December 2004 Newsletter
NEW EVIDENCE FROM VIETNAM
Pierre Asselin, assistant professor of History, University of Hawaii - Kapiolani, author of A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the Making of the Paris Agreement (Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press, 2002).
On February 3, 1997, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) issued Resolution 25-QD/TW sanctioning the publication of a series containing documents relating to party policymaking. Entitled Van kien Dang - Toan tap (Party Documents - Complete Works) and published by the Nha xuat ban Chinh tri quoc gia (National Political Publishing House), the series has been released gradually since 1998, with new volumes made available every few months. It is organized (and was released) chronologically beginning with the period leading to 1930, the year of the founding of the Indochinese Communist Party, which was the forerunner to the wartime Vietnamese Workers’ Party (1951–1976) and the VCP (1976–present). Each volume is in Vietnamese (abridged English and French editions may be published in the future), typically encompasses one year, and includes dozens of documents on domestic and foreign affairs from the first/general secretary (the party head), prominent revolutionary leaders affiliated with the party, the Politburo, and the Central Committee.(1) Most valuable for researchers are the abundant instructions and resolutions issued by the Politburo and the Central Committee relating party concerns, detailing policies, and establishing guidelines for the implementation of those policies.
As of the end of 2003, the series extended to the year 1968. With new volumes being released every few months, it is only a matter of time before the series covers the entire period of the American military intervention in Indochina. While the record that is presented for the period 1954 to 1968 was subjected to a thorough review and editing process and is therefore partial, the documents contained therein offer fascinating insights into the party’s policymaking process and, more significant, its position on a wide range of important yet heretofore vaguely understood issues.
Recently, I scrutinized the volume for the year 1954 in hopes of acquiring a better understanding of the party’s position regarding implementation of the Geneva provisions and the prospects for achieving reunification through the nation-wide elections to be held in 1956. Directives and resolutions issued by the party in the immediate aftermath of the signing of the accords leave no doubt that Hanoi entered the post-Geneva era intent on avoiding further bloodshed and confident that implementation of the accords would bring about national reunification. Indeed, the leadership went to great lengths to make sure that the membership and other supporters did nothing to sabotage the accords, undermine their “spirit,” or otherwise provoke or justify non-compliance on the part of the Saigon regime and its French and American backers.
Among the more interesting pieces of evidence are:
1. A July 27 directive from First Secretary Truong Chinh instructing cadres
to respect the letter and the spirit of the Geneva Accords and make no allowances
for the resumption of hostilities. “Our nationalist struggle has entered
a new era,” the secretary wrote, and has “become a political struggle
to consolidate peace.” For the sake of prompt reunification, the Revolution
must continue “according to a peaceful approach” (phuong phap
hoa binh). For the time being, the most pressing task was “explaining
the present situation” to the rest of the membership and the masses and
impressing upon them the importance of avoiding violent action and resisting
provocations by the enemy. “Our people must continue their protracted
and arduous struggle by peaceful methods in order to consolidate peace and achieve
reunification, total independence, and democracy throughout the nation.”1
Shortly thereafter, the first secretary elaborated on his previous instructions,
stating that it was crucial for revolutionary forces to do nothing that could
adversely influence the political situation in the South and thereby legitimate
the desire of the Americans and their allies to sabotage the accords. He also
urged all supporters of the Revolution to court elements within the Vietnamese
communities that had traditionally supported Western interests–such as
Catholics and those who had served in the colonial administration–and
make them understand the policies of the party and the DRVN government.(2)
2. An August 31 missive in which Truong Chinh instructed cadres to closely supervise the movement of southerners who chose to relocate to the North and of northerners who opted to return home after time spent fighting in the South. Under the terms of the Geneva Accords, all Vietnamese could move freely between the two zones and settle wherever they wished before May 19, 1955. Convinced that the movement of people would impact the general elections planned for 1956, the first secretary asked that those who chose to come to the North from the South be treated with utmost kindness. Positive experiences would most likely have a “very big influence” (anh huong rat lon) on the spirit of “southern compatriots” and increase the prospects for peaceful reunification under the party leadership in 1956.(3)
3. A September 5 document expressing concern over the departure of northerners
for the South. The party apparently believed the French and the Ngo Dinh Diem
regime were enticing (du do) and pressuring (bat ep) northerners
to move south as part of a strategy to influence the political situation there
and “gather a few more votes for the upcoming elections.” Undermining
those efforts by the enemy and limiting the number of people who chose to relocate
to the South from the North was a “pressing struggle.” In order
for it to succeed, cadres at all levels had to work closely with religious organizations,
and particularly Catholic communities, as they were the most susceptible to
enemy propaganda. Cadres had to publicize the policy of the party regarding
the protection of religion and freedom of belief. Winning the “hearts
and minds” of the sizeable Catholic communities at Bui Chu and Phat Diem
was especially important. To that effect, Truong Chinh instructed local cadres
to coopt patriotic Catholics and use them to propagate favorable information
about the party and the North Vietnamese government. Such individuals could
also be used to publicize and assist in the implementation of specific policies
for those areas. Starting in September 1954, the party temporarily suspended
the rent reduction and land redistribution (agrarian reform) campaigns; allowed
the circulation of foreign currencies, including the southern currency, prohibited
in the rest of North Vietnam; and ordered the return of property seized from
Catholic authorities as well as the release of clergy members who had been placed
under house arrest.(4)
4. Correspondence from September 26 urging the membership to cultivate a healthy
relationship with the members of the International Commission for Supervision
and Control (ICSC), an organization created under the terms of the Geneva Accords
to supervise their implementation and deter as well as document cease-fire violations.
