before that decade the Western alliance and East Germany mutually refused any cultural crossover.

Dichter argues that although NATO took a hard line against socialist, Soviet-aligned East Germany at the height of the Cold War, sport diplomacy began to soften diplomatic attitudes after the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. Many nations—including NATO members—were eager to host prestigious, lucrative mega-events, such as Olympics or individual sports’ world championships, that were now broadcast worldwide several times each decade. These conflicting interests came to

a head in 1963, when the International Olympic Committee (IOC) condemned the injection of politics into sport and issued an ultimatum to the nations whose cities had applied to host the upcoming 1968 winter and summer Olympic Games: “(A)ll athletes, teams, officials, Jurys [sic], etc., from National Olympic Committees and International Federations recognized by the I.O.C. will be granted free entry without any restriction” (99). Desperate to be accepted by elite sport NGOs and to win coveted host bids despite their nations’ restrictive foreign policies, member states defied NATO’s anti-

GDR mandate and allowed East German athletes to compete at sporting events in their countries.

Not only did the resistance of municipal boosters to the inflexibility of national and NATO dictates test the quadripartite NATO states, Dichter argues, but it also afforded less powerful members like Canada and Norway more influence within the alliance. These boosters demanded that their countries’ efforts to host sporting events and reap the benefits of “nation branding” be taken seriously, and they argued that the West should do whatever it took to satisfy NGO sport powerbrokers—and by extension, Soviet-bloc rivals.

Dichter is clear on why these would-be-host countries sought more functional relations with banned states: a winning bid, at its most successful, translated into tourism spikes, financial windfalls, and international clout. These dividends hinged on hosting engrossing, suspenseful athletic contests. Therein lay the incentive to include the most talented athletes, including those who hailed from the GDR or other excluded states. Host countries wanted to offer sponsors and viewers riveting, no-holds-barred competition of the highest caliber. Yet a stick also accompanied the carrot of this opportunity for NATO members: the negative publicity that would arise from restricting rival states’ athletes from competition. Indeed, international sporting audiences and national fans alike condemned the exclusion of GDR athletes as a blunt policy that made athletes political pawns and arenas proxy battlefields.

These poor optics proved a significant incentive for NATO to soften its policies toward East Germany by the mid-1960s. Dichter is careful to remind the reader that sport is inherently political; but to sports fans in the 1960s, athletes who were denied free travel seemed arbitrary victims of an inflexible Western order. NATO mitigated its GDR travel ban in order to prevent the Soviet propaganda machine from “controlling the narrative,” which had framed the alliance’s exclusion policy as capitalist repression (168). However, all these pressures combined in 1963 to convince the member-state powerbrokers of NATO to allow all East German athletes to participate in the 1968 summer and winter games “on condition that they refrain while in NATO countries from political activities in support of the so-called DDR” (168).

The influence of sporting NGOs on multinational policy bodies such as NATO, Dichter emphasizes, persisted into the

middle of the decade. In 1965, for example, the IOC recognized East Germany as an independent nation, despite the political efforts of NATO, West Germany, and other bodies to prevent the elite sport group from bestowing legitimacy on the socialist state. For readers who may doubt the impact of athletics on this Cold War diplomacy, Dichter illuminates the impact of the IOC, an organization replete with soft power and unbound by the geopolitical politicking, on the enormously sensitive issue of GDR recognition: “Ultimately,” she writes, “the IOC could do as it pleased—or, what its dominating president wanted to do—because the organization knew every country wanted to participate in the Olympic Games” (192). Its actions helped foster the culture of détente that had begun in Europe by the late 1960s in the wake of the Mexico City and Grenoble Olympic Games.

Dichter is arguably the most venerated expert in the history of European sport diplomacy. She has been both pioneer and innovator in the field. She is, therefore, well positioned to take on this ambitious study of sport politics and NATO at the dawn of détente. This monograph builds on several of her previously published works on the subject of winter mega-events amid Cold War tensions.¹ But *Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games* is much more expansive than Dichter’s previous efforts.

For starters, the breadth and depth of her archival use is remarkable, and was the key to piecing together this synthesis. Her archival work spans eight countries and multiple languages. She painstakingly explains the power dynamics at play within an immense web of sources—foreign ministry files, individual athletic federations’ records, Olympic materials, extant NATO sources, international newspapers—and makes sense of the connections among them. Her organizing principle was to take “a multilateral approach to the alliance, the German question, and international sporting events,” as that is the only approach that “demonstrates the many ways sport and diplomacy impact one another and have affected the trajectory of both the Olympic movement and alliance politics” (4). Her multilateral methodology results in an exhaustive exploration of how elite sport and the Western military alliance affected each other and, in particular, how resisting Eastern Bloc athletes’ free travel “demonstrate[d] a backfiring of soft power” for NATO nations that refused to ease their cultural restrictions on East Germany until the mid-1960s (5). As forceful as these elite powers appeared, negative publicity could strike at the cultural capital they hoped to gain from dominance in sport.

In this work, Dichter uses her skills primarily to analyze top-down bureaucracies: NATO, national security departments, the IOC, discrete sporting federations, and other organizations. Although she does discuss various leaders of these groups, such as American construction magnate and IOC president Avery Brundage, hers is not a study that draws on people’s personal circumstances in considering their historical impact. Nor does it use lenses of social history such as gender, race, or class. Dichter does note that sport leaders in her narrative “were almost always men in the 1960s,” but more attention to their whiteness, wealth, and gender would convey the reconditeness and hyper-exclusivity of the cultural diplomacy cliques that exercised their power in the IOC and elsewhere (8). Furthermore, at the same moment that sport leaders advocated for free sport for East Germans, they remained silent on the racialized imperial violence that NATO states were pursuing in Kenya, Vietnam, and other sites of revolution outside the West. Dichter could have used this broader context to illuminate the profound elitism of white NATO and IOC leaders in a decolonizing world without sacrificing her core focus on sport, North Atlantic diplomacy, and the GDR.

Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games is a specialist’s deep history. Indeed, while titles in the series of which this volume is a part—the “Culture and Politics in the Cold War and Beyond”

series at the University of Massachusetts Press—vary in topic, most take a more sweeping approach to their interpretations of Cold War political culture than we see here. While Dichter dexterously illuminates the intricate negotiations between NATO, its member states, and sport, some readers outside her particular fields of specialization may find that, once past the introduction, her level of granularity at the chapter level makes it challenging to more broadly situate the narrative within a Cold War context. A reader considering the nuclear capabilities of three NATO members in the early 1960s, for example, might wonder, when parsing out the intricate conversations between cities, nations, and NATO, why sport prestige seemed worth the trouble to global superpowers.

Other readers—deep in a mid-chapter tapestry of 1968 bids—might wonder, again, exactly why that year’s games held so much significance for these organizations. Certainly Dichter answers such queries clearly in the preface and introduction. As she writes, “while the German question formed the central problem around which NATO discussions on sport focused, the contest for the 1968 Summer and Winter Olympic host cities became the larger and more complicated issue for the alliance as it impacted more states than a sporting event in a single country did” (x). Yet the chapters quickly dive beneath the surface to focus on quite specialized Iron Curtain sport studies history.

One way in which *Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games* might have been more accessible to a broader audience is if Dichter had kept some bedrock conceptual and structural narrative exposition in the chapters, along with the deep dives. She does this deftly in the conclusion, “To Grenoble and Beyond.” There she details the participation requirements, such as Olympic identity cards rather than GDR travel documents, of the East German athletes at the 1968 winter Games in Grenoble, France, as well as the gradual opportunities and pressures that had compelled NATO to admit those East Germans athletes.

In the end, Dichter boldly asserts that sport paved the road to détente in central Europe: “By 1966 the governments of both the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany had started to make public comments and outward overtures toward a loosening of the hardline Hallstein Doctrine toward the GDR. Sport provided the avenue for concrete action to achieve détente” (195). Crucially, Dichter pairs the detail with the logical attractions of sport diplomacy to Cold War states: sport was visceral and dramatic, relatively quantifiable, heavily covered by global media, and a safe arena for antagonists with nuclear capabilities to fight for dominance on the world stage.

Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games is a nuanced and fascinating window onto the role of sport in Cold War cultural diplomacy. Perhaps its greatest attraction for scholars will be its utility across fields. Historians, sport specialists, and political scientists, among other academics, should teach it in graduate seminars and will be able to draw on it for their own work. And methodologically, Dichter has crafted a model for other scholars faced with webs of interconnected alliances and legal issues.

In 2022, the applicability of Dichter’s research has been thrown into relief—first, as the IOC condemned Russia for mistreating fifteen-year-old figure skater Kamila Valieva, who competed at the Beijing Olympics despite a doping violation; and second, as sport entities from FIFA to Wimbledon banned Russian athletes from competition because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in late February. NATO’s expansion into central Europe is among Russian president Vladimir Putin’s justifications for war, and in the face of the Russian onslaught, support for Ukraine among member states’ athletes—as well as Ukrainian athletes’ strong showings in global competition—garnered more media attention than diplomats’ negotiations.

These disturbing events show the relevance of Dichter’s

research and the continued need for the multivalent expertise she and other historians of sport diplomacy can offer, as NATO continues to rely on the cultural power of sport to communicate the force of its democratic message in the twenty-first century.

Note:

1. See, for example: Heather L. Dichter, “A Game of Political Ice Hockey: NATO Restrictions on East German Sport Travel in the Aftermath of the Berlin Wall,” in *Diplomatic Games: Sport, Statecraft and International Relations since 1945*, ed. Heather Dichter and Andrew Johns (Lexington, KY, 2014); Heather L. Dichter, “Canadian Government Involvement in Calgary’s Failed 1968 Winter Olympic Bid,” *International Journal of the History of Sport* 38 (2021): 1329-1349; Heather L. Dichter and Sarah Teetzel, “The Winter Olympics: A Century of Games on Ice and Snow,” *International Journal of the History of Sport* 37, no. 13 (2020): 1215-1235; and Heather L. Dichter, “We have allowed our decisions to be determined by political considerations”: The Cold War German Question in the International Ski Federation,” *Sport in History* 37, no. 3 (2017): 290-308.

Review of Heather L. Dichter, *Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games*

Kevin B. Witherspoon

The 1968 Olympic Games have been a popular subject of study for historians of sport, with dozens of books and articles devoted to the topic. At least three scholarly books were published in the past year alone: Harry Blutstein’s *Games of Discontent: Protests, Boycotts, and Politics at the 1968 Mexico Olympics*; Axel Elías’s *Mexico City’s Olympic Games: Citizenship and Nation Building, 1963-1968*; and Heather Dichter’s *Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games: International Sport’s Cold War Battle with NATO*. One might wonder: do we really need another book about the 1968 Olympics? Dichter’s book, in particular, demonstrates that scholars are far from done with exploring these endlessly fascinating Olympics. Nearly every sentence of this important book reveals previously undisclosed information.

It should be noted that this book is not about the 1968 Olympics themselves at all. Familiar figures like Peggy Fleming, Bob Beamon, Tommie Smith, John Carlos, and Dick Fosbury do not appear in these pages. The athletic competitions are not discussed, nor are the less familiar but perhaps more important events of 1968: the Mexican student protests and the tragic massacre in Tlatelolco Square on October 2. The book is about the bidding for the games, which took place five years before the Olympics themselves. Historians have paid far less attention to this process. Importantly, Dichter focuses as much on the bid for the Winter Olympics, ultimately won by the French city of Grenoble, as she does on the Summer Olympic bid, won by Mexico City. Here again, Dichter paves new ground.

Few books in sports history canon match this volume for sheer depth of research.

Over a span of nearly twenty years, Dichter spent time in various archives in eight different countries and dozens of cities, consulting sources in at least four of the languages in which she is fluent or proficient: English, French, German, and Norwegian. She scoured not only the most prominent archives for anyone studying the Olympics—the National Archives in College Park, MD, the Avery Brundage Collection at the University of Illinois, and the Olympic Studies Centre in Lausanne, Switzerland—but also a bevy of other archives less frequently tapped by sports scholars, if at all. These include the NATO archives in Brussels; an array of records of various international sports federations;

national archives in Canada, Germany, England, and Norway; and city libraries and archives in many of the cities submitting bids for the 1968 Summer or Winter Olympics, including Detroit, Lyon, Oslo, and Lake Placid. Having studied and then worked in Canada, the United States, and the UK, Dichter is uniquely suited to undertake a project requiring this breadth of research. The impressive collection of notes and sources covers more than sixty pages at the end of the book.

The resulting narrative weaves together a complex web of correspondence drawn from these many sources. As Dichter skillfully recounts, representatives of national sporting bodies corresponded with diplomatic officials and national leaders in each of the nations involved in the bidding process. Further up the athletic food chain, Olympic officials in each nation corresponded with each other and with members of the International Olympic Committee, led in that era by the notorious Avery Brundage.

All of these athletic officials then engaged in further discussions with NATO and other government officials, who in turn held their own series of meetings and internal exchanges to determine their favored course of action. These exchanges went on throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, the period at the heart of this book, and Dichter admirably summarizes them all in clear and orderly fashion. One wonders how a single scholar managed to gather, digest, and bring order to such a vast and complicated tangle of correspondence.

All of this dialogue involved a number of Cold War issues confronting government and sporting officials in these years, most notably the travel ban on East German athletes enforced by many nations, particularly those in NATO. International sport in this era was plagued with a plethora of vexing issues, among them the admission of Soviet and other Eastern-bloc athletes into the Olympics in the 1950s, the challenge of enforcing the rules of amateurism, and the intrusion of diplomatic crises like the Soviet invasion of Hungary and the Suez Crisis, both in 1956, which strained sporting relationships for the nations involved. Among the most difficult issues, though, was how best to handle the representation and recognition of athletes from nations divided by Cold War (or lingering World War II-era) animosities, such as North and South Korea, the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan, and East and West Germany.

The last of these is at the epicenter of this book, as Dichter has added a great deal of detail from her prior research involving sport in divided Germany—or more precisely, the all-German teams that represented both nations in the Olympics in 1956, 1960 and 1964. While the issue of German athletes had challenged international sporting leaders since the dawning of the Cold War in the mid-1940s, it came rapidly to a head after East Germany announced new national symbols, such as a flag and a national anthem, in 1959.

That issue became even more troublesome after the construction of the Berlin Wall in August of 1961. Not only did the wall bring into physical reality the metaphorical divide suggested in Winston Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech in 1946, it also signaled the end of free travel across the German border for all German citizens, including athletes, and that posed an existential threat to the idea of a single all-German athletic squad. Even if the Germans were to accept such a unified team as a necessity, how could the athletes train, travel, and compete together if they were not able to cross the border between the countries?

Dichter explains how this seemingly self-contained problem had a dramatic effect on international sport, as every nation hosting a significant international meet or competition had to confront the “German problem”: whether to admit East and West German athletes and, if they did, how to handle them. Dichter discusses an array of world championships and other competitions

in a variety of sports and describes how host nations such as the United States, Canada, Denmark and Norway grappled with the “German problem.” Over time, she notes, banning East German athletes from international competitions as a punishment because their government had erected a wall began to seem less justified.

In 1962 and 1963, the international press—even in the West—began to criticize the policy more frequently and called for change. International sporting events, diminished by the absence of some of the world’s best athletes, became a visible symbol of the policy’s inadequacy, and as the bidding process to host the 1968 Olympics gained momentum in 1963, those NATO nations submitting bids urged the organization to ease restrictions on travel for East German athletes. As NATO nations France and the United States faced a stiff challenge from non-NATO nation Mexico in the contest to host the 1968 Summer Olympics, the potential ban on East German athletes emerged as one issue in the back of the minds of International Olympic Committee members placing their votes. While Dichter correctly notes that a number of other issues were equally important (such as the extension of the Olympics to a Latin American and Spanish-speaking nation and the fact that Mexico was not firmly positioned in either the U.S. or Soviet sphere of influence in the midst of the Cold War), she also explains that this overt intrusion of global politics into the Olympic bidding process certainly did not help the French or American cause.

Serious sport scholars have long since accepted that sport and politics are inextricably linked. Dichter’s work shows, however, that international sport played a significant role in shaping global policy in one of the most powerful institutions in the world at that time, NATO. While adhering to a strict ban against East German travel during the years in question, NATO officials inflicted collateral damage on a number of significant international sports competitions, the cities and nations hosting them, and the athletes themselves. Such nations were not able to reap the full “soft power” benefits of hosting the events, which usually included highlighting the organizational abilities of the local and national government and shining a positive light on the nation’s people and culture. When top athletes from a nation like East Germany were not allowed to compete, and the competitions were sometimes thrown out of balance, host nations actually felt their national images suffered. Therefore, countries such as Norway, slated to host the European speed skating championships and the Holmenkollen ski festival in 1962, sought to exert whatever pressure they could to compel NATO to ease the restrictions on East German travel.

It was the Olympics, and specifically the competition to host the 1968 Olympics, that focused the most attention on the “German problem.” The IOC and its president Avery Brundage required all interested nations to provide a guarantee that athletes from all nations would be allowed to participate in an Olympic competition held in their nation. Such guarantees were not merely an athletic concern; they were a national and even international concern, as NATO nations enforced the travel ban against East German athletes. And yet athletic officials in each of the contending nations pushed their diplomats and government officials to support the guarantee, thus altering their foreign policy for the sake of hosting a sporting event. Here, Dichter powerfully demonstrates one of her core arguments: that the IOC had the power to influence global diplomacy.

Dichter has unquestionably written an important work rooted in extensive primary research. If I have any criticism, it is simply that I was left wanting more at times. Most notably, the concluding chapter, “To Grenoble and Beyond,” provides only very brief accounts of the 1968 Olympics themselves and of the lingering impact of the “German problem.” The chapter devotes only one paragraph each to the Winter Games in Grenoble, the Summer Games in Mexico City, and the 1972 Summer

Olympics, which were held in Munich. As Dichter notes, the IOC vote awarding those Olympics to Munich was held in 1966, as the “German problem” still hung over IOC decision-making. Considering the extensive detail offered throughout most of the book and Dichter’s research specialty in Germany itself, one might expect a more thorough analysis of that 1966 decision.

Similarly, at times the narrative might have benefited from a more thorough discussion of the “human stories” of the athletes themselves and the competitions impacted by the travel ban and other issues. One high point in the work, for instance, is the account of Helmut Recknagel, the (East) German ski jumper and gold medalist in the 1960 Olympics, who was unable to compete in the important 1962 Holmenkollen Ski Festival in Norway because of the travel ban. Expanding the book to include more of these accounts might have pushed up against the word limit imposed by the press or made this a different work from the one the author intended, but doing so might also have added a human element to a narrative overwhelmingly devoted to document analysis. These minor suggestions do not detract from the significance or importance of the work as written.

Readers interested in the 1968 Olympics are likely familiar with the medal-stand protest of Tommie Smith and John Carlos, other issues involving black athletes in the late 1960s, the “thin air” that contributed to memorable moments like Bob Beamon’s long jump and Lee Evans’s record-breaking four-hundred-meter sprint, and the Mexican student protests and Tlatelolco Massacre. These and other episodes are thoroughly explored in the growing body of literature devoted to this topic. *Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games* is a welcome addition to this literature and offers a completely fresh approach to what we might have thought was a familiar topic.

Review of Heather Dichter, *Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games*

John Soares

For those prompted to look for historical context on sports diplomacy by the “diplomatic boycott” of the Winter Olympics in Beijing and by international sports organizations’ responses to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Heather Dichter’s *Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games* has arrived at a propitious moment. Dichter’s book focuses on the 1960s, when members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), led by the “Western Four” (the United States, Great Britain, France and West Germany), were looking to protest the construction of the Berlin Wall and undermine Communist East Germany’s efforts to secure de facto recognition through sport. (Disclosure: I have taken part in several conference panels with Dichter, and she co-edited two publications I contributed to, the anthology *Diplomatic Games* and a recent special issue of the *International Journal of the History of Sport*.) *Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games* tells a fascinating, multi-layered story about the complexities of soft power, but it is also a cautionary tale: the dictatorships successfully deploy sport for diplomatic purposes, but the democracies’ efforts backfire on them.

As Cold War historians know, in the 1960s NATO members supported the claims of the Federal Republic (FRG) to be the only legitimate, democratically elected government in Germany, and they refused to recognize the Communist “German Democratic Republic” (GDR). Non-recognition, though, was becoming increasingly problematic as the reality of the GDR grew harder to ignore and the proliferation of newly independent nations in Asia and Africa increased the number of international actors with no stake in the German dispute. In sport, the East Germans had secured membership in a number of international

federations. Through 1964 the International Olympic Committee (IOC) insisted that “Germany” was a single area that would have to field a unified Olympic team, but the growing difficulties in making this arrangement work suggested its days were coming to an end.

The construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 demonstrated that the GDR could not compete with the FRG for most Germans’ loyalty and could keep its people in only by physically restraining them, in violation of international agreements. In sport, though, NATO’s reaction to the wall fueled sympathy for the East. The wall put an end to most travel out of East Germany, so NATO policy was to ban travel by those the GDR wanted to send abroad. This was easy enough to do: East Germans travelling to countries that did not recognize the GDR or its passports needed Temporary Travel Documents (TTDs) from the Allied Travel Office (ATO) in West Berlin. After the wall went up, the ATO simply refused to issue TTDs in most cases, including those of athletes seeking to attend international sporting events.

East German athletes were thus excluded from international sports competitions in NATO countries, but this ended up hurting the hosts. The 1962 world skiing championships were scheduled for Chamonix, France, but the international federation stripped the event of its championship status. That year’s world ice hockey championships in Colorado Springs, Colorado, were boycotted by the USSR, Czechoslovakia and other Communist nations.

Chamonix’s downgraded event and Colorado Springs’ depleted field cost the host cities significant gate receipts and tourist income. Later that year, the world weightlifting championships were moved from Hershey, Pennsylvania, to Budapest, Hungary. It was becoming clear that NATO travel restrictions on East Germans would encourage the re-location or awarding of prestigious international events to neutral or Warsaw Pact countries. The restrictions also brought stinging criticism both internationally and domestically and stoked divisions among NATO members and between the Western Four and smaller members.

The stakes got higher in 1963 and 1964, as the IOC held its bidding process for the 1968 Summer and Winter Games. (Through 1992, both games were held in the same calendar year.) Cities from the United States, Canada, France and Norway were among those bidding, and they faced demands from the IOC that prospective host countries guarantee all qualified athletes—read: East Germans—would be admitted. As Dichter describes in detail, these four NATO members were effectively dueling with each other, along with contenders from countries that imposed no travel restrictions on East Germans. In making their case to the IOC, some of these NATO members “prioritized national self-interest” (134) ahead of alliance cohesion. Any country hoping to host the Olympics did not want to be the last one upholding NATO policy while fellow members were seeking advantage by undercutting it in their quest for the games.

The end result of the sport diplomacy described in *Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games* was that NATO took a beating. Grenoble, France, was awarded the 1968 Winter Games, but first Lyon, France, and Detroit lost the Summer Games to Mexico City, in part because Mexico would be sure to allow East German athletes to compete. More problematic for the Western democracies, at its Madrid meeting in 1965 the IOC adopted a German solution that recognized a separate East German Olympic Committee within a unified German team that paved the way for future inclusion of East Germany in the Olympics on terms of full equality. In just seven years, the Olympics would see the East German flag flying, and its national anthem playing, on the soil of the Federal Republic. In effect, as Dichter puts it, “international sport . . . forced NATO to reconsider its practices in the face of a changing international reality, becoming by the end of 1968 the earliest field where NATO member states

accepted détente with East Germany” (161).

It is not the book’s point, but *Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games* also serves as a useful reminder that democracies confront structural disadvantages when trying to utilize sport as a form of soft power. Political independence by sport officials and organizations was one of the stated organizing principles of the IOC; it was expected of National Olympic Committees (NOCs) and individual members. And, subject to pressure from independent media and their own voters, Western democracies (usually) delivered. Dictatorships typically did not. For example, American IOC member (and future IOC president) Avery Brundage ginned up a dispute at St. Moritz in 1948 because he believed the U.S. hockey team was insufficiently “amateur.” He valued the principle of amateur purity more than U.S. medal hopes, encouraged the creation of a second U.S. hockey team, and even threatened an American boycott of the St. Moritz Games over the issue. His effort failed, but he demonstrated the political independence the IOC expected of its members.

In a Communist system, though, it is hard to imagine an Olympic official working against his own country’s medal chances and publicly protesting the professionalism of his country’s Olympic team, as Brundage did. Significantly, IOC officials understood this reality this before they admitted the Communists. In 1950, Brundage—then the IOC vice president—

wrote to the organization’s president that “it is impossible . . . to find a NOC in any Communist country that is free and not under complete State control. If we conform to fundamental Olympic principles and follow our rules and regulations we cannot possibly recognize any Communist Olympic Committee.”¹² Rejecting Communist NOCs, though, would have made the IOC one more international organization divided by the Cold War, rather than the force for peace and understanding it aimed to be. So, not for the first time, and certainly not for the last, the IOC would hope that engagement with a dictatorship would promote positive change in that regime.

Once admitted to the Olympic movement without any meaningful concessions to what Brundage correctly identified as the IOC’s “fundamental principles” and its “own rules and regulations,” the Soviets did not buy into the IOC vision. Rather, as sports scholars have long known and Dichter reminds us, Soviet “representatives immediately attempted to take control of international federations and the IOC.” In each organization, they demanded seats on the executive committee. They also wanted Russian made an official language and Franco’s Spain expelled (197).

The IOC did not accede to all these demands, but it did permit the Kremlin to select “its” IOC member, in yet another egregious violation of IOC principles and practices. Such actions made it clear that when then-IOC president Brundage expressed concern during the flap over Berlin that the IOC might, in his words, “degenerate into a tool or weapon in the cold war” (99), he was trying to close the proverbial barn door a literal decade after the horses were gone.

Dichter reminds us that even before the Berlin Wall went up, GDR officials were claiming the presence of East German athletes on unified German Olympic teams constituted recognition of the GDR. When the ATO was refusing TTDs to athletes and sports officials, East German wrestlers submitted incomplete applications for a competition in Toledo, Ohio. Even if NATO had been granting TTDs, these forms would have been unacceptable. The transparent purpose was to generate rejections so East German propaganda hands could complain about them (55–6). In another instance, the East German ski federation declined a workaround of the NATO policy that would have permitted its members to enter Greece for an international conference, where they would have been recognized as representing East Germany. Instead, the East Germans preferred the propaganda value

of complaining about NATO's travel restrictions (60–1). And Dichter shows that the Communists did indeed reap sympathetic publicity internationally, even in Western media, because of their exclusion from international events.

The outcome of the sport diplomacy described in *Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games* dramatizes what we should already know: the most attention-grabbing examples of Western politicization of sport were typically responses to serious Communist provocations, like the Berlin Wall, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, or the Soviet invasion of Hungary, which led a number of democracies to skip the 1957 world ice hockey championships in Moscow. By contrast, Communist boycotts like those of the previously mentioned 1962 world ice hockey championships and the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics were triggered not by any comparable Western offense, but by Kremlin displeasure that the democracies did not supinely acquiesce to its machinations.

In the end, as Dichter notes, East Germany's sport diplomacy successfully "pav[ed] the way for greater détente between the West and the German Democratic Republic" (ix). She concludes that "as détente became the accepted norm throughout the entire sporting community by the late 1960s, international sport provided the model that international relations in general then followed" (200). Although not integral to the book's thesis, the discussion here gives readers a useful way to think about détente in the 1970s, which did unfold in a fashion very similar to the sports détente of the 1960s.

In both cases, the Communists took advantage of systemic unfairness and Western self-criticism to make notable gains, while leaders and much informed opinion in the West kept hoping in vain for a "reciprocity" that was never forthcoming from the Communists. Washington lost a war in Vietnam and was hamstrung by a "post-Vietnam syndrome"; watched Congress kill its covert effort in Angola; sought the normalization of relations with Cuba; and undermined crucial strategic allies, who fell to anti-American groups, because of those allies' human rights records. Meanwhile, Moscow—sometimes supporting involvements initiated by their purportedly "non-aligned" Cuban friends—helped Communist groups seize power in a number of countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Central America and the Caribbean; stepped up the silencing of Soviet dissidents; labored to crush a genuine workers' movement in Poland; and, finally, invaded Afghanistan.

Dissatisfied by this return on détente as a geopolitical investment, American voters in 1980 handed the White House to Ronald Reagan, an unrepentant anticommunist whose harsh rhetoric and military build-up helped bring the United States and the Soviet Union perilously close to nuclear war in 1983. Détente, then, failed to deliver, leading the United States to replace it with a dangerously confrontational anti-Sovietism that many had thought terminally discredited by McCarthyism and Vietnam. For détente, as for many other policies in history, what it achieved was rather different from what its architects had imagined.

This is an interesting and useful study. It is perfectly sized (201 pages of text) for use in undergraduate courses, with well-chosen and helpful illustrations. Its chapters are clearly organized, the topic deeply researched in both foreign ministry and sport sources in an impressive number of countries and languages. Dichter makes complicated issues about an important issue in sport and Cold War history understandable. Her book commands and deserves the attention of historians interested in U.S. relations with Cold War Germany, the complexity of NATO politics, soft power in diplomacy, and the intersection of sports and international relations.

I am also pleased to say that Dichter's book teaches the value of learning from the past—an unalloyed asset for a work of history. In her closing words, she notes that "[w]hen the politically led boycotts of sporting events hit the Olympics with

the African boycott of Montreal (1976), the Western boycott of Moscow (1980), and the international Communist boycott of Los Angeles (1984), the world saw the legacy of NATO's actions and diplomatic interventions from the height of the Cold War in the 1960s" (201). Since those NATO efforts in the 1960s ended in utter failure, informed policymakers in later years might have thought better of replicating them. Happily, going forward, sports officials and would-be wielders of soft power now have this impressive book to remind them about some of the challenges lurking beneath the promise of sport diplomacy.

Note:

1. Quoted in Alfred E. Senn, *Power, Politics and the Olympic Games* (Champaign, IL, 1999), 92.

Review of Heather L. Dichter, *Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games: International Sport's Cold War Battle with NATO*

Richard Ian Kimball

The title of Heather L. Dichter's smart new volume *Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games: International Sports Cold War Battle with NATO* would seem to give the game away.

Surely this history will hit the sweet spot where two of the primary themes that historians have come to associate with the Olympic movement meet: the underhanded dealings that have led to the selection of Olympic host cities and the politicization of the Olympic Games.

In fact, *Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games* describes the intersection of negotiation and politicization, but in altogether unexpected and enlightening ways. By keeping her focus tightly on the inner workings of NATO and internal discussions with member countries as well as the alliance's international diplomatic efforts, Dichter provides us with an in-depth and at times granular understanding of "the power

of sport to influence international diplomacy" (ix), particularly in the growing acceptance of East Germany into the community of Olympic nations between 1960 and 1968.

Dichter, an associate professor at De Montfort University in Leicester, UK, combines her dual expertise in the history of sport and diplomatic history to examine how NATO, the International Olympic Committee, international sports federations, and nation-states interacted to accrue the international prestige provided by hosting and attending international sporting events such as world championships and the Olympics. The international competitions in *Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games* take place far from the playing field—the action here is found in a "web of diplomacy" (7) that consists of endless meetings at NATO headquarters and seemingly never-ending correspondence between diplomats and their home nations as well as their allies and the IOC.

