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Germany to Greece: Drop Dead

by William Glenn Gray

Germans have chosen to work; Greeks have chosen leisure. For this reason, Germans are furious with Greece for accumulating an unsustainable debt burden and thereby undermining the solidity of the European currency. But the self-righteous anger in Berlin may itself call into question the political basis of the Euro.

Diplomats Among Warriors

by John Prados

In Afghanistan at the moment (February 2010), U.S. Marines, allied troops, and Afghan government soldiers are embarked on an offensive at a town called Marja in Helmand province. American commander-in-chief General Stanley A. McChrystal here makes the first expression of the strategy that underlies the appeal for reinforcements that led to the Obama administration “surge” [...]

Is Wartime a Time to End Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell?

by Mary Dudziak

As the Obama Administration moves (slowly) toward repeal of Don’t Ask Don’t Tell, one argument in opposition is that the nation is at war, and significant changes in the military should not take place during wartime. One response to that point is that all hands are needed during heightened military deployments, and it harms American [...]

Beware Presidents’ Use of History

by John Prados

We are told that history plays as tragedy and repeats as farce. But perhaps that is changing. In the summer of 2007 President George W. Bush invoked the Vietnam analogy to justify an equally or more tragic war in Iraq. And in the West Point speech announcing his new strategy for Afghanistan, President Barack Obama [...]

The State Department Wants You! (or does it?)

by Molly Wood

In October 2007, presidential candidate Barack Obama promised a new approach to American foreign policy.  “It’s time to make diplomacy a top priority,” he announced.  “Instead of shuttering consulates, we need to open them in the tough and hopeless corners of the world. Instead of having more Americans serving in military bands than the diplomatic [...]

Afghanistan and the Chinese Civil War

by William Stueck

Any political historian will tell you that government decisionmakers frequently use historical analogies in making up their minds and that, more often than not, they do so badly.   And Kimber Quinney reminded us in her thoughtful November 9 commentary that historians are not immune to employing such analogies either, or in doing so badly.
Yet as [...]

Twenty Years On: Merkel in Washington

by William Glenn Gray

Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the idea of creating new structures for a post-Cold War world is still quite radical. German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s approach represents a familiar way of doing business, one that continues to bank on the essential unity of “the West.” But is it effective?

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Lessons in Arms Sales & Foreign Policy

January 26th, 2009

Coincident with the inauguration of President Barack Obama, China issued a White Paper outlining its national defense strategy on Tuesday.  In that paper, China pointed to a security situation that was “improving steadily” overall   At the same time, the paper explicitly referred to the growing threat from the United States’ increased arms sales to Taiwan.  Over Beijing’s protest, the Pentagon announced last October a deal for the sale of $6.5 billion in arms to Taiwan-to include 30 Apache attack helicopters, 330 Patriot missiles, and 32 Harpoon missiles.  Beijing referred to the deal as a “violation” of established principles that would cause “serious harm to the China-US relations as well as to peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits.”

In 2008, as in each of the previous seven years, the United States led the world in arms sales at $32 billion.  In 2006-2007, the U.S. sold weapons to more than 170 nations, up from 123 at the start of the Bush administration.  Obviously, these arms deals are supposed to accomplish a range of foreign policy goals-winning influence, gaining access, maintaining and encouraging friendly regimes, as well as bolstering the U.S. balance of payments and domestic economy.  At the same time, these large-scale weapons sales prop up teetering regimes and dictatorships, sow discord, promote violent solutions to international problems, and result in widespread civilian suffering.  In fact, U.S. weapons “played a role in 20 of world’s 27 major wars in 2006-07,” according to a December, 2008, report from the New American Foundation.  Weapons from the United States are now present in half of the major armed conflicts currently taking place worldwide.  And, thirteen of the 25 leading U.S. clients were either undemocratic and/or guilty of human rights violations-Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Korea, Kuwait, Egypt, Colombia, etc.

One obvious omission from this abbreviated list is Iraq.  The U.S. has-some would say necessarily-sent into Iraq an enormous volume of weapons.  Aside from those destined for the American military, hundreds of millions of dollars in weapons have gone in to arm an Iraqi army and its police and security forces.  (Of course, arming Iraq preceded the current war.  Each current member of the Security Council armed the regime of Saddam Hussein in the years leading to the present conflict)   In the last four years, the Pentagon has financed the shipment of more than 1 million rifles, pistols, and infantry weapons to Iraqi forces.  These shipments have largely been the responsibility of private arms firms such as Taos Industries.  Taos alone was awarded contracts totaling more than $95 million for supplying arms to Iraq.  All told, the Pentagon oversaw the signing of 47 weapons-supply contracts amounting to nearly $220 million since 2003.  Due to little or no oversight and widespread corruption, as many as several hundred thousand of those weapons have now been “lost.”  Officials are unable to account for their distribution inside Iraq.  Many have concluded that some number of those weapons have found their way into the hands of insurgents.

One over-arching and troubling pattern in all of this has been the shift in responsibility from the State Department to the Defense Department since 9/11.  This shift has meant, among other things, vastly increased arms available to a wider range of clients (an additional $40 billion in new funding for arms sales), less oversight from the State Department (whose regulations include at least a nod to human rights), and less congressional scrutiny (the responsible congressional committees differ substantially from State to Defense).

As many of us assume, this is not an entirely new phenomenon.  However, the real take off moment for this most lethal element of American foreign policy can be traced to a fairly recent past.  Following the Vietnam War and amid a faltering economy and BOP deficits, Richard Nixon ordered the Pentagon to relax and/or remove the barriers to international arms sales in 1974.  As the result of that decision (coupled with aggressive marketing from U.S. arms suppliers and new wealth among some Middle East states-namely OPEC), arms sales skyrocketed.  In the twenty years leading to 1969, U.S. arms sales totaled less than $12 billion-and $9 billion of that went to the “developed” world.  From this low, the numbers quickly climbed: $1.4 billion in 1971; $3 billion in 1972; $5.3 billion in 1973; $10 billion in 1974.  Added up, the U.S. shipped $49.8 billion in arms in 1974-1977.  U.S. arms shipments to Persian Gulf countries alone shot up 2500 percent.  These sales had more to do with avoiding massive BOP deficits than with foreign policy and, as we know, resulted in serious “blowback.”  Some at the time recognized the contradictory nature of these deals and the resulting blowback.  The Shah of Iran was the lead recipient of U.S. arms.  A younger Senator Joseph Biden complained in 1982, “we kidded ourselves” that “we had close to $30 billion worth of the most sophisticated arms in the world in Iran.”  And yet, “without a shot being fired, the Shah was marched out of the country.”  Now, “all those weapons are either lying dormant or have become accessible to the Soviet Union.”  Indeed, massive arms sales are probably a better instrument for dealing with balance of payments problems than for charting a sustainable foreign policy.

Perhaps it is this history that the Chinese hope the new administration will recall.

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About James Carter
James M. Carter (Ph.D. University of Houston) specializes in American foreign relations, the Vietnam War, the United States and East Asia, the Cold War, modernization theory, political economy, and nation building. His book _Inventing Vietnam: The United States and State Building, 1954-1968_ was published by Cambridge University Press in 2008. He has also written articles on war profiteering in Vietnam and Iraq and the US advisory effort in Vietnam, and he has published reviews and essays in _The Journal of Military History_, _Peace & Change_, _Education About Asia_, _Itinerario_, History News Network, _The Asia Times_, and the BBC. Currently he is pursuing two research projects: the first focuses on US-China relations during the Boxer Rebellion, the second examines the relationship between the government and private corporations in the realm of foreign policy from World War II through the 1960s.

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