September 2000 Newsletter

During late April 2000, we were in Seoul, Korea to attend a conference titled "Pursuing Peace Beyond the Korean War" commemorating the 50th anniversary of the start of that conflict. The Research Institute on National Security Affairs at Korea National Defense University sponsored the meeting, in partnership with the Chosun Ilbo and the Korea Broadcasting System.To our pleasant surprise, Professor Hwang Bong-moo, who was the principal organizer, informed us that he had arranged for a meeting with the Republic of Korea's President Kim Dae-jung for the eight foreign scholars presenting at the conference. In addition to the three of us, the others were Chu Shu-long, Senior Research Fellow at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, Heiner Meulemann, professor at the Institute for Sociology at the University of Cologne, Shigemura Toshimitsu, Director of the Center for Korean Studies at Taqshok University, Scott Snyder, Korea Representative at the Asia Foundation, and Vadim Tkachenko, Director of the Center for Korean Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences. Professor Wang told us that several of his colleagues asked if they could accompany us, but he refused all these requests. It would be the first time he would meet Kim Dae-jung since his election as president of the Republic of Korea.

Before describing our meeting with President Kim Dae-jung, a few words about the conference. Held over two days, it was a rather typical gathering in format, but it was very well-attended, with at least three hundred people in the audience for each session. Those attending were almost all Koreans, demonstrating the great significance that the Korean people attached to the events marking the beginning of the Korean War. Korean presenters at the conference relied heavily on recently released Soviet documents tojustify an energized anger directed toward North Korea, now exposed as irrefutably responsible for initiating the conflict. But many included in their comments emotional personal recollections of the suffering that they and their relatives endured as a result of the Korean War. This was especially true of General Paik Sun Yup, who gained great fame during the war and now chairs "The 50th Anniversary of the Korean War Commemoration Committee." Still vigorous despite being eighty years old, his two presentations during the conference were moving in their depiction of the huge price the Korean people have paid--and are still paying--for this ruinous war.

Several top officials in the South Korean government made appearances at the conference, including the prime minister, the defense minister, and the minister of foreign affairs and trade.But unofficial participation in the conference was carefully controlled. A conference organizer told one of us that time allotted for questions from those attending was purposely limited to prevent veterans from presenting long and overly emotional statements about their experiences in the war. Nevertheless, a Korean in the audience was the last to speak at the final session on Friday before Professor Hwang had to cut him off after he had spoken at length about how North Korea had revealed its malevolence in starting the war. Moreover, he said, this proved Pyongyang could not be trusted and would exploit President Kim Dae-jung's policy of engagement toward North Korea. Each of us therefore had gained a renewed sense of the deep, personal, and ongoing importance of the Korean War to the Korean people as we anticipated our meeting with Kim Dae-jung on Saturday, April 29, the day after the conference ended.

We traveled by bus the short distance from the Seoul Plaza Hotel located directly across the street from City Hall to the Blue House, the presidential residence that is located on the northern end of downtown Seoul. As we went through the front gate on what was a truly glorious spring day, many Koreans were congregating outside, presumably participants in tours. The Blue House is an impressive building constructed in the traditional pagoda style of other palace structures scattered around the capital. We entered through the front door into a large reception hall and ascended a very wide staircase facing a large stylized map of South Korea on the wall in front of us. We had left the hotel at 9:20 a.m. and, about twenty minutes later, we were relaxing and sipping tea in a small meeting room on the second floor.

At about 9:50, we were escorted into a large meeting room a few yards away where we would meet President Kim Dae-jung. The room was perhaps fifty feet wide and one hundred feet long with beautiful carpeting and little furniture. Slightly oversized chairs, six on each side, were arranged in an oval open at one end. At the other end was an identical chair for President Kim. A bevy of photographers were there briefly at the start to record the event. At precisely 10:00 a.m., we rose to greet President Kim Dae-jung as he walked into the room. Also present were his National Security Advisor, press secretary, and a female interpreter. Kim Dae-jung is now 75 years of age, having devoted much of his life to ending the military's dictatorial rule in South Korea and gaining election as president. His entry into the room was slow and deliberate, almost a shuffle. He also has a slight limp, perhaps the result of mistreatment while imprisoned for political dissent.