Dichter's impressively broad research incorporates the foreign ministry records from six NATO nations, including domestic and international correspondence. Moreover, she has deeply mined the NATO archives and captured, at times, a day-by-day breakdown of the ebbs and flows of negotiation. Additionally, her analysis of a variety of newspapers gives a sense of the attitudes in NATO nations as well as East Germany. The records of the IOC were likewise well analyzed, although Avery Brundage is often allowed to speak for the entire Olympic movement.

Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games contains no sordid tales of the behind-the-scenes wrangling, bribery scandals, or generally illicit behavior that led to the selections of Mexico City and Grenoble as Olympic hosts for 1968. Instead, the intrigue here is found in the ongoing contest over the recognition of the German Democratic Republic (GDR, or East Germany) by the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, or West Germany) and its NATO allies. Dichter, who has published extensively in modern

German sport history, deftly tells the story of how East Germany used international sports as the proverbial camel's nose sneaking under the tent to gain recognition as a separate and sovereign nation. Participation in international sporting events meant that other nations would have to acknowledge the East German flag, national anthem, and even passports. That was a victory on the path toward full recognition. NATO members, led by the Big Four—France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States—opposed this use of sporting “soft power” at every turn.

Beginning in 1956, an all-Germany team made up of athletes from both nations participated in international sporting events, including the Olympics. Although the East Germans continued to jockey for recognition of their own teams, the all-German approach kept the controversy at a low simmer. All of that changed in the summer of 1961, when the East German government constructed the Berlin Wall, effectively stopping the free flow of people between the two nations. NATO members reacted by creating the Allied Travel Office (ATO), which prohibited the travel of East Germans, including athletes, to or through NATO member countries.

Controlled by France, the UK, and the United States, the ATO issued Temporary Travel Documents (TTDs) to East Germans as it saw fit. The decisions to issue or withhold TTDs (and the negotiations inside NATO that often preceded them) became NATO's central sporting concern between 1961 and 1968. In her analysis of the capitulation of the West in eventually recognizing East Germany, Dichter brilliantly identifies the TTDs as the small—if squeaky—hinges upon which history turned. The travel documents may not carry the emotional and symbolic power of the black-gloved fists raised by Tommie Smith and John Carlos in Mexico City in 1968, but in Dichter's hands they become central to the story.

The author's appreciation for how international sports and politics were shaped by what would normally be mundane administrative decisions showcases her understanding of how procedures and policies shape what we see on the field or who makes it to the championship podium. Understanding how the issuance or denial of travel documents played out behind the scenes adds nuance to our comprehension of how sports become politicized by reorienting our historical lens away from athletes and political leaders and towards diplomats and internal NATO politics. These behind-the-scenes Cold Warriors used the travel documents to posture, gain symbolic victories, and realign political and diplomatic relationships in light of international athletics.

The central portion of the text revolves around the political and diplomatic gyrations within the Western alliance as well as the fraught relationship between NATO and the Soviet Bloc. For a brief time, the TTDs appeared to be the perfect vehicle both to counter the “soft power” of East German sports diplomacy and to beat the GDR at its own game by controlling travel. Almost across the board, the ATO allowed East German athletes to travel as members of all-German teams (which often used a generic German Olympic flag and played Beethoven's Ninth Symphony in lieu of either nation's national anthem). East German athletes and teams were rarely granted travel papers—a decision which often proved unpopular inside NATO as well as with non-NATO countries.

By keeping East Germans off the field, ice, and pitch, NATO appeared to be using sports to score political points. By 1962, international federations (like weightlifting) allowed championships to be held only in locations that could guarantee free travel of movement to competitors from all countries, including East Germany. This became a major concern for Western nations and was “addressed at the highest echelon of the diplomatic corps” (43).

As issues around TTDs grew increasingly controversial in the mid-1960s, diplomatic cracks appeared in NATO. Member states tried to take advantage of the “soft power” of hosting

sporting events that would parlay into greater national prestige. Canada and Norway, two smaller members on the fringe of the alliance, led the charge against restrictive TTD policies. Canada sought to enter the world stage by hosting the Olympics, while Norway wanted to maintain its superiority in world skiing by hosting European and World Championships.

It became less likely that those ambitions would be fulfilled, as athletic associations began to remove their events from NATO countries in favor of Warsaw Pact or non-aligned nations, which promised open travel for all competitors. Both Canada and Norway considered the current NATO travel restrictions damaging to their national interests and lobbied for changes in the alliance's approach. Rifts emerged in the group as sports took on increasing importance in domestic agendas. As Dichter records, much of the diplomatic discussion centered on “the general inability of NATO to exert control over international sport” (72).

Over the course of the 1960s, the power of international sport, and particularly the lure of the Olympic Games, overcame NATO's intransigence regarding free travel and led to the recognition of East Germany. The issues came to a head over the bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games. Cities from four NATO countries—Canada, France, Norway, and the United States—vied to host the 1968 games. Two obstacles stood in their way. In 1963, the IOC condemned the intrusion of politics into sports and declared that all future Olympic host cities must ensure free access to all participants. Two years later, the IOC voted to recognize East Germany as a full-fledged member of the world sporting community. If any NATO country was to have a chance at hosting the games, the alliance would have to change its tune on East German travel and participation.

Ultimately, the power of the IOC prevailed. Canada, desperate to host the Games, was willing to let the IOC, rather than NATO, decide the terms. Each of the four nations decided to follow the IOC's directives, effectively allowing “international sport to dictate the course of intra-alliance diplomacy” (120).

In the end, the price of securing the 1968 Winter Olympics—at least for Grenoble—was the termination of NATO's travel ban and, ultimately, the recognition of East Germany and a realignment of Western diplomacy. The camel was standing in the middle of the tent; sport's “soft power” had knocked down the front door of international recognition. As Dichter concludes, international sport became the “earliest field where NATO member states accepted détente with East Germany” (161). NATO, however, did survive the intense conflict “between maintaining NATO unity and [national] self-interest” in the leadup to the '68 games.

Our innocence about the relationship between sports and politics seems to be restored and then lost again with every generation (if not every Olympic cycle). From the IOC's 1963 condemnation of politics in sports to IOC President Thomas Bach's remarks on the eve of the 2021 Tokyo Olympics, when he declared that “The Olympic Games are not about politics” and the IOC “is strictly politically neutral at all times,” it is clear that there is a deep belief in the value of making statements about the non-politicization of sport, especially the Olympics. *Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games* reminds us of the myriad ways that sports are about making statements that are both political and diplomatic.

Dichter's story also describes how the power games inside countries and between nations have shaped and been shaped by the sporting landscape. The runup to the selection of the 1968 Olympic host cities provides a great example of how the politics of sport influenced the internal workings of NATO in ways that bound the alliance closer together but also created openings for individual nation-state members to flout the alliance and pursue their national interest at the expense of Western unity.

Dichter's deep dive into the diplomatic side of the politicization of international sport in the 1960s shows sport to be on the leading edge of change. A willingness by NATO

By keeping East Germans off the field, ice, and pitch, NATO appeared to be using sports to score political points. By 1962, international federations (like weightlifting) allowed championships to be held only in locations that could guarantee free travel of movement to competitors from all countries, including East Germany.

members to signal through sport their readiness to recognize East Germany represents a revolution behind the scenes, driven by sport but felt throughout the corridors of power, in NATO and beyond.

Author's Response

Heather L. Dichter

First, I would like to thank Andy Johns for selecting my book for a *Passport* roundtable and Jenifer Parks, John Soares, Kevin Witherspoon, Anne Blaschke, and Richard Kimball for contributing to it. I am thrilled that all these excellent historians who work on sport enjoyed and praised *Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games*. While we historians conduct extensive research for our projects, often in archives, I greatly appreciate that the reviews all highlight my multi-country, multi-lingual archival methodology and the breadth of the research I did.

Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games is the culmination of an ambitious project that required many different types of archives in several countries, but it was a story that could not be told with only the sport or only the diplomatic materials. Of course, starting this research a week after leaving Canada (two years after having received my PhD at Toronto) and with no job made the idea of a new project daunting. Thankfully, I had what I like to call my "SHAFR post-doc" to get the research underway that fall. I spent just two months in Europe, which the William Appleman Williams grant only partially covered, but it was something, and I am forever grateful to the support SHAFR provided me.

As the reviewers noted, my book is about more than just the Olympic Games. The Olympic movement cannot function without the international federations, and I am glad the reviews all recognize the important role that other sporting events, regardless of their popularity, played in this process. Kevin Witherspoon notes that he would have liked to see more of the human side of the story. Indeed, hearing from the athletes whose opportunity to compete disappeared because of NATO policies and the Communist Bloc responses would have been interesting. Rarely, though, were these athletes named, either by the East German state newspaper *Neues Deutschland* or in the often incomplete or unsubmitted Temporary Travel Documents (TTDs). Olympic and world champion ski jumper Helmut Recknagel is the notable exception here. His experiences were atypical of East German athletes denied travel to the West. He was so well known in Norway from his Holmenkollen victories in 1957 and 1960 that the Holmenkollen museum has a pair of his skis at its entrance.

Instead, the book focuses on the "behind the scenes Cold Warriors," as Richard Kimball notes, where negotiation and politicization intersect. The negotiations took place at numerous levels within and across countries, as well as between diplomats and sport leaders. As a result, international sport, which politics had long affected, now shaped international politics and diplomacy at NATO and within its member states.

As John Soares, Kevin Witherspoon, and Anne Blaschke all note, it is the interaction between sport and politics that led to the challenges NATO member states faced when trying to use international sporting events for soft power

purposes while dealing with the German problem. Sport has been accepted as a form of public diplomacy, but as I argue in the book, international politics and the rules of international federations can lead to these public diplomacy endeavors backfiring when events deplete athlete fields.

Almost all the diplomats and sport leaders in the book are white men. The only women who appear were the French representative to one NATO committee and the president of the international federation for archery (who was also the first female president of any international sport federation). Most of the sporting events impacted, too, were men's world or European championships. Sometimes these events were for both men and women, but several international federations did not yet offer championships for women.

I agree with Blaschke that I could have done more with whiteness, wealth, and masculinity within the book. Yes, my book's focus is on predominantly white countries (or white individuals within them), but the international sport leaders at the time were also elite, white, and from these same states. When NATO and international sport were dealing with the problem of East Germany in the 1960s, international sport was facing several issues from non-white populations across the world: decolonization, apartheid, a divided Korea, and the two-China problem. I hope that my book's examination of the questions surrounding Germany will help scholars working on those areas delve further into these issues to understand better how the white, male, and privileged international sport leaders responded.

While I covered only a few years in the mid-1960s, I am glad each of the reviewers could see the wider relevance of events in these years to actions elsewhere around the globe and, as John Soares in particular highlights, later in time. I had no idea just how relevant my book would be when, barely four months after its release, NATO and states excluded from international sport would dominate the news on a daily basis. The Russian invasion of Ukraine prompted Sweden and Finland to apply for NATO membership and strengthened Ukraine's and Georgia's interest in NATO membership. The organization's origins as a military alliance have come to the fore with Russia's attack on Ukraine. From a sport standpoint, Russia and Belarus (for its support of Russia) have been almost universally excluded from international sport competition, and any events that had been scheduled in those countries have been relocated elsewhere—some on short notice.¹

These actions are reminiscent of the challenges international sport faced in the 1960s. While the reviewers here have all worked on sport history themselves, I hope that their positive discussion of *Bidding for the 1968 Olympic Games* will encourage non-sport historians—whether they are interested in diplomacy, the Cold War, NATO, or just history in general—to read this book and consider additional ways in which sport plays a role in diplomacy, and how very seriously numerous foreign ministries have taken sport for decades.

Note:

1. For anyone interested in what international federations are doing with respect to Russia and Belarus, I recommend following www.insidethegames.biz for news.

CALL FOR PAPERS

2023 Conference of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

Renaissance Arlington Capital View, Arlington, Virginia, June 15-17, 2023

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) invites proposals for its 2023 annual conference. The deadline for proposals is **December 1, 2022**.

SHAFR is dedicated to the study of the history of the United States in the world, broadly conceived. This includes not only foreign relations, diplomacy, statecraft, and strategy but also other approaches to Americans' relations with the wider world, including (but not limited to) global governance, transnational movements, religion, human rights, race, gender, trade and economics, immigration, borderlands, the environment, and empire. SHAFR welcomes those who study any time period from the colonial era to the present. Given that the production, exercise, and understanding of U.S. power takes many forms and touches myriad subjects, the Program Committee welcomes proposals reflecting a broad range of approaches and topics.

Proposals

SHAFR is committed to inclusion and diversity, and encourages proposals including members of groups historically under-represented within the organization. We particularly encourage proposals from women, scholars of color, colleagues residing outside of the United States, junior and contingent scholars, and scholars working in other disciplines. Your proposal must include a diversity statement that describes how it will advance this SHAFR commitment.

Graduate students, international scholars, and scholars whose participation might expand the organization's breadth are encouraged to apply for SHAFR grants to subsidize the cost of attending the conference. Please see below for details.

The Program Committee welcomes panels that transcend conventional chronologies, challenge received categories, or otherwise offer innovative approaches and fresh thinking.

Panel sessions for the 2023 meeting will run one hour and forty-five minutes. A complete panel typically includes three papers plus chair and commentator (with the possibility of one person fulfilling the latter two roles) or a conceptually more expansive roundtable discussion with a chair and three or four participants. Papers should be no longer than twenty minutes and must be shorter in situations where there are more than three paper presentations. The Committee is open to alternative formats, especially those based on discussion and engagement with the audience, which should be described briefly in the proposal.

Individual paper proposals are also welcome, though complete panels with coherent themes will be favored over single papers. Those seeking to create or fill out a panel should consult the "Panelists Seeking Panelists Forum" (which will be made available online) or Tweet #SHAFR2023.

The Program Committee hopes to develop a pool of potential commentators/chairs for panels constructed from individual proposals. If you are interested in volunteering for this pool, please contact the program co-chairs at program-chair@shafir.org.

Policies

All proposals and funding applications should be submitted via the procedures outlined at shafir.org. Applicants requiring alternative means to submit the proposal should contact the program co-chairs via e-mail at program-chair@shafir.org.

Proposals should list the papers in the order in which participants will present, as they will be printed in that order in the conference program and presented in that order during their session. Each participant may serve twice, each time in a different capacity. For example: you may serve once as a chair and once as a commentator; or once as panelist and once as chair or commentator. No participant may appear on the program more than two times.

AV requests, along with a brief explanation of how the equipment is essential to the presentation, must be made at the time of application and included in your proposal. AV access is limited and expensive. As such, please carefully assess your AV needs and realize that such requests can place limits on when and where we schedule accepted panels.

Any special scheduling requests (e.g., that a panel not take place on a particular day) must be made at the time of application and included in your proposal.

Generally, annual membership in SHAFR is required for those participating in the 2023 meeting. The president and Program Committee may grant some exceptions to scholars whose specializations are outside the field. Enrollment instructions will be included with notification of accepted proposals.

SHAFR and the media occasionally record conference sessions for use in broadcast and electronic media. Presenters who do not wish for their session to be recorded may opt out when submitting a proposal to the Program Committee. An audience member who wishes to audiotape or videotape must obtain written permission of panelists. SHAFR is not responsible for unauthorized recording. SHAFR reserves the right to revoke the registration of anyone who records sessions without appropriate permissions.

Divine Graduate Student Travel Grants

SHAFR will award several Robert A. and Barbara Divine Graduate Student Travel Grants to assist graduate students presenting papers at the 2023 conference. The following stipulations apply: 1) no award will exceed \$300; 2) priority will be given to graduate students who receive no or limited funds from their home institutions; and 3) expenses will be reimbursed by the SHAFR Business Office upon submission of receipts. The Program Committee will make decisions regarding awards. A graduate student requesting travel funds must make a request when submitting the paper/panel proposal. Applications should include: a 1-page letter from the applicant; reference letter from the graduate advisor that also confirms the unavailability of departmental travel funds. The two items should be submitted via the on-line interface at the time the panel/paper proposal is submitted. Funding requests will have no bearing on the committee's decisions on panels/papers, but funds will not be awarded unless the applicant's submission is accepted by the Program Committee in a separate decision. Application deadline: **December 1, 2022.**

SHAFR Global Scholars and Diversity Grants

SHAFR also awards Global Scholars and Diversity Grants to help defray travel and lodging expenses for the 2023 conference. These grants are aimed at scholars whose participation in the annual meeting helps to diversify the organization. Preference will be given to those who have not previously presented at annual meetings. The awards are intended for scholars who represent groups historically under-represented at SHAFR, scholars who offer diverse and complementary intellectual approaches, and scholars from outside the United States. "Scholars" includes faculty, graduate students, and independent researchers. To further integrate grant winners into SHAFR, awards include one-year membership that includes subscriptions to *Diplomatic History* and *Passport*. Applicants should submit a copy of their individual paper proposal along with a short cv (2-page maximum) and a 2-3 paragraph essay addressing the fellowship criteria (including data on previous SHAFR meetings attended and funding received). Please submit your application via the on-line interface. Funding requests will have no bearing on the committee's decisions on panels/papers, but funds will not be awarded unless the applicant's submission is accepted by the Program Committee in a separate decision. Application deadline: **December 1, 2022.**

Other Conference Events

The 2023 conference will host SHAFR's annual Job Search Workshop to help prepare graduate student members for the job market. Students will have the opportunity to receive individualized feedback on their cover letters and CVs from experienced faculty members. Those interested in participating can indicate this on the online conference submission form (although it is not necessary to be a panelist to participate). The Job Workshop is open to all current graduate students and newly minted PhDs. Priority will be given to first-time participants.

The program will also continue SHAFR's Syllabus Workshop, sponsored by the Teaching Committee. Graduate students and new PhDs will have the opportunity to work with experienced faculty on their syllabi. Those interested in participating can indicate this on the online conference submission form (although it is not necessary to be a panelist to participate). The Syllabus Workshop is open to all current graduate students and recent PhDs.

For more details about the conference please visit the main conference web page.

A Roundtable on Mark Lawrence, *The End of Ambition: The United States and the Third World in the Vietnam Era*

Jason Parker, Gregg A. Brazinsky, Matthew F. Jacobs, Meredith Oyen, and Mark
Atwood Lawrence

Introduction to Mark Lawrence, *The End of Ambition: The United States and the Third World in the Vietnam Era*. Princeton University Press, 2021.

Jason Parker

For those of us Beatles devotees born after the band broke up, it is arresting to ponder that their period of regular- and then super-stardom lasted fewer years than many of us spent in grad school. That same feeling— of great distance traveled in what was in retrospect a short window of time— also strikes when we guide our students across the eight short years separating JFK’s Inaugural from the Nixon Doctrine. From “pay any price, bear any burden” to apocalyptic-scale nuclear arsenals and the Vietnam debacle in less than a decade is a rich, terrible, and bloody history, as the readers of these pages know well. Yet the quagmire in Southeast Asia tends to eclipse, for the LBJ administration then as for scholars now, contemporary developments in other parts of the much-contested and increasingly-assertive “Third World” in that era.

As one of our leading scholars of the Vietnam War, it is fitting and proper that it be Mark Lawrence to illuminate those global-South blind-spots that Vietnam eclipsed. Lawrence pursues several quarry at once in this book, which seeks to fill a gap in the literature and at the same time to connect dots in our interpretation of the 1960s. He argues that the shift from JFK to LBJ and thence to Nixon translated to a transition from hopeful engagement with global-South actors, centered on the modernization-development paradigm in vogue at the start of the decade, to its displacement by the prioritization of order and stability in these turbulent areas. This owed in part to the dynamics of the Vietnam War. It also stemmed, Lawrence finds, from idiosyncratic local factors in each state, as well as from the changing currents within the U.S. national-security establishment and in domestic American politics. In this elegant and well-constructed reading, the LBJ administration is the crucial bridge connecting the New Frontier to the Nixon Doctrine.

The three reviewers, although expressing some reservations, on the whole agree. They found much to praise in Lawrence’s book. It fills a gap in the modernization-development literature, noting that it offers a way to explain the “decline” phase following the well-covered “rise” in the works of Michael Latham, David Ekbladh, et al. The “demise of development” story, regionally strong in the works of such scholars as Brad Simpson and Thomas Field, here attains a global scope and reinforces the interpretation of the LBJ years as the aforementioned “bridge” to the Nixon Doctrine. It offers, in the words of one, a “strong

foundation” for further enhancement of our understanding of these crucial years. Moreover, it presents a model for analysis within the archival limitations under which we all live in the wake of Covid restrictions, and within its own compass, succeeds as an inside-baseball study of high policy in the shadow of Vietnam. It is, in the words of one reviewer, “readable, thoughtful, and persuasive”— an assessment with which I heartily concur.

The reviewers’ reservations—some shared by two or all three, others not—center for the most part on a few key issues. The intertwined issues of primary-source limitations and a focus on policy elites— bound up in the evidentiary base being overwhelmingly from the LBJ Library that Lawrence directs— are one. Another is the more or less incomplete picture, perhaps born of this inside-baseball focus, of the larger universe of bureaucratic aid and development.

Having taken on a life of its own by the end of the LBJ administration, the sector deserves attention as a virtually autonomous actor by that point. Independent by then of central administration directives, committed aid-and-development parties in Washington and abroad could and did pursue their work with only limited regard to shifts in presidential strategic thinking. Indeed, Lawrence’s book could offer a jumping-off point for future investigation of the “peak NGO” era that began to crest after it.¹ In addition, the inattention to human rights and racial dynamics in policymakers’ thinking during these years is ripe for redress in future scholarship. Finally, in perhaps the most provocative critique, Matt Jacobs wonders whether we ought instead to think about the JFK years as the aberration, leaving LBJ-Nixon as a kind of regression to the Cold War grand-strategy mean.

For those of us trained by scholars whose own autobiographies were shaped and scarred by the Vietnam years, the war’s “black hole” gravitational effect on their output and on U.S. foreign policy alike raised a question: once that generation passed the torch, would the war’s hold on the scholarship diminish? As it turns out, not so much— for Lawrence and others of the subsequent generation, the “black hole” continues to bend the very light around it. Yet Lawrence here makes a signal contribution by studying the places thus shadowed, even as the war’s utter centrality is confirmed. In his Conclusion, Lawrence argues that the arc of 1960s U.S. foreign policy tracks that long noted on the domestic front: from a robust liberalism to a resigned realism, as the former “crumbled under pressure from both a dissatisfied left that aimed for faster, more thoroughgoing change and a resurgent conservative movement.” The reviewers agree that he makes a convincing case in this regard, although one cheekily wonders whether it was as least as much due to the evident early failures of the New Frontier and Great Society alike to achieve their ambitious

goals. Dispiriting though it is to ponder, the leap from “All You Need Is Love” to “Helter Skelter” to “Get Back” turns out to be quick and short.

Note:

1. See for example Agnieszka Sobocinska, *Saving the World? Western Volunteers and the Rise of the Humanitarian-Development Complex* (Cambridge, 2021).

Review of Mark Atwood Lawrence: *The End of Ambition: The United States and the Third World during the Johnson Era*

Gregg A. Brazinsky

The study of American developmentalism in the Third World has occupied a prominent place in the historiography of U.S. foreign relations for over twenty years now. Historians in the field have examined the origins and implementation of a broad array of American efforts to promote economic development and democratization in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These have included overarching studies of modernization as an ideology, studies of development policy in specific countries or regions, and explorations of how development programs played out in local contexts.¹

What historians have not devoted much attention to, however, is how and why the developmental zeal that seemed to be such a critical component of American foreign policy during the early 1960s faded and gave way to more conservative and realistic approaches toward the Third World by the end of the decade. There has been a vague sense that development programs withered quickly once Richard Nixon assumed the presidency in 1969, but no one has offered a detailed exploration of that process, and the notion that Nixon single-handedly dismantled what was at one point a far-reaching and well-funded development apparatus has long seemed a little bit too neat and convenient.

In *The End of Ambition*, Mark Atwood Lawrence offers a highly detailed and finely nuanced treatment of how the United States gradually abandoned its idealistic emphasis on transforming newly independent nations and shifted its focus to preserving stability and limiting expensive commitments to modernization schemes. Lawrence contends that there was not an abrupt transition from developmentalism to retrenchment in 1969. Instead, it was during the Johnson administration that Washington gave up its liberal aspirations, as policymakers struggled with the demands that war in Vietnam placed on America's resources.

The Vietnam War undermined progressive American visions of the Global South for several reasons. First, it had a dispiriting effect on U.S. policymakers and weakened their certainty about what American development programs could accomplish. Second, it fostered suspicion of Washington's motives in many neutral independent nations whose loyalty the United States was trying to win through development programs. Finally, it made it more difficult to justify the continuation of expensive programs in regions that seemed to be rejecting American influence.

Lawrence devotes three chapters to exploring the worldviews and assumptions of JFK, LBJ and their key advisors. One interesting takeaway from these chapters is that there was never a very uniform commitment to development and nation-building in the American

policy establishment—even during the early 1960s, when this outlook reached the pinnacle of its influence. The enthusiasm of “nation builders” such as Walt Rostow, Roger Hilsman, and David E. Bell was always kept in check by men like Secretary of State Dean Rusk and George W. Ball, who tended to view ambitious development schemes as unrealistic and grandiose.

Despite the optimism about the prospects for American influence in the Third World that he sometimes projected in his speeches, Kennedy often vacillated between the conflicting perspectives of his advisors. Thus, even during the Kennedy administration, American policy toward the Third World was not always as consistent and generous as the president's rhetoric indicated. Johnson inherited this ambiguous legacy and brought to it his own sense that while development aid was important, it was not necessarily a critical ingredient for victory in the Cold War.

At the heart of this book are Lawrence's case studies of American policy toward different Third World nations. He chooses five countries that had relatively high priority in the mindsets of American policymakers: Brazil, India, Iran, Indonesia, and Southern Africa. With these choices, he echoes to some degree the sentiments of Odd Arne Westad and Jeremy Friedman, who have also seen developments in these countries as pivotal to the overall evolution of the Cold War in the Third World.² While there have already been a number of detailed studies of American policy

toward some of these countries, Lawrence's book brings a fresh perspective to the literature by looking at American policy through a comparative framework.

One point that comes across clearly when one looks at Lawrence's new book alongside Friedman's recent *Ripe for Revolution* is that Vietnam was far less critical than American policymakers who were obsessed with it during the 1960s thought it was.³ While, as Lawrence

argues, Vietnam may have shaped U.S. policies toward Brazil and Indonesia, it was the triumph of the right and the demise of the left in these countries that had a more enduring impact on the politics of the Third World.

The End of Ambition draws primarily on American archival materials to make its case. While Lawrence uses a smattering of materials from Brazil, the UK, and Canada, he cites materials from the LBJ Library far more than any other source. This methodology has its strengths and limitations. Lawrence often cannot delve into the thinking of the Johnson administration's counterparts in Brazil or Indonesia in great detail. Yet his accounts of Johnson administration policy toward each of the countries he selects are incredibly thorough and nuanced.

Lawrence clearly benefited from working as the director of the LBJ Library. He combed through the library's collections meticulously and managed to turn up a great deal of material that sheds new light on different aspects of American policy. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine a historian who did not have Lawrence's access to and familiarity with the materials in the LBJ Library writing about Johnson's policy quite so definitively.

More than many other recent works on the Cold War in the Third World, Lawrence's book limits itself to a focus on policymaking elites. His work stands in contrast, for instance, to Daniel Immerwahr's *Thinking Small*, which zeroes in on the implementation and unraveling of some very specific aid projects in more local contexts.⁴ Both of these approaches have their merits, but I wonder about the relevance of Lawrence's arguments to the vast economic aid apparatus that the United States had set up around the world by the late 1960s.

Even before the Kennedy administration, United States Operations Missions (USOMs) worked with governments in many newly independent countries to create economic plans and initiate development programs. By the late 1950s, Rostow's ideas about modernization had already become influential among American officials working in Afro-Asian countries. While enthusiasm for development and engagement with Afro-Asian countries might have waned in the highest echelons in Washington during the Johnson administration, it is important to remember that the expansive development bureaucracy that Kennedy had helped to grow did not lose its enthusiasm as quickly as LBJ and his leading advisors did.

One need only peruse the USAID's development experience clearinghouse—an online collection of the agency's documents—to see that American aid programs remained active in many parts of the Third World despite LBJ's shifting priorities.⁵ The White House may have wavered in its ambition to liberal nation building, but thousands of American experts who worked in newly independent countries remained very much committed to it. The notion of an end to American ambition likely applied only to a part of the policy establishment.

This is not to say that what happened at the higher echelons of policymaking did not trickle down to the thousands of Americans who worked on the ground in organizations like the USAID, the Peace Corps, or the United States Information Agency. A more pessimistic attitude in Washington about what could be achieved through development and whether the United States could actually build postcolonial states into liberal democracies unquestionably led to reduced budgets and weaker support for these agencies. Lawrence's approach does not really enable him to fully capture this dynamic. It is still difficult to know how soon and to what degree the shift in policy under Johnson impacted what was actually happening in countries receiving American support. Although the USAID and USIA are mentioned in *The End of Ambition*, they figure as relatively minor players whose concerns and agenda don't shape policy and whose overall impact is unclear.

Lawrence's case studies take us across a diverse array of countries in the Global South that American officials put a great deal of emphasis on, yet I also wonder how what might be called "capitalist Asia" would fit into his narrative. Typically, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan have received little attention in the literature on the Cold War in the Third World, because they sided so strongly with the Free World. Yet Lawrence's study is less about the Cold War rivalries that authors like myself, Westad, and Friedman have focused on and more about the rise and fall of American developmentalist ambition.

It is worth noting that when Rostow wrote of the "big five" countries that received the most American aid—including both military and economic assistance—early in the Kennedy administration, he was referring to South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, Vietnam, and Pakistan.⁶ While Vietnam figures prominently in the book and Pakistan sometimes figures in Lawrence's discussion of India, the other three do not receive significant attention. Of course, Lawrence could not have covered every country, and there are certainly arguments to be made for focusing on countries where the rightward shift in American policy was more evident. Yet given that the rise and fall of American developmentalism is one of the major themes of the book, one wonders why countries that were afforded such a high priority by American officials were left out. It would have been interesting to see how well Lawrence's analysis held up when looking at cases that came to be considered models of liberal developmentalism (even if this was not exactly true) alongside countries where Washington compromised its lofty ideals.

Ultimately, *The End of Ambition* raises as many interesting questions as it answers. That is by no means a bad thing. And even though there are some places where I wish Lawrence could have expanded his analysis, there can be no doubt that he accomplishes a great deal. *The End of Ambition* is unquestionably one of the most important books on the Cold War in the Third World to appear in the last twenty years, and it offers the best overall analysis of American policy in the Global South during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Its impressive research, nuanced analysis, and accessible prose style should make it required reading in both undergraduate and graduate courses on the Cold War.

Notes:

1. See, for instance, Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and Nation Building in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2000); Bradley R. Simpson, *Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960–68* (Redwood City, CA, 2010); Nathan J. Citino, *Envisioning the Arab Future: Modernization in U.S.-Arab Relations, 1945–1987* (Cambridge, UK, 2017); Begüm Adalet, *Hotels and Highways: The Construction of Modernization Theory in Cold War Turkey* (Redwood City, CA, 2018).
2. Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge, UK, 2005); Jeremy Friedman, *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2015).
3. Jeremy Friedman, *Ripe for Revolution: Building Socialism in the Third World* (Cambridge, MA, 2022).
4. Daniel Immerwahr, *Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community Development* (Cambridge, MA, 2015).
5. See the USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse: <https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/home/Default.aspx>.
6. Gregg Brazinsky, *Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2007), 3.