The document explained the nature and political dispositions of the member states
(Poland, India, and Canada) and emphasized the importance of developing a cordial
relationship with the commission membership. Should the Americans and their
allies accuse Hanoi of violating the agreement or infringe upon its terms themselves,
a good relationship with commission members could be helpful. Truong Chinh described
the Poles as “our friends” and the Indians as “agreeable to
peace in Indochina” but was less sanguine about the Canadians. “Canada
is [ideologically] close to the United States,” he warned, and as a longtime
friend and ally of the Americans, it was the ICSC member most likely to prove
problematic for Hanoi. Accordingly, the party had to exercise caution in its
dealings with the Canadians while striving to “develop good diplomatic
relations” with them. The first secretary instructed cadres to make every
effort to accommodate the Canadians and pay particular attention to their basic
needs, including food preparation, accommodation, and access to information.
Maintaining good relations with the commission members would “create favorable
conditions for the struggle to consolidate peace and achieve our reunification.”(5)
5. A Politburo resolution issued in September offering the strongest and clearest
articulation yet of the party’s position on the Geneva Accords. Entitled
“New Situation, New Responsibilities, and New Policy,” this lengthy
document sanctioned and reiterated directives issued by First Secretary Truong
Chinh and the Central Committee between late July and early September 1954.
Moreover, it listed pressing tasks to be accomplished and fundamental responsibilities
to be fulfilled in order for peace to be sustained and reunification to be promptly
achieved. This document governed the actions of the party until late 1956, at
which point Hanoi abandoned hopes for a peaceful reunification of the nation
and began effecting a major policy shift.(6)
The newly available documentary record reveals that despite some skepticism,
Hanoi officials genuinely believed the accords were workable and clearly intended
to implement them. However, they were concerned that their own supporters might
endanger the accords by failing to abide by their terms, and they were aware
of the threat represented by the machinations of France, the United States,
and Saigon. While there was little Hanoi could do to change the mindset and
disposition of its opponents, it could see to it that its own followers in the
North and in the South did not become responsible for the collapse of the peace
and the resumption of hostilities. With the eyes of the world on Indochina,
the more that was done to respect the agreement, the greater the pressure on
the other side to do the same.
In retrospect, it appears that the period immediately following the signing
of the Geneva Accords may have been the most crucial in the broader context
of the Vietnamese Revolution. After July 1954, Hanoi seemed to have seriously
and genuinely believed that a resumption of hostilities was not a foregone conclusion
and that the terms of the accords and their implementation would advance the
interests of the Revolution and lead to its eventual triumph. By all indications
the party leadership, fatigued by years of continuous warfare, opposed a prolongation
of hostilities and endeavored to make the peace promised by the Geneva Accords
work.
The volumes of this series will have a significant impact on our understanding
of the period of the American military intervention in Indochina. With their
release, Western scholars no longer have an excuse to ignore the policymaking
process in Hanoi and the role that North Vietnam played in the conflict.
NOTES
1. Certain volumes for the period before 1948 cover multiple years, including Vol. 1 (1924-1930), Vol. 6 (1936-1939), and Vol. 7 (1940-1945).
2. “Chi thi cua Ban Bi thu, ngay 27 thang 7 nam 1954: Tuyen truyen ve
nhung Hiep dinh cua Hoi nghi Gionevo - Tinh hinh va nhiem vu moi” in Van
kien Dang - Toan ta,Tap 15: 1954 (Ha Noi: Nha xuat ban Chinh tri quoc gia,
2001) [hereafter referred to as VKD: 1954], 238-41.
3. “Chi thi cua Ban Bi thu, ngay 30 thang 7 nam 1954: Ve viec chap hanh
lenh dinh chien” in VKD: 1954, 248-9.
4. “Chi thi cua Ban Bi thu, ngay 31 thang 8 nam 1954: Ve viec don tiep
bo doi, thuong binh, mot so can bo va dong bao mien Nam ra Bac” in VKD:
1954, 259.
5. “Chi thi cua cua Ban Bi thu, ngay 5 thang 9 nam 1954: Ve viec dau tranh
chong Phap va bon Ngo Dinh Diem du do va bat ep mot so dong bao ta vao mien
Nam” in VKD: 1954, 263-70.
6. “Chi thi cua Ban Bi thu, ngay 26 thang 9 nam 1954: Ve nhiem vu cua
cac cap uy Dang o cac dia phuong thuoc bac vi tuyen 17 doi voi Uy ban quoc te”
in VKD: 1954, 320-3.
7. The Politburo issued the resolution at the conclusion of a meeting/conference
held September 5–7, 1954. It is reproduced in “Nghi Quyet cua Bo
chinh tri: Ve tinh hinh moi, nhiem vu moi va chinh sach moi cua Dang”
in VKD: 1954, 283-315.
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