President Kim began our meeting with a statement in Korean that, with translation into English, lasted about twenty minutes. He first congratulated us on the success of our conference on the Korean War, expressing his confidence that our exchange of opinions had been enlightening. Kim then noted that his country soon would celebrate the fifty-year anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, remarking that this was the most important war of the postwar era. He also stated that the absence of peace on the Korean peninsula represented the last legacy of the Cold War. The president then emphasized that peaceful discussions rather than war now would determine Korea's future. He attributed his optimism to the "Sunshine Policy" that he had implemented after becoming president early in 1998. At first, North Korea and its leader Kim Jong Il, President Kim explained, had been very suspicious, thinking that Seoul had a hidden agenda aimed at undermining the control of the Communist government in the north. But Kim Dae-jung's patience had been rewarded with steadily improving relations leading to an agreement for the two leaders to meet in Pyongyang in June 2000.

President Kim Dae-jung did not make eye contact as he made these summary comments without referring to notes. His soft-spoken delivery was impressive because it conveyed to us his profound self-confidence and serenity. Kim then summarized the objectives of the "Sunshine Policy" that he had outlined during his speech the previous March at the Free University of Berlin. Known as the Berlin Declaration, his statement identified four aims. First, South Korea was prepared to assist North Korea in overcoming its economic difficulties through investment in infrastructure, joint business ventures, and agricultural help to end food shortages. Second, Seoul sought genuine reconciliation and cooperation with Pyongyang to end the Cold War confrontation and secure peace, rather than seeking reunification. Third, Kim urged action to arrange reunion of families separated as a result of the Korean War. Last, South Korea proposed opening a dialogue immediately to move toward implementation of the Basic South-North Agreement of 1991 that had provided for a commitment to negotiations to resolve differences and promote peace.

Justifying his reputation as an intellectual, his words were those of a scholar-statesman, not a politician. His description of the challenges Korea now faces and how best to overcome them reflected a sophisticated grasp on national, regional, and international affairs. President Kim explained that in contrast to his predecessors, he had not set out preconditions for expanded cooperative contacts with North Korea. Rather, he had pursued his policy of engagement with consistency and sincerity since assuming office. He then pointed out that Seoul was providing Pyongyang with $200 million in annual economic aid. Other achievements included joint ventures such as tourist visits to Kumgang Mountain and the reunion of more than 8,000 separated families. His "Sunshine Policy" therefore had succeeded in breaking down mutual suspicion and building a foundation of trust between the two Koreas. In concluding, the president stated that his meeting with Kim Jong Il would be the first step toward achieving this objective. His expectations were not high, explaining that while important, the summit would not answer all the questions that existed between the two Koreas. We later agreed that Kim's "Sunshine Policy" was an integrated, logical, and pragmatic approach for bringing an end to a half-century of hostility on the Korean peninsula.

Now it was time for questions. Kim Dae-jung's facial expressions and occasional nodding as he listened closely to queries, all but one in English, indicated that he may not have required the translation into Korean that followed each question. The subsequent exchanges were unhurried and provided a number of important insights on current South Korean foreign policy. Professor Chu Shu-long spoke first, asking President Kim what role he expected the People's Republic of China to play in the upcoming talks in Pyongyang. In response, Kim stated that Beijing had supported his policy of engagement with North Korea; he hoped and expected that China would continue to do so. Speaking in Korean, Professor Tkachenko observed that maintaining security on the peninsula was the most difficult problem facing the two Koreas. He asked President Kim if the security concerns of each government would make progress difficult in the forthcoming negotiations. While Kim agreed that security was a primary concern for both sides, he was optimistic that the summit would help build a foundation for trust, thereby leading to greater cooperation between the two governments.

Stueck then commented on the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea, pointing out that North Korea had been consistent in demanding withdrawal as a condition for greater engagement. Would President Kim, he asked, be flexible on this issue? If so, what would be the impact on Korean-American relations? The president responded that North Korea could not compel withdrawal because U.S.troops were deployed in South Korea in accordance with a bilateral agreement. More important, the U.S. military presence on the Korean peninsula acted as a stabilizing force both locally and regionally. Surprisingly, Kim stated that he suspected North Korea really wanted U.S. forces to stay, viewing them as a deterrent to a possible attack from South Korea. He emphasized the continued need for U.S. forces on the peninsula to maintain regional stability, but did imply that negotiations might lead to an arrangement for U.S.military withdrawal at some future date.