Review of Mark Atwood Lawrence, *The End of Ambition: The United States and the Third World in the Vietnam Era*

Matthew F. Jacobs

Mark Atwood Lawrence is better acquainted than most scholars with the voluminous literature on the conflicts in Vietnam. And as his prior work demonstrates, he is also well positioned to take a broader view of those conflicts than scholars who focus solely on the American experience there. Since he built his scholarly reputation largely on his ability to render comprehensible the complexities and nuances of conflict in Vietnam, it seems appropriate for him to explore U.S. relations with the rest of the Third World in the shadow of Vietnam in the 1960s. That is precisely what he attempts in *The End of Ambition: The United States and the Third World in the Vietnam Era*, where he steps away from Vietnam and looks at U.S. policymakers.

The structure of the book makes sense, though it requires some intellectual nimbleness from the reader in the early going. In addition to an introduction and conclusion, the book is made up of eight chapters. Chapters 1 and 3 lay the intellectual foundation for the remainder of the book. The first chapter examines "The Liberal Inheritance" of Cold War foreign policymaking and explains the policymaking process during the Kennedy administration.

Here, Lawrence identifies four main strands of thought and their advocates. "Globalists" recognized global political diversity, embraced the desire for change across the Third World, and believed the United States had a critical role to play in bringing about that change. "Nation-builders"—most notably, modernization theorists—recognized the need for transformation and a U.S. role in that process but argued for a single pathway toward its accomplishment.

“Strong-point” thinkers acknowledged the challenges of the world of the 1950s and 1960s but believed focusing on key relationships and alliances offered the best means of navigating the instability that ensued. Finally, “unilateralists” believed the United States could and should act in its own interests at every turn. Lawrence contends that the Kennedy administration contained representatives from each group and that while the president generally welcomed the intellectual give-and-take that frequently emerged, he usually favored the globalists.

The third chapter differentiates Johnson’s approaches to the broader world from Kennedy’s. In Lawrence’s telling, Johnson was more focused on top-down change, elite-generated stability, and transactional relationships that would earn acknowledgment of U.S. efforts in Vietnam. He was thus more inclined to favor strong-point thinking, less likely to engage in debate, and more likely to sideline advisors who did not share his views. Those tendencies were enhanced by Johnson’s greater emphasis on domestic issues, particularly the Great Society, as well as his requirement of personal and political loyalty and his need to demonstrate his power and masculinity, all of which are well documented by other scholars.

Sandwiched between chapters 1 and 3 are brief analyses of five cases—Brazil, India, Iran, Indonesia, and Southern Africa—during the Kennedy administration. These cases also serve as the individual focal points of chapters 4 through 8. The case studies reflect good geographic distribution, as all the main regions of the Third World are represented. Lawrence acknowledges that he picked countries that the Johnson administration appears to have viewed—or so the evidence suggests—as the most prominent in each region of the world, although some scholars might disagree with his selections.

This position is certainly defensible, but it is also reasonable to ask what might be gained by analyzing at least one or two less prominent cases, so that readers might see how Lawrence’s argument does or does not apply more broadly across the Third World. It does seem an odd choice to insert the Kennedy-era case study overview chapter between the two chapters exploring the intellectual and policymaking foundations of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, as it disrupts the flow between those two chapters as well as the case study analyses. The Kennedy-era case study chapter could have been placed directly before the other case study chapters or could even have been broken up and integrated into each of the relevant case studies themselves.

Nonetheless, the book’s structure serves loosely to connect the Kennedy and Johnson years to the broader contours of U.S. foreign policymaking from the 1950s to the 1970s. The structure therefore helps to build a sense of both continuity within and departure from the broader era of which it is a part. That is indeed one of Lawrence’s points: that a retreat from Kennedy’s bold foreign policymaking in the Third World began in the Johnson administration, rather than emerging from the transition to the realpolitik of the Nixon and Kissinger years. In Lawrence’s interpretation, the Nixon Doctrine was thus less innovation and more continuation of a policy developed out of a mixture of necessity and intellectual predilection.

Overall, there is little to quibble with in the basic telling of the story, and it is a story well worth the telling. An unpacking of the Johnson administration’s approach

to the broader Third World is long overdue, and Lawrence spotlights cases (Indonesia, most notably) that are frequently overlooked in the broader literature on the history of U.S. foreign relations since World War II. Certainly, a specialist who works on Brazil, India, Iran, Indonesia, or Southern Africa might have a suggestion here or there, but that is to be expected when one undertakes this sort of project.

Lawrence also provides a compelling look at the important and sometimes not-so-subtle differences between key advisors and officials who are often lumped together and portrayed as sharing a well-developed worldview and approach to policymaking. One cannot come away from reading this book and look at Dean Rusk, Walt Rostow, Robert Komer, Chester Bowles, George Ball, and a variety of other individuals in the same way ever again. Finally, Lawrence’s handling of Vietnam is also deft. While the country goes unmentioned for long stretches of each case study, we are reminded that it is ever present, a constant litmus test against which the Johnson administration was evaluating all relationships.

Along the way, however, Lawrence has made some significant choices that will give some readers pause. For example, he states explicitly that he is most interested in examining the ideas and decisions underpinning U.S. foreign policy and approaches to the Third World and in understanding the impact of U.S. involvement in Vietnam in particular. Thus, he relies heavily on traditional U.S.-based sources, such as materials from the National Archives, presidential libraries, newspapers and other media, and diaries or memoirs of prominent, mostly white and male policymakers.

The result is a book that is unapologetically U.S.-focused and therefore uneven at times. U.S. policymakers were often forced to react to events and individuals they had little control over, and, as a result, sometimes struggled to respond appropriately. We get a meaningful exploration of the policymaking mindsets that governed those reactions, but it feels as if the agency of other actors in defining the limited range of options U.S. officials were faced with is underacknowledged.

The biggest challenge with *The End of Ambition*, however, is in deciding if that really is the meaning of the story Lawrence tells. Did the United States ever really possess the ambition to change the world, and if so, did the trials and tribulations of the 1960s bring about its demise? Lawrence argues that the United States began the 1960s with both a policymaking impulse and a broader popular sense of unbridled optimism that it could facilitate a dramatic global transformation, only to have those hopes dashed by the time the next decade arrived. The culprits were military and political overreach in Vietnam, fiscal and political overreach at home in the form of the Great Society, and a concomitant political and social backlash against the forces for change.

In some ways that argument seems obvious enough. But in other ways it is less clear. For example, as I noted earlier in this review, the focus on U.S. policymakers, U.S. sources, and ultimately U.S. agency is important in analyzing American ambitions but limits our ability to understand how local actors embraced, resisted, or constrained those ambitions. There are two additional avenues through which we might explore the ambiguities surrounding this suggested end of ambition.

Review of Mark Atwood Lawrence, *The End of Ambition: The United States and the Third World in the Vietnam Era*

Meredith Oyen

First, Lawrence makes the Kennedy and Johnson administrations seem at once intricately connected to while also separate from broader U.S. policymaking during the Cold War. For example, he suggests that the toll Vietnam exacted was partly responsible for the decline in ambition he sees occurring during the Johnson administration. But what if the energy the Kennedy administration brought to policymaking in the Third was an aberration during the Cold War and Johnson was never really on board with it?"

There is ample evidence in the book to suggest that was the case. Chapter Three on "Lyndon Johnson's World" and LBJ's predilection for strong-point thinkers and transactional relationships focused on the Cold War and Vietnam highlights that point. Moreover, in most of the cases Lawrence examines, the transition away from ambition came quite quickly, usually by 1965 or 1966 at the latest, and was not a drawn-out process that corresponded chronologically with the quagmire in Vietnam. From that perspective, U.S. ambitions in the Third World seem uniquely Kennedyesque, and the 1960s look less like the end of ambition and more like Johnson choosing policymakers and policies that comported with his preferred strong-point transactional approach from the beginning.

Second, Lawrence notes repeatedly throughout the book that Kennedy was more adventurous and willing to promote change abroad, while Johnson felt Kennedy was too timid in pursuing urgently needed change at home. Johnson was comfortable expending political and financial capital domestically that he was largely unwilling to spend internationally outside of Vietnam. But Johnson was chastened by the backlash to his domestic agenda, just as he was by the backlash to his efforts in Vietnam.

The point here is to note that to the extent that there may have been a shared national sense of ambition, it never coalesced around a common set of issues or ideas. The ambition that Kennedy might have articulated or possessed regarding transformation in the Third World was not Johnson's. Similarly, Johnson's and his supporters' ambitions in Vietnam did not remain aligned with the broader public. And as the domestic backlash to the Great Society demonstrated, significant portions of the public did not share Johnson's ambition on that front either.

To be sure, *The End of Ambition* is a compelling read about U.S. engagement with the broader Third World in the shadow of Vietnam. That is a story worth telling in its own right, and Mark Lawrence does it justice. But to the extent that American ambition to transform the Third World existed in the first place, the evidence Lawrence presents suggests it died shortly after Kennedy himself.

One might be able to make a compelling case that the 1960s did indeed witness the end of some sort of American ambition on a large scale, but to do so successfully would require defining and teasing out at least three different and often competing strains of ambition—domestic transformation in the form of the Great Society, fighting the Cold War in places like Vietnam, and promoting broader global transformation. Mark Lawrence has laid a strong foundation here, but more work remains to be done to prove that point conclusively.

Lawrence notes repeatedly throughout the book that Kennedy was more adventurous and willing to promote change abroad, while Johnson felt Kennedy was too timid in pursuing urgently needed change at home. Johnson was comfortable expending political and financial capital domestically that he was largely unwilling to spend internationally outside of Vietnam.

In *The End of Ambition: The United States and the Third World in the Vietnam Era*, author Mark Atwood Lawrence takes readers on a journey from the lofty aspirations for U.S. influence in the world under President John F. Kennedy to the more constrained and pragmatic goals of the Nixon-Kissinger era. His focus is on the foreign policy decision-making of President Lyndon B. Johnson, as he grappled with what he inherited from Kennedy and struggled against allowing the Vietnam War to consume everything. Lawrence argues that Johnson responded to changes in the Third World in ways that demonstrate a clear transition away from Kennedy's idealism and that he put in place many of the salient features of Nixon's approach to the world.

Lawrence is best known as a historian of the Vietnam War, and although that conflict does not take center stage in this book, its presence is always felt. Lawrence makes his case that over the course of the Johnson years, "the Vietnam War played a crucial role in leading U.S. leaders to abandon their liberal preoccupations in favor of a more cautious approach aimed at ensuring stability" (5). The Vietnam War did not simply consume the budget for international aid. It also undermined confidence in the agenda that helped lead the United States boldly into that nation-building project and fueled criticism against the United States in the Third World.

In *The End of Ambition*, Lawrence examines three core factors that influenced the shift in approach to foreign policy: changing leadership in the foreign policy establishment (both at the presidential level and in terms of the key advisors, appointees, and experts who influenced policy); domestic turmoil in the United States, as Johnson's ambitious domestic agenda and the civil rights movement led to conflict and clashes that broke down the Cold War consensus abroad; and changes within the Third World, as recently decolonized or newly decolonizing countries sought to forge their own paths, get aid from both the United States and the Soviet Union, and engage with the nonaligned movement.

Lawrence makes his case by structuring his book around five Third World "case studies": Brazil, India, Iran, Indonesia, and Southern Africa. The book begins with three early chapters that do a terrific job of succinctly and engagingly summarizing the attitudes and decisions of the Kennedy administration toward the Third World and the shift to the Johnson administration and what changed because of the sudden change of power. Lawrence notes that Kennedy's administration "conceived no consistent or coherent approach to the Third World generally or to specific challenges that arose on its watch (17)." He describes the administration in broad terms as inspired by grand hopes for democratization and U.S. influence in the Third World and open to nonalignment but filled with differing perspectives that debated courses of action without necessarily alighting on a unified policy prescription. Taking the reader through Kennedy's responses to events in his five chosen case studies in a second chapter, Lawrence concludes that because of all the disagreements among the Kennedy elite, the administration "failed to achieve the coherence or consistent innovation that JFK's rhetoric so

often seemed to promise" (41).

Lawrence then turns to a discussion of how the LBJ administration began to diverge from its predecessor when it took over from the fallen president in November 1963. Despite rhetoric of continuity, significant differences in priorities, personality, and decision-making style ensured that Johnson would make different decisions on almost every front. The international environment in which Johnson made decisions also influenced his relatively low tolerance for bold experiments and led him to create some of the patterns for U.S. interaction with the Third World that would be perpetuated by Nixon.

Each of the next five chapters centers on how Johnson responded to events and challenges he faced in Lawrence's case studies. Together, the five chapters demonstrate an emerging "tolerance for authoritarianism" (108), a concern about the costs of international aid, and Johnson's desire to find support for his Vietnam policy among Third World leaders. Lawrence provides comparisons where necessary. For example, he notes that LBJ proved very tolerant of Brazil's turn away from democratic values but found it easy to criticize the democratic leadership of India when their goals did not align with his own.

The final case study, on Southern Africa, provides some of the starkest examples of the effect of domestic politics in the United States on foreign policy decisions, even as it notes the limitations of the Johnson administration's willingness to boldly challenge the status quo. In these chapters the Vietnam War is like a specter that haunts the Johnson administration: it pops up periodically as a reminder of Johnson's eagerness to obtain support from the Third World for the war efforts, and it is clearly a low hum in the background of any decision on what risks to take or how bold a policy choice should be. That said, I was almost surprised it did not appear even more often. I would have assumed that the financial consequences of the war, increasing domestic opposition to it, and uncertainty over strategy would have entered many more conversations, especially ones that concerned places like Indonesia.

The case studies painstakingly build Lawrence's argument and successfully make the case that the transition under Johnson set up the familiar outlines of the Nixon-era approach to the Third World. What gets left out is interesting, however, in part because of Lawrence's focus on the changes in U.S. decision-making and his heavy emphasis on sources from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, Texas. For all the debates about democratization or authoritarian governments, there is very little discussion of human rights in the countries under study. Evidently, human rights were not a major factor in choices about economic or military aid, or the subject did not come up enough in these documents to make a case for it.

The absence of human rights here raises a question for further research: would a wider view of U.S. diplomacy with these nations in the 1960s—one that included more popular press, a wider range of secondary sources, and a more in-depth set of materials from international sources—reveal that concerns over human rights were presented or debated at various points along the way? Similarly, aside from the discussion of apartheid in the final Southern Africa chapter, there is very little discussion of race. Given the long shadow of both colonialism and race relations in the United States, it is inevitable that many people in government held assumptions about their counterpoints in the Brazilian, Indonesian, Iranian, or Indian governments that were rooted in prejudice or stereotypes. Cultural differences nearly always play a part

in mutual understanding and misunderstanding. Do the limits of the sources, and particularly, limits on sources from these target governments, prevent us from knowing the role that racism or racialized assumptions played in these relationships?

No one book can do everything, of course, and these omissions do not interfere with the clarity of the argument or how effectively Lawrence makes his case. Arguably, answering every such critique about five different geographic sites would require very deep and broad research and a series of monographs rather than a single tome, and those monographs would reflect a very different project. This book is the product of the questions the author asked going into it, and those questions are answered well. They speak more to the limitations of the sources upon which the book was based. And there is value in books with this sort of more limited, U.S.-oriented scope and archival foundation.

One aspect of *The End of Ambition* that makes it important in this historical moment is the model it provides for how to make a meaningful contribution to the literature on the United States and the World without international travel.

One aspect of *The End of Ambition* that makes it important in this historical moment is the model it provides for how to make a meaningful contribution to the literature on the United States and the World without international travel. With a few exceptions, the book is overwhelmingly based on sources from the *Foreign Relations of the United States* volumes and records available at the LBJ Presidential Library, where Lawrence is the current director. The source base makes for a particular perspective that emphasizes high level interchanges and presidential decision-making, and it is certainly possible that it results in constraints based on what did or did not make it into the briefs that appeared at that level.

But in an era in which traveling across international borders to visit archives has become more taxing, time consuming, and in some cases downright impossible, it is useful to have examples of thoughtful scholarship from domestic—and widely accessible—sources. For an extended time to come, a lot of people won't be able to make the international archival trips that have so defined the field for the last few decades, whether because of their own personal constraints (such as small, unvaccinated children at home, elder care, or personal health risks) or structural dilemmas. (Has anyone tried to access an archive in China recently?) A generation of dissertation writers and tenure-track scholars are being forced to rethink projects begun with high hopes for primary source access. A new book that models interpretation within these limits is helpful for reasons beyond the arguments it makes about what changed in U.S. foreign policy ambitions from the 1960s to the 1970s.

In his conclusion, Lawrence presents the Nixon Doctrine as the culmination of the series of decisions Johnson made about the Third World over the course of his presidency. Rather than being a departure from previous policies, the doctrine was a continuation of the ways in which Johnson, and the war that consumed him, reshaped U.S. foreign policy. Idealized visions of a world transformed by American leadership could not be pursued while the country faced mounting challenges. Instead, priority was placed on "order and stability" (307). That shift marked the end of one era of ambition in U.S. foreign policy, but as is often the case, would give rise to others as new personalities and ideals came into power. *The End of Ambition* is a very readable, thoughtful, and persuasive journey through these shifting tides in the 1960s.

Author's Response

Mark Atwood Lawrence

I am sincerely grateful to Gregg Brazinsky, Matthew Jacobs, and Meredith Oyen for such incisive reviews of *The End of Ambition*. Naturally, I am flattered by their positive assessments, no small thing coming from such distinguished scholars with insightful and elegant books to their credit. Particularly gratifying is the unanimous view that I managed to offer a fresh take on the Vietnam War while simultaneously speaking to larger themes in American history during the 1960s—precisely my aim. But I also appreciate the questions and critiques that the reviewers offer. In this response, I would like to address what strike me as the four most important reservations that they raise about my book.

The first is one that I have anticipated since I conceived of the project and made the decision to rely principally on U.S. sources. Shouldn't a book aiming to explain broad currents of international behavior cast its net more widely by considering sources from countries beyond the United States? Jacobs suggests that my focus on American decision-makers may limit my ability to appreciate the agency of foreign governments and therefore the ways in which U.S. options were limited by choices over which Americans had no control. Oyen wonders whether my reliance on American material limits my ability to detect the salience of particular issues—racial prejudice and concern for human rights, for instance—that generated relatively little explicit discussion among American leaders but might have been more significant than the book allows.

These are undeniably valid concerns, and I am a strong champion (and sometimes practitioner) of multi-national, multi-lingual research aimed at situating the United States within the ebb and flow of international relations. Each of the bilateral relationships that I explore clearly deserves thorough research rooted in international sources and deep familiarity with the cultures and histories of the countries in question. Still, I feel confident about the approach I took in *The End of Ambition*.

For one thing, as the reviewers acknowledge, my focus on American sources accords with my main goal of explaining American behavior. While foreign sources can certainly be helpful in elucidating the pressures operating on Washington, only deep reading of American records can provide nuanced insight into the political and bureaucratic forces that I believe most profoundly shaped U.S. behavior during the period I examine. In this contention, I lean toward the views laid out by Daniel Bessner and Fredrik Logevall in their eloquent 2020 essay "Recentring the United States in the Historiography of American Foreign Relations."¹

My confidence in my sources springs as well from the sheer richness of U.S. materials, which enables the careful historian not only to reconstruct U.S. policy deliberations but also to appreciate the ways in which decisions made by foreign governments shaped and constrained Washington's options. Indeed, one of the broad trends that I chart in *End of Ambition* is growing alarm among U.S. leaders that the outside world increasingly defied American control. Even with its relatively light sprinkling of foreign sources, the book shows in no uncertain terms the influence wielded by leaders of even relatively weak nations like Iran, Indonesia, and India. Sources from these places are not, then, the only way to appreciate the agency—at least in broad strokes—of the countries with which Washington interacted.

The second reservation, raised especially by Jacobs and Brazinsky, centers on my selection of case studies.

Jacobs notes my decision to focus on U.S. relations with major regional powers and wonders how my argument would have held up if I had examined less "important" nations. This is a surely reasonable point, and I might well have found less distinct patterns of U.S. behavior if I had examined, say, Ethiopia, Burma, or Senegal. Yet one of my points in *End of Ambition* is that American leaders focused their attention on regional powers like Iran and Brazil precisely because they expected those nations, if sufficiently aligned with U.S. priorities, to exert helpful influence throughout their neighborhoods.

Looking at less influential nations might thus have made it more difficult to see the key trends that mattered most over time, though I certainly concede that it would be worthwhile to explore how those smaller nations experienced the strengthening of regional powers and the decline of U.S. aid. I suspect many of those nations

Shouldn't a book aiming to explain broad currents of international behavior cast its net more widely by considering sources from countries beyond the United States?

followed a course roughly similar to the pattern I describe in my chapter on India: growing disappointment with the United States, as Washington showed less tolerance of non-alignment and less generosity in its material assistance.

Brazinsky asks shrewdly about a different cluster of nations that I might have examined: Taiwan, South Korea, and other countries of "capitalist Asia."

It's true that I touch on these countries only tangentially, mostly in the context of exploring how Indonesia's lurch to the right in 1965 helped consolidate a pro-Western order in much of East and Southeast Asia outside of Indochina. Much like Wen-Qing Ngoei in his masterful *Arc of Containment*, I see these "success stories" as part of a regional trend toward pro-Western authoritarianism that has long been overshadowed by American failures in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.² But, as Brazinsky suggests, I am remiss in failing to draw out this point in any detail. Doing so might have provided additional evidence for my basic points about the concentration of U.S. aid on a relatively small number of friendly nations. Doing so might also have shown that Americans were sometimes correct in anticipating that elite-enforced political stability might evolve in the direction of democracy over the long term.

I have a similar reaction to the third reservation raised by the reviewers: Brazinsky's suggestion that my focus on high-level decision-makers may obscure the fact that many lower-level officials remained ambitious about economic development throughout the period I examine. Brazinsky is surely correct, and I would have done well to acknowledge that shifting attitudes at the highest echelons of power did not necessarily mean changed minds throughout the foreign policy bureaucracy. Indeed, it stands to reason that agencies focused on development assistance—USAID and the Peace Corps, for example—would have remained committed to their core purposes and may have been inclined to resist changes at higher levels.

Outstanding studies by scholars such as David Ekbladh, Daniel Immerwahr, and Sara Lorenzini make it clear that the decline of developmental ambitions in the late 1960s and 1970s was hardly a simple or seamless trend.³ The same was surely true in the domestic arena, where the decline of liberal ambitions at the highest levels hardly marked a clear or abrupt end to all efforts to fight poverty, protect civil rights, and safeguard the environment, among other objectives of the Great Society. Innumerable policymakers remained committed to the kinds of projects that had flourished in the early 1960s. Meanwhile, non-governmental and supranational organizations expanded to fill the space abandoned by Washington's most powerful leaders, a point made elegantly by Akira Iriye in his 2004 *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World*.⁴

Undoubtedly, the persistence of liberal ambitions throughout the bureaucracy and the intensification of reform-minded activity outside the purview of the federal government help account for the resurgence of liberal activism at higher levels in later years—a point I might have made more forcefully in my conclusion. The Carter administration's preoccupation with human rights as well as the later neoconservative drive for democratization in the Third World surely owed something to liberal currents that continued to swirl, even as leaders at the highest level turned to other priorities in the late sixties and early seventies. I hope my book might help inspire other historians to examine the links between the heyday of liberal ambitions in the early 1960s and later surges of interest in the political and economic progress of the Third World.

The fourth and most pointed reservation about *The End of Ambition* comes from Jacobs, who asks an incisive question that cuts to the core of my argument. Did declining American aspirations really flow, as I contend, from a complex array of factors that included rising anti-Americanism in Third World, social and political change within the United States, and the distractions caused by the war in Vietnam? Perhaps, Jacobs suggests, the U.S. policy shift flowed from a single, much simpler cause: the death of John F. Kennedy.

This possibility rests on a characterization of President Kennedy that I certainly endorse: JFK's nuanced understanding of the Third World and sincere desire to position the United States alongside the forces of sociopolitical change made him something of an anomaly among American presidents. Reasonably enough, Jacobs wonders whether Kennedy's assassination, by itself, assured that U.S. policy would revert to older patterns once the relatively unimaginative Lyndon Johnson entered the Oval Office.

I can easily see why Jacobs would raise this question. I devote a good deal of the book to teasing out differences of outlook between Kennedy and Johnson when it came to foreign policy generally and the Third World specifically. Kennedy's assassination raised the likelihood of changes in American policy, regardless of the shifts in the international or domestic environment. Yet, as I argue in the book, the shift from JFK to LBJ is hardly the sole explanation for the transformation of American policies toward the Third World. President Johnson had neither the inclination nor the ability to jettison his predecessor's policies in abrupt or categorical ways. Rather, it took time for LBJ, responding to increasingly difficult international and political conditions, to reorient American policy, and this shift was not inevitable. To put it another way, changing circumstances played a critical role in pushing LBJ to fall back on his core predilections.

Various factors assured that the transformation of American foreign policy would unfold slowly, if it unfolded at all, despite differences of outlook between the two

presidents. For one thing, Johnson saw powerful incentives to stress continuity with the policies and personnel of his slain predecessor. Just as important, LBJ shared JFK's rhetorical dedication to development and democratization in both the domestic and international arenas. Absent the stresses and strains that buffeted U.S. foreign policy during the later 1960s, LBJ would have been content, I'd speculate, to leave well enough alone and perhaps, if international conditions remained favorable, to reap the political and reputational rewards of extending the Great Society beyond American shores. LBJ, after all, often spoke during the early parts of his presidency about his desire to spread liberal reform abroad, even if he never put significant U.S. resources behind this ambition.

My case studies provide additional evidence that LBJ's relatively conventional Cold War predilections coexisted with an aversion to quick or wholesale changes in American policy. Even in Brazil, where Johnson backed a rightwing coup just five months into the presidency of João Goulart, American officials spoke sincerely at first of their desire for a restoration of democracy in the near term. It took time for the administration to accept the permanence of the new regime. With respect to India, Iran, Southern Africa, and Indonesia, moreover, my chapters show that American policy developed slowly and inconsistently.

None of this is to downplay the importance of presidential outlooks and mindsets. My book shows how the leaders at the top of the decision-making pyramid set the parameters within which the bureaucracy generated policy. Yet *The End of Ambition* also shows that U.S. policy, like the proverbial oil tanker, could change course only slowly and that the person at the wheel had to respect the strength of the crosscurrents, the locations of the most favorable channels, the threats of oncoming traffic, and the advice of crew members. The transformation of U.S. policy toward the Third World from the mid-1960s to the early 1970s came about in this way. It was a messy, complicated process that stemmed from various causes and, as I try to show, carried heavy implications for subsequent eras of America's engagement with the outside world.

Notes:

1. Daniel Bessner and Fredrik Logevall, "Recentring the United States in the Historiography of American Foreign Relations," *Texas National Security Review* 3, no. 2 (Spring 2020): 39–55.
 2. Wen-Qing Ngoei, *Arc of Containment: Britain, the United States, and Anticommunism in Southeast Asia* (Ithaca, NY, 2019).
 3. David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton, NJ, 2010); Daniel Immerwahr, *Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community Development* (Cambridge, MA, 2018); and Sara Lorenzini, *Global Development: A Cold War History* (Princeton, NJ, 2019).
 4. Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley, CA, 2002).
- Ebitis anisit ius aut quias conse peliquae as endaerro beatis autente rem. Itament, con nament.

Seven Questions on...

The Vietnam War

Gregory A. Daddis, Pierre Asselin, Kathryn Statler, Addison Jensen, and David Prentice

Editor's note: "Seven Questions On..." is a new regular feature in *Passport* that will ask scholars in a particular field to respond to seven questions about their field's historiography, key publications, influences, etc. It is designed to introduce the broader SHAFR community to a variety of perspectives for a given field, as well as serving as a primer for graduate students and non-specialists. **AJ**

1. What drew you to this field and inspired you to focus on your specific area of the history of the Vietnam War?

Gregory A. Daddis: I arrived at West Point for New Cadet Basic Training in June 1985, only weeks after I graduated from high school. The most popular movie in America that spring was George P. Cosmatos's *Rambo: First Blood Part II*. I'm pretty certain it was the last movie I saw before donning cadet gray. I'm absolutely certain I didn't place the movie within its larger historical context. To a wide-eyed high-schooler like me, it was just an action flick with a muscular hero and plenty of orangeballed explosions.

Throughout my four years at West Point, however, I came to see how much of an impact the war in Vietnam had on our nation and my soon-to-be profession. It was more than just a pop culture phenomenon. A number of my instructors had served in the war and many of the academic department chairs—all full colonels—had seen combat. The superintendent, Lieut. Gen. Dave R. Palmer, had written a book on the war, *Summons of the Trumpet*, that we dutifully read in our military history courses. When I commissioned into the army upon graduation, I continued to feel the war's everexpanding ripple effects. I deployed to Desert Storm with non-commissioned officers who had served in Vietnam. I read memoirs like Philip Caputo's *A Rumor of War* in professional development sessions. I studied critical works like Andrew F. Krepinevich's *The Army and Vietnam* in command and staff seminars. I taught about Vietnam back at West Point. And I watched pundits resurrect the "quagmire" of Vietnam when the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan began to bog down in the early 2000s.

So, in many ways, my army service inspired me to study the American war in Vietnam. The conflict indelibly shaped the institution in which I had served for more than 25 years.

Pierre Asselin: In one word: *Rambo* (aka, Sylvester Stallone). I grew up in Quebec City, Canada. At the time, the city was very, very, very French-Canadian Catholic (*Québécois pure laine*, we used to say). As I recall, there was one Black kid in my grade school and one Asian kid in my high school. I knew nothing of and had no interest in the world beyond my own, including Asia. I struggled in both grade and high school owing to a combination of exceedingly average intellect and general indifference toward knowledge. The only subject matter I was decent at was History, and that was only because I excelled at memorizing material and that was the way my teachers wanted it.

One day during my first year of CEGEP, equivalent to the last year high school in the United States, my Western Civilizations teacher notified us we would each be writing a research paper on an aspect, any aspect, of violence in the history of the West. Having watched the second installment of the *Rambo* *magnus opus* the night before, I asked the teacher after class if I could write my paper on the war that provided the context for the movie, which I described to him as "the war the US fought against China" (my understanding of Asia remained limited to the point I thought all Asians were Chinese). Familiar with Stallone's body of oeuvres, my teacher caringly informed me that, to the best of his knowledge, the United States had never fought a major war in China and the conflict in question involved Vietnam. When I asked him about the difference between Vietnam and China, he—this time with a hint of exasperation—recommended that I go to the school library at once and start my research. I did as he instructed and found an illustrated history of the war that became the foundation (i.e., only source) for my paper entitled "The Vietnam War" analyzing—I use the term loosely—five types of booby traps used by the Viet Cong during the conflict. The surprisingly excellent grade I received for my paper (C+) encouraged me to major in History in college, which I had to attend because my mother would not have it otherwise.

Under the tutelage of Professor Hyunh Kim Khanh at Glendon College in Toronto, my interest in the Vietnam War became a passion and that passion became my life/career. It was Prof. Khanh who pushed me to look at the Vietnam War from a different perspective and secured funding for me to spend the summer of 1988 studying Vietnamese at the University of Hawaii at Manoa. That experience altered the course of my life. It drew me to both Hawaii, where I ended up pursuing a Ph.D. and living for twenty-five years, and Vietnam, which I visited for the first time in 1989 and became a professional and personal fixation thereafter. Even today, after all this time, I still marvel at the privilege of conducting research in Vietnam and feel so alive—as I put it to a colleague recently—doing just that. That research nurtures my passion for the war's history, which has not abated one bit since my college days.

Kathryn Statler: One of my best friends and fellow History majors in college wrote a paper her senior year on the 1950 "Bao Dai Solution." I thought it was such an intriguing topic. That same year a freshly minted Ph.D. from Yale, Fred Logevall, whose passion was Vietnam, arrived at U.C. Santa Barbara. I became interested in figuring out how U.S. foreign policy evolved from a tentative commitment to Bao Dai in 1950 to full scale intervention in the 1960s, and quickly realized there was no way to answer that question without doing a deep dive into French intervention in Indochina and the complicated 1950s Franco-American relationship.

Addison Jensen: My interest in the Vietnam War stems from a variety of sources, but I think it was primarily popular culture that led me to this field of study. As the product of two parents

who came of age in the 1960s and 1970s, I grew up listening to the music of the Vietnam era: Creedence Clearwater Revival, Bob Dylan, Peter, Paul & Mary, Buffalo Springfield, The Who, James Brown, Sam Cooke, and many others. So, I have always had a deeprooted love of the popular culture—particularly the music—of the Vietnam era. I have a clear memory of sitting in a high school English class listening to the lyrics of Buffalo Springfield's 1966 song "For What It's Worth." Our teacher had told us (erroneously, as I later found out), that the song was about the antiwar protests. The lyrics of the song stood out to me (there's battle lines being drawn/nobody's right if everybody's wrong/young people speaking their mind/getting so much resistance from behind), and I wanted to know more about this conflict that had so deeply divided the United States.

By the time I was in college, my interest in the cultural and social dimensions of the conflict had expanded well beyond the music of the era. I have always been drawn to the voices of individuals whose experiences speak in some way to the larger themes of war and society. Initially, I was interested in the stories of Vietnamese Amerasians, many of whom were adopted and brought to the United States. This was, in part, a result of my own personal experience as an adoptee. But I think I was also fascinated by the ways in which the war blurred the lines between the civilian and military spheres. That theme is one that I have carried with me into my current research on the experiences of American service members and their awareness and attitudes towards the various countercultural movements of the era.

My current research blends my passion for popular culture with my interest in both the individual experiences of American GIs (of various classes, genders, and racial/ethnic backgrounds) and the social and racial justice movements of the 1960s and 1970s. It was a chance encounter with an underground magazine known as *Grunt Free Press* that sparked my interest in this topic. As I combed through volumes of *Grunt Free Press*, it became clear to me that American GIs, particularly those stationed in the rear, were keenly aware of the momentous social and cultural changes occurring back in the United States. They were receiving news of the movements through music, television and radio shows, movies, underground magazines, and other forms of popular culture that made their way overseas to the troops stationed in Vietnam. In each of these various mediums, GIs were not only learning about stateside events, but expressing their opinions about these movements and their own attitudes towards the war. To me, this was fascinating—I wanted to learn more about the interplay between war and society, and how news from home affected service members' conceptions of military service, gender roles, and the United States itself. These questions continue to guide my research.

David Prentice: I wanted to better understand strategic change, particularly the shift from interventionism to retrenchment, and had settled on the origins of détente and the Nixon Doctrine. But it was too big a topic for a master's student! I benefitted from a good adviser—Chester Pach—who helped me narrow it down to Vietnamization.

I've stuck with Vietnam because the whole war is a story about choices. The more we learn and know, the harder those decisions become. Writing about Lyndon Johnson, Francis Bator well noted the president faced "no good choices"—something that can be said of every Vietnamese, French, and American leader as they confronted what to do or not do. Vietnam is a war of innumerable tragedies and dilemmas. "There's nothing worse than going back over a decision made, retracing the steps that led to it, and imagining what it'd be like if you took another turn," LBJ lamented. "It can drive you crazy." Yet, removed from the decision by time, it can also be one of the most intellectually stimulating exercises out there.

2. Which scholars do you see as having laid the groundwork for the study of the history of the Vietnam War?

GAD: My strong sense is that nearly all scholars of the American war in Vietnam would name George C. Herring as one of the principal architects of our field. His *America's Longest War*, now in its sixth edition, not only set the stage for how we think about the war, but it likely has been used in more college classrooms than any other single work. A close second would be Marilyn Young, whom I admired from the first time I read her *The Vietnam Wars* to the last time we were on a panel together before she passed away. She was a powerful voice and, like George, an incredibly generous and warmhearted human being.

I would argue, though, that with the possible exception of Bernard Fall, who was both an academic and wartime correspondent, journalists laid the field's basic foundations. David Halbertam's *The Making of a Quagmire* and *The Best and the Brightest*. Neil Sheehan's *A Bright Shining Lie*. Frances Fitzgerald's *Fire in the Lake*. Michael Herr's *Dispatches*. Stanley Karnow's *Vietnam: A History*. These were the works that established some of the earliest critiques (and assumptions) of the American war that scholars have been wrestling with ever since.

Equally, military veterans were part of this first wave of critical writing, perhaps first and foremost Col. Harry G. Summers with his searing appraisal *On Strategy*. But others soon followed, like Phillip B. Davidson's *Vietnam at War*, Truong Nhu Tang's, *A Viet Cong Memoir*, and Bao Ninh's, *The Sorrow of War*, the latter two volumes suggesting that not just Americans had something vital to say about a long and devastating war in Southeast Asia.

PA: Khanh was a remarkable scholar but that was all lost on me at the time. It took me a while to start reading serious books about the conflict. I remained infatuated for the longest time by accounts of the Vietnam War written by or about Americans who fought in it. Mark Baker's *Nam* was my favorite. The first scholar I read closely and became devoted to was William Duiker. In my eyes he pioneered the study of the Vietnam War as American and Vietnamese history (one aspect of the latter, at least). George Herring, Marilyn Young, and Larry Berman are three scholars I have always held in the highest esteem. Objectively speaking, Douglas Pike must be recognized as the first serious scholar of the Vietnam War.

KS: For me, some of the earliest teaching and work from George Herring, David Anderson, and George McT. Kahin had a profound impact on how I viewed the origins of U.S. intervention in Vietnam. Moreover, I took Walter Capps' Vietnam War course (900+ students in Campbell Hall at U.C. Santa Barbara), which was a way for veterans to share and analyze their experiences with a wide audience and find some closure. This course also had a tremendous influence on how I began to think about the conflict. On the one hand, I wanted to understand the diplomacy and politics of U.S. intervention, and on the other hand, I also wanted to understand the war's personal impact.

AJ: This is a big question! The answer will largely depend on what dimension of the war you're looking to explore. But for those looking for a concise overview of the literature surrounding the conflict, I would recommend picking up a copy of John Dumbrell's book, *Rethinking the Vietnam War* (2012). The book provides both an overview of the major historiographical schools of thought, as well as a historical account of the war. I'm also certain that the other scholars who weigh in on this edition of "Seven Questions On..." will discuss many of the classic works of scholarship on the Vietnam War. So, I'd like to offer up a reading list for individuals who are interested in understanding the conflict from the ground up—from the varied perspectives of the men and women who served in the U.S. military. Of course, this list is not all-encompassing. But I think the books listed below provide a solid foundation for anyone hoping to gain an understanding of the

wartime experiences of American men and women from a variety of backgrounds.

To start with, no reading list on this subject would be complete without Christian G. Appy's *Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers & Vietnam* (1993) and Kyle Longley's *Grunts: The American Combat Soldier in Vietnam* (2008). Both books provide excellent overviews of the American GI's experience of the Vietnam War, from enlistment to postwar life. For a better understanding of women's roles in the conflict, I recommend both Kara Dixon Vuic's *Officer, Nurse, Woman: The Army Nurse Corps in the Vietnam War* (2010) and Heather Stur's *Beyond Combat: Women and Gender in the Vietnam War Era* (2011). The literature on the experiences of GIs from minority backgrounds is underdeveloped and still growing. That being said, there are a number of places to begin. Wallace Terry's book, *Bloods: Black Veterans of the Vietnam War, An Oral History* (1985), remains the place to begin any research on the experiences of Black Americans during the Vietnam War. I would follow that book up with James E. Westheider's *Fighting on Two Fronts: African Americans and the Vietnam War* (1997), for an overview of Black GIs' experiences of the war, and Herman Graham III's *The Brothers' Vietnam War: Black Power, Manhood, and the Military Experience* (2003) for an understanding of how gender (particularly ideas of masculinity) and Black Power influenced the wartime experiences of Black men. Scholarship on Chicanos, Latinos, and Asian Americans is much harder to come by, but chapters in Steven Rosales' book *Soldados Razos at War: Chicano Politics, Identity, and Masculinity in the U.S. Military from World War II to Vietnam* (2017) and Simeon Man's *Soldiering and Empire: Race and the Making of the Decolonizing Pacific* (2018) provide insight into Chicano and Asian American experiences of the war, respectively. While many of these works are relatively new additions to the scholarship on the Vietnam War, each book is essential to developing a full understanding of the conflict as experienced by Americans of diverse backgrounds who served in the military.

DP: To be honest, I've never thought about the historiography systematically. So instead, I can only offer those scholars who laid the groundwork for my study of the conflict.

First and foremost was Fred Logevall and his *Choosing War*. It was the first "history" book I ever read.

As Logevall explained President Johnson's decision to escalate and Americanize the war, I knew I had found my discipline and methodology. I loved the idea of using both domestic and international sources to develop the context that framed key decisions. And of course, there was contingency. Structural forces made for hard, not impossible, choices. For a young scholar about to enter the historical profession, *Choosing War* was a powerful first read.

If Logevall was the guide, George Herring and his *America's Longest War* provided the road map. Succinct, wonderfully written, and updated often, this book is a model of good, accessible scholarship. It has been sitting by my desk (and frequently consulted) for well over a decade.

3. Discuss how the field has evolved to include different approaches to analyzing the history of the Vietnam War.

GAD: For me, the most interesting recent scholarly trajectories fall under what we might call a "war and society" approach. Christian G. Appy helped trailblaze here with *Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam*, which remains a classic in highlighting the social background of those who fought. Mai Elliott arguably does something similar from the Vietnamese perspective in *The Sacred Willow: Four Generations in the Life of a Vietnamese Family*. Meredith H. Lair's *Armed with Abundance: Consumerism and Soldiering in the Vietnam War* is an excellent example of the "war and society" genre.

A number of books over the last decade have highlighted the ways in which views of gender help us better understand the war. Heather Marie Stur's *Beyond Combat: Women and Gender in the Vietnam War Era* remains an important work, as does Kara Dixon Vuic's *Officer, Nurse, Woman: The Army Nurse Corps in the Vietnam War*. Amanda Boczar's recent *An American Brothel: Sex and Diplomacy during the Vietnam War* follows suit, and I sought to contribute to this scholarship with *Pulp Vietnam: War and Gender in Cold War Men's Adventure Magazines*.

Race, of course, was a critical part of the American war, as evidenced in Wallace Terry's foundational *Bloods: Black Veterans of the Vietnam War: An Oral History* and by the works of James Westheider. (*The African American Experience in Vietnam: Brothers in Arms* is one example.) Beth Bailey's forthcoming *An Army Afire: The US Army and "The Problem of Race" in the Vietnam Era* no doubt will advance these lines of inquiry in important ways.

There's also some truly interesting work being done with the intersections between diplomatic and military history. Robert K. Brigham offered us an early way forward in *Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLF's Foreign Relations and the Viet Nam War*. More recently, Amanda Demmer looks at the ways in which these issues lasted beyond the war itself in *After Saigon's Fall: Refugees and US-Vietnamese Relations, 1975-2000*.

Finally, there are some wonderful contributions in the field of memory, as evidenced by Viet Thanh Nguyen's *Nothing Ever Dies: Vietnam and the Memory of War*; and David Kieran's *Forever Vietnam: How a Divisive War Changed American Public Memory*.

PA: Access to archival repositories in Vietnam, limited as it remains and challenging as it can be, changed everything. The study of the Vietnam War has been revolutionized by that access. Above all, it has forced and allowed us to reconsider the roles of Hanoi and Saigon (the latter's archives were seized by Hanoi's armies in 1975 and are now accessible at National Archives Center No. 2 in Ho Chi Minh City), among other local actors, in shaping the origins, course, and outcome of the conflict. Vietnamese and their leaders on either side of the 17th parallel used to be nonfactors in histories of the war or else reduced to narrow, essentialized stereotypes (e.g., Saigon leaders as inept, Ho Chi Minh as "fake" Marxist-Leninist and sole bearer of the Vietnamese nationalist mantle, North and South Vietnam as passive victims of US imperialism, etc.). That is no longer the case today. The agency of Vietnamese actors and their complex, multifaceted nature can no longer be ignored. By the way, it is because of these circumstances that students who aspire to become serious scholars of the conflict must learn Vietnamese.

I also believe that access to Vietnamese archives has accounted for the growing number of studies engaging different Vietnamese perspectives, and the field's evolution by extension. I, Ang Cheng Guan, Lien-Hang Nguyen, and Tuong Vu used newly available materials to retell Hanoi's side of the story after the pioneering efforts of William Duiker. Seth Jacobs, Phillip Catton, Edward Miller, Jessica Chapman, and Geoff Stewart then proceeded to reassess South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem's life and legacy. Recently, Keith Taylor, George Veith, Heather Stur, Tuong Vu (again!), and a new generation of bright young scholars set out to change our views of the so-called Second (South) Vietnamese Republic under President Nguyen Van Thieu. Who knows where the next wave will take us?!

The archives of other countries, including those of the former socialist bloc, have demonstrated the reach of the Vietnam War. As those archives indicate, it was a world war of a different kind. Scholarship on the war's global dimensions and the role of other foreign actors in it specifically has contributed in no insignificant ways to the field's evolution.

KS: There is no way to cover all the different approaches, so instead I will cheat and list recent and relatively recent books I have read that have had a major impact on the way I think about the war. Those books include Greg Daddis, *Pulp Vietnam: War and Gender in Cold War Men's Adventure Magazines*, Amanda Demmer, *After Saigon's Fall: Refugees and U.S.-Vietnamese Relations, 1975-2000*, Kara Dixon Vuic, *The Girls Next Door: Bringing the Home Front to the Front Lines*, and Pierre Asselin, *Vietnam's American War*, Heather Stur, *Beyond Gender: Women and Combat in the Vietnam Era*, Jessica Elkind, *Aid Under Fire: Nation Building and the Vietnam War*, Jessica Chapman, *Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam*, and Mark Lawrence, *Assuming the Burden, Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam*.

AJ: I am constantly in awe of the new scholarship being produced on the Vietnam War. Over the last two decades or so, historians have increasingly adapted social and cultural approaches to the study of the conflict, and as a result, new voices are being incorporated into the narrative. While initial work on the war tended to focus on the decisions of the elite Washington politicians and military generals—new scholarship has expanded to include the perspectives of the men, women, and children who experienced the war at the ground level. The opening of previously inaccessible archives has also allowed historians to widen the lens to highlight Vietnamese voices (both Northern and Southern), and the experiences of other international actors, including the allies of both North and South Vietnam. As a result, the literature on the conflict is becoming increasingly international in scope.

Personally, I am most intrigued by the works of historians who are blending military history with social and cultural approaches to explore the experiences of American servicemen outside of combat. The combat narrative has long dominated scholarship that focuses on American GIs' experiences of the war. But books such as Meredith H. Lair's *Armed with Abundance: Consumerism & Soldiering in the Vietnam War* (2011) have broken new ground by examining military life in the rear, where most servicemen served in noncombat positions. As Lair notes in the book, at least 75% of American troops served in the rear. Yet, scholarship on the "grunts" (men who saw combat) continues to dominate the literature, while works focusing on men who served away from the "frontlines" is sparse. Lair's book brings attention to the "leisure culture" of the war, highlighting the consumerism that took place on and off military bases in Vietnam. In the years since, scholars have examined other noncombat experiences of the war, including sexual encounters between American servicemen and Vietnamese civilians (Amanda Boczar) and the importance of popular culture and the media to conceptions of gender, masculinity, and GIs' processing of the war (Amber Batura, Gregory Daddis, and Doug Bradley and Craig Werner). These are just a few examples of the ways in which the field is constantly expanding, and I'm eager to see how the body of scholarship continues to grow.

DP: The biggest and most important change has been the inclusion of Vietnamese voices and perspectives—the so-called Vietnamese turn. Hang Nguyen, Pierre Asselin, Tuong Vu, and others led the way with pioneering work on life and politics in the communist Democratic Republic Vietnam. The "discovery" of Le Duan has forever changed how scholars and the public approach and understand the war. Ed Miller, Sean Fear, George Veith, NuAnh Tran, and others have done similar work for the Republic of Vietnam. The marriage of Vietnamese studies and American diplomatic history is spawning fresh narratives that are richer, more complicated, and more accurate than anything we had before.

4. What are some of the challenges faced by scholars working in the field?

GAD: Perhaps the greatest challenge has been working profitably with Vietnamese sources, especially Southern ones. For non-Vietnamese speakers like myself, I've had to rely on the generosity of translators, no one more so than Merle Pribbenow who has helped so many in return for so little.

Still, the field is getting better in this arena, advancing the works of earlier scholars like William J. Duiker, whose *The Communist Road To Power In Vietnam* remains an essential work. Scholars like Lien-Hang T. Nguyen (*Hanoi's War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam*) and Pierre Asselin (*Vietnam's American War: A History*) are helping us better understand the war from Hanoi's perspective, while others are doing the same from Saigon's vantage point. Some of the more interesting contributions here are: Brigham's *ARVN: Life and Death in the South Vietnamese Army*; Jessica Chapman's *Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam*; Edward Miller's *Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam*; Stur's more recent *Saigon at War: South Vietnam and the Global Sixties*; and George J. Veith's *Drawn Swords in a Distant Land: South Vietnam's Shattered Dreams*.

PA: As I mentioned above, access to Vietnamese archives is still limited. The archives of key organs including the Party, Foreign Ministry, and Ministry of Defense remain off-limits to both foreign and Vietnamese scholars. That unfortunate situation is unlikely to change anytime soon owing to the Party's obsession with controlling the domestic narrative on the war. Also, at those repositories that are accessible, researchers remain at the mercy of "censors" who vet all archival files before they are shared. Not infrequently I have been denied more than half the files I requested at National Archives Center No. 3 in Hanoi, the repository for post-1945 Vietnamese government (Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Socialist Republic of Vietnam) documents. For the record, this is all fine by me; it is just the nature of the system in Vietnam. I used to have to spend three months in Hanoi to read files for one month: after arrival and submission of my petition to access materials, it took approximately four weeks to get permission to consult indexes and request files and then another 45 weeks for the collecting and vetting of those files. These days, I can show up Archives No. 3 in the morning and start reading that same afternoon. That is a major improvement over past practice!

Personally, as a "senior scholar" (I hate the label, but it is being applied to me), a central challenge is remaining relevant in a constantly evolving and changing field. To be perfectly honest, my biggest fear at this point is to be viewed as a "dinosaur" by younger peers, as someone whose best and most productive years are behind them but somehow chooses to hang around. That fear has propelled me to consider new and creative ways of approaching the history of the Vietnam War and, to that end, dig more frequently and deeper in Vietnamese archives (insecurity and the need to prove to myself and others that I "belong" has always been a powerful personal motivator). My scholarship has taken an unexpected but surprisingly stimulating turn as a result of all this. I recently completed a study of American visitors to North Vietnam during the war based on fantastic materials from the Hanoi archives. I am currently working on a draft article based on Ministry of Culture files that explores various forms of artistic expression effectively weaponized by Vietnamese communist authorities to win over world opinion and international support during the war. Also, in light of the latest shift in Vietnam War studies prompted by young scholars including NuAnh Tran, Sean Fear, Tuan Hoang, and Kevin Li who encourage us to take Vietnamese non/anticommunist nationalism more seriously, I decided and Cambridge University Press agreed to produce a second, more true-to-its-title edition of *Vietnam's American War*. This new edition will emphasize the civil war dynamics of the

conflict and engage more robustly noncommunist Vietnamese actors and the regime in Saigon in particular, neglected in the first.

KS: The first challenge is combating the perception that everything has been said about the Vietnam War. As we know, there is so much more to be learned, and I continue to expand my understanding of the war through the incredible research being produced from graduate students to emeritus professors. Learning Vietnamese for those who want to take a deep dive into the North Vietnamese, Vietcong, and South Vietnamese perspectives is another challenge. And then a final challenge is figuring out how to navigate the massive scholarship on the war.

AJ: I'll tackle this question from my own perspective, as someone whose research relies heavily on oral history. First, and perhaps most obviously, is the challenge of interviewing as many individuals as possible before the next generation of veterans passes. The average Vietnam veteran is now in their mid-1970s, and of course, this age group is particularly vulnerable to Covid19, making the necessity of interviewing this group even more urgent. Second, for historians like myself who are interested in the experiences of those who served in the rear, it can be difficult to find individuals who are willing to share stories of their wartime service. For years, narratives of the Vietnam War have prioritized the stories of the men who saw combat. In my research, I've found that it can be difficult to find veterans who are willing to talk about their noncombat experiences of the war—many of these men do not view their service as anything worth sharing. A “real” experience of the war, to many of these men, is synonymous with combat, death, and deprivation, so it can be challenging to get these individuals to discuss some of the seemingly mundane elements of their day-to-day lives in Vietnam. Hopefully, an increase in scholarship focusing on the noncombat experiences of the Vietnam War will encourage more of these men and women to share their stories. Finally, there are the two additional challenges faced by any historian who engages with the oral history of the Vietnam War: remaining mindful of the potentially traumatic experience of reliving the war in interviews, and the fallibility of memory.

DP: Access to Vietnamese archival sources can be a challenge, but my sense is this is getting better. When I started researching my book, the common attitude was “don't bother.” But, I increasingly realized that Vietnamese voices were essential to understanding how, when, and why America chose to end its war. Thanks to Sean Fear, NuAnh Tran, Tram Pham, and the University of Social Sciences and Humanities, I had the privilege of examining invaluable documents in Vietnam's National Archives Center II in Ho Chi Minh City. Yes, foreign research is more challenging than hitting the U.S. presidential libraries, but it's worth it!

5. What are some of the significant questions in the field that you feel need to be addressed in greater detail or, alternatively, which questions need to be reconsidered by contemporary scholars?

GAD: How can historians best represent what Phillip B. Davidson accurately called a “mosaic war”? How can they make generalizations about a conflict that was so multifaceted and differed from place to place and changed in character, rather significantly, over time?

Provincial studies long have been important to our field in answering such questions, beginning with Jeffrey Race's *War Comes to Long An* and continuing with Eric M. Bergerud's *The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province*. More recent historians are adding their voices by helping us understand the war's sometimes dizzying complexity. Among these are: *Losing Binh Dinh: The Failure of Pacification and Vietnamization, 1969-1971* by Kevin M. Boylan; *To Build as Well as Destroy: American Nation Building in South Vietnam* by Andrew J. Gawthorpe; and *The*

Control War: The Struggle for South Vietnam, 1968-1975 by Martin G. Clemis.

For me, the key is embracing this complexity, avoiding searches for either blame or easy answers. As directors Ken Burns and Lynn Novick tried to demonstrate in their epic ten-part documentary *The Vietnam War*, “There is no single truth in war.”

PA: That the Vietnam War was, fundamentally, a civil war in which the Americans, and the French before them, became involved. France-trained scholars including Christopher Goscha and François Guillemot have advanced that argument for some time, but it has fallen on deaf ears in the United States. Shawn McHale's recent *The First Vietnam War* sheds important light on the matter. I uncovered revealing documents on the topic during my last visit to Archives No. 3 (May 2022) that form the basis of an article forthcoming in *Journal of Cold War Studies*. I think we in academia have been reluctant to accept that premise because we fear it might take away from the (very popular) argument that Vietnam was a victim of US imperialism, pure and simple. To me, one does not have to nullify the other. The Vietnam War should be understood as a tragedy resulting from unfortunate decisions made by all sides, not just the one that suits our own ideological inclinations. History is never simple.

Beyond that, contemporary scholars need to reconsider the Ho-as-misunderstood-nationalist trope and do away once and for all with the premise that those who supported the various non/anticommunist regimes in Saigon were nothing but stooges of the French or Americans. We in academia in particular must distance ourselves from the war narrative that Hanoi itself fabricated and propagated during the conflict and which somehow continues to inform our thinking on and teaching of it. At a minimum, we must be more critical of and willing to reassess our perspectives on the war's key dimensions. We have collectively proven reluctant to abandon and move beyond the old, traditional consensus on the war. In my opinion, Americans in general favor accounts of the war that reinforce—as opposed to challenge—their conceptualization of it.

KS: Why aren't there more books and articles detailing the role Vietnamese civilian women played in the war and the impact of the war on Vietnamese women? More research on the long term political, environmental, diplomatic, military, social, and economic fallout from the Vietnam War, especially from an international perspective, also seems warranted.

AJ: My answer to this question will probably be easy to anticipate given my responses to the previous questions! First, while the scholarship on the wartime experiences of men and women of diverse backgrounds is continuing to expand, there is still much work to be done on the subject. The literature focusing on service members' experiences of the Vietnam War has, so far, focused overwhelmingly on white males. As a war shouldered heavily by the working-class, it is imperative that scholars work to highlight the voices of Black Americans, Hispanics and Latinos, Asian Americans, and American Indians who fought in Vietnam in numbers disproportionate to their populations. While the experiences of women who served in the war have (thanks to historians like Heather Stur and Kara Dixon Vuic), been given more attention in recent years, there is still ample room to grow, and scholarship on the service of gay men and women is nearly non-existent (though Randy Shilts and Justin David Suran provide a starting point for scholars interested in the subject). It is especially important to consider all of these experiences alongside the broader cultural landscape of the racial and social justice movements of the Vietnam era.

In a similar vein, the vast majority of work done on the military experience of the Vietnam War has focused on the “combat moment” at the expense of a far more common experience—life in the rear. This combat narrative is one that has been further

cemented by the media—including Hollywood films such as *Platoon*, *Full Metal Jacket*, *Apocalypse Now*, and countless others. While it is important to acknowledge the very real sacrifices made by grunts who endured the horrors of guerrilla warfare, the emphasis on stories of combat obscure the narratives of the men and women who served in the rear. Examining these experiences more closely can reveal much about the relationship between Americans and Vietnamese civilians, the blurred line between civilian and military spheres, and the evolving opinions of the U.S. role in the world.

DP: Obviously, we need more research on the Vietnamese side of the war, but I would add that we need more research on Laos and Cambodia as well. Both nations played key diplomatic, strategic, and political roles during the First and Second Indochina Wars. We tend to get so focused on the war in Vietnam that we forget about its other theaters or how that conflict shaped its neighbors.

6. For someone wanting to start out in the history of the Vietnam War, what 5-8 books do you consider to be of seminal importance—either the “best” or the most influential titles?

GAD: For my money, David Elliott’s *The Vietnamese War: Revolution and Social Change in the Mekong Delta, 1930-1975* remains the book to read for understanding the political and social dimensions of a long conflict involving the struggle over Vietnamese identity in the modern era. On antecedents to the American war, readers can’t do much better than *Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America’s Vietnam* by Fredrik Logevall. Fred also helps us understand the American decisions for intervening in Southeast Asia in *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam*.

I’d like to think my *Westmoreland’s War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam* helps us better understand the ways in which US military leaders sought to fight a complex political-military war. *Hanoi’s War* by Hang Nguyen does the same, I would argue, for the communist side.

Appreciating the American home front is critical and Penny Lewis does this well by combining issues of class, dissent, and memory in her compact *Hardhats, Hippies, and Hawks: The Vietnam Antiwar Movement as Myth and Memory*. Grasping the constructed narratives of the war also is important, arguably best explored in Tim O’Brien’s definitive *The Things They Carried*. Ocean Vuong’s beautifully written *On Earth We’re Briefly Gorgeous* showcases how such narratives (and trauma) can be passed from one generation to the next while challenging us to reconsider when wars truly end.

Finally, it’s crucial to hear the voices of those who participated in the war by reading a classic memoir, none more searing than Ron Kovic’s *Born on the Fourth of July*, Lynda Van Devanter’s *Home before Morning: The Story of an Army Nurse in Vietnam*, or Le Ly Hayslip’s *When Heaven and Earth Changed Places*.

PA: Well, I have written three books, so that leaves only 2-5 titles. Seriously, perspective is everything to me. I am partial to titles that have offered original, creative, thought-provoking takes on the war. Works that piqued my own interest or otherwise shaped my thinking on the conflict include almost anything written by Douglas Pike and Bernard Fall; Frances Fitzgerald’s *Fire in the Lake*; Stanley Karnow’s *Vietnam: A History*; William Duiker’s *The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam*; Jeffrey Race’s *War Comes to Long An*; Guenter Lewy’s *America in Vietnam*; Nguyen Tien Hung and Jerrold Schecter’s *The Palace File*; Gabriel Kolko’s *Anatomy of a War*; Truong Nhu Tang’s *A Viet Cong Memoir*; George Kahin’s *Intervention*; Marilyn Young’s *The Vietnam Wars*; Edwin Moise’s *Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War*; David Elliott’s *The Vietnamese War*; and Carlyle Thayer’s *War by Other Means*. These are in my mind the canons of the field, critically important in influencing how entire generations of scholars have engaged the

Vietnam War.

Michael Vickery’s *Cambodia, 1975-1982* conditioned my approach to the study of the Vietnam War more than any other work. His discussion of the “standard total view” daring scholars to question even interpretations emanating from the body of widely accepted scholarship on a topic is largely the reason I have never wedded myself to a particular ideological perspective on the Vietnam War and spent the better part of my career being contrarian instead, that is, trying to find fault in the established academic consensus on that conflict. Someone once called me an “apologist a**hole” for US imperialism because I argued in my second book that Hanoi had in fact started the Vietnam War. It has never been my intention to defend western imperialism or exonerate the United States for the death and destruction it caused in Vietnam and across the rest of Indochina. All I sought do to then and still aim to accomplish today is demonstrating that nothing about the Vietnam War is as easy to understand as we think.

KS: Well, for the critical 1950-1960 period, obviously my book, *Replacing France: The Origins of U.S. Intervention in Vietnam*, does the best job of explaining how the United States became increasingly involved in Vietnam. Of course, David Anderson’s *Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953-1961* probably had the biggest influence on me as I wrote my book. Everyone should also read George Herring’s *America’s Longest War* for the best overview of the entire conflict. For the American soldier’s experience, I recommend Kyle Longley’s *Grunts: The American Combat Soldier in Vietnam*. For the connection between domestic politics and foreign policy in Vietnam there is nothing better than Andrew Johns’s *Vietnam’s Second Front: Domestic Politics, the Republican Party, and the War*. David Schmitz’s *Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War* forced me to reconceptualize the timing of Nixon’s decisionmaking on the war.

AJ: Every book that I have mentioned so far is, in my opinion, deserving of a spot on the “most influential” list of studies that focus on American military experiences of the Vietnam War. If I were to focus more broadly on the conflict as whole, I would add these books to the list:

1. For those just beginning to study the Vietnam War, George C. Herring’s *America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975* (1979) remains an indispensable account of the war. It was used as a textbook in an undergraduate class I took on the Vietnam War, and though it is one of the older publications on this list, I think it remains a useful overview of the conflict.