Matray next congratulated President Kim on the realism and wisdom of his "Sunshine Policy." He commented that while the American people also were commemorating the anniversary of the Korean War, few, unfortunately, paid attention to Korea or U.S. policy toward the divided country. He then asked what impact, if any, that President Kim thought the U.S. presidential election this fall might have on U.S. policy toward Korea. Kim was emphatic in stating that there would be no change because there existed a bipartisan consensus supporting his "Sunshine Policy" in the United States. As proof, he noted that William Perry, who served as National Security Advisor under President George Bush, was in charge of U.S.negotiations with North Korea. Kim lauded the "Perry Process" and predicted it would continue regardless of who became president because both parties realized that an inflexible approach of "toughness" was counterproductive.

Professor Shigemitsu commented on press coverage of the forthcoming summit, asking whether President Kim thought North Korea would allow unfettered media access to the negotiations. Kim Dae-jung responded in the affirmative, noting that Pyongyang had issued its announcement of the dates for the summit on a Sunday to maximize media coverage the following day. Professor Muelemann then inquired about whether the negotiations might lead to greater cultural, media, and family exchanges, noting how this had accelerated the process of German reunification. After stating that this was a "good point," President Kim observed that South Koreans already could watch television programs from North Korea. There needed to be greater progress in this area, but Pyongyang had warranted concerns that providing access to information about the south would destabilize its government.

Chen Jian, in the last question, asked what Kim thought the impact of the "Sunshine Policy" would be on matters of regional strategic concern. He pointed specifically to first, the future of Taiwan, and second, the emerging closer relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China. President Kim in response stated flatly that there was only one China and Taiwan was part of it. He emphasized that it was important for the issue to remain simple, but stressed that the dispute had to be resolved peacefully. He was careful to define his position as not deviating from that of the United States. Regarding U.S.-China relations, Kim explained that both Washington and Beijing supported his "Sunshine Policy" and this reinforced regional cooperation and stability. As the interpreter was finishing translation of the president's answer, the press secretary, who was sitting off to the side, rose to signal that it was time for our meeting to end. President Kim expressed his appreciation for our visit and then walked around the room and shook each of our hands before leaving promptly at 11:00 a.m.

Readers naturally will wonder why the president of the Republic of Korea chose to meet with our group. Obviously, Kim Dae-jung was attempting to sell his "Sunshine Policy" to people who he thought were careful observers of recent events on the Korean peninsula. He did a good job on this count, but it is fair to say that he was preaching to the choir. Also, President Kim was striving to cultivate an international audience, as Korean statesmen have tried to do since shortly after Pak Chung-hui seized power in 1961. He has done this with success since assuming office, resulting in world opinion of President Kim Dae-jung being far more favorable than was the case for any of his predecessors. Finally, President Kim was operating in accordance with a common Korean misconception that all of us have noticed. South Koreans believe that academics in the countries that we represented, especially the United States, are much better connected and influential than in fact they are. Despite discussing recent developments in Korea during meetings with U.S. Ambassadors Donald Gregg and James Lilley on prior visits to Seoul, it would be foolish to think that our views had any impact on U.S. Korea policy. Korean academics, by contrast, influence policy much more directly, many occupying government jobs or serving in various advisory capacities.

Fifty years ago a war began in Korea that would result in the deaths of two million Koreans and the devastation of a divided country. Despite the end of the Cold War in 1989, a state of war continues on the Korean peninsula and little real progress has occurred toward eliminating the danger of renewed conflict, let alone reunification. President Kim Dae-jung of South Korea may have taken the first step toward opening a new era in Korea's history that at least will replace confrontation with engagement as the basis for cooperative relations between Seoul and Pyongyang. Chen Jian spoke for all of us when he congratulated the president during our meeting for adopting a "Sunshine Policy" that was "wise and farsighted." There can be no doubt that success will require patience and perseverance, but these are among Kim Dae-jung's strongest qualities. It is remarkable that a person who has suffered so much as a victim of political repression, including imprisonment and torture, now has established a reputation as a great statesman. His election as president of the Republic of Korea came at a critical moment in Korea's history. After suffering under the control of foreign powers for almost the entire twentieth century, Koreans now control their own destiny. Perhaps the summit that Kim Dae-jung arranged with Kim Jong Il for June 2000 will be the first step toward ending the most tragic era.