2. Pierre Asselin’s book, *Vietnam’s American War: A History* (2018) offers readers a look at, in Asselin’s words, “the story of the Vietnam War from the ‘other side.’” This book is crucial for any scholar looking to balance out accounts of the war from the U.S. perspective with a work that examines the war from the vantage-point of Vietnamese communist decision-makers.

3. Two other works by Christian G. Appy deserve a spot on this list. First is *Patriots: The Vietnam War Remembered From All Sides* (2003), an oral history of the war that includes the voices of Vietnamese veterans (on both sides) alongside those of American veterans (of varying backgrounds). The book also includes interviews with prisoners of war, military commanders, activists, women (civilians, activists, and veterans), entertainers, politicians, and the families of veterans. For those looking to read a wide range of perspectives on the war, this book provides a solid foundation.

4. Second is Appy’s *American Reckoning: The Vietnam War and Our National Identity* (2015) which provides a thought-provoking look into the realities and myths of the Vietnam War and the ways the conflict affected how Americans think of ourselves as a people and nation. Appy also draws on an impressively wide range of sources, including movies, songs, and official documents.

5. Finally, I don't think any list of books on the Vietnam War is fully complete without including the novels and autobiographical accounts of Tim O'Brien, one of the most well-known authors to come out of the Vietnam War. Any of his books, including *If I Die in A Combat Zone* (1973), *Going After Cacciato* (1978), and *The Things They Carried* (1990) is worth a read for anyone hoping to gain a better understanding of the emotional complexities of the war.

DP: George Herring's *America's Longest War* and Pierre Asselin's *Vietnam's American War* are fundamental starting points. Both books were born out of their authors' deep knowledge and extensive research. They are indispensable.

Second, I'd recommend three books that well explain, from the perspective of the Vietnam War, the conduct of U.S. statecraft and the role of American domestic politics. Mark Atwood Lawrence's *Assuming the Burden* captures the divisions within American officialdom on Vietnam and the dilemmas of U.S. power as that country grappled with the First Indochina War. As I've already noted, Logevall's *Choosing War* is a profile in how to think about presidential decisionmaking. And Andrew Johns's *Vietnam's Second Front* reminds us that politics is never far removed from those decisions.

Finally, I'd suggest a spate of stellar, Vietnamese-centered books. For the communist side, there is Tuong Vu's *Vietnam's Communist Revolution*, Hang Nguyen's *Hanoi's War*, and Asselin's *Hanoi's Road to the Vietnam War*. For the other, there is NuAnh Tran's *Disunion*, Edward Miller's *Misalliance*, George Veith's *Drawn Swords*, and every article written by Sean Fear whose book cannot come soon enough.

7. For someone wanting to teach a course on the history of the Vietnam War or add the Vietnam War to an existing course on U.S. foreign relations, what core readings and/or media would you suggest?

GAD: Without question, to me, the best single volume on the diverse, and often competing, interpretations of the Vietnam War is Gary R. Hess's *Vietnam: Explaining America's Lost War*, 2nd ed. For an introduction to the field, this work is essential for understanding the key debates regarding the course and conduct of the war.

I then would recommend a primer, like Mark Atwood Lawrence's *The Vietnam War: A Concise International History* or Mark P. Bradley's *Vietnam at War*. Both are excellent, pithy overviews of the war from an international perspective and usefully place the conflict within its proper Cold War context.

Finally, I would suggest a documentary reader so students could explore some of the basic arguments of the war through primary sources. Among the best of these are: Edward Miller's *The Vietnam War: A Documentary Reader*; Michael H. Hunt's *A Vietnam War Reader: A Documentary History from American and Vietnamese Perspectives*; and Mark Atwood Lawrence's *The Vietnam War: An International History in Documents*.

PA: Pretty much anything by Christopher Goscha and his *The Road to Dien Bien Phu* specifically. Goscha deals mainly with the French War (1945-54), but it was in its context that the United States decided to "buy" Vietnam and the two Vietnams were created. As to more comprehensive histories suitable for classroom use, I have always liked William Turley's *The Second Indochina War* and John Prados' *History of an Unwinnable War*. George Herring's *America's Longest War* is still a remarkable book but priced unreasonably by its publisher. In my own undergraduate course on the war, I use Prados, my *Vietnam's American War* (written expressly for the classroom), Christian Appy's *Patriots*, and Edward Miller's *The Vietnam War* documentary reader. No media stand out to me. The Ken Burns series has merit, to be sure. I refuse to use

American literature (e.g., Tim O'Brien), movies, or music because they invariably reinforce the notion that the war was a purely American affair—and tragedy. American veterans and former antiwar activists are a remarkable resource, especially as many of these men and women were our students' age when they served in or protested the war. I have access in San Diego to a vast pool of officials, troops, and refugees from the old South Vietnam. Unfortunately, it is difficult to get them to agree to speak to a roomfull of American students. However, when they do, they humanize a part of the Vietnamese experience in ways no other source can.

Anyone who teaches the Vietnam War and wants to do right by their students should expose them to variegated perspectives on it, not just their own or that of their favorite author—unless I am that author!

KS: My course is titled "The Vietnam Wars" and I change up my readings each time I teach it. Last fall semester I assigned my book, *Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam*, George Herring, *America's Longest War*, Kyle Longley, *The Morenci Marines: A Tale of Small Town America and the Vietnam War*, Andrew Johns, *The Price of Loyalty: Hubert Humphrey's Vietnam Conflict*, Greg Daddis, *Pulp Vietnam: War and Gender in Cold War Men's Adventure Magazines*, and Pierre Asselin, *Vietnam's American War*. I usually use something by Tim O'Brien; *If I Die in a Combat Zone* is a perennial favorite. I often contrast Graham Greene's *The Quiet American* with the two film versions. For the Vietnamese perspective I still like Le Ly Hayslip's *When Heaven and Earth Changed Places*, Truong Nhu Tang's *A Vietcong Memoir*, Bao Ninh's *The Sorrow of War*, Dang Thuy Tram's *Last Night I Dreamed of Peace*, and Duong Thu Huong's, *Novel Without a Name*. I have assigned Viet Thanh Nguyen's *The Sympathizer* as well. Zoom has made it very easy to invite the authors to engage students on the major themes of their books.

I prefer to show brief clips of the PBS 1983 *Vietnam: A Television History* throughout the semester to the 2017 Ken Burns/Lynn Novick documentary, *The Vietnam War*. While the Burns/Novick documentary is excellent on covering combat from all perspectives, I find it weak on diplomacy, politics, economics, civilian, social and environmental factors. I always show the 2003 documentary *The Friendship Village* featuring George Mizo and the 2014 documentary by Rory Kennedy, *Last Days in Vietnam*.

And then I start every class with a song. I always begin with "The Ballad of Ho Chi Minh" and then the "Ballad of the Green Berets." After that, a sampling of songs I play include Buffalo Springfield "For What's It's Worth," Phil Ochs, "Draft Dodger Rag," Edwin Starr, "War: What is it Good For?" Country Joe McDonald, "I Feel-Like-I'm-Fixin-to-Die Rag," CCR, "Fortunate Son," Donovan, "Universal Soldier," Bruce Springsteen "Born in the USA," and REM, "Orange Crush." The most recent song I play is "Uncommon Valor: A Vietnam Story," by Jedi Mind Tricks. The very last class, right before the holidays, I play "Happy Xmas (War is Over)," by John Lennon and Yoko Ono. For each song, we listen to the lyrics and then dissect the song, situating it within the historical context and relevant themes of the class. Students are amazed to learn what "Born in the USA," "Orange Crush," and "Happy Xmas" are actually about. At the end of the semester, I ask students to choose an additional song we have not listened to and analyze it as part of their final assignment for the class.

AJ: I have yet to teach a class that focuses exclusively on the Vietnam War, so I'm looking forward to reading the responses of my fellow scholars to this question! That being said, I have taught classes on U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1945, so of course, my version of this class devotes at least one week of material to the Vietnam War. During this week of the course, I have found that students particularly enjoy material that allows them to engage with the culture (songs, movies, pop cultural icons) of the 1960s

and 1970s. Not every student is familiar with the history of the Vietnam War, but if you play Creedence Clearwater Revival's 1969 hit "Fortunate Son," and ask the class how many students have heard the song before, it is likely that nearly every hand in the room will shoot up. I have found that these songs provide a great inroad for discussing the socioeconomic and generational divides that were exacerbated by the Vietnam War. The song also tends to generate a lively discussion on music as a form of protest. Full disclosure: my proclivity for using music to kick off a classroom discussion was inspired by two of my mentors, both of whom start their classes this way!

In addition to incorporating songs, films, documentaries, and other forms of popular culture into the classroom, I've also found that students are particularly interested in individual voices from the war. Of course, there are a wide variety of American memoirs and autobiographies to choose from, including the aforementioned works of Tim O'Brien and other famous veterans of the conflict. However, in recent years, I've gravitated away from these well-known voices and towards the writings of less well-known American veterans of the war. Virtual repositories such as Texas Tech University's Vietnam Center and Archive house a large collection of oral histories, and in the future, I hope to design some sort of assignment around this collection. I am well-aware that my offerings thus far have been overwhelmingly U.S.-centric, so I look forward to reading the suggestions of other scholars!

DP: Most of the aforementioned books are absolutely essential. As a textbook, I would recommend Herring's *America's Longest War* and/or Asselin's *Vietnam's American War*. Should Mark Atwood Lawrence revise and update his *The Vietnam War: A Concise International History*, I would recommend that. I would assign/use his *The Vietnam War: An International History in Documents*.

I would also utilize the presidential tapes as much as possible. Michael Beschloss's (for the Johnson years) and Luke Nichter/Douglas Brinkley's (for Nixon) volumes facilitate finding and locating critical and interesting recordings. From there, it's a breeze to go to the Miller Center website and download the files. There are few things as riveting as listening to presidents agonize over Vietnam.



Passport would like to thank out-going assistant editor
Brionna Mendoza of The Ohio State University for her outstanding work on
Passport over the past three-plus years and wish her well in her new career.

A Review of Walter Hixson, *Architects of Repression: How Israel and Its Lobby Put Racism, Violence, and Injustice at the Center of U.S. Middle East Policy*

KC Johnson

Few would expect a fair-minded interpretation of Israel and U.S. foreign policy from a book featuring a gushing cover blurb from Ilan Pappé. Yet Walter Hixson's *Architects of Repression* fails to clear even this low bar. Mostly recapitulating the framework of Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer's work on the Israel lobby, minus the duo's insinuations about Jewish responsibility for the second Gulf War, this book will persuade only the most vitriolic critics of Israel.

Hixson fashions American supporters of Israel, and especially AIPAC and related pro-Israel lobbyists, as all-powerful advocates of a settler-colonialist state that have "dissemble[d] and distort[ed] perceptions of the Israel-Palestine issue in Israel's favor," blinding Americans to the horrors on the "blood-drenched Gaza border" (2). He promises archival research to show that "the little state of Israel—not the behemoths Russia or China, as many Americans might imagine or have been led to believe— intrudes more directly into American domestic politics than any other nation in the world" (4).

Yet *one page* before this assertion, Hixson reveals that "this book does not offer a comparison with other lobbies" (3). This dilemma—how to prove Israel intrudes "more" than any other country without looking at any other country's actions—sets the tone for the rest of the book. Everything to come makes sense as long as readers simply assume that Israel is a uniquely malevolent force, disrupting the U.S. democratic structure, and don't look too closely for any proof for their preexisting beliefs.

The book proceeds in chronological fashion, starting in the 1940s, with pro-Israel lobbyists successfully browbeating or manipulating a succession of U.S. presidents. John Kennedy, for instance, was "hamstrung in the pursuit of balanced Middle East diplomacy" by the "lobby's powerful influence over American domestic politics" (43). Yet those seeking an understanding of the issues at play in Kennedy's proposed "balanced Middle East diplomacy" would need to look elsewhere, since the relevant chapter contains no mention of the administration's handling of Yemen, Iran, Saudi Arabia, or Turkey. Arab states in this book are passive players—natural allies of the United States, even—foiled by the machinations of the lobby.

While the lobby might have outflanked Kennedy, Ronald Reagan dealt it a high-profile defeat: despite furious opposition from AIPAC, the Senate declined to block the sale of AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia. This unequivocal setback would seem to present a problem for Hixson's thesis. But the author dismisses the result, maintaining that the AWACS sale "had no effect on the overarching issue in

Middle East politics, namely Israel's continuing occupation and construction of illegal settlements" (74). Consider the events that occurred in or continued to affect "Middle East politics" at about the time of the sale—the Iran-Iraq war, Anwar Sadat's assassination, the Lebanese civil war, persistent U.S.-Turkish tensions over the invasion of Cyprus, the Israeli raid on Iraq's nuclear facility, Iran's moves toward state-sponsored terrorism, Soviet adventurism in South Yemen and Syria. Perhaps Hixson is correct that the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza was more important than all these other events. But he provides no basis for such a conclusion in the book.

Ironically, Hixson's strategy of portraying the lobby as always omnipotent robs him of any analytical tools to explain why some presidents, such as Lyndon Johnson, *did* tilt far more heavily in Israel's direction. Nor does Hixson offer much to explain comparable congressional turns. He oddly suggests that a 1963 foreign aid amendment targeting the Nasser regime in Egypt, one of the first significant pro-Israel moves from Congress, came when Senator Ernest Gruening (D-AK) introduced an amendment "complementing a House version introduced by [Jacob] Javits" (42). But by this point, Javits had been in the Senate for seven years.


Hixson's takes on U.S. policymaking are consistently simplistic. The book cites various pro-Israel lobbyists who privately highlight their own effectiveness, with the author showing scant curiosity as to whether lobbyists (on any issue) might have an incentive to inflate their importance to keep the contributions flowing. That is especially true on an issue such as U.S. policy toward Israel, where, as Hixson reluctantly concedes, the public has overwhelmingly favored a pro-Israel policy until quite recently. Did the lobby's policy newsletter *really* shape congressional opinion toward Israel, as Hixson implies (35)? Anything is possible, but the fact that Hixson cites only a single congressional archival collection (the Emanuel Celler papers) anywhere in the book should give readers pause.

Hixson likewise offers the thinnest of evidence in interpreting elections. AIPAC, he claims, "eventually helped defeat" Arkansas senator J. William Fulbright's "re-election bid in 1974" (36). Perhaps. But Dale Bumpers, who bested Fulbright by thirty points in the primary, surely would have won without any help from AIPAC at all. In the 1984 Senate elections, Hixson cites the ouster of Charles Percy in Illinois to portray AIPAC as all-powerful—only to admit, thirty pages later, that the organization came up short in neighboring Kentucky, where it backed Democratic incumbent Dee Huddleston.

At the presidential level, Hixson contends that even though the state of the economy was ultimately the more important issue, AIPAC's criticisms of George H.W. Bush's Middle Eastern policies "clearly factored into the 1992 election." Yet while Bush's share of the Jewish vote dropped from 1988, he still carried Florida, and he was never going to win other states (New York, California) that had a significant Jewish vote. The author adds that Bush himself "reportedly blamed his defeat on Israel and the lobby"—an extraordinary claim for which Hixson provides no citation at all (85).

The book's closing chapters, on events of recent years, read more like an op-ed. The Palestinians, as presented, are *never* responsible for any violence committed against Israeli civilians. Hixson attributes the suicide-murder attacks in the Second Intifada to Ariel Sharon's "provocations" and "the indiscriminate violence on the part of the IDF" (95). Describing the origins of the 2014 Gaza conflict, Hixson contends that the then prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, "responded to the deaths of three Israelis in the West Bank" (117). The reader would have to turn to Google to determine who these Israelis were (civilian teenagers) and how they died (kidnapped and murdered).

Architects of Repression is not a good work of history. That is frustrating, as its topic is extremely important. Since the mid-1960s, the United States has chosen (mostly) to support a small country thousands of miles away, even when strategic interests might have dictated a different course. A high-quality study of the Israel lobby that used policy toward Israel as a case study of foreign policy in a democracy would have been most welcome. Instead, we are left with Hixson's own recognition that his "book does not purport to represent the last word on the history of the Israel lobby" (6).



In the next issue of *Passport*

A roundtable on **Steven Brady**, *Chained to History*
A roundtable on **Maria Quintana**, *Contracting Freedom*
Jill Crandell on the DPAA & Family History project

...and much more!

2022 SHAFR Summer Institute Women in the World



Pictured (front to back and generally left to right): Lindsey Harris, Ariel Natalo-Lofton, Camelia Lenart, Nicole de Silva, Ellen Chesler, Brandy Thomas Wells, Bingyi Gong, Mia Martin Hobbs, Sabrina Thomas, Savitri Kunze, Grace Song, Kelly Shannon, and Amy Sayward

The focus of SHAFR's 2022 Summer Institute—in addition to learning about and advancing the study of “Women in the World”—was to build community among the ten participants, three conveners, and one organizer of the institute, something sorely needed as we near the end of the global pandemic. With participants and conveners ranging across all academic ranks, coming from several continents, and studying women in various times and places, the Summer Institute was able to draw from and build upon these diverse perspectives to build community and to

develop future projects. Pictured above, all gathered for a final dinner in New Orleans on the night before the launch of the SHAFR conference.

Our first convener was Brandy Thomas Wells, Assistant Professor of History at Oklahoma State University, who started the institute on Monday with a discussion of Black women's internationalism, focused on readings by Imaobong Umoren and Brandon Byrd.¹ These readings provided a foundation for launching into a wide-ranging discussion about the historiography, about how more conservative actors are less frequently researched, and about how to find women in archival sources that we know were present but are absent from official records.

Ellen Chesler—currently a Senior Fellow at the Roosevelt Institute but also having decades of experience in government and philanthropy as well as academia—focused her seminar discussion around the theme of “Becoming Human: The Invention of Universal Rights for Women.” The readings uncovered the activism of women from around the world who helped to define women's rights in and through the United Nations in the decades leading up to the Beijing Conference.² She also shared insights on how to make scholarship more relevant and available to policymakers, ways to move between academia and policymaking, and the challenges of publishing about female historical actors with both pioneering and deplorable aspects within their worldview.³

Kelly Shannon, Associate Professor of History and the Chastain-Johnston Middle Eastern Studies Distinguished Professor of Peace Studies at Florida Atlantic University, was our final convener, tackling the ways in which gender, religion, and worldview have intersected, specifically looking at Muslim women's place in the U.S. foreign-policy imagination. She drew on her own research as well as that of others to illuminate these historical intersections.⁴ Shannon also drew on her experience to share with participants about the challenges of publishing one's dissertation as a book within the framework of tenure and promotion in an academic job. Participants in the Summer Institute included

- Nicole de Silva, graduate student at the University of California, Santa Barbara, who researches U.S. women's involvement in transnational consumer movements between the world wars⁵
- Bingyi Gong, graduate student at Osaka University, studies technology exchange between China and the United States during the Reagan administration⁶
- Lindsey Harris, graduate student at Tulane University, researching U.S. and Central European nurses in the aftermath of World War I⁷
- Mia Martin Hobbs, Research Fellow at Deakin University in Australia, researches the intersections of war, conflict, and gender⁸

- Stacy Holden, Associate Professor of History at Purdue University, whose next project is researching Edith Wharton's 1917 trip to Morocco⁹
- Savitri Kunze, post-doc at the University of Chicago, whose dissertation looks at stateless people and the institutions that influence their lives and fates¹⁰
- Camelia Lenart, Lecturer at the University at Albany, researches Martha Graham, Alvin Ailey, and dance-focused cultural tours into Eastern Europe during the Cold War¹¹
- Ariel Natalo-Lifton, graduate student at Temple University, studies women in the U.S. military between 1972 and 1992, looking at how they navigated the identities of both the "lady soldier" and a "brother-in-arms"¹²
- Grace Song, graduate student at Notre Dame, is researching cultural connections between Korea and the United States in the early twentieth century¹³
- Sabrina Thomas, Associate Professor of History at Wabash College, is writing her second book about women's transnational activism after World War II and the Vietnam War around the issues of race and rescue¹⁴

The Summer Institute ended with participants discussing future avenues for collaboration around the theme of "Women in the World," so SHAFR members should keep their eyes peeled for future work in this vital area of foreign policy histories.

Notes:

1. Brandon R. Byrd, "Black Women's Internationalism from the Age of Revolutions to World War I," *Oxford Research Encyclopedia, American History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), oxfordre.com/americanhistory/; Inaobong D. Umoren, *Race Women Internationalists: Activist-Intellectuals and Global Freedom Struggles* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2018).
2. This reading was from Rebecca Adami and Dan Plesch, eds., *Women and the UN: A New History of Women's International Human Rights* (London: Routledge, 2021); it is available open access through this link: <https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/oa-edit/10.4324/9781003036708/women-un-rebecca-adami-dan-plesch>.
3. Ellen Chesler, *Woman of Valor: Margaret Sanger and the Birth Control Movement in America* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007).
4. Kelly J. Shannon, *U.S. Foreign Policy and Muslim Women's Human Rights* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017); Leila Abu-Lughod, "Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others," *American Anthropologist* 104, no. 3 (September 2002): 783-90; Perin Gürel, "Transnational Feminism, Islam, and the Other Woman: How to Teach," *Radical Teacher* 113 (Winter 2019): 71-74; Mahnaz Afkhami, "Promoting Women's Rights in the Muslim World," *Journal of Democracy* 8, no. 1 (January 1997): 157-66.
5. <https://www.history.ucsb.edu/graduate-student/nicole-de-silva/>
6. <https://twitter.com/elinorgong?lang=en>
7. <https://liberalarts.tulane.edu/departments/history/people/lindsey-harris>
8. <https://chrg.deakin.edu.au/about-us/profile/miamartinhobbs/>
9. <https://stacyeholden.com>
10. <https://humanrights.uchicago.edu/people/savitri-maya-kunze>
11. <https://www.albany.edu/faculty/lenart/camelia.html>
12. <https://womenalsoknowhistory.com/individual-scholar-page/?pdb=2043>
13. <https://history.nd.edu/graduate-program/graduate-student-directory/grace-song/>
14. <https://wabash.academia.edu/Research/SabrinaThomas>

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
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
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
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A Call to Action: How SHAFR Can Help History Ph.D.s Find Jobs

Michael H. Cresswell and Nicholas Evan Sarantakes

No part of American society has escaped the Covid pandemic unscathed. The historical profession is no exception. The pandemic has already negatively affected teaching, research projects, and the meetings of scholarly organizations. Perhaps the most important effect concerns the job prospects for recent and soon-to-be PhDs. Although prognostication is not part of the historian's toolkit, the long-term outlook does not look promising. The pandemic has turned a troubling employment situation into a full-blown crisis.

Finding jobs for new PhDs in history has been a major challenge for decades. One reason is that graduate programs have produced too many PhDs relative to the job market. A stunningly large number of exceptionally talented scholars who graduated from excellent programs have been unable to find jobs in academia. Those who succeeded have often found themselves "overqualified" for their teaching positions. To make matters worse, schools are shutting down, departments are being merged, both contingent and tenured faculty are losing their jobs because of declarations of financial exigency, and current faculty are losing benefits like contributions to their retirement programs and health care.

This state of affairs is troubling. It affects the ability of individual scholars to save for retirement, buy a house or a car, get married, start a family, meet their health needs, send their children to college, or care for family members. The surplus of history PhDs also shapes their career paths in other ways, undermining their ability to conduct research, publish, or even convert their dissertation into a book. This glut can even affect those with jobs. When the supply exceeds demand, the price for supply—in this case the salary offered to faculty—goes down. We simply can't wish this away.

SHAFR has so far made a responsible effort to address this issue. It has sponsored interview workshops at the annual meeting and roundtables on alternative forms of employment. Despite these positive steps, more work is needed. In that spirit, we offer recommendations intended to spark a conversation about how to solve the problem rather than merely bemoaning its existence.

Increase Demand

Our first recommendation is for SHAFR to commission a white paper like the one the Society for Military History produced on the importance of military history to the kind of education required for the twenty-first century.¹ SHAFR should circulate the white paper widely, hanging it on the organization's website and publishing it where it will find the right audience: *The Atlantic*, *Perspectives*, etc. It does not need to be published in places where it will basically be preaching to the choir, like the *Foreign Service Journal* or

Passport.

A second recommendation is for the SHAFR president to write to deans and chairs of history departments at every research university and teaching college without a diplomatic historian on the faculty. The letters need to make the case that diplomatic history is a very popular subject that draws many students. They can also note that that most diplomatic historians are trained with some type of regional expertise and can therefore offer non-U.S. specific courses. That type of diverse education can make diplomatic historians more viable as job candidates than historians who focus exclusively on the United States. Versatility is one of diplomatic historians' key strengths.

SHAFR should also commission a study of what types of courses draw the most students. It is an article of faith among SHAFR members—one that is probably correct—that the courses we offer attract large student numbers. That is a good thing, particularly at schools that base funding on enrollments. SHAFR needs to give strength and specificity to these perceptions. What courses attract students? (Cold War? U.S. diplomatic history survey?) The study should also compare these courses to those in other fields to show that diplomatic history often attracts larger numbers of students. When contacting deans and department chairs at other institutions, SHAFR presidents should provide them with this study.

Reduce Supply

In addition to working to increase demand, faculty should work to reduce the supply of PhDs. Because of the pandemic, reductions are already underway. Several graduate programs refused to admit new students while they operated in a remote teaching environment. A complicating factor is that most graduates of PhD programs do not land jobs at research universities. In 2015, the research team of Aaron Clauset, Samuel Arbesman, and Daniel B. Larremore made news by showing that a small number of schools accounted for most of the individuals filling tenure track jobs at schools granting the PhD. In history, they found that eight schools (Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Stanford, the University of California at Berkeley, Chicago, Columbia, and Brandeis) filled seventy-five percent of the jobs at other institutions that grant PhDs in history. The remaining 25 percent were filled by the other 136 schools with a history PhD program.²

There is room to quibble with the findings of this study, but not much. What should happen is that faculty should be extremely reluctant to write letters of recommendation for students who are applying to PhD programs outside those eight. We should avoid making a bad situation worse.

Mitigate

Much writing on the job crisis offers few if any solutions, perhaps because the authors believe that shining a light on the problem is contribution enough. While more can be done, there are limits. The best that SHAFR can do is to offer initiatives that will mitigate the problem. Readers should consider the ideas presented here in that light. One important note: the initiatives listed below are directed at everyone in SHAFR. All parts of SHAFR need to work together to resolve some of the professional challenges facing our members, particularly those who are younger and those that find themselves on the margins of the discipline.

1. Establish a book prize for contingent faculty. Historians holding part-time jobs are slowly falling behind those who were more fortunate and found full-time faculty positions. While part-time instructors might be teaching, they have less time to remain current with the historiography, write, attend conferences, and travel for research. They also usually have less access to libraries and are often ineligible for grants and fellowships. As a result, anyone working outside academia or in a non-tenure track positions is likely to have a one-book career—at best. A book prize offers the winner a chance to jump from part-time work to a full-time, tenure-track position.

2. Leverage the SHAFR website. The society should use its website to do two different but related things. First, it should provide links to web sites that list employment opportunities. Some of those would include the following:

a. Academic:

Global academic jobs
<http://www.university-directory.eu/>

European academic jobs
<http://www.academicjobseu.com/>

Jobs.ac.uk (Britain and Commonwealth)
<http://www.jobs.ac.uk/>

Korean academic jobs
<http://www.hibrain.net/>

Times Higher Education Supplement
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/jobs_home.asp

Canadian Association of University Teachers
Bulletin
<http://www.academicwork.ca/>

Australian university jobs
<http://www.unijobs.com.au/>

b. Academic administration

The American Association of Collegiate Registrars and Admissions Officers
Career Navigator
<https://www.aacrao.org/jobs-careers/career-navigator>

National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators Career Center
https://www.nasfaa.org/NASFAA_Career_Center

c. Academic book-selling

Independent College Bookstore Association
<https://icbainc.com/newsroom/job-postings/>

d. Academic publishing

The Association of Documentary Editing job listings
<https://www.documentaryediting.org/wordpress/?cat=4>

The Association of University Presses job listings
<https://jobs.up.hcommons.org/>

e. Commercial book-selling

Barnes & Noble careers
<https://careers.barnesandnoble.com/>

Books-A-Million
<https://careers.booksamillion.com/>

Hudson News Career Center
<https://www.hudsongroup.com/careers>

f. Government and other jobs

State and local government jobs
<http://www.50statejobs.com/>

The American Association for State and Local History
<http://www.aaslh.org/jobsonline.htm>

The Chronicle of Higher Education: organizations other than colleges
<http://chronicle.com/jobCategory/Organizations-other-than/176>

USAJobs.gov (federal government)
<http://www.usajobs.gov/>

g. Journalism

Editor & Publisher
http://www.editorandpublisher.com/ep_jobs/

Sigma Delta Chi: The Society of Professional Journalists
<https://www.spj.org/jobbank.asp>

The Association for Alternative Newsweeklies
<http://www.altweeklies.com/aan/Directories/Jobs>

National Education Writers Association
http://www.ewa.org/site/PageServer?pagename=resources_jobcenter

The Association of Health Care Journalists
<http://www.healthjournalism.org/prof-dev-jobs.php>

National Association of Science Writers
<https://www.nasw.org/jobs>

Associated Press
<https://careers.ap.org/index.html>

Gannett
<http://www.gannett.com/career/findajob.htm>

- Cox
<http://www.coxnewspapers.coxnewsweb.com/cgi-bin/coxjobs/openings.cgi?sortby=posted&orderby=desc>
- The *Tribune* Media Company
<http://www.tribune.com/employment/index.html>
- The *Washington Post* Company
<http://www.washpostco.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=62487&p=irol-jobsNational>
- Conference of Editorial Writers
<https://www.ncew.org/index.php?src=jobs&category=General>
- North American Agricultural Journalists
<http://www.naaj.net/jobs>
- Society of American Business Editors and Writers
<http://sabew.org/resources/jobs/>
- Society of Environmental Journalists
<http://www.sej.org/library/jobs/overview>
- The Religion Newswriters Association
<http://www.religionwriters.com/tools-resources/resume-bank>
- SportsJournalists.com
<http://www.sportsjournalists.com/>
- Journalismjobs.co
<http://www.journalismjobs.com/>
- AMFMjobs.com
<http://www.amfmjobs.com/>
- TVjobs.com
<http://www.tvjobs.com/>
- h. Library Science
- American Library Association
<http://joblist.ala.org/>
- LibGig.com Jobs
<http://www.libgig.com/>
- The Special Libraries Association career center
<http://www.sla.org/careers/>
- Association of Research Libraries career resources
<http://www.arl.org/resources/careers/positions/index.shtml>
- The Society of American Archivists Online Career Center
<http://www2.archivists.org/careers>
- i. Museum Studies
- The Chronicle of Higher Education*: museum jobs
<http://chronicle.com/jobCategory/Museums/192/>
- American Association of Museums
<http://www.aam-us.org/aviso/index.com/>

j. Public History

- H-Net public history jobs
http://www.h-net.org/jobs/search_results.php?restrict=1&status=Open&cat=55
- The Historical Research Associates, Incorporated
<http://www.hrassoc.com/page.aspx?Source=About&menu=Current+Openings>
- The History Factory
<http://www.historyfactory.com/index.aspx?sectionid=12>
- PreserveNet job board
<http://www.preservenet.cornell.edu/employ/index.cfm>
- PreservationDirectory.com
<http://www.preservationdirectory.com/PreservationBlogs/ArticleListings.aspx?catid=3>
- PreservationDirectory.com Facebook page
<http://www.facebook.com/pages/PreservationDirectorycom/182062916596>
- The National Council on Public History
<http://ncph.org/cms/careers-training/jobs/>

k. School Teaching

- National Association of Independent Schools career center
<https://careers.nais.org/jobs/>

3. The second task for the website is to list jobs in the field. SHAFR has supported such endeavors in the past, but it needs to make a systematic effort to inform deans, human resources offices, and history departments that it will advertise positions relevant to diplomatic history and make it clear that SHAFR will do this free of charge. Few deans will say “no” to free. Create an article contest/prize for contingent faculty. Many organizations have article prizes reserved for students and often hold a spot in their journals for the winners of these contests. SHAFR should do the same. For contingent faculty, publishing is far more difficult than it is even for junior assistant professors. They usually lack funding and often don’t have the full support of their libraries. As a result, publishing an academic article is much more difficult for contingent faculty than for those with permanent positions. Winning a prize could be just the help they need to land a permanent position.

4. Sponsor teaching awards for contingent faculty. Teaching is a difficult task, but it is even more difficult when it is done on the side. We propose the creation of a qualifications-based system. Most teaching awards are competitive in nature. They are sponsored by the school itself, the alumni association, or a student organization, and they end up recognizing only one person. In our proposal, there would be three award levels: bronze for lower division undergraduate courses; silver for upper division undergraduates; and gold for graduate-level courses. Individuals would earn the award after receiving points for meeting certain criteria: quality of student evaluations, peer evaluations, number of students taught, length of reading assignments, use of certain pedagogical approaches, writing assignments, etc. These awards would be presented once a year, and an individual could earn more than one, so they could say they were a three-time bronze medalist, a two-time silver medalist, and so on. The purpose is to recognize

and reward the extra work that contingent faculty do and encourage administrators to keep or promote faculty who are winning recognition for excellence in teaching. Good teaching attracts students.

5. Designate a SHAFR vice president to serve the needs of contingent faculty members. The needs of part-time instructors differ from those of teachers who have full-time employment. SHAFR can leverage its organizational strength and task this vice-president with developing programs that will help its most vulnerable members. Such initiatives could include gathering information on the requirements in each state for teaching certificates, or organizing conferences and workshops like the following:

a. A multi-organizational conference. It is possible that if learned societies got together to confront the job crisis directly, the numbers might improve. A multi-organizational conference could include organizations similar to SHAFR, like the Society for Military History, and larger ones like the Organization of American History. This conference should also include the department chairs and/or graduate directors of the eight schools that fill most of the tenure track jobs, since other departments will likely follow their lead.

b. Faculty workshop(s). Another type of conference would be for faculty who are advising and directing students pursuing non-tenure track jobs. In all likelihood, most faculty went from graduate school to faculty positions and know little beyond one type of career path. This conference or workshop, which could be held in conjunction with the annual SHAFR meeting, would provide a place and an opportunity for faculty to share ideas that will make their students more viable in non-tenure track jobs.

c. Course development workshop(s). This type of meeting could explore the following questions: What courses attract students? (Cold War? U.S. diplomatic history survey?) Why? Is it the time of day? Does the course fit into major and/or minor requirements? Is it instructor reputation? Is it the type of books assigned? What books are popular with students? What kind of assignments are good teaching tools but are also popular? What actions can contingent faculty take to promote diplomatic history courses on campus? What makes for an effective syllabus? Some of these suggestions seem either obvious or unrelated to job issues, but there is a connection. SHAFR needs to help all faculty—especially contingent ones—develop courses that draw lots of students on a regular basis. Deans and department chairs love large enrollments, which help promote the idea of hiring diplomatic historians for full-time positions or converting contingent faculty into full-time faculty.

d. Maintenance of effective initiatives already in use. SHAFR has been responsible in its efforts to develop junior faculty. It has conducted mock interview sessions, has offered vitae evaluations one-on-ones, and has sponsored roundtables on alternative forms of employment at its annual meetings. Many of these sessions have been well attended. There is anecdotal evidence that people have profited from these undertakings. It is easy to demand reform and new initiatives, but most of the current tasks need to continue.

6. Leverage the SHAFR newsletter. *Passport* can help by featuring a series of articles that examine the issue of employment. One of the first things it should do is to

commission a series of third-person articles, rather than the this-is-what-I-did type that populates many academic newsletters. These articles should focus on forms of employment in which an individual can use some of the skills they developed while working on a PhD. Possible jobs include:

- a. book-selling, be it as a corporate book buyer or a store manager for retailers like Barnes & Noble, Amazon Books, Half Price Books, Books-a-Million, and Hudson News
- b. journalism: formats are changing—a lot—but journalists are still reporting the news, be it in newspapers or on websites
- c. commercial book publishing: jobs range from editors to literary agents, and include publicists
- d. academic publishing: jobs range from acquisition editors to advertising
- e. museum studies: there is a good deal of overlap between the skills a PhD has and what these jobs require
- f. military service: each of the armed services offers different career paths, of which several are relevant to individuals with a PhD
- g. command historians: many military units require historians to collect relevant documentation and write reports on activities, and these positions often come with tuition reimbursement programs that are great for grad students
- h. professional military education: the military has a series of accredited schools that are more like civilian colleges than you might think; they grant master's degrees and have a great deal of instruction in economics, International Relations, military history, and diplomatic history
- i. jobs with the U.S. government: several agencies require editors, writers, and historian
- j. political jobs in D.C.: many jobs in Washington are relevant to a diplomatic historian's education
- k. think tank jobs: these institutions prize PhDs, but they often require some other type of expertise in addition to the degree
- l. academic administration: there are jobs in fields like admissions, financial aid, and student services/housing that allow graduates to remain part of the university community
- m. library work: as expert consumers of information, history PhDs are at home in libraries, but most positions require a master's of library science degree
- n. school teaching: there are plenty of teaching opportunities in both public and private schools. The difference between undergraduates and high school students is often best measured in months
- o. archivist: there is a good deal of overlap in the skills a PhD has and what these jobs require
- p. historical editing: the number of projects is surprisingly large
- q. historical preservation: this field is a combination of history and architecture and requires the input of historians and architects
- r. public history: there are many opportunities for historians that often attract significant audiences

Passport could also run articles about historians who were initially employed outside of academia but managed to find full-time employment as professors. How was it done? Can others make that move? How easy is it to do? Has it been done often?

It is worth noting that SHAFR has already taken steps to confront the problem the profession faces. In 2021, the newsletter published "The Academic Job Crisis: A Forum," which included seventeen articles from scholars at different schools and in different employment situations. It was an

informative exchange.³ More is required, though.

There are no easy answers to the job predicament. No scholarly organization is in a perfect position to solve the crisis. However, SHAFR is better placed than most to do something constructive. The ideas offered in this article are not intended to be the last word; we therefore invite others to share their thoughts. Ultimately, we want to see action.

Notes:

1. Tami Davis Biddle and Robert M. Citino, "The Role of Military History in the Contemporary Academy," A Society for Military History White Paper, <https://www.smh-hq.org/docs/Statements/SMHWhitePaper.pdf>.

2. Aaron Clauset, Samuel Arbesman, Daniel B. Larremore, "Systematic Inequality and Hierarchy in Faculty Hiring Networks," *Science Advances* 1, no. 1 (February 2015), <https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.1400005>.

3. Daniel Bessner and Michael Brenes, guest editors, "The Academic Jobs Crisis: A Forum," *Passport: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review* 52, no. 1 (April 2021), 30–53. This issue included essays from Susan Colbourn, "What can SHAFR Do?"; Emily Whalen, "Unfenced"; Michael Franczak, "Career Diversity in the 1970s: Ernest May's 'Careers in Business'"; Henry D. Fetter, "Crisis? What Crisis?: A Personal View from Outside the Academy"; Chris Foss, "I'm Still Standing. Better Than I Ever Did?"; Zeb Larson, "Getting Out and Fighting On: How to Confront the Jobs Crisis"; Ryan Irwin, Julia Irwin, Stuart Schrader, and Judy Wu, "A Conversation about the Jobs Crisis"; Michelle Paranzino, "Rethinking Tenure: Serve the Public, not the Profession"; Marc Reyes, "History for Everyone: On Contingent Magazine"; Michael Koncewicz, "Do Jobs Outside the Academy Support Scholarship?"; Kurt Güner, "The Research Downward Spiral"; and Carl Watts, "Conclusion."

SHAFR's June 2022 Prize Winners

Oxford University Press USA Dissertation Prize

The winner of the 2022 Oxford University Press USA Dissertation Prize is **Thomas Mead Jamison**, whose dissertation “Pacific Wars: Peripheral Conflict and the Making of the U.S. ‘New Navy,’ 1865-1897” was written under the supervision of Erez Manela at Harvard University. The development of the America’s “New Navy” of the late 1800s traditionally has been attributed to the likes of Alfred Thayer Mahan and the “Young Turks,” who believed that the United States risked becoming an insignificant power in the face of European-driven colonialism and naval advancements. In this impressive dissertation, Jamison effectively argues that it is time to look more closely at the what was happening in the Pacific. Using English, Chinese, and Spanish-language materials, Jamison finds that on the one hand, U.S. officials feared their navy had fallen behind those of other nations bordering the Pacific, including Japan, China, and Chile. On the other hand, those same countries had an interest in North American naval technology, particularly that developed by the Confederacy during the Civil War, which they then employed in a number of regional military conflicts. It was this combination of demand for U.S. naval innovations, the data that came from the use of those innovations in combat, and the perceived threat to the United States from the Pacific that played an essential part in the creation of the “New Navy.”



The committee (V. Scott Kaufman--chair, Megan Threlkeld, and Charlie Laderman) also recognized **Micah Wayne Wright** with Honorable Mention for his dissertation, “Puerto Rico and U.S. Empire in the Caribbean, 1898-1936,” which was advised by Andrew Kirkendall at Texas A&M University. This well-researched dissertation, which relies on both Spanish- and English-language sources, challenges earlier assessments as to when Puerto Ricans became agents of the U.S. empire. Wright assesses the impact Puerto Ricans’ unique role--caught between their love of nation, their Latin identity, their divisions over independence or statehood, and the U.S. effort to have them support North American imperialism--had on the divisions among Puerto Ricans and the establishment of the “third way,” that is, a place between statehood and independence.

Marilyn Blatt Young Dissertation Completion Fellowship

A Ph.D. Candidate in History at the Johns Hopkins University, **Jilene Chua** is completing a dissertation entitled “U.S. Colonial Law and Chinese Life in the Philippines.” The project explores U.S. legal colonialism in the Philippines by focusing on negotiations in the legal realm between the U.S. colonial state and the Chinese migrants, immigrants, and their descendants living there. It sheds light on how the Chinese population—a prominent contributor to the economy but excluded from citizenship and discriminated against at the same time—concretely lived the ongoing tensions between local and global economic aspirations and colonial state-building. The project reveals the intersection of two phenomena rarely studied together: the expansion of formal U.S. colonialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the fierce opposition to Chinese immigration that swept the United States (and several other nations) at the same time. With its analysis of multiple facets of U.S. colonial law—immigration, citizenship, criminal, commercial, and inheritance law—Chua’s project stands out for its breadth and for the masterful use of the skills it entails. Chua has brought together a broad range of archival documents collected from a heterogeneous set of repositories in the Philippines and in the United States, in addition to oral histories, which altogether required the use of at least four languages (English, Spanish, Tagalog, and Philippine-Hokkien). As a result of this impressive archival research, Chua is able to foreground many understudied historical actors, painstakingly analyzing their multiple perspectives and experiences. This dissertation therefore complicates numerous historiographical strands and debates, from legal colonialism, gender, and race to labor, cultural history, and international history at large.



The committee (Ilaria Scaglia—chair, Tore Olsson, and Monica Kim) also awarded Honorable Mention to **Mattie Christine**

Webb, a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of California, Santa Barbara. She is completing a dissertation entitled “Diplomacy at Work: The South African Worker and the Sullivan Principles on the Shop Floors, 1973–1986.” Drawing on both archival research and interviews and contributing to numerous ongoing historiographical debates, this project stands out for the multiple ways in which it gives agency to Black workers to shed light on the role they played in the dismantling of the apartheid system. Webb succeeds admirably at balancing top-down diplomatic history with bottom-up labor and social history, due primarily to the project’s wide source base, which draws both upon South African and international archives and oral histories. “Diplomacy at Work” is an exciting contribution to the transnational history of internationalism and Black liberation.



Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize


This year’s prize goes to **Mattias Fibiger** for “A Diplomatic Counter-revolution: Indonesian Diplomacy and the Invasion of East Timor,” *Modern Asian Studies* 55, no. 2 (March 2021): 587–628. The committee (Melani McAlister—chair, Alex Beasley, and Theresa Keeley) found it to be a deeply researched and highly nuanced account of debates within the Indonesian government about policy toward East Timor at the moment that Portugal departed its former colony. Fibiger draws on the archives of the Suharto regime to trace the ways in which advocates for annexation mobilized within the state bureaucracy, and then, crucially, with regional states such as Australia, Singapore, and Malaysia. This story of the diplomatic push of counter-revolutionary actors such as Suharto shows how deeply the Afro-Asian alliance was fractured by the realities of the postcolonial era. This is a truly global-facing history, which positions the United States as one important factor in a far more multilateral story.



The committee also awarded Honorable Mention to **Augusta Dell’Omo** for “Infernal Handiwork: Trinity Broadcasting Network Aids Apartheid South Africa, 1980-1994,” *Diplomatic History* 45, no. 4 (September 2021): 767-93. This article radically reframes historical treatments of the transnational politics of South African apartheid. Focusing on the U.S. Trinity Broadcasting Network (TBN)—a white, conservative, evangelical Christian outlet that partnered with the apartheid government in the 1980s and 1990s, Dell’Omo unearths a wide-ranging “pro-apartheid movement” that countered the more well-known global anti-apartheid movement of the era. Her work makes crucial interventions in the history of white evangelicalism, the (transnational) origins of “color blind” conservatism, the long history of the recently resurgent global white supremacist movement, and the afterlives of “white men’s countries” like South Africa in the late twentieth century.



Diana Lemberg, Lecturer in the School of History at the University of St. Andrews, also received Honorable Mention for “The Weaponization of Language Training in U.S. Foreign Relations, 1941-1970,” *Diplomatic History* 45, no. 1 (January 2021): 106-31. Lemberg persuasively demonstrates how audiolingualism, a language teaching method, grew from its military beginnings to become the U.S. government’s preferred method, as it promised to reshape linguistic behavior and thereby expand the global influence of the United States. In exploring the link between U.S. power and language training, Lemberg also highlights the porous relationship between the foreign and the domestic, as she shows that audiolingualism was used to teach U.S. students as well.



Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

Roberto Saba won this year’s prize for *American Mirror: The United States and Brazil in the Age of Emancipation* (Princeton University Press), which the committee (Jeremi Suri—chair, Gretchen Heefner, and David Milne) considered transnational history at its best. Drawing from a rich array of sources in Brazil and the United States, Saba shows how and why emancipation



became tied to the promotion of capital and wage labor, rather than human rights and democracy. Saba's cast of characters is impressive, including journalists, engineers, missionaries, planters, diplomats, entrepreneurs, and students. Individuals and ideas circulated between the two countries, as each sought to facilitate the transition from a political economic order based on slave labor to one in which free labor ideology could reign. The project was remarkably successful, Saba shows. Saba's book provocatively problematizes the meaning of post-slavery emancipation for freedom and democracy, raising enduring questions about the relationship between labor, finance, and political power in modern capitalist economies.



Paul Hirsch received Honorable Mention for *Pulp Empire: The Secret History of Comic Book Imperialism* (University of Chicago Press), a beautiful, unique, and provocative book. Turning to comic books as a revealing source for popular culture and policy in the Cold War, Hirsch captures the nightmares, hopes, and dreams of countless citizens in a nuclear world. In his close analysis, comic books are both projections and promoters of core beliefs about conflict and power. With their reach among diverse readers, the comic books set the discursive boundaries for many discussions about good and evil as well as strength and weakness in a time of transition for formerly isolationist Americans. Hirsch's book blends cultural analysis with discussions of gender, race, and nationalism. His book opens many valuable perspectives on the complex sources of Cold War thinking.

Myrna F. Bernath Book Award

Joanne Meyerowitz received this year's prize for *A Global War on Poverty: The Lost Promise of Redistribution and the Rise of Microcredit* (Princeton University Press), a welcome contribution to the literature on the history of international development. Focusing on development practices since the 1960s, she offers a fresh, compelling intervention by directing attention to the paradoxical intersection of the rise of neoliberalism and gender politics. Meyerowitz shows how practitioners abandoned the goal of redistribution and found new purpose by focusing on impoverished women, ultimately leading to microcredit models of international aid that re-branded female recipients as "entrepreneurs." The committee (Daniel Immerwahr—chair, Lucy Salyer, and Kimber Quinney) praised the book's brisk and assured style and described it as not only a major work of scholarship but also a model of the craft that sheds light on the complicated politics of global poverty relief.



Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize



Mark Atwood Lawrence is this year's recipient of the Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize for best subsequent book in the field for *The End of Ambition: The United States and the Third World in the Vietnam Era* (Princeton University Press). The committee (Sheyda Jahanbani—chair, Sarah Snyder, and Mario Del Pero) was deeply impressed by this original, elegant, and important book. Diving into one of the most underexplored aspects of Lyndon Johnson's presidency—his engagement with the post-colonial world beyond Vietnam, Lawrence offers us surprising new insights into how a president who dreamed of a "Great Society for the world" ultimately chose to put stability and order over the principles of democracy and justice. The archival treasures Lawrence unearthed, the narrative he so powerfully constructed, and the contribution he has made to existing scholarship on the Johnson

presidency, the United States and the Third World, the Cold War, and decolonization all demonstrate intellectual brio and rigor in equal parts. It is an extraordinary achievement.

The committee also recognized **Yunxiang Gao** with Honorable Mention for *Arise, Africa! Roar, China! Black and Chinese Citizens of the World in the Twentieth Century* (University of North Carolina Press), which dazzled with its creative approach to documenting and contextualizing the many different kinds of connections that existed between Black intellectual-activists--W. E. B. Du Bois, Paul Robeson, and Langston Hughes--and their Asian counterparts--Liu Liangmo and Sylvia Silan Chen. Gao's multi-lingual archival finds—in such diverse collections—reveal the potential of transnational history to tell enormous stories in exciting and revelatory ways.



The Michael H. Hunt Prize for International History

The 2022 Michael H. Hunt Prize for International History is awarded to **Roberto Saba** for his book *American Mirror: The United States and Brazil in the Age of Emancipation* (Princeton University Press). The committee (Nathan Citino--chair, Max Paul Friedman, and Katharina Rietzler) found it to be a highly original study about the unmaking of slavery and the consolidation of capitalism in the United States and Brazil. Based on extensive research in English and Portuguese, the book delivers a clear, powerful argument that transnational collaboration among capitalist modernizers helped to abolish slavery and extend capitalist labor relations into the plantation countryside. Neither a complete emancipation nor mere transition to other forms of unfree labor, the abolition of slavery fulfilled bourgeois modernizers' agenda of integrating agriculture into global capitalist markets on the basis of formally free wage labor. *American Mirror* explores the many dimensions of this agenda, from infrastructure projects and the capitalist development of the coffee trade to the publication of periodicals and the establishment of modern schools. It shows that in contrast to the sectional crisis that led to the U.S. civil war, anti-slavery forces, including American investors, collaborated with Brazilian planters who appropriated U.S. capital and expertise as they adapted to capitalist wage labor. For Brazilians, the United States reflected the possibilities of capitalist modernity, while Brazil showed Americans an alternative image of national development through peaceful emancipation. The book makes new contributions to several historiographical debates, including those concerning slavery and capitalism; abolition; imperialism; and U.S.-Latin American relations. *American Mirror* is therefore an original work of transnational political economy that critiques capitalism in the Marxist tradition of Eric Williams.



The committee also recognizes **Christian Ostermann** with Honorable Mention for his book *Between Containment and Rollback: The United States and the Cold War in Germany* (Stanford University Press). An outstanding, even exemplary, work of international history, *Between Containment and Rollback* utilizes German, English, and Russian sources to provide a definitive account of crucial events in the early Cold War. While generously acknowledging previous scholarship, Dr. Ostermann contributes an original analysis of the postwar division of Germany and the 1953 East German uprising. The committee congratulates Dr. Ostermann for his book, which represents excellence in international history to which he has also contributed over many years by facilitating the work of other scholars at the Woodrow Wilson International Center.

Arthur S. Link-Warren F. Kuehl Prize for Documentary Editing

The Link-Kuehl Prize recognizes outstanding collections of primary source materials in the fields of international or diplomatic history, especially those distinguished by the inclusion of commentary designed to interpret the documents and set them within their historical context. This year's prize goes to the meticulous "born digital" source, *The Papers of the Revolutionary Era Pinckney Statesmen* (University of Virginia Press), edited by Constance B. Schulz and her staff.



It is a massive project of documentary editing that stands at the cutting edge of modern electronic publishing. Covering the period of 1792-1811, volumes two and three contain 2,099 fully edited documents and an additional 3,873 calendared documents. The prize committee (Chris Dietrich--chair, David Reynolds, and David Nickles) especially lauded its coverage of numerous types of history--political, diplomatic, social, gender, African-American, family--that will greatly enrich the scholarship of many future historians of the revolutionary and early national eras. Among the distinctive editorial features is the linked identification of persons enslaved by the Pinckney family.



The full list of the Pinckney Project staff, who made substantial contributions to volumes 2 and 3 follows:

Senior Editor: Constance B. Schulz

Associate Editors: Robert Karachuk, Mary Sherrer, and Marty D. Matthews

Assistant Editors: Brooke Alexander, Chad T. Allen, Robin V. H. Copp, and Rachel Love Monroy

Consultants: Monica Henry-Leibovich and Mary MacNeil

Graduate Research Assistants: Gary Sellick, Katelynn Hatton, Casey J. Lee, Zoie Anderson-Horecny, and Caleb Wittum

Undergraduate Research Assistants: Maura Dunn, Madison Santmyer, Zhane Gaillard, Zkara Gaillard, and Riley Sutherland

The Link-Kuehl committee also awards Honorable Mention to **Joseph M. Henning** as editor of *Interpreting the Mikado's Empire: The Writings of William Elliot Griffis*. An annotated and contextualized selection of twenty-five excerpts on Griffis's voluminous published writings on East Asia, this volume provides a valuable insight into the perspectives of a person who influenced U.S. views of Japan. The volume reveals a great deal about the United States during the Gilded Age and Progressive eras and is relevant to international historians interested in subjects such as racial Darwinism and stereotypes about "the orient."




The Peter L. Hahn Distinguished Service Award

This award recognizes a long-time SHAFR member "whose service demonstrates a deep commitment to the organization's mission of promoting and disseminating" foreign relations scholarship, and for mentorship, teaching, and other important service. The committee (Mary Dudziak—chair, Mark Bradley, and Melvyn Leffler) is pleased to make this year's award to **Mitchell Lerner**, Professor of History at Ohio State, and Director of its East Asian Studies Center. Among his contributions to SHAFR, Mitch was the force behind turning SHAFR's informal newsletter into the publication *Passport* and editing it for eight years. For his vision, dedication, and hard work, the committee

is proud to recognize Mitch with the Peter L. Hahn Distinguished Service Award.

The Norman and Laura Graebner Award

The Graebner Award is a lifetime achievement award intended to recognize a senior historian of United States foreign relations who has significantly contributed to the development of the field, through scholarship, teaching, and/or service, over their career. This year's winner certainly meets those qualifications. **Frank Costigliola**, Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor at the University of Connecticut, earned his PhD from Cornell in 1973 under the direction of Walter LaFeber. Since then, Frank has been a major contributor to SHAFR's growth and development, serving in significant leadership roles over the past five decades.



He has been a member of the Executive Council (twice) and served as SHAFR's Vice President in 2008 and its President in 2009. He has also served on the Board of Editors of *Diplomatic History*. All SHAFR members recognize Frank's many scholarly contributions to the field but are particularly grateful for his role as co-editor of *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, 3rd edition, and *America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941*, 2nd edition. Also of interest to all SHAFR members was Frank's active participation on the CIA's Historical Review Panel (2016-2019) and as an invited consultant to the Department of State's Policy Planning Staff in July 2014.

In addition, Frank has made many significant and pathbreaking contributions to the study of America in the world, among them *The Kennan Diaries* (editor); *Roosevelt's Lost Alliances: How Personal Politics Helped Start the Cold War*, which won SHAFR's Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize; *France and the United States: The Cold Alliance since World War II*; and *Awkward Dominion: American Political, Economic and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919-1933*. Frank's thoughtful and frequent essays have explored the intersection of culture, economics, and politics, and his recent publications on the role of emotions in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy are pioneering to say the least.

We have all benefited from Frank's insight, his intellect, his scholarship, and his SHAFR leadership. Therefore the prize committee (Robert Brigham—chair, Andrew Rotter, and Judy Wu) is very pleased to recognize Frank Costigliola as the unanimous choice for the 2022 Norman and Laura Graebner Award.

SHAFR SPOTLIGHTS

After graduating from the University of Sydney in 2001, my first plan was to become a diplomat. I took the exam for the Australian foreign service, passed every level, but ultimately fell at the last hurdle because I refused to renounce my Iranian citizenship. I decided to try my luck with international organisations, so I headed to the United States for a masters degree at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and then joined the UN Secretariat in New York in the Executive Office of Secretary-General Kofi Annan. When my contract ended, I could have stayed in the UN system, but it would have meant going to Afghanistan or Iraq given my language skills. That wasn't exciting enough for me, so instead I opted for the dangers of punting and high table at Oxford. In the last year of my DPhil at Oxford, I applied for a lectureship at LSE in order to get some experience with the job market. To my complete surprise, they offered me the job and I've been teaching in the Department of International History ever since. My work is focused on 'Iran and the World' including US-Iran relations. My first book, *Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah*, looked at the partnership between Iran the United States in the 1970s. My current book project is a transnational history, examining human rights activism in Europe and the United States and the origins of the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?

Curb Your Enthusiasm is pretty, pretty good. I grew up watching a lot of British TV in Australia, so *Fawlty Towers* and *Yes, Minister* are high on my list. I love espionage thrillers (isn't that how we all ended up in SHAFR?). My favourite are the BBC adaptations of *Tinker, Tailor, Solider, Spy* and *Smiley's People* with Alec Guinness. I love Iranian films, but I can generally only take them in small doses as they are so heavy. I recommend Mani Haghighi's *Pig* (2018), an irreverent satire of Iranian cinema featuring a serial killer who targets film directors in Tehran.

What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

It would have to be when I started teaching at LSE. I was 31 and hadn't yet finished my DPhil, so I was working furiously to finish my dissertation and come to grips with a full-time job. Like a lot of junior academics, I had imposter syndrome. I was terrified that the students would see right through me. I remember wearing a tie to work for the first year, just to make it clear that I worked there and was not a student.

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

Obviously, I would love to have dinner with Nixon, Kissinger and the Shah, but preferably at one of Ardeshir Zahedi's legendary soirées in the Persian Room of the Imperial Iranian Embassy in Washington, DC. The one historical figure I would have loved to meet is Shapour Bakhtiar, Iran's last prime minister under the Shah. From his days as a student fighting in the French Resistance, to serving in Mosaddeq's government, to his brief premiership, to his murder in exile in the Paris suburbs in 1991 at the hands of the Islamic Republic, he dedicated his whole life to the cause of secular democracy in Iran. I'd love to be able to tell him that history vindicated him.

What would you do if you won the \$500 million Powerball?

I would set up my own history department and hire all my friends. There would be no committees, no administration, no forms, no annual reviews, and an annual writing retreat at our summer campus on the Cote d'Azur. You teach what you want, how you want, and you research what you want, how you want. Tuition would be free, salaries would make bankers envious, and grades would have to be earned. The departmental cafeteria would serve Persian food (there will be no debate or discussion about that).

You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

I would have loved to attend the Baalbek International Festival in Lebanon back in the early 1970s, before the civil war. To see Fairuz and Nina Simone performing in the ruins of the Roman temples in the Beqaa Valley would be something. I'd also love to have attended the Shiraz Arts Festival in Iran between 1967-1977, especially Iannis Xenakis's light and sound performance at Persepolis.

What are five things on your bucket list?

- To finish my current book;
- To visit every Persian-speaking country/community in the world;
- To have a dog;
- To produce a Netflix series on the Iranian Revolution;
- To build a library for my books and my collection of Iranian memorabilia

What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

Most likely I would have stayed in the UN system and continued as an international civil servant. Now I think I'd go into television, particularly producing Persian-language documentaries. Given that my books are banned in Iran, I love being able to reach an Iranian audience through the medium of television.



Roham Alvandi

I'm a senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies, where I work on US foreign policy. I grew up on a farm in a rural part of Denmark. Flat, windy, and nice enough but not much to it. An academic career was not in the cards but somehow, I ended up studying history at the University of Copenhagen, where I gravitated toward the America and its relationship to the world. Before I knew it, I had lived a combined four years in Washington DC, San Francisco, New York, and North Carolina, studying, working, researching, and traveling. Along the way, I wrote a book, *Reagan, Congress, and Human Rights: Contesting Morality in US Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, 2020), and several articles on human rights, democracy promotion and transatlantic relations. I'm currently working on a commissioned study of Denmark's 20-year engagement in Afghanistan as well as a new research project on the history of American efforts to build a community of democracies. I live in Copenhagen, Denmark with my wife and our daughter, where I try to fit in some time for football (known to some as soccer), sci-fi novels, and travelling.

What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?

In no particular order, my favorites TV shows include *The Wire*, *The Americans*, *Westworld* (1st season) and in the lighter end *Seinfeld*, *The Office*, and *Parks and Recreation*. Another excellent show I watched recently is *Station Eleven*. My guilty pleasure is random sci-fi movies and series (I need to watch *The Expanse*, don't I!) The list of movies is way too long to comply with the maximum limit here, but as child of the 90's, I have a soft spot for *The Big Lebowski*.

What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

The most nerve-wracking moment would have to be the interview for my current position. It took place virtually with seven or eight people seated together in a room and me zooming in. As many people have experienced by now, selling yourself through a computer screen is not easy and can be quite stressful. Moreover, the stakes were particularly high because it was my dream job, and I knew there probably wouldn't be another one like it for several years. Consequently, losing out on it would mean trying my luck at the academic job market abroad or leaving academia.

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

This is a tough one. I will try to pick three that I think would enjoy each other's company and make it a fun night. First, Kurt Vonnegut. I love his books and I think he would bring a good mixture of absurdist humor and interesting political thinking to the table. Next, Socrates, the footballer, not the philosopher (that he was named after). Picked not for his skills with a ball but for his visions off the pitch. At his Brazilian club Corinthians, he began the Corinthians Democracy movement that gave everyone (including cleaning staff) an equal vote in managing the club and split win bonuses equally. The movement eventually helped pave the way for democracy in Brazil in 1985. I would love to hear his thoughts on politics and football and pick his brain for my answer to the next question. Finally, since I can see this is shaping up to be a rather revolutionary bunch, I might as well go all in and invite Rosa Luxemburg. I don't know if she would be able to keep up with the drinking of the others (who were both heavy drinkers), but she would certainly increase the level of sophistication in the conversation. I was tempted to add Ronald Reagan for his jokes and the chance to ask him research questions, but I'm afraid the clash of politics with the other guests would be too great.



Rasmus S. Sondergard

What would you do if you won the \$500 million Powerball?

What I would really like to say in response to such a question is that in an ideal world no person would have this kind of money as it is diametrical to democracy and unethical in a world of deprivation. But such an answer, of course, doesn't make for a fun read. So, on a less serious note, I would unite with other people with money to spare and buy my beloved Manchester United from its unpopular billionaire owners and turn it into a fans-owned club along the German model where fans own the majority of the shares. If I'm allowed to dream further, this would be the first step towards the revolution so badly needed in modern football that would kick out authoritarian regimes and dubious billionaires as owners and reduce the influence of money in the beautiful game. Much like me winning the Powerball, this of course will never happen.

You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

An unlimited budget is of course great, but I feel like the real asset here is the time machine. So, I would focus on artists who are no longer with us that I never had a chance to see perform live. An incomplete list would include the Beatles, the Doors, Jimmy Hendrix, Nina Simone, Nirvana, Jeff Buckley, Bob Marley, Aretha Franklin, Queen, and the Velvet Underground. If I were to add a band that doesn't require a time machine, I would invite Arcade Fire. In addition to the musical performances, I would include a SHAFR-style roundtable on US foreign affairs featuring John Lennon, Nina Simone, Bob Marley, and Kurt Cobain.

What are five things on your bucket list?

I don't have a bucket list as such. But like many people, I have lots of places I would like to visit. From filling in US visa applications, I know that I have visited 37 countries so far (yes, dear American friends, they make you do this). I would like to grow that list and revisit some of my favorites with my family.

What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

One option would be to take over the aforementioned family farm, where I would become the sixth generation, but I can say for certain that I don't have the talents for that. So, more likely, I would be working in international affairs in some way, possibly the Danish foreign service or an international organization.

I am currently Senior Lecturer in U.S. history at the University of Sheffield. My interest in history—or at least academic history—was sparked by a class I took at Oberlin during my first semester of freshman year on World War II. We read Daniel Goldhagen's *Hitler's Willing Executioners* and Christopher Browning's *Ordinary Men* side-by-side. Goldhagen and Browning, famously, disagreed on the exceptionalism of Germans' capacity for atrocity. Suddenly it became clear to me that the historian's job was not to recite a chronology of events, but to interpret their sources in service of an argument that helps us to understand the mechanisms of change over time. That class led me to major in history and, after a few years working at a foundation—where I spent my time writing press releases on short deadlines, with little time to think—I ended up going back to school to get my PhD at the University of Chicago. My first book, *Gateway State: Hawai'i and the Cultural Transformation of American Empire* (Princeton, 2019) looks at how Hawai'i statehood emerged at the intersection of global decolonization and domestic civil rights. My current project explores the reinvention of New York as a global city after its 1975 fiscal crisis.



Sarah Miller-Davenport

What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?

This is where I expose myself as an unabashedly middle-brow movie consumer with a nostalgia complex. My three favorite films are all from the 1980s, and they were all watched repeatedly and obsessively on my parents' VCR: *Ghostbusters*, *Pretty in Pink*, and *Dirty Dancing*. *Ghostbusters* is a classic New York movie, and I have what I'm sure is an apocryphal memory of watching them film that scene where the street splits open from the window of my school bus one day. *Pretty in Pink* probably has the best soundtrack of all time. I can still recite entire monologues from *Dirty Dancing*, and I will forever defend that movie as a sophisticated take on class, mid-century Jewish assimilationist culture, and reproductive rights.

Like many academics I know, I watch a lot of TV to turn off my brain at night. Recently I've really enjoyed *Severance*, *We Own this City*, *Under the Banner of Heaven*, *Yellowjackets*, *Evil*, and *Hacks*.

What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

As a graduate student, I once had an interview for a prize lectureship and one of the professors on the selection committee sighed audibly and covered his face with his hands while I was talking. I somehow got through the rest of the interview and promptly went home and wept. (Faculty: don't do this!)

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

That Walter Benjamin quote at the beginning of Mike Davis's *City of Quartz*—"A native's book about his city will always be related to memoirs; the writer has not spent his childhood there in vain"—has always stuck with me. This is how I justify my somewhat solipsistic current project, which is about my home town of New York and its reinvention as a global city after its 1975 fiscal crisis. In my research I get to go back to the New York of the late-1970s and 1980s, which I remember both vividly and vaguely in equal measure. I would love to see Bella Abzug and Ed Koch duking it out over dinner (I'd root for Bella). And I once came across a woman in the archives who wrote to City Hall to complain about the fact that the noise from garbage trucks interfered with her early-morning "merry lovemaking" with her husband. I think she should be there too. New York City really does produce outsized characters.

What would you do if you won the \$500 million Powerball?

That is entirely too much money! I would use a little over a million of it to buy a relatively modest apartment in Brooklyn, which is, alas, what that kind of home costs these days. I would go out to eat more and upgrade some of my clothes and furniture. I would not bat an eye at the cost of Diptyque candles or fancy hand soap. But no one needs that much to live on and so I would give most of it away to organizations dedicated to mutual aid, housing justice, defunding the police, and combatting climate change.

You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

Blondie, Prince, Madonna, the Shangri-Las, and Nirvana.

What are five things on your bucket list?

I love a good murder mystery and someday, decades from now, I'd like to write a murder mystery, under a pseudonym, set in academia. The aforementioned mean professor might make an appearance.

Following the murder mystery theme: I've always wanted to host one of those murder mystery parties. Am I too old for this? Maybe.

While we're on parties: in pre-pandemic times, I prided myself on throwing a great dinner party. But I once went to a friend's dinner party that put me to shame. One thing that made it particularly memorable was their homemade wine, including a parsnip wine that was surprisingly delicious. Making your own wine is a bit intimidating and potentially explosive, but I would love to say, "please try my homemade carrot-rhubarb wine" to my dinner guests.

Since we're on the topic of food and drink: I don't eat meat and love to cook and I've long wanted to go to Phuket, Thailand, during the vegetarian Nine Emperor Gods Festival and take a vegetarian cooking class.

On travel: I would visit all of the world's bioluminescent bays. Many years ago I went kayaking in the bioluminescent bay in Vieques, Puerto Rico, and it was among the most spectacular experiences I've ever had. Apparently three of the five bioluminescent bays in the world are in Puerto Rico. I'm sure there's a really incisive *DH* article to be written about that.

What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

This is supposed to be fantasy, so let's go with dog psychologist! I already have lots of amateur expertise, especially after spending so much time at home with my dog, Lupa, during the pandemic. She is endearingly bananas—and endlessly fascinating. Maybe I'd figure out why she loves one out of every 100 dogs and despises all the rest.

I've had an atypical path to becoming a history professor. I grew thinking I'd be a professional musician, but I joined the Marines halfway through college instead. After five years on active duty as an engineer officer, I transitioned into the reserves, which allowed me to go back to school while still spending summers in uniform. I started Yale's American Studies program in 2002, but later transferred into the history department, where I became fascinated with the U.S. military's political and cultural interventions in American society and foreign policy. After finishing grad school, I spent several years teaching at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis and published my first book – a cultural history of the Marine Corps in WWII and the early Cold War. Thereafter, I served in Afghanistan and held a diplomatic posting in Juba, South Sudan. In 2016, I was appointed as Director of Defense Policy and Strategy on President Obama's National Security Council Staff. I moved to UT Austin in 2017 and met my wife, Jessica, there as well. My research interests are all over the place at times, but they mostly concern the ways that military influence and military infrastructure have affected U.S. politics, culture, and foreign relations since World War II. I am currently working on a history of the Global War on Terror, which will be published by Simon & Schuster in the next few years.

What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?

From watching friends raise children, I know that no good comes from picking favorites. I have a few films that I re-watch periodically just for fun, so I'll offer a few of them here. For overall goodness and happiness: *Forrest Gump*. For pure laughs: *Guardians of the Galaxy*. For amazing acting and drama: *Sophie's Choice*. For originality: Wes Anderson's *Royal Tenenbaums* and *Grand Budapest Hotel*. For clever innovations in the soldier-comes-home-from-war genre: *Taking Chance* and *The Lucky Ones*. And, finally, for thoughtful rom-coms, I don't think you can beat Richard Curtis, who wrote *About Time*, *Knotting Hill*, and *Love, Actually*.

What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

I note that this question does not allow a list like some of the others, so I'll have to confine myself to just one such moment. Do I go with the time I fainted from heat exhaustion at the very first meet-and-greet between faculty and new grad students, prompting my department chair to note that no one had yet died on his watch and he hoped to keep it that way? Or, should I go with the time I got food poisoning on a campus visit and had to give my job talk while sweating and warning that I might have to make a dash for the bathroom halfway through? Or do I just wait for this summer's SHAFR conference where I shall surely do something that adds to the list? I choose option 3.

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

I can't even get three *living* people to commit to dinner these days. And, if I could resurrect the dead for dinner, I wouldn't put three of them all together. The zombie threat is just too great. Also, did anyone consider how these guests are going to respond when they suddenly arrive in the present, learn of their own deaths, and are then ordered to have one last dinner, but with strangers? Who is going to explain the Internet to Benjamin Franklin? Not me. He's not getting anywhere near my browser.

What would you do if you won the \$500 million Powerball?

I'd buy a small 2-BR house here in Austin, TX, and use the remaining \$39 for one of those hats with fans attached to it so I can survive the summer heat.

You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

Ok, the first thing I'd do is use the time machine to make just enough small changes in the past so that everyone in the world agrees with me that loud, crowded festivals are not fun after age 30, and it's much better to have intimate concerts of about 150 people in a beautiful space where you can hear the music without being moshed, or smoshed, or moofed, or whatever it is kids do at festivals these days. (I understand that altering the past is dangerous, and if you don't do it right, we end up with a world where dinosaurs wear smoking jackets and turtles have invented the telegraph, but I just don't care.) Then we'd all gather somewhere beautiful (perhaps the Cloisters in Manhattan?) and listen to Bach on harpsichord, Miles on trumpet, Django on guitar, and a bunch of bluegrass musicians no one else has heard of. I'm also pretty partial to a Cape Verdean Fado singer named Cesaria Evora, so she'll probably be there too. We'd round the whole thing out with sets by Dolly Parton, James Brown, Woody Guthrie, and a Fat Elvis concert complete with horn section, strings, back-up singers and a karate demonstration. Bob Dylan can come too, but only if e-nun-ci-ates, so we can decipher what song he is actually singing.

What are five things on your bucket list?

It's good to have dreams, but lists (and buckets) can sometimes get in the way of living well. I try with a sense of purpose that isn't tied to things or specific experiences, but to how I learn about and treat other living creatures.

What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

I guess I'd still be in the Marines, but I wouldn't be as happy as I am as a teacher. Maybe I'd be a constitutional lawyer; that seems like a growth field these days. Two of my favorite memories are of hiking the Camino of Santiago in Spain and the Appalachian Trail in the Eastern U.S., so maybe I'd just take my family and do those over and over again until I receive a turtle-gram with our next assignment.



Aaron O'Connell



Jayita Sarkar

I was born and raised in Calcutta, India, where I spent the first two decades of my life. After that, I moved around quite a bit— first a year in France, then several years in Switzerland, followed by nearly a decade in New England (New Haven, CT; the Boston area; and Norwich, VT) and now I am in Scotland, in the UK. For SHAFR folks, Calcutta in India is today known as Kolkata— it was officially renamed at the turn of the twenty-first century.

As a child I was fascinated by the past, but I was not that interested in history as a subject taught in school. It had to do with how it was taught and what was taught. There was very little modern and contemporary history in our textbooks. There was a lot about ancient civilizations of the South Asian subcontinent, the Mughal empire, British colonialism, and the moment of independence of August 1947. After 1947, there was no more history in our textbooks— it was political science.

But once I realized that textbook history and history as a discipline are two different universes, for me there was no looking back. I received a PhD in History from the Graduate Institute Geneva in Switzerland, which is well-known for its strengths in modern, contemporary, and international history. After all, the Institute was founded to create expertise for the League of Nations, which was the predecessor of the United Nations.

I currently live in Scotland with my wife and two cats. My first book, *Ploughshares and Swords: India's Nuclear Program in the Global Cold War* was published by Cornell University Press in 2022. I am currently writing my second book, *Atomic Capitalism: A Global History*, and conducting research for the next one, *Partition Machine: From South Asia to the World*.

What are your favorite movies/TV shows of all time?

I rarely watch TV shows, but when I do, I watch standup comedy sets. Before the COVID-19 pandemic upended our lives, I used to do standup comedy workshops at Improv Boston for fun. I also watch a lot of standup comedy as much as I can.

As for movies, I love movies with good historical content. It is hard to pick favorites because they are so many! My all-time favorite movies are: *Jules et Jim* by François Truffaut (1962), *Ghore Baire* by Satyajit Ray (1984), and *Europa Europa* by Agnieszka Holland (1990)

What was your most embarrassing/nerve-wracking/anxiety-producing professional moment?

That would have to be my first research presentation as a graduate student back in 2010. I could hear my heartbeat through my eardrums as I spoke— I was very nervous. I started out as a scaredy grad student.

If you could have dinner with any three historical figures, who would they be and why?

This is not in any particular order.

Lord George Nathaniel Curzon. Not because I am a fan (on the contrary), but because my newest book project is on partitions as an idea and practice, and he might have some answers— especially where his writings and papers go silent. Simone de Beauvoir. I was fascinated by the *Second Sex*, when I first read it back in college. I want to learn more about her ideas on gender-queerness (if she has any), and see what she thought about LGBTQIA+ politics of our times— both the progress and backlash. Mahasweta Devi. Her writings have inspired me from a young age. Her work is emancipatory, to say the least. I want to hear from her how she wrote so fearlessly against all odds.

What would you do if you won the \$500 million Powerball?

I would use a part of it to buy a small villa in Taormina, Sicily to visit every summer. After all, Scotland does not get much sun! The other part of it would go to create a foundation to support digitization of social archives from fraught territories across the world (an ongoing research interest that connects my next two book projects).

You have been given an unlimited budget and a time machine to organize a music festival. What bands or solo acts do you invite?

This would be a mish-mash of my musical tastes in Bengali, Hindi, French, and German. So, here is a motley list:

- Mohiner Ghoraguli
- Indian Ocean
- Stromae – especially, “Alors on danse” and “Papaouté”
- Edith Piaf
- Zaz
- Charles Aznavour
- Die Ärzte
- Max Raabe

What are five things on your bucket list?

Now that I think about it, I have already checked four out of five things on my bucket list.

- Floated on the Dead Sea
- Snowshoed on an active volcano
- Hiked an active volcano
- Did a tour of Norwegian fjords

The only thing I haven't done yet is see the *aurora borealis*. Hopefully, our recent move to Scotland will facilitate that. Once that happens, it will be time to come up with a new bucket list.

What would you be doing if you were not an academic?

I enjoy taking candid photos of everyday urban life. I particularly enjoy photographing dilapidated buildings with a distinct architectural past. Old buildings in Calcutta (my hometown), Palermo, and Naples, for example, excite me very much. So, I think I would likely have been a photographer or a photojournalist of urban decline.

SHAFR Council Meeting March 2, 2022 via Zoom

Council Members Present: Laura Belmonte (presiding), Emily Conroy-Krutz, Ann Heiss, Kristin Hoganson, Daniel Immerwahr, Kyle Longely, Sarah Miller-Davenport, Andrew Preston, Lauren Turek, Vanessa Walker, Karine Walther, Molly Wood, and Kelsey Zavelo.
Attending: Amy Sayward (ex officio), Faith Bagley

Renewal of the *Passport* Editor

Laura Belmonte started the meeting and presented an oral report on the findings of the committee charged with reviewing *Passport* editor Andrew Johns for renewal. In light of his work, his self-evaluation, and the findings of the committee, the committee recommended that Johns be reappointed for another five-year term. That motion passed unanimously, 13-0-0.

General Renewal Policy

Amy Sayward reviewed the proposed draft renewal process that Council had requested at its January meeting. It was drafted to cover the executive director and editors of *Passport* and *Diplomatic History*, but it could be expanded in the future to include the conference coordinator and *Guide* editor. The initial term of service is five years, so in the fourth year, the person will undergo a review process, which includes self-reflection as well as an affirmation of institutional support, where that is relevant. Following the review, Council can choose to renew the person for an additional five years (or a shorter period) or initiate a search to fill the position. If renewed, SHAFR would undertake national search in the ninth year, but Council could offer the person in the position the opportunity to compete in the national search. This policy would be incorporated into all future contracts/MOUs for these positions, or they could be added to the by-laws.

Shaun Armstead had suggested that the review might be more useful in the third year, rather than the fourth, to allow room for correction. Belmonte stated that regular communication and biannual reports are made by each of these positions, so it might not be necessary but could be helpful. Daniel Immerwahr made a motion to move the initial review to the third year; Karine Walther seconded the motion, which passed unanimously 13-0-0.

Walther then made a motion to approve the policy as amended; Emily Conroy-Krutz seconded, and all present voted in favor (13-0-0). Sayward spoke to the differences between putting this policy into the by-laws (which would require a vote of the membership this fall) versus just having it as an internal policy (which would be easier to amend as needed). Some Council members argued that adding the policy to the by-laws would make the process of filling and renewing those positions more transparent to the membership. Others argued that both goals could be accomplished by publishing this policy in the minutes and in *Passport*, without having to amend the by-laws. In a poll of Council members, a majority favored publication of the policy without amending the by-laws (9-4-0).

Sanctions and Appeals Committee

Sayward guided Council through the key points of the draft of the Sanctions and Appeals Committee operating procedures, which were drafted in response to questions proposed by the Code of Conduct Review Team (CCRT). The June 2021 Council meeting had established the committee will consist of five members, and the draft policy recommended that it respond only after the CCRT and External Investigator had reviewed accusations and levied initial sanctions (such as removal from the conference), which would occur immediately. The Sanctions and Appeals Committee would meet subsequently to decide on any additional sanctions; its minutes would remain confidential and become part of the official paper file in the Executive Director's possession, which would not be archived. The Executive Director would also be responsible for communicating the committee's decisions and for collecting/communicating any no-contact orders ahead of SHAFR events.

For the appeals section of the policy, the draft policy took the stance that if an offense had been serious enough to warrant a decision for expulsion from the organization by the Sanctions and Appeals Committee, such a decision would likely not be revisited unless exculpatory information had come to light. In other cases, the person could appeal after two years by presenting either exculpatory evidence or that steps they had taken to make amends. The Sanctions and Appeals Committee could also get a statement from the target of the behavior, which would be solicited through the Executive Director, who would also supply the committee with the original documentation. The Sanctions and Appeals Committee will decide whether to hear the appeal and whether to uphold, remove, or reduce sanctions.

A clarifying question was about a target of harassment who chose to remain anonymous at the time of the complaint. Sayward clarified that there could be no follow-up in such a case, and in any other case, the target would decide whether or not they wanted to be involved in the appeal process. There was discussion about whether the Sanctions and Appeals Committee would still meet if the external investigator did not recommend sanctions, and there was consensus that the committee would not meet if neither the external investigator nor the Code of Conduct Response Team (CCRT) recommended sanctions.

There was also discussion on whether the Sanctions and Appeals Committee would meet during the conference. Some suggested that the external investigator—responding to a CCRT report—should make a recommendation to the Sanctions and Appeals Committee, which would make the ultimate decision about in-conference sanctions (such as issuing a warning or expelling a person from the conference). However, others suggested that the external investigator should make that decision in order to ensure that there would be no appearance of a conflict of interest. In this case, the SHAFR President would notify the offender of the external investigator's sanction and would work with the Executive Director to execute that sanction. The Sanctions and Appeals Committee would, in this scenario, only meet after the conference and decide on any subsequent sanctions in the event that the CCRT and/or external investigator recommended further sanctions beyond the scope of the conference. Council also pointed out that this policy would not only apply to the conference but to all other SHAFR-organized events, therefore the wording in the draft policy should recognize that. There was also discussion of how conflicts of interest would play out in terms of the membership of the Sanctions and Appeals

Committee and what language to add to the draft policy to reflect this issue. In the case of a committee chair identifying a conflict of interest, there was consensus that the SHAFR President would ask another member of that same committee to fill in. In the case of a conflict of interest by the President and/or President-Elect, there was agreement that a former president could be asked to step in. In defining what type(s) of relationship would/should trigger a recusal, there was discussion of how close of a relationship might prevent someone from making an objective finding. Council requested that the Executive Director review and utilize the existing conflict-of-interest policy in a subsequent draft of this policy. The question of conflict of interest also came up in terms of whether there would or would not be an inherent conflict of interest if a member of the Sanctions and Appeals Committee who had been involved in an initial verdict was on the committee when it heard an appeal of that same verdict.

Council instructed the Executive Director to distill this feedback into a revised policy for further Council review and vote in a timeframe that would allow it to be in place ahead of the June conference. Additionally, the Executive Director was instructed to contact the external investigator ahead of each year's conference (rather than the head of the CCRT).

Decision on the Future of *The SHAFR Guide*

Building on its January discussion, the Executive Director had provided documentation and three basic decisions that Council could make about the future of *The SHAFR Guide*: to negotiate a new contract with Brill to publish the *Guide*, to discontinue publication of the *Guide*, or to move the *Guide* in-house as a member benefit. Council believed that the usage statistics by SHAFR members demonstrated that the *Guide* was useful to people, and Sayward affirmed that Alan McPherson was willing to continue as the editor of the *Guide*. There being no financial advantage to moving the *Guide* in-house, which was also a problematic proposition given the current flux in the state of the website, Andrew Preston moved that SHAFR continue publishing the *Guide* with Brill; Lauren Turek seconded the motion, which passed unanimously (13-0-0).

Webpage Update

Sayward reported to Council on the new process for updating the shafr.org website, which will be spear-headed by the Electronic Communications Editor (Brian Etheridge) and his advisory committee, who, instead of issuing a general Call for Proposals (CFP), are identifying websites of historical organizations that are particularly strong and then interviewing their designers in a process more akin to the process by which the Program Committee and President chose the on-line platform for the 2021 SHAFR Conference. The Electronic Communication Advisory Committee hopes to have a recommendation for Council by its June meeting.

Request for Funds from Electronic Communications Advisory Committee

A further item of business from the Electronic Communications Advisory Committee was a budget request for materials and services needed to interview SHAFR members at the June conference on the Tulane campus that would then be developed into three podcasts. There was general discussion by Council about whether these would be on-going expenditures. Some suggested that if podcasts become a regular element of SHAFR electronic communications that we might seek to do the editing in-house. Belmonte suggested that this was best considered as a pilot project to support our newly hired Electronic Communications Editor who would not otherwise be able to request funds ahead of the conference. Immerwahr made a motion to approve the \$2000 budget; Walther seconded, and the motion passed unanimously 13-0-0. However, Council requested by September 1st a document from the Electronic Communications Editor that would lay out a strategic vision and budget for electronic communications for Council consideration.

SHAFR Advocacy

Sayward brought Council's attention to the American Historical Association's statement (issued the previous day) condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine ([https://www.historians.org/news-and-advocacy/aha-advocacy/aha-statement-condemning-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-\(february-2022\)](https://www.historians.org/news-and-advocacy/aha-advocacy/aha-statement-condemning-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-(february-2022))). She also pointed out that response to that statement on Twitter that morning had been ambivalent, stating that although they condemned the invasion of Ukraine, they were concerned that similar statements had not been issued for areas of conflict where the people were not white. Discussion in Council reflected similar discomfort. There were questions about whether SHAFR should simply have a policy of not signing on to such statements, focusing instead on areas of declassification and records preservation (such as the recent advocacy vote to sign on to the AHA letter about the Presidential Records Act). Others wondered whether SHAFR might, instead, expand its advocacy to deal with issues such as the ways in which academics were being censored for statements about the on-going conflict between Israel and Palestine. Vanessa Walker pointed out that human rights activists have traditionally engaged in such deliberations about what is effective and necessary. Belmonte suggested that a robust discussion of SHAFR's role in public advocacy was needed and could perhaps be held at the June Council meeting.

Sayward also asked for Council guidance on the best method of requesting advocacy votes. She explained that technical glitches on advocacy votes in the MailChimp framework previously had led her to shift the last advocacy vote (on the preferred attributes of the future Archivist of the United States) into the MemberClicks framework. However, this latter advocacy vote had failed to reach the required 30% of members voting, which might have been attributable to members having to sign in to MemberClicks before they could vote. Hoganson stated that she favored the lowest possible barrier to voting, and this seemed to be the consensus of Council. Walker moved to send the advocacy vote on Ukraine to the membership; Molly Wood seconded the motion, which passed 10-2, which was a sufficient threshold of approval (80% voting and 2/3 voting in favor per the by-laws). As a result, the issue will be sent to the membership for a final decision.

Before the meeting adjourned, Sayward asked for Council members' availability, and there was consensus for June 8th.

SHAFR Council meeting
8 June 2022 via Zoom 9:30 a.m.-2:30 p.m. US EDT

Present: Laura Belmonte (presiding), Shaun Armstead, Emily Conroy-Krutz, Ann Heiss, Kristen Hoganson, Kyle Longley, Sarah Miller-Davenport, Andrew Preston, Lauren Turek, Vanessa Walker, Karine Walther, Molly Wood, Kelsey Zavelo, Amy Sayward (ex officio)

Attending: Faith Bagley, Elizabeth Ferguson, Anne Foster, Petra Goedde, Amy Offner

Introductory Matters:

Laura Belmonte started meeting and asked for motion of thanks for outgoing committee, Council, and task force members and chairs:

- *Ways & Means Committee chair Andrew Preston and member Mark Lawrence*
- *Diplomatic History editorial board members Lori Clune, Justin Hart, and Amy Offner*
- *Development Committee member Catherine Forslund*
- *Graduate Student Committee members Mattie Webb, Jeffrey Rosario, Koji Ito, and Katie Davis*
- *Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize committee chair Jeremi Suri*
- *Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize committee chair Brooke Blower*
- *Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize committee chair Melani McAlister*
- *Dissertation Prize committee chair V. Scott Kaufman*
- *Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize committee chair Sheyda Jahanbani*
- *Norman and Laura Graebner Award committee chair Robert Brigham*
- *Peter L. Hahn Distinguished Service Award committee chair Mary Dudziak*
- *Michael H. Hunt Prize for International History committee chair Nathan Citino*
- *Link-Kuehl Prize for Documentary Editing committee chair Christopher Dietrich*
- *Myrna Bernath Book and Fellowship Awards committee chair Daniel Immerwahr*

Andrew Preston moved, Ann Heiss seconded, and all voted in favor (13-0-0).

Amy Sayward then reviewed the motions voted on since the January Council Meeting:

- Approval of January 2022 Council minutes
- Approval of March 2022 Council minutes
- Approval of Sanctions & Appeals Committee operating procedures
- Endorsement of SHAFR statement on the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA)
- Advocacy vote on Presidential Records Act (with membership concurring)
- Advocacy vote on CoSA statement on AOTUS characteristics (insufficient membership support)
- Advocacy vote on Ukraine (with membership concurring)

Advocacy Issues:

Belmonte reviewed issues with the current bylaws, which require a membership vote for advocacy statements passed by Council. No other historical organizations have such requirements. She also posed the question of whether the scope of SHAFR's advocacy should be limited and opened the floor for discussion. Council members agreed that the current process is cumbersome, requiring a minimum of 7-8 days. Sometimes a decision is needed more quickly, which would require a more flexible policy. One member suggested that perhaps Council could simply vote on more professional concerns (as elected representatives of the membership), with the membership as a whole voting on more political concerns. But another suggested that some issues will not be clearly divided between professional and political concerns, and another suggested that Council needs and the membership has a right to provide input on advocacy issues. Another was worried about fatiguing members with so many advocacy votes and emails. Following on this concern, a member suggested possibly having a blanket authorization for certain issues core to SHAFR's mission but targeted advocacy, especially as the more statements are made the louder silences become. A Council member wondered aloud whether the bar might be set at unanimous Council support (which would suggest a core issue) else the motion should go to the membership for input, which would also eliminate the need to define issues as professional or political.

This idea had general support. Since any such policy change will require an amendment of the by-laws, Council asked Sayward and Belmonte to work on language for a subsequent Council vote and then a vote by the membership in the fall election.

Amy Offner, SHAFR's representative to the National Coalition for History (NCH), then joined meeting and reviewed concerns about the NCH's advocacy on issues related to NARA access and declassification, which are of utmost concern to SHAFR. She stated that since the NCH is currently undergoing an internal evaluation, it might be an opportune time for SHAFR to initiate a discussion with NCH leadership. The question was raised whether it was appropriate for SHAFR, as an international organization, to have such a focus on U.S. issues, but another stressed how the issues in the United States – whether the jobs crisis or declassification of U.S. government documents – have implications for the entire global membership.

Sayward then referred Council to Richard Immerman's email discussing SHAFR's representatives on the ad hoc group formed to regularly discuss pressing issues with the U.S. National Archives. Council reached consensus that SHAFR's representatives should be the chair of the Historical Documentation Committee (currently Sarah Snyder) and the SHAFR

President, in order to provide an element of continuity and also to communicate to NARA the importance of these issues to SHAFR. Council members pointed out the importance of maintaining a list of contacts within the organization with significant experience on these issues that both of SHAFR's representatives could and should reach out to ahead of meetings in order to be fully briefed and prepared.

Financial Matters:

Sayward reviewed her mid-year financial report and proposed fiscal year 2022-23 budget for Council. She noted boxes in blue, which could be affected by subsequent Council action. She also pointed out that the proposed annual meeting budget does not currently consider a virtual component, which would be about \$10,000 extra. Sayward also pointed out that Sherry Mart, SHAFR's external investigator for code of conduct violations, had retired and that her replacement charges \$7,500 for training and being on-call, with further expenses if there is an investigation.

Preston then reviewed the Ways and Means Committee report, as the committee had discussed anything with financial implications. However, he emphasized that the committee only makes suggestions, as only Council can vote on appropriations. The committee's first recommendation was for both the *Guide* and *Passport* editors to receive an annual stipend of \$7,000. After a short discussion, the committee's motion to raise the stipend for both to \$7,000 and to retain the *Passport* editor's \$650 in travel support was passed unanimously. The question of whether or not to include a virtual component for next year's conference was deferred to Council's September meeting, when it would have a membership survey as well as the Conference Coordinator's report on which to make an informed decision. Council then discussed what SHAFR's policy should be in terms of reimbursing Council members attending the June conference moving forward, since Council meetings will continue to be via Zoom for the foreseeable future. In the past, reimbursement of conference travel expenses was tied to attendance at the Council meeting during the conference. There was discussion of possibly having a pool of funds that Council members could apply to, and there was discussion about whether some positions (perhaps with specific constituents) should have priority for travel support. Sayward reviewed the previous policy, which allocated \$10,000 in the budget to reimburse Council members' airfare/mileage and stay at the conference rate (or lower). Karine Walther made a motion to maintain the current system for all in-person conferences, as Council members do need to engage with the membership, which happens most directly at the in-person conference. She subsequently amended her motion that the current policy and budget should give special priority to graduate students, international members (international to the conference), and teaching-centered members. Vanessa Walker seconded the amended motion, which passed with one abstention (12-0-1).

Publications:

Petra Goedde, editor of *Diplomatic History*, joined the meeting and reviewed the report that she and Anne Foster had written for Council. She noted that the transition of two assistant editors had happened smoothly. She noted that the journal's acceptance rate had gone down, which might be related to the increase in international submissions, which are not always submitted in a way that translates easily into the format of the journal. She introduced an idea that the editors had discussed, of having a mechanism to provide assistance to a committee/person who could assist promising rejections as part of an effort to increase international participation. Goedde also pointed to the journal's new concept series, which highlights new concepts as a think piece that could be good conversation starters; two sessions of the conference focus on these as well. A Council member asked if these concept pieces were peer-reviewed, and Goedde responded that they were peer-reviewed by members of the editorial board. She also pointed out that they had been made available as open access to be of greater use in teaching. There was further discussion about the idea of having a mentor for international submissions with language barriers and differing formats. Goedde pointed out that the editors could not assign a mentor, as this would create a conflict of interest. It was suggested that this might be an issue that the Task Force on Internationalization might flesh out for subsequent Council discussion. Emily Conroy-Krutz made a motion to approve the suggestions from the editors for appointment to the *Diplomatic History* editorial board. Walther seconded the motion, which passed unanimously (13-0-0).

Elizabeth Ferguson from Oxford University Press (who has succeeded Trish Thomas) then joined meeting and highlighted elements of the Publisher's report. She stated that the journal's readership is good, with most readers based in the United States and Europe, with a slight drop in East Asian readership. People are largely going straight to the publisher's website to access articles, which is good. She explained the impact factor, which fluctuates significantly for historical journals, and explained that there had been a significant rise in 2021 in open access articles, in part due to several campaigns to increase readership. She happily reported that the publication schedule was back on track and that the type-setter issues that the journal had experienced previously were now resolved; Goedde seconded this observation. In response to questions about significant delays in getting members their missing or back issues, Ferguson reported that the issue was largely the result of an unreliable U.S. Postal Service and pandemic-related issues in OUP customer service. However, reforms had been made in customer service, and Ferguson fully expected all customer service issues to be addressed within 3-4 business days. Ferguson and Goedde then left the meeting.

Sayward also pointed out that SHAFR's first contract with Temple University is set to expire on June 30, 2024. She has asked Goedde to evaluate Temple's willingness to consider a renewal for an additional five years, conditional as well upon the editors' willingness to continue and Council's approval. Goedde was confident that she could ascertain this during the Fall 2022 semester.

Conference Matters:

Walther highlighted the proposed update to Code of Conduct Response Team (CCRT) reporting procedure. SHAFR's current policy calls for two members of the CCRT to do the initial interview with the reporter, but conversations with Paula Brantner, SHAFR's new external investigator ahead of the training earlier that week had revealed that it is generally

Brantner's practice to be the "first responder," taking reports via a hotline number and email address and then reporting anonymized information to the CCRT, Executive Director, and President for a decision on sanctions. Sayward iterated that this procedure would uphold several key values that had emerged and crystalized in Council discussions over the past several years, including maintenance of anonymity and avoidance of any appearance of conflict of interest. Walther also stated that members of the CCRT felt underqualified (despite training) to handle these initial reports. Therefore, she made a motion that any report of a potential code of conduct violation should go to the external investigator first. Conroy-Krutz seconded the motion, and all voted in favor (13-0-0).

Sayward then reviewed issues related to SHAFR's presence at the annual American Historical Association (AHA) meeting, which also has financial implications. She explained that she had been unable to identify an off-site location for a reception and asked whether SHAFR wants to continue to host a luncheon and reception at the AHA, especially given the cost. This question was also animated by the fact that Council was not going to meet in-person at the AHA in the future. Sayward pointed out that a hotel reception required a bartender and cashier and generally attracted about fifty people before the pandemic and about a dozen at the most recent (pandemic-impacted) AHA meeting. Kyle Longley moved that SHAFR should continue to host a luncheon and sponsor AHA sessions, at least until more post-pandemic information is available. Sarah Miller-Davenport seconded the motion, which passed unanimously (13-0-0).

Sayward also briefed Council on SHAFR's new Conference Coordinator, Kaete O'Connell, who Sayward commended for doing an excellent job despite some challenges in the planning for this year's campus conference (especially related to the recent cancelation of our bus contract).

Financial Matters (continued):

There was general consensus, following from the Ways & Means Committee report, to ask the Development Committee to develop a campaign around issues of access, representation, and equity, as previously proposed by Kristin Hoganson.

Ann Heiss made a motion to approve the FY 2022-23 proposed budget, as amended by Council's motions. Conroy-Krutz seconded the motion, which passed unanimously (13-0-0). There was also general consensus to request that Brill cover half of the cost of the editor's increased stipend, in line with Council's previous discussion about a 50/50 cost-sharing with the publisher moving forward. ,

Membership Matters:

Sayward highlighted that there had been several recent polls (by the Teaching Committee and by the Graduate Committee) as well as proposed polls (of SHAFR members at "teaching institutions" and of recent PhD graduates). Therefore, she proposed to conduct an in-depth poll that would also gauge members' preferences in terms of conference format moving forward. She will circulate a draft survey to Council for its feedback before sending it to members.


Prize Matters:

Sayward raised the question of whether SHAFR wanted to have a prohibition on one person receiving two book awards. She pointed out that there is currently a prohibition on the same person winning the Myrna Bernath Book Award and either the Stuart Bernath or Ferrell Book prizes. However, Belmonte pointed out that there was no such prohibition by the AHA. And additionally, the donors to the Hunt Prize had not stipulated such a prohibition (unlike the Myrna Bernath Award). Council did not express a concern with one book winning multiple prizes where it was not prohibited.

Concluding Matters:

Sayward mentioned that her contract will expire on July 30, 2025, so next year's Council will want to begin the search process to ensure ample transition time. Council expressed a preference for January 3, 2023 for its first Council meeting of the year. Sayward will be in touch to confirm that date and to set a date for a September meeting.

Hoganson ended the meeting by thanking Belmonte and Sayward for their work on behalf of SHAFR.



Professional Notes

Brian Etheridge was appointed as Director of Institutional Effectiveness and the Quality Enhancement Program at Kennesaw State University, where he is also Professor of History.

Addison Jensen (Ph.D. candidate, University of California, Santa Barbara) will be the Assistant Editor of *Passport: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review*, beginning with the September 2022 issue.

Mark Atwood Lawrence received the 2022 Tonous and Warda Johns Family Book Award from the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association for his book, *The End of Ambition: The United States and the Third World in the Vietnam Era* (2021).



Cold War Essay Contest

John A. Adams '71 Center for Military History & Strategic Analysis 2022

For the eighteenth consecutive year, the John A. Adams '71 Center for Military History & Strategic Analysis at the Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Va., is pleased to announce that it will award prizes for the best-unpublished papers on Cold War military history. The contest promotes innovative scholarship on Cold War subjects.

Any aspect of the Cold War (1945-1991) era is eligible, including papers on military strategy, plans, and operations; the relationship between the armed forces and society; international security affairs; Cold War alliances; and the connections between Cold War military history and contemporary geopolitical challenges. The essay may embrace a U.S. or global focus.

Prizes: First prize will earn a plaque and a cash award of \$2,000; second prize, \$1,000 and a plaque; and third prize, \$500 and a plaque.

Procedures: Writers should send their entry electronically to the Adams Center at the Virginia Military Institute by Friday, November 4, 2022. Please make your submission as a MS Word document and limit your essay to a maximum of 7,500 words (minimum 4,000 words) of double-spaced text, exclusive of documentation and bibliography. A panel of judges will examine all papers; the Adams Center director will announce the winners in December 2022. The first-prize winning essay will appear in *The Journal of Military History*.

Submissions to:

adamscenter@vmi.edu

Questions to:

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Online at: <http://www.vmi.edu/adamscenter>
On Facebook at: <http://www.facebook.com/acmhsa>
On Instagram: @vmiadamscenter



Recent Books of Interest

Bernstein, Seth. *Return to the Motherland: Displaced Soviets in WWII and the Cold War*. (Cornell, 2022).

Boczar, Amanda. *An American Brothel: Sex and Diplomacy During the Vietnam War*. (Cornell, 2022).

Brady, Steven J. *Chained to History: Slavery and US Foreign Relations to 1865*. (Cornell, 2022).

- Budjeryn, Mariana. *Inheriting the Bomb: The Collapse of the USSR and the Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine*. (Johns Hopkins, 2022)
- Chen, Dean P. *US-China-Taiwan in the Age of Trump and Biden: Towards a Nationalist Strategy*. (Oxford, 2022).
- Chilcote, Ronald H. ed. *Latin American Studies and the Cold War*. (Rowman & Littlefield, 2022).
- Colbourn, Susan. *Euromissiles: The Nuclear Weapons That Nearly Destroyed NATO*. (Cornell, 2022).
- Congdon, Lee. *George Kennan for Our Time*. (Cornell, 2022).
- Costigliola, Frank. *Kennan: A Life Between Worlds*. (Princeton, 2022).
- Çubukçu, Ayça. *For the Love of Humanity: The World Tribunal on Iraq*. (Penn, 2022).
- Cucuz, Diana. *Winning Women's Hearts and Minds: Selling Cold War Culture in the US and USSR*. (University of Toronto, 2022).
- Cuddy, Brian and Fredrik Logevall, eds. *The Vietnam War in the Pacific World*. (UNC, 2022).
- DeGooyer, Stephanie. *Before Borders: A Legal and Literary History of Naturalization*. (John Hopkins, 2022).
- Doenecke, Justus D. *More Precious Than Peace: A New History of America in World War I*. (Notre Dame, 2022).
- Delury, John. *Agents of Subversion: The Fate of John T. Downey and the CIA'S Covert War in China*. (Cornell, 2022).
- Fidelis, Malgorzata. *Imagining the World from Behind the Iron Curtain*. (Oxford, 2022).
- Flaherty, Martin S. *Restoring the Global Judiciary: Why the Supreme Court Should Rule in U.S. Foreign Affairs*. (Princeton, 2022).
- Foss, Sarah. *On Our Own Terms: Development and Indigeneity in Cold War Guatemala*. (UNC, 2022).
- Fredman, Zach. *The Tormented Alliance: American Servicemen and the Occupation of China, 1941-1949*. (UNC, 2022).
- Fry, Joseph A. ed. *Letters from the Southern Home Front: The American South Responds to the Vietnam War*. (LSU, 2022).
- Geiger, Andrea. *Converging Empires: Citizens and Subjects in the North Pacific Borderlands, 1867-1945*. (UNC, 2022).
- Gorman, Daniel. *Uniting Nations: Britons and Internationalism, 1945-1970*. (Cambridge, 2022).
- Goscha, Christopher. *The Road to Dien Bien Phu: A History of the First War for Vietnam*. (Princeton, 2022).
- Hendrickson, Burleigh. *Decolonizing 1968: Transnational Student Activism in Tunis, Paris, and Dakar*. (Cornell, 2022).
- Huxtable, Simon *News from Moscow: Soviet Journalism and the Limits of Postwar Reform*. (Oxford, 2022).
- Ho, Joseph W. *Developing Mission: Photography, Filmmaking, and American Missionaries in Modern China*. (Cornell, 2022).
- Iandolo, Alessandro. *Arrested Development: The Soviet Union in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, 1958-1968*. (Cornell, 2022).
- Kaplan, Edward. *The End of Victory: Prevailing in the Thermonuclear Age*. (Cornell, 2022).
- Kiernan, Vincent. *Atomic Bill: A Journalist's Dangerous Ambition in the Shadow of the Bomb*. (Cornell, 2022).
- Knüsel, Ariane. *China's European Headquarters: Switzerland and China During the Cold War*. (Cambridge, 2022).
- Koda, Naoko. *The United States and the Japanese Student Movement, 1948-1973: Managing a Free World*. (Lexington Books, 2022).
- Kowner, Rotem and Iris Rachaminov. *Out of Line, Out of Place: A Global and Local History of World War I Internments*. (Cornell, 2022).
- Kunakhovich, Kyrill. *Communism's Public Sphere: Culture as Politics in Cold War Poland and East Germany*. (Cornell, 2022)
- Kung, Chien-Wen. *Diasporic Cold Warriors: Nationalist China, Anticommunism, and the Philippine Chinese, 1930s-1970s*. (Cornell, 2022).
- Maynard, Jonathan Leader and Mark L. Haas, eds. *The Routledge Handbook of Ideology and International Relations*. (Routledge, 2022).
- McGreevey, Robert C. *Borderline Citizens: The United States, Puerto Rico, and the Politics of Colonial Migration*. (Cornell, 2022).
- McNab, Chris. *US Soldier vs. Chinese Soldier: Korea, 1951-53*. (Bloomsbury, 2022).
- Melnick, Ross. *Hollywood's Embassies: How Movie Theatres Projected American Power Around the World*. (Columbia, 2022).

- Millwood, Pete. *Improbable Diplomats: How Ping-Pong Players, Musicians, and Scientists Remade US-China Relations*. (Cambridge, 2022).
- Mukherjee, Rohan. *Rising Powers and the Politics of Status in International Institutions*. (Cambridge, 2022).
- Nash, Philip. *Clare Boothe Luce: American Renaissance Woman*. (Routledge, 2022).
- Neu, Charles E. *The Wilson Circle: President Woodrow Wilson and His Advisors*. (John Hopkins, 2022).
- Perlman, Susan McCall. *Contesting France: Intelligence and US Foreign Policy in the Early Cold War*. (Cambridge, 2022).
- Petersen, Mark J. *The Southern Cone and the Origins of Pan America, 1888-1933*. (Notre Dame, 2022).
- Poling, Gregory B. *On Dangerous Ground: America's Century in the South China Sea*. (Oxford, 2022).
- Pompeian, Edward P. *Sustaining Empire: Venezuela's Trade with the United States During the Age of Revolutions, 1797-1828*. (Johns Hopkins, 2022).
- Rabe, Stephen G. *The Lost Paratroopers of Normandy: Resistance, Courage, and Solidarity in a French Village*. (Cambridge, 2022).
- Robey, Sarah E. *Atomic Americans: Citizens in a Nuclear State*. (Cornell, 2022).
- Roehrich, Elizabeth. *Inspectors for Peace: A History of the International Atomic Energy Agency*. (Johns Hopkins, 2022).
- Rosenberg, Andrew S. *Undesirable Immigrants: Why Racism Persists in International Migration*. (Princeton, 2022).
- Schimidli, William Michael. *Freedom on the Offensive: Human Rights, Democracy Promotion, and US Interventionism in the Late Cold War*. (Cornell, 2022).
- Scott, Blake C. *Unpacked: A History of Caribbean Tourism*. (Cornell, 2022).
- Silverstone, Marc J. *The Kennedy Withdrawal: Camelot and the American Commitment to Vietnam*. (Harvard, 2022).
- Slotten, Hugh R. *Beyond Sputnik and the Space Race: The Origins of Global Satellite Communications*. (Johns Hopkins, 2022).
- Specter, Matthew. *The Atlantic Realists: Empire and International Political Thought Between Germany and the United States*. (Stanford, 2022).
- Stinsky, Daniel. *International Cooperation in Cold War Europe: The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 1947-1964*. (Bloomsbury, 2022).
- Taylor, Jordan E. *Misinformation Nation: Foreign News and the Politics of Truth in Revolutionary America*. (John Hopkins, 2022).
- Thomson, David K. *Bonds of War: How Civil War Financial Agents Sold the World on the Union*. (UNC, 2022).
- Valsania, Maurizio. *First Among Men: George Washington and the Myth of American Masculinity*. (John Hopkins, 2022).
- Winkelmann, Tessa. *Dangerous Intercourse: Gender and Interracial Relations in the American Colonial Philippines, 1898-1946*. (Cornell, 2022).
- Wyrzten, Jonathan. *Worldmaking in the Long Great War: How Local and Colonial Struggles Shaped the Modern Middle East*. (Columbia, 2022).
- Zaloga, Steven J. *The Oil Campaign 1944-45: Draining the Wehrmacht's Lifeblood*. (Bloomsbury, 2022).
- Zeiler, Thomas W. *Capitalist Peace: A History of American Free-Trade Internationalism*. (Oxford, 2022).
- Zhao, Suisheng. *The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy*. (Stanford, 2022).
- Zelizer, Julian E. ed. *The Presidency of Donald J. Trump: A First Historical Assessment*. (Princeton, 2022).



Samual Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grant Update

I thank the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations for the Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grant. The grant allowed me to wrap up research on the anti-communist, Catholic, and nationalist Mexican *Unión Nacional Sinarquista* (National Synarchist Union) within the context of the United States during World War II. I had done archival research in the US prior to the award, but the funding allowed me to conduct research in Mexico. Due to the pandemic, I paid for remote research in the archives. I used half the funds to pay a research assistant to view and digitize materials for me in the *Archivo General de la Nación* (Mexican National Archives), *Archivo Histórico del Arzobispado de México* (Archives of the Archdiocese of Mexico), and the *Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores* (Mexican equivalent of the State Department). As for the other half of the funds, I utilized them to pay archivists at the library of the *Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia* (National Institute of Anthropology and History) to digitize materials on my behalf. I am very much grateful to SHAFR for the opportunity to research in Mexico, aiding me not only in my dissertation, but towards my book manuscript now that I recently defended in February 2022.

Thank you,

Nathan Ellstrand



Samual Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grant Update

In 2021 I was awarded the Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grant. Unfortunately, due to the ongoing pandemic and limitations on international travel, I could not visit overseas archives in person. However, I subscribed to several online newspaper databases and acquired copies of documents from the Vietnam Center and Archive with the award money. Specifically, I requested the Douglas Pike Files on Vietnamese resistance. These files contain newspaper clippings, reports, and materials on Vietnamese resistance to communist rule following the Fall of Saigon in 1975 and information about the organization The National United Front for the Liberation of Vietnam, a central case study for my dissertation. In these files, I found that Douglas Pike had collected newspaper clippings and reports from the United States government about the ongoing resistance against the Vietnamese government following the collapse of the Republic of Vietnam in 1977. Through examining these documents, I found that the US Government was not only aware of resistance organizations in Southeast Asia against the Vietnamese government and but that there were low levels of cooperation between US officials and the guerilla resisters. Beyond acquiring newspapers and documents from archives, I have also used part of the scholarship money to pay for transcription services for the oral histories I have completed. This service enabled me to analyze the collected interviews better and expedited my writing process. However, as of yet, I have not spent the total amount of the scholarship but will continue to use the money to acquire sources for my dissertation as I am able.

Frances Martin
University of Connecticut

The Last Word: Zelensky Wags the Dog, But Slowly

Zachary Jonathan Jacobson

Too often agency (and blame) for the war in Ukraine has been presumed to lie predominantly with the greater powers. Liberals like Anne Applebaum point to President Vladimir Putin's autocratic and expansionist mission to restore a greater Russia as the precipitating reagent for the crisis, while realists like John Mearsheimer hold the Americans and Europeans responsible for encouraging Ukraine to challenge Russia by seeking membership in NATO.² In both cases (and both have a case), what has been underplayed is the agency of Ukraine. Taken for granted have been President Volodymyr Zelensky's artful strategic manipulations to pull a wide community of actors into the regional conflict. His calls for military assistance have resembled what the political scientist Joseph Nye Jr. termed the "soft powers" of persuasion.³

In examining the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, scholars like Nye attempt to look beyond the "hard power" competition of arms races, economic sanctions, and proxy wars between the superpowers during the years of the Cold War. They conclude that the soft power allure of Western society across the Iron Curtain lay in a raucously more diverse culture, a shared belief in human rights, and a free-wheeling capitalism, an alternative life to a younger Soviet generation eager to sculpt fluorescent mohawks, pull on high-waisted Levi's, and down sweating cans of Coca Cola.

Unlike Harry Truman, John F. Kennedy, and Ronald Reagan, however, today's Western chiefs of state—Joseph Biden, Emmanuel Macron and Olaf Scholz—have not emerged as charismatic leaders to front-face the military mission and the culture war against Russia. They have not pulled Ukraine into the Western sphere of influence. Indeed, in their ambivalence to confront Putin directly, they have not had to. They have been excused from spearheading this task, as the one-time actor has taken the lead role.

In stark contrast to President Ashraf Ghani, who fled Afghanistan as the Taliban inched closer to Kabul, Zelensky remained in the streets of Kyiv to rally his people. The Ukrainian president reached up to call the great powers to join his side in a grand alliance of like-minded nations. From the borderland of Eurasia, it was the Ukrainian president who commandeered moral authority, transforming himself into the standard-bearer for a Western, liberal order. He pitched Ukraine—however fumbling in its own constitutional order—as the frontline in an existential fight between democracy and authoritarianism, playing upon the notion of an imagined community of shared liberal values, cajoling the Western powers to invest in him as both a strategic partner and an ideological brother.

In reevaluations of the Cold War, historians have described a phenomenon whereby the "tail could wag the dog"—i.e., a lesser power like Ukraine could persuade and even coerce stronger ones. They term the dynamic "pericentrism" and explain how the periphery defined the center. Scholars want to exhibit agency in the ability of Chi Minh in North Vietnam or Fidel Castro in Cuba to draw

the superpowers into their local feuds. As the political scientist Tony Smith writes, "while junior members in the international system at times took actions that tried to *block, moderate, and end* the epic contest, they also took actions that played a key role in *expanding, intensifying, and prolonging* the struggle between East and West."⁴ The historian Federico Romero argues that the superpowers did not create conflicts in the developing world but "exacerbated them by pouring in weapons, money, and advisors, connecting local actors to actual networks and powerful imageries of larger historical trends, raising the stakes."⁵

Scholars like Smith and Romero have looked to identify those "local and national protagonists," "political entrepreneurs" and "postcolonial elites who exploited geopolitical tensions." For it was not just the United States and the USSR pumping artillery into the developing world. Leaders in the developing world played on the superpower conflict to attract more aid to their postcolonial battles. The lesser powers could manipulate the greater, "feeding on and contributing to the central dynamics of the East-West contest."⁶

Like the current conflict between Russia and its Western foes, the ideological pump was already primed for a standoff between the great Cold War powers before proxy fighting broke out, and like Zelensky today, the Hos, Ches and Castros and the Ben Gurions, Mandelas and Walesas had the ability to convince the all-too-eager empires that their local struggles were central to that ideological standoff. Key to their strategies were their soft power appeals, their transnational calls for higher ideals, whether communist or liberal/democratic, as the North Vietnamese pressed for aid in the 1970s from the Soviets to fend off the American "imperialists" or later, in the 1980s, the Afghani mujahidin enlisted the help of the Americans to deter the Soviet "menace."

Today, an unshaven Zelensky, in his fitted olive-green tees, has similarly fashioned for himself what Tom Wolfe once called a "radical chic." In his siren selfie videos, he radiated the charisma of the uncompromising guerilla, that musky allure of the freedom-fighter, of Ho, Castro and Che, of Simón Bolívar, of Vladimir Lenin.⁷ After each video Zelensky posted, Western allies crowded around to praise his "bravery and the resolve," his eloquence, his actorly poise; they marveled at how he had become the "Churchill of our times," the "personal embodiment of his country's refusal to yield to a murderous authoritarian," a "worthy successor" to the homburg-hatted bulldog.⁸

Indeed, in the war with Russia, a forceful Zelensky refashioned a previously underwhelming record. From a purely political perspective, the war proved to be a boon for the president. In his 2019 campaign, he ran on a platform of "sound judgment," "honesty," "pragmatism" and fair and open democratization.⁹ Yet his promises to end the conflict with Russia in the eastern regions of Ukraine, to curtail rampant corruption, to recapture his nation's economy

from a clique of oligarchs and to confront the COVID pandemic sputtered. His tenure was riven by failed judicial and anti-corruption reform, intimidation of whistleblowers and failure to prosecute allegations of “large-scale and coordinated fraud” by associates close to the president.¹⁰

Within six months of his taking the presidency, Zelensky replaced his cabinet of highly touted, fresh-faced reformers with more “seasoned” veterans of previous administrations. From a 70 percent approval rating on entering office, a year into his tenure only 25 percent of Ukrainians reported that they would support his reelection. At the two-year mark, according to the Wilson Center’s Mykhailo Minakov, Zelensky’s “decision-making [continued to be] conducted in the style of ‘emergency politics,’ without the requisite respect for Ukraine’s constitution and the division of powers stipulated therein.” Far from a bastion of liberal democracy, in January 2022 Ukraine was ranked 123rd of 180 countries in terms of government corruption by Transparency International, a ranking in the neighborhood of such perennial offenders as the Philippines and Azerbaijan. Russia, at 130th, was not far behind.¹¹

Yet the comparison of Zelensky to Churchill is persistent, and indeed it is far more apt than the well-worn laurel first appeared to be when examined beyond the hagiography. Like a bunkered Churchill over his wireless, Zelensky has spoken out not from a position of strength, not from the mountain top, not from atop a city on a hill. The pictures of Churchill with FDR (later Truman) and Stalin at the Yalta, Tehran and Potsdam postwar summits all too often have fixed the British prime minister in our minds as just one of the superpower-ed leaders. Yet in the face of Nazi aggression, after the British flight from Dunkirk in June 1940, Churchill’s leadership skills were not yet in evidence. Britain had drained its currency reserves. In December 1940, Churchill begged Franklin Roosevelt for military aid. “The “moment approaches,” he wrote, “when we shall no longer be able to pay cash for shipping and other supplies.”¹²

The British PM also had a mixed record when it came to advancing the cause of liberal democracy. After all, even as he aimed to cement an Atlantic alliance as a fraternity of democracies—as a shield to save the “free world” from tyranny—Churchill scrambled to shore up the dominion Britain maintained over its imperial holdings, and he was prepared to commit to a pact with a tyrannical Stalin. British writer Henry Hemming notes that it would take some time for Churchill to overcome the historic rockiness in Britain’s “special relationship” with the United States. Americans “generally did not see Britain as some close, beloved ally at the start of the Second World War.” Enormously unpopular among Americans, Britain had the distinction of being not only an economic rival but one of the once-great European empires that had within that same century already engulfed the world in war.¹³

Key to the persisting parallel between Churchill and Zelensky is their shared soft powers of persuasion. Both were able to make their local stories international and even global. The narrative during the early years of World War II, like the narrative of today’s fight against Russian authoritarianism, was, after all, an artfully crafted simplification of complex ideological, strategic, economic, cultural, and political circumstances. In its early stages, World War II lacked a cohesive, defining tale of cause or a hopeful, foreseeable denouement. Violent clashes crossed into theaters both in the Far East and West, with the overrunning of historic borders and the mixed ideological alliances of democracies, empires and communist states in all-out war.

The beleaguered Conservative British prime minister helped provide a cohesive story. He wagged the dog (but “softly,”) as he called for aid from his more powerful

allies.¹⁴ From underneath the bombed-out cobbles of London, Churchill rallied his people as the last bulwark for the “survival of Christian civilization” against the “abyss of a new Dark Age.”¹⁵ Through an evocation of agreed-upon values and sought-after ideals, not through coercion or bribery, he pressed the Allies to fend off a venal German empire running rampant across Europe. As Churchill beseeched FDR, “the safety of the United States as well as the future of our two democracies and the kind of civilization for which they stand, are bound up in the survival and independence of the British Commonwealth of Nations.” He invited the “Czechs, Poles, Norwegians, Dutch, Belgians and the United States” to join the UK in a brotherhood of like-minded nations who shared the aims of democracy at home and a liberal order abroad.¹⁶

Zelensky manipulated Western allies by likewise calling his strategic partners to task. He insisted that they had moral duties to uphold if they were to continue to present themselves as the champions of the “free world.” He coaxed his prospective allies with ethical challenges, harnessing his soft power to great effect, tailoring his pressure to each partner’s national narratives of historical commitment, demanding they not repeat gross moral error or allow mass tragedy to strike. Indeed, an eager Zelensky ventured into the most wrought episodes of those allies’ histories to press his cause. Addressing the Bundestag, he reminded German leaders of their pledge to “never again” allow a genocide and not to permit the erection of another Berlin Wall across Europe. Speaking to the U.S. Congress, he alluded to keeping the promise of Martin Luther King Jr.’s “dream.” He warned the Oireachtas, the Irish parliament, of Russia “deliberately provoking a food crisis,” recalling Ireland’s Great Famine. Although later criticized for the analogy, he demanded that Israeli lawmakers in the Knesset not allow the Russians to commit a “Final Solution” against the Ukrainians.¹⁷

Like a latter-day Churchill, Zelensky struck a chord with his pleas. In contrast to the 2008 invasion of Georgia and the 2014 annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, when Russia dominated the information space and the Western powers looked on from the sidelines, this latest crisis was dominated by the Ukrainian president. Heather Conley, the president of the German Marshall Fund, concluded that his words were “changing policy” across the world. His streaming remarks received standing ovations in the Greek parliament and the Canadian House of Commons. “There is no question that public opinion . . . in Switzerland w[as] influenced by the very successful projection of a certain image,” said Jacques Pitteloud, the Swiss ambassador to the United States.¹⁸

Zelensky’s crusade has penetrated beyond the politics of the great powers. It was the Czechs who first sent tanks to Ukraine. One former commanding general of the U.S. Army in Europe explained the extent of that investment. “The tank is not just a rental car,” he said. “Whenever you’re talking about transferring any sort of mechanized or armored vehicles, you have to also think about spare parts, maintenance packages, training, fuel, ammunition . . . to make sure they can keep things running.”¹⁹ Subsequently, Slovakia shipped an advanced air defense system, fulfilling one of Zelensky’s chief requests to help “close the skies.” The Baltic states contributed anti-armor weapons, artillery and thermal-imaging devices. As the *Washington Post* wrote, in pericentric fashion, these smaller countries “led the way” in fulfilling Zelensky’s calls for more substantial military aid.²⁰

However eager his allies have been to commit to bolstering the war against Russia, the scope of the Ukrainian president’s soft power has proven to have limits. He pressured the Americans and Europeans for even deeper support for Ukrainian independence than they were willing to provide. Western leaders pushed

back against his most aggressive hard-power demands for aircraft and for booting the Russians from the United Nations Security Council. After Pentagon spokesman John Kirby explained that the United States would not support a no-fly zone, Zelensky hit back. "Listen: we have a war!" he said. "This is not Ping-Pong! This is about human lives! We ask once again: solve it faster. Do not shift the responsibility, send us planes." He tweeted pictures of a "devastated a maternity hospital." He attempted to coerce by charging a collective guilt for ensuing war crimes, again alluding to a commitment his partners made to hold off tyranny. "How much longer will the world be an accomplice ignoring terror? Close the sky right now!"²¹

Speaking to the U.K.'s House of Commons, Zelensky returned to Churchill's refusal to quit during World War II as the historical demarcation for the British promise to fend off tyranny. "We will not give up, and we will not lose. We will fight till the end," Zelensky repeated. The "we" were Ukrainians. But in repeating Churchill's words, he made it clear that the "we" was the alliance of which he has softly taken charge. Distancing himself from his Russian neighbor to the east, he has reimagined Ukraine as part of a community of Western democracies. After the speech streamed at the Palace of Westminster, however, Prime Minister Boris Johnson did not welcome Zelensky into the Western alliance. Instead, he proclaimed pride in the British joining fight led by the Ukrainians' president. "Today," Johnson stated, "one of the proudest boasts in the free world is, 'Ya Ukrainets'—I am a Ukrainian.'"²²

Notes:

1. I would like to thank Ryan Evans and the editors of the *War on the Rocks*, as well as Clark Murdock, for reading this article and providing key insights that helped me develop it.